Local 5795, CWA

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 9, 1971

192 N.L.R.B. 556 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 5795, Communications, Workers of America,
AFL-CIO (Western Electric Co., Inc.),and Christi-
na C. Coogle. Case 25-CB-1 028
August 9, 1971
'DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
KENNEDY
On April 7, 1971, Trial Examiner Harry Hinkes
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondent had not engaged in the
alleged unfair labor practices and recommending, that
the complaint be ,dismissed in its entirety, as set forth
in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision with a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions,' and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in
its entirety.
1 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made
by the Trial Examiner. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a
Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear
preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544,
enfd. 188 F.2d 363 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the Trial Examiner 's findings.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HARRY R . HIKES, Trial Examiner : The charge in this
proceeding was filed by Christina C. Coogle on August 21,
1970,1 and served on or about August 24 upon Local 5795,
Communications Workers of America , AFL-CIO, herein-
after referred to as the Respondent or Union. Pursuant to
this charge a complaint was issued on December 8 alleging
that the Union had fined Mrs . Coogle because she reported
to her employer, Western Electric Company, Incorporated,
the breach by a fellow-employee of the Company's rule
against alcoholic, beverages on the job and that the
disciplinary action of the - fine had a restraining and
coercive effect upon her andother employees and served no
legitimate union purpose, in violation of Section '8(b)(IXA)
of the Act. By answer duly filed' Respondent denied the
commission of-anyjunfair labor practices.
A hearing was held before me in Indianapolis , Indiana,
on February 4, 1971 , at which all parties were afforded full
opportunity to be represented , examine witnesses, and
adduce relevant evidence . Briefs have been received from
counsel for the Respondent and from counsel for the
General Counsel and have been given careful considera-
tion.
Upon the ., entire record in this proceeding I make , `the
following:
FINDINGS of FACr
1. JURISDICTION
Western Electric Company, Incorporated, a New York
corporation, owns and operates a facility located in
Indianapolis, Indiana. During the 12 months preceding the
issuance of the complaint , a representative period , Western
Electric, in the course and conduct of its business
operations, manufactured and sold goods valued in excess
of $50,000 which were shipped directly to customers
located outside the State of Indiana . The complaint alleg
Respondent's answer admits and I find that Weste
Electric is now and has been at all times material herein an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits and I
find that the Union is, and has been at all times material
herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The essential facts of this case are not disputed. It
appears that on July 16, Mrs. Coogle, an employee of
Western Electric, found a bottle of some alcoholic beverage
in a drawer of the machine upon which she was working.
About a year earlier, when she was hired by the Company,
she had been told by her supervisor of the Company's work
rules among which was one prohibiting alcoholic beverages
on company property. Not wanting to be blamed for the
possession of the bottle, she reported her discovery to Jerry
Ashby, her supervisor. Ashby, in turn, reported to John
Thorlton, his immediate supervisor, whereupon they
removed the bottle from the drawer and put it into
Thorlton's file cabinet.
The next day, July 17, Mrs. Coogle was called to
Thorlton's office and asked whose bottle it was. Coogle
replied that she thought it belonged to another employee,
Lynn Fields, and suggested that Thorlton speak to still
another employee, Kellums, about it. Thorlton spoke to
Kellums and then called in employee Fields . As a result the
1 All dates hereafter are 1970 unless otherwise designated.
192 NLRB No. 85
LOCAL -5795, CWA
Company took disciplinary action against employee Fields.
Both Fields and Coogle were union members.
In August, Mrs. ' Coogle was notified that the Union was
charging her with "injury to a' feliow' union member" and
was summoned to appear before the Union's trial court.
Among the "Duties of Members" specified on Coogle's
application for membership in the Union was "Refuses to
injure fellow members." " The trial court met on September
23 and on September 28 notified Mrs. Coogle that she was
guilty of the charges and fined $500.
Analysis and Conclusions
Section 8(bxl)(A) declares it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act states that
employees have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and also have
the right to refrain from any and all such activities.
