Local 4186, United Steelworkers of America

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 8, 1970

181 N.L.R.B. 992 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 4186 , United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO ( McGraw Edison Company, Food
Equipment Division ) and Arnold Blaine. Case
3-CB-1192
April 8, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On September 29, 1969, Trial Examiner George
A. Downing issued his Decision in the above-entitled
case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and
recommendations, as set forth below.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent
Union, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, by
threatening to request employee Arnold Blaine's
discharge unless he paid his membership dues, while
simultaneously continuing certain disciplinary
sanctions imposed as a result of his filing a
decertification petition. We agree, but for the
reasons set forth below
The facts are summarized as follows Respondent
and the Employer have a history of collective
bargaining dating back to 1944. At all times
material, the collective-bargaining agreement has
contained a union-security clause, the validity of
which is not in question . Arnold Blaine, an
employee and Union member, filed a petition
seeking decertification of the Respondent.
Subsequently, after being redesignated by a majority
in the election, Respondent initiated disciplinary
proceedings against Blaine. Initially, Respondent in
effect expelled Blaine and thereafter, following
Blaine's appeal, restored him to membership but
suspended his rights to attend union meetings for a
period of more than I year and indefinitely to hold
office. Blaine thereupon refused to pay his
membership dues. The Union threatened to invoke
the union-security clause, and Blaine paid his dues.
The alleged violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) places
in issue the Board's policy of providing unimpeded
access to its procedures and remedies As stated by
the Supreme Court, "Any coercion used to
discourage, retard, or defeat that access is beyond
the legitimate interests of the labor organization."'
In the instant case we are not confronted with a
situation in which a union has disciplined a member
because he has filed a decertification petition simply
by fining,' expelling,' or suspending' the member.
Here, not only were Blaine's membership rights
substantially reduced as discipline for his
decertification activity, but during the period of
impaired membership the Union insisted upon his
payment of dues by threat of discharge through
application of the union-security clause. It is true
that a reduction in membership rights standing
alone is not necessarily unlawful.' However,
Respondent's insistence upon Blaine's continued
payment of dues during periods when his rights as;a
member were significantly reduced constituted "a
continuing form of coercion tending to operate as a
serious restraint upon access to Board processes.
The Union's insistence upon Blaine's payment of
dues, on pain of discharge, cannot be considered as
disassociated from the suspension of membership
rights resulting from his decertification activity. We
see no justification, either in the proviso to Section
8(b)(1)(A) or in considerations of a labor
organization's need for self preservation, for the
steps taken against Blaine. The threat to enforce the
union-security clause while continuing the sanctions
against Blaine was hardly necessary to preserve the
Union's existence as an institution, nor could it be
viewed as a noncoercive form of internal discipline
which would have no discouraging effect upon a
member's decision to invoke the Board's
representation procedures
It is for these reasons that we affirm the Trial
Examiner's finding that a labor organization violates
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by invoking, or threatening to
invoke, a lawful union-security clause to enforce
payment of dues by a member whose membership
has been significantly impaired because he filed a
decertification petition.6
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that Respondent, Local 4186, United
'N L R B v Marine & Shipbuddine Workers , 391 U S 418, 424
'See International Molders' and Allied Workers Union . Local No 125,
AFL-CIO (Blackhawk Tanning Co. Inc ). 178 NLRB No 25
'See Tawas Tube Products, Inc, 151 NLRB 46
'See Price v NLRB , 373 F 2d 443 (C A 9)
'Tawas Tube Products , Inc, supra, fn 3
'As our decision in this case is based on the coercive steps taken as a
result of filing a decertification petition , we need not pass upon whether a
labor organization violates Section 8(b)(I)(A) through enforcement of a
union security -clause against a member whose membership was impaired
for reasons unrelated to seeking access to Board decertification processes
181 NLRB No. 162
LOCAL 4186, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, Rochester,
New York, its officers , agents, and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER ' S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE A DOWNING, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
as amended was heard at Rochester, New York, on July
16, 1969, pursuant to due notice The complaint, which
was issued on May 12, 1969, on a charge filed November
6, 1968, alleged in substance that Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act on and after May 9,
1968, by refusing Arnold Blaine certain rights and
privileges of membership while demanding that he
continue to pay membership dues and by informing Blaine
that it would request Blaine's employer, Toledo Kitchen
Machines, to discharge him pursuant to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement which contained valid
union shop provisions Respondent answered, denying the
unfair labor practices as alleged
Upon the entire record in the case I make the
following.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER; RESPONDENT AS A
LABOR ORGANIZATION
I find on the basis of admitted and undenied allegations
of the complaint that McGraw Edison Company and
Toledo Kitchen Machines, Division of Reliance Electric,
are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act' and that Respondent is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act
II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A The Issue
The sole issue presented herein, a novel and narrow
one, is whether Respondent Union, while denying Arnold
Blaine certain privileges and rights of membership,
restrained and coerced him within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to invoke the union
security clause of the contract if he did not pay his dues.
