201 N.L.R.B. 531 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

Local 25, IBEW

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJan 31, 1973

201 N.L.R.B. 531 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

LOCAL 25, IBEW Local 25, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and Eugene Iovine, Inc. Case 29-CC-301 January 31, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On September 26, 1972, Administrative Law Judge Alvin Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed limited exceptions and a brief in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and finds, in accord with certain exceptions of Respondent, that the complaint herein should be dismissed in its entirety. The Board has therefore decided to affirm only those rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge which are consistent with its Decision herein. 1. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, that the confrontation between pickets and a neutral delivery man, Christie, on January 3, 1972, did not result in a violation of 8(b)(4)(i)(B). However, in adopting the finding of the Administrative Law Judge, we rely solely upon the absence of credible evidence that the pickets either impeded Christie's access to the jobsite or orally induced him to refrain from crossing the picket line. 2. The Administrative Law Judge further found that Respondent's picketing at the construction site violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). In so finding, the Administrative Law Judge reasoned that the picketing was not conducted in compliance with the Moore Dry Dock I requirement that picketing be confined to periods when "the primary employer .. . [is] . . . engaged in its normal business at the situs." This conclusion was based solely on evidence that pickets, who were present each week, Monday through Friday, between December 21, 1971, and January 24, 1972, remained at the jobsite on 3 days when primary employees were not working. In all i Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547. 2 Local 3, LB E W (New Power Wire and Electric Corp ), 144 NLRB 1089, enfd. in pertinent part sub nom New Power Wire and Electric Corp. and P & L Services, Inc v N L R. B, 340 F 2d 71 (CA. 2) See also Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic and Gulf District, Harbor and Inland Waterways Division , AFL-CIO [Salt Dome Production Co.] v. N.L.R B, 265 F.2d 585, 590. 531 other respects, the picketing was concededly in compliance with the Moore Dry Dock standards for permissible common situs picketing. Respondent excepts to the violation found by the Administrative Law Judge , arguing that, under settled Board authority , the evidence he relied upon was insufficient to establish that the primary employ- er, at any time during the picketing , was not engaged in normal business operations at the situs . We find merit in Respondent 's exceptions. In New Power Wire and Electric Corp.,2 the Board held with court approval that, in a context similar to that before us here , the absence of employees of the primary employer does not furnish a per se basis for finding that the primary employer is not engaged in its normal business at the common situs. The conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge in this case cannot be reconciled with that injunction. We are not confronted with a situation where the absence of primary employees is one factor among other evidencing a secondary objective .3 Here, the absence of the primary employees was plainly temporary, with undisputed evidence showing that (1) during the entire duration of the picketing, the primary employer's (Iovine's) work remained in an uncompleted state ; (2) lovine's electrical work was performed on an intermittent basis, depending upon completion of certain other basic construction work; and (3) neither Iovine nor the Respondent had any way of knowing in advance when lovine would have come to the jobsite to do its work and Respondent could not foretell whether the primary employees, though absent , would not return instanter. In the circumstances, and in accordance with settled Board principles,4 the absence of primary employees herein did not in itself establish that an object of Respon- dent's picketing was to enmesh neutrals in its primary dispute with lovine. It being undisputed that the picketing conformed in all other respects with Moore Dry Dock standards and as there is no other evidence of a secondary objective, we shall dismiss the alleged 8(b)(4)(i ) and (ii)(B) allegation. Having found no substantial evidence that Respon- dent committed any of the alleged violations, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor 3 Cf. Carpenters ' District Council of Milwaukee County & Vicinity (Farmers and Merchants Bank of Menomonee Falls ), 196 NLRB No. 60. 4 New Power Wire and Electric Corp., supra, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 861 , AFL-CIO (Brownfield Electric, Inc.), 145 NLRB 1163; Plumbers Local Union No 307 (Meyers Plumbing), 146 NLRB 888, 891 -892; Plumbers Local Union No . 307, AFL-CIO (Warren Zimmer- man d/b/a Zimmerman Plumbing and Heating), 149 NLRB 1361, 1366-67. 201 NLRB No. 80 532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The trial in this proceeding, with all parties represented , was held before me in Brooklyn, New York, on May 8, and June 20 and 21, 1972, upon the General Counsel's complaint dated March 16, 1972,1 and Respondent's answer .2 In general, the issue litigated was whether Respondent violated Section 8 (b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act). Particularly, the questions for decision are as follows: 1. Did Respondent engage in secondary picketing? 2. Was any individual, employed by any person with whom Eugene Iovine , Inc. (lovine), does business, or by any other person , induced or encouraged by means other than picketing to refuse to perform services for his employer? 3. Was any person with whom lovine does business, or any other person, threatened, coerced, or restrained? 4. Assuming an affirmative answer to the foregoing questions, did an object of the conduct involved fall within the proscription of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act? 5. If it be concluded that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, should an order, broader than usual, be entered because of Respondent's previous violations of the Act's secondary boycott provisions? Upon the entire record,3 upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying , and upon careful consideration of the arguments made and the briefs submitted,4 I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION lovine, a New York corporation , is engaged in Queens, New York, in the installation and servicing of electrical equipment and related products. lovine annually purchases and receives goods and materials valued at more than $50,000 from suppliers located outside the State of New York. The Town of Hempstead (Hempstead) is a political subdivision of the State of New York. Peter Peterson Construction Company and Farran Contracting (respec- i The complaint was issued pursuant to a charge filed on December 22, 1971, by Eugene lovine, Inc. 2 During the trial the complaint was amended by sinking the word "construction" from par 3 ; and the answer was amended to admit the allegations of pars. 2, 3, 4, 7(b), 8(b), and 10(a) of the complaint. 3 Issued simultaneously is a separate order correcting obvious inadvert- ent errors in the stenographic transcript of this proceeding. 4 Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by them , whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the trial, may not be discussed in this Decision , each has been carefully weighed and considered 5 In relevant portion , Sec 8(bX4XB) is as follows- Sec 8... (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- tively, Peterson and Farran) are contractors in the building and construction industry. Reliable Fireproof Products Corporation (Reliable) manufactures and sells building construction material. On the foregoing facts I find that Iovine is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. I also find that Peterson , Farran, and Reliable are persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(bX4) of the Act. Finally, in this connection , I find that Hempstead is a person entitled to protection from unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(bX4XB) of the Act. Accordingly, I conclude that the assertion of jurisdiction over this matter by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) is warranted . Plumbers, Steamfttters, Refrigera- tion, Petroleumfttters, and Apprentices, Local 298, AFL v. County of Door, a Muncipal Corporation, et at , 359 U.S. 354, 358-359; United States Trucking Corporation (Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America), 146 NLRB 956, 959, enfd. 344 F.2d 649 (C.A. 2); S. M. Kisner, et al., d/b/a S. M. Kisner and Sons, 131 NLRB 11%, 1199; Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85. If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 111. INTRODUCTION Briefly, this