The complaint in this proceeding alleges that the Union's
fine of Mrs. Coogle "had a restraining and coercive effect
upon her and other Western Electric employees." " It may be
conceded that the Union's imposition of a $500 fine for an
employee's report of another employee's breach of a
workrule would be coercive 2 in that it would tend to
discourage her and other employees from such action in the
future. The Act, however, does not simply render illegal all
coercive acts of a union but only such coercive acts which
infringe upon the rights of employees enumerated in
Section 7 of the Act. There is nothing in this record to
indicate that Coogle's organizational rights were infringed
by the imposition of the fine, nor that she was prevented
from forming, joining, or assisting a labor organization.
Similarly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
imposition of this fine prevented her from bargaining
collectively through representatives of her own choosing
nor that she was prevented from engaging in concerted
activity. In this connection it should be noted that Coogle's
"reporting" activities were not concerted activities but an
action initiated solely by herself and executed by herself.
Accordingly, I cannot find that the imposition of the fine
against Mrs. Coogle touched upon any of her rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
There are cases indicating a broader reach of Section
8(bXl)(A). Thus, 8(bXl)(A) has been held to prohibit a
union's internal rules which affect a member's employment
status. N.LR.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,388 U.S. 175,
195;Local 479, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
151 NLRB 555, 558. Similarly, in the Skura case, supra, a
union's attempt to regulate its members ' access to the
Board's processes was held to be violative of Section
8(bXIXA). The Supreme Court in the Wisconsin motor
Corp., case, 394 U.S. 423, held that
... it has become clear that if the rule invades or
frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule
557
may not be enforced , even by fine or expulsion , without,
violating Section 8(bxl).
There is nothing here which suggests that Coogle's fine
affected her employment status or invaded or frustrated an
overriding policy of the labor laws such as her access to
Board's processes.
The Wisconsin Motor case, however, speaks of "a
properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union
interest." The complaint alleges that the union had "no
legitimate interest in obstructing enforcement of said work
rule." I believe the complaint confuses the legitimacy
required under the court decisions. The Wisconsin motor
case referred to a union rule which reflects a legitimate
union interest. The complaint, however, refers to the
obstruction of a company work rule in which the union had
no legitimate interest . The union rule in which the Union
was required to have a legitimate interest is its rule
prohibiting injury to a fellow union member. The complaint
does not allege that the Union had no legitimate interest in
enforcing a rule which prohibited injury to fellow members
nor does there seem to be much room to argue such a
proposition. Assuming the Union's rule simply prohibited a
member from informing upon another member, it would
appear that such a rule would represent a legitimate union
interest in promoting harmony within the ranks. However,
where such a rule was contrary to a company's workrule,
e.g.. where the informer 's work duties required him to
report infractions of work rules (as, where the informant
has an inspector's job or a guard's duties), such union rule
would not be proper inasmuch as its application and
enforcement would result in a dereliction of duties by the
informer and, consequently, lead to his discharge, thus
affecting his employment status . Here, however, it is not
suggested the Coogle's work duties required her to report
the presence of Field's bottle. The Union's fine, therefore,
could not affect her employment status. As the Board said
in the Wisconsin Motor case:
Whether or not the Union's rule in this case is desirable
or equitable is a matter we need not and do not decide.
It is sufficient, in our view, that the Union deliberately
restricted the enforcement of the rule to an area
involving the status of a member as a member rather
than as an employee. .
Whether or not Coogle's reporting activities actually
injured a fellow member and whether or not she is guilty of
violating such rule is not the issue here. Such resolution will
be made if and when the Union seeks to enforce the
decision of its trial court at which time, presumably, the
reasonableness of the fine will also be examined .3 For this
proceeding, however, it is sufficient that the rule of the
Union reflects a legitimate union interest , infringes upon no
statutory labor policy and is, therefore, not violative of
Section 8(bx1XA) of the Act. I shall therefore recommend
dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The General Counsel has not sustained his burden of
proof to establish that the Respondent-Union violated
2 Charles S. Skura 148 NLRB 679.
. Arrow Development Co., 185 NLRB No. 22.
558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL, LABOI .t<"RELATIONS BOARD
Section 8(bXl)(A) of .the., Act when . it fined member , RECOMMENDED-ORDER
Christina C. Coogle for having injured a fellow member: - ,'
On the, basis of ; the, foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of laws I recommend that the complaint in this
case be dismissed in its entirety.,