Though Blaine was disciplined, in the language of
Respondent's brief, "for committing an act of dual loyalty
by filing a decertification petition designed to end the
Union's representative status," the General Counsel's
contention is that the violation resulted, not from the
disciplinary action in itself, but from the fact that
Respondent coupled it with a threat of discharge if he did
not pay his dues There was no evidence, however, that
Respondent actually sought to procure Blaine's discharge,
and the General Counsel voluntarily withdrew the 8(b)(2)
allegation at the close of the hearing
'McGraw Edison Company purchased Toledo Kitchen Machines on or
about November 8, 1968, and became its bona fide successor and assign It
is engaged at its plant at Rochester , New York, in the manufacture and
sale of food service equipment and it sells and ships annually to extrastate
points products valued in excess of $50,000
AMERICA 993
B. The Evidence
Respondent Union has been the certified bargaining
agent of the employees at the Rochester plant for some 25
years and the collective-bargaining agreements have
contained a valid union security provision Arnold Blaine
has been an employee and a member of the Union since
1963
In February 1967 Blaine led a drive among the
employees aimed at unseating Respondent as the
bargaining agent and, after obtaining sufficient signatures
to obtain an election, filed a decertification petition with
the Board's Regional Office in Buffalo on March 6.
Respondent won the election held on April 3 by a vote of
64 to 6, and on April 11 it was certified by the Regional
Director as the collective-bargaining representative.
Thereafter Blaine's conduct became the subject of an
internal union proceeding. Charges were filed against
Blaine on June 20 by two other union members based in
part on his filing of the petition to decertify the Union in
violation of the International constitution.' On July 6
Blaine was tried by a trial committee under procedures
established in the constitution. The committee found
Blaine guilty and recommended that he be suspended
indefinitely from membership and that he be denied
attendance at local union meetings and the right to hold
office in the local during his suspension. The committee's
report and recommendations were approved and accepted
in a special membership meeting held on July 19, and
Blaine was notified of that action in writing on July 20
On August 19 Blaine filed his appeal to the
International executive board which appointed a
commission to hear the appeal On October 18 the
commission held a hearing at which Blaine appeared,
testified orally and presented a written Statement On
November 27 the commission issued a lengthy written
report in which it found Blaine's conduct in filing the
decertification petition to be violative of the provisions of
the International constitution quoted in footnote 2, supra
Though expressing general concurrence in the
recommendations of the original trial committee, the
commission decided that some modification was in order
since Blaine had been denied all membership rights for
nearly a year, and it recommended that Blaine should
immediately be restored to full membership status but
should be denied the right to attend union meetings or to
hold union office until July 1, 1969
On December 15 Blaine was furnished with a copy of
the commission's report and on May 9, 1968, the
International executive board adopted the
recommendation of the commission Blaine thereafter
took the position that because of the restrictions placed on
his membership rights he was no longer required to pay
dues under the Union security provisions of the contract.
Around June 13 or 14 Blaine was orally informed by the
recording secretary of the Local that he could lose his job
if he did not pay his dues That threat of job loss was
repeated in writing by letter of July 11 from Charles
Shaw, subdistrict director, in which Blaine was informed
that if he failed to pay his dues (either by checkoff or
directly to the Union), "we will have no alternative other
'The constitution provided that a member may be penalized for
committing (among other things) one or more of the following offenses
"(d) Advocating or attempting to bring about the withdrawal from the
International Union or any local union or any member or group of
members," and "(m) deliberately engaging in conduct in violation of the
responsibility of members toward the organization as an institution "
994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
than to request the Company to discharge you, pursuant
to the Union security provision of the collective
bargaining agreement presently in effect."'
On July 22, Blaine wrote the International protesting
the fact that he was being required to pay dues while
being denied certain membership rights On October 1 the
Local wrote Blaine that unless he paid his dues it would
have no alternative other than to treat him as being
delinquent in dues payments and that the limitations on
his membership rights did not excuse him from his
obligation to pay the regular monthly dues. Thereafter
Blaine paid the full amount of back dues and remained
current in his dues until he left the employment of the
Company on March 16, 1969
Denial of the right to attend meetings deprived Blaine
of the following privileges, among others, as shown by the
International Constitution: Nominating delegates to the
convention; voting for delegates to the convention; acting
as a teller during elections; participating in disciplinary
matters and in deliberations with regard to
communications received by the union ; hearing the
Treasurer's report on funds and reports of any special
committees and standing committees, including the
Grievance Committee; and participating in deliberations
whether or not to expend funds. It was stipulated,
however, that Blaine was permitted to attend limited
portions of two meetings , on February 12 and March 12,
1969, for the limited purpose of nominating an officer.
C. Concluding Findings
We begin by noting that the parties are in agreement
that the issue involved here is a novel one on which there
is no precedent directly in point That is true because the
issue as framed by the pleadings , as litigated, and as
briefed is not whether a violation resulted from the
disciplinary measures imposed on Blaine for filing the
decertification petition , for the General Counsel concedes
that such sanctions have been upheld by the Board, with
court approval , in Tawas Tube Products inc , 151 NLRB
46, and in United Steel Workers of America, Local 4028
(Pittsburgh-DeMoines Steel Company) , 154 NLRB 692,
enfd . sub nom Price v. N L R B, 373 F.2d 443 (C.A. 9),
cert . denied June 10, 1969. ' But, the General Counsel
contends , the violation arose when Respondent coupled
the disciplinary action with the threat of discharge if
Blaine did not pay his dues, for thereby Respondent left
the field of allowable discipline affecting membership
under internal union rules and invaded a proscribed field
where employment interests were threatened As next
noted, this presents the precise issue which was suggested
by Price and Tawas but which was left unanswered.
In Tawas the Board held that a union did not violate
the Act by expelling members who actively supported a
decertification petition , but pointed out that the
disciplinary action was limited to union membership and
that no attempt to affect job interests was involved 5
Again in Price , the Board found no violation resulting
from Price ' s suspension for filing a decertification
'Shaw also enclosed a check to reimburse Blaine for dues paid "for the
eight months [he was) expelled from the Union "
'A full review and analysis of those and other related cases appears in
International Molders and Allied Workers Union Local 125, AFL-CIO
(Blackhawk Tanning Company Inc ), 178 NLRB No 25 See both the
majority and dissenting opinions and the decision of Trial Examiner
Fannie M Boyls which was affirmed by the Board See also LRR
Analysis, Vol 72, No 1, Sept 1, 1969
petition, citing its holding in Tawas that a disciplinary
expulsion which did not affect job interests was
permissible action which did not constitute interference
with the election process. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
373 F.2d 443 (C.A. 9), stressing, as did the Board, that
the disciplinary action affected only Price's membership
and did not affect his job
The General Counsel contends further that the provisos
to Section 8(a)(3) do not sanction the conditioning of
employment or the payment of dues where the member
involved is accorded less than full membership in the
Union 6 That interpretation, the General Counsel argues,
is not inconsistent with Section 8(b)(1)(A) because Union
discipline cannot affect employment interests and thus,
since Respondent's action viewed as a whole threatened
Blaine 's employment status as a result of his filing the
decertification petition, it restrained and coerced him
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(A).
It is patent that since the disciplinary action was
imposed upon Blaine because of the decertification
petition, Respondent could not lawfully seek his discharge
under the 8(a)(3) provisos because that would constitute a
reason other than the failure to pay dues ' Indeed, so
much is specifically conceded in Respondent's brief where
after commenting that Blaine was disciplined for filing the
decertification petition, the statement is made:
At that function (sic), considerations concerning
Blaine's employment status and his membership status
came into play. As to the former, the union was
precluded from causing Blaine's discharge because of
his membership suspension; and, indeed, in conformity
with law, the union refrained from taking that step.
It is also apparent from the rationale of the Board and
the decisions it relied upon that the result reached in
Tawas and Price was due solely to the fact that the
internal union discipline involved, though affecting
membership status, was not used to affect employment
interests. As without more, I would conclude that a
contrary result is impelled here because Respondent
sought to enforce its disciplinary sanctions (imposed as in
Tawas and Price because of the decertification petition) by
threatening to cause Blaine's discharge, I turn to
examination of Respondent's contentions
'The Board supported its conclusion by citing Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Company, 149 NLRB 67, and Wisconsin Motor
Corporation. 145 NLRB 1097 (Scofield herein), as well as the Supreme
Court decision in Radio Officers' Union v N L R B. 347 U S 17, 40
Both in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield the Board found that the rule
violations involved were not used to affect the jobs of the employees but
only their status as members In Radio Officers', the Supreme Court
pointed out (concerning Section 8 (a)(3) and its provisos ) that, "The policy
of the Act is to insulate employees ' jobs from their organizational rights "
The Court held similarly in Scofield, 394 U S 423, 428, that "Congress
did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of
unions , aside from barring enforcement of a union 's internal regulations to
affect a member's employment status " (Emphasis supplied )
'The union-security provisions of the existing contract met the
requirements of the first proviso to that section for conditioning
employment on union membership The second proviso forbids
discrimination where membership is denied or terminated for reasons other
than the employee 's failure to tender dues and initiation fees unformily
required
'The case of Al Messera, Inc , 101 NLRB 837, 839, cited by
Respondent , is plainly distinguishable , for the Board there found that the
real reason for requesting certain discharges was nonpayment of dues, not
"dual-unionism " Distinguishable also is Local 771 IATSE (Alfred Kelly).
l31 NLRB 1, as concerns the 8(b)(I)(A) issue, for it involved no threat to
the employee to cause his discharge
LOCAL 4186, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA 995
Preliminarily it may be noted that Respondent not only
joined with the General Counsel in citing Tawas and Price
but, oddly, characterizes them as being "on all fours"
here. That term plainly constitutes a misstatement for it is
apparent from the foregoing discussion that they turned
on the absence of the very factor which serves both to
shape and to distinguish the present issue.
Briefly stated Respondent's position rests mainly on the
premise that in the union security situation an employee
who has been denied membership or expelled from
membership pursuant to internal union rules occupies the
same position as regard the dues paying obligation as an
employee who chooses not to join ab initio. Cf Union
Starch and Refining Company, 87 NLRB 779. That is so,
Respondent argues, because otherwise a union would be
unable to guard against "free riders" who would obtain
the benefits of collective bargaining without cost, and it
argues further that it would be anomalous for an
employee who is subjected to a lesser form of discipline
(e g., suspension rather than expulsion) to be immune
from the same valid union-security provision which is
applicable to an expelled member
Much of the force of Respondent's argument is
dissipated upon analysis by certain anomalies in its own
position. Already noted is Respondent's concession that it
was precluded from causing Blaine's discharge because of
his membership suspension and its representation that it
refrained from taking that step in conformity with the
law. That concession seems plainly inconsistent with
Respondent's main thesis that expelled or suspended
members assume the same status as nonmembers as
concerns the dues paying obligation in the union security
situation By the same token it is in full accord with the
General Counsel's view that as Respondent could not
lawfully cause Blaine's discharge, it could not threaten to
do so without violating Section 8(b)(1)(A). Furthermore,
in the letter of July 11, 1968, in which Respondent
threatened Blaine with discharge if he failed to pay his
dues, it refunded to him all the dues he paid during his
suspension. That action plainly reflected the
acknowledgment, made explicit in his brief, that
Respondent could not require Blaine to pay dues while
under suspension.'
Respondent also argues at length its contention that the
Board can reach the result sought by the General Counsel
only by passing upon the reasonableness of the Union's
disciplinary action which is precisely the domain
foreclosed to the Board by the plain language of the
proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) I Whatever the merit of that
contention as a general proposition, the Board has plainly
rejected it in a situation where as, here, the discipline is
imposed for filing a decertification petition. Thus, in the
recent Blackhawk Tanning case, supra, footnote 4, the
Board, after comparing different types of disciplinary
action (i e., expulsion versus fine), found qualitative
differences to exist which called for different legal
conclusions and a different result, and it distinguished the
'A similar concession appeared in the Price case, supra, in which
Steelworkers Local 4028 was represented before the Court of Appeals by
the same law firm that represents Local 4186 here See in 5, at 445, where
the court observed that, "At oral argument , the union and the Board
seemed to be in agreement that Price was not paying, and was not
expected to pay, dues while suspended " The factual background in Price
was almost identical with what we have here Price, like Blaine , was tried
on charges of violating the Steelworkers ' constitution by filing a
decertification petition Price was convicted by a trial committee which
recommended suspension from membership , and his appeal to the
International Executive Board was denied
Price and Tawas cases on that basis It is also to be noted
that in affirming the Board in Price, supra (373 F.2d 443,
447) the court of appeals concluded its opinion with the
statement, "We express no opinion as to whether, if the
discipline had been more severe, the result should be
different." (Emphasis supplied )
Respondent's argument concerning its need for
protection from "free riders" does not advance its
position. Section 8(b)(2) and the Section 8(a)(3) provisos
were designed to protect both the union from free riders
and employees who are willing to pay for their ride.
Union Starch and Refining Company, supra, 87 NLRB at
785-786. The Board there rejected the view that employees
would be encouraged to tender dues and refrain from
actual participation in the union, pointing out that, as a
general rule, rather than from refraining, employees are
likely to insist upon participating in the affairs of a union
to whose treasury they are required to contribute."
This is plainly not a case where loss of membership
rights was of no significance to the employee and without
deterrent effect against resorting to the Board (cf. Tawas
Tube, supra at 49), nor is it a case where the employee
welcomed or invited expulsion or suspension (cf.
Blackhawk Tanning, supra, TXD) Thus Blaine not only
continued to pay dues during some 8 months of
suspension but he protested strenuously after the
suspension was lifted not because of the dues requirement
but because he was being denied the right of a member to
participate actively in the affairs of the Union.
In such a situation it is plain that it was not the Union
which needed protection, for Blaine was willing to pay for
his ride if accorded the rights and privileges of
membership Moreover, as the General Counsel aptly
observed, the purported restoration of full membership
restored nothing, for it constituted in effect only an
attempt to revive an obligation to pay dues. Though
Respondent was yet free to impose such internal
disciplinary sanctions as it saw fit to enforce the
obligations of membership, it could not use them to affect
Blaine 's job interests, for in the language of Scofield,
supra, 394 U.S at 428, there is no limitation respecting
the internal affairs of unions, "aside from barring
enforcement of the union's internal regulations to affect a
member's employment status "
Rejection of Respondent's contentions return us to the
conclusions tentatively reached before consideration of its
defenses. I therefore conclude and find that by threatening
to procure Blaine's discharge unless he continued to pay
his membership dues and assessments while
simultaneously continuing the disciplinary sanctions
imposed as a result of his filing of the decertification
petition, Respondent restrained and coerced Blaine in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
By way of postscript it may be noted that despite
obvious distinctions suggested by counsel herein the
rationale of Blackhawk Tanning, supra, plainly supports
the above conclusion However, because of the basis on
which the present case was litigated and briefed (see
section A, supra), it is unnecessary to consider here the
"qualitative differences" in types of disciplinary action on
which the Board's decision turned What is significant
under the issue here is not the "quality" of the discipline
which resulted from the filing of the decertification
'Citing JAM v Gonzales, 356 U S 617, 620, and other cases including
N L R B v Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 388 U S 175,
Scofield v N L R B. 394 U S 423, and Local 138, JUOE (Skura), 148
NLRB 679
996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
petition but the fact that it was coupled with threats of
discharge if Blaine did not pay his dues
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By threatening to request Blaine's discharge unless he
continued to pay his membership dues while
simultaneously continuing the disciplinary sanctions
imposed as a result of his filing of the decertification
petition , Respondent restrained and coerced Blaine in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
as specified below which I find necessary to remedy and
to remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
I shall recommend, in addition to the usual cease and
desist and posting provisions, that Respondent be required
to reimburse Arnold Blaine for all dues and assessments
which he paid from June 13, 1968 (the date of the first
threat of job loss) until he left the employ of the Company
on March 16, 1969
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby issue the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Local 4186, United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to request the discharge of employees
unless they pay membership dues and assessments while
simultaneously continuing disciplinary sanctions imposed
because of their activities in support of a decertification
petition
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act
2. Take the following affirmative action.
(a) Reimburse Arnold Blaine for all dues and
assessments which he paid from June 13, 1968, through
March 16, 1969, with interest thereon at the rate of 6
percent per annum. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
(b) Post at its offices, meeting halls, and all places
where notices to members are customarily posted, at
Rochester, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix "10 Copies of said notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after
being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted immediately upon receipt thereot and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the
Regional Director for Region 3 for posting by McGraw
Edison Company, it being willing, at all places where
notices to its employees are customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith ii
"in the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , recommendations and Recommended Order herein,
shall as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 3, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by order of the National Labor Relations Board
an Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten to request the discharge of
employees unless they pay membership dues and
assessments while simultaneously continuing
disciplinary sanctions which we have imposed against
them because of their activities in support of a
decertification petition
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL reimburse Arnold Blaine for all dues and
assessments which he paid from June 13, 1968, through
March 16, 1969
LOCAL 4186, UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF
AMERICA , AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office,
4th Floor, The 120 Building, 120 Delaware Avenue,
Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone 716-842-3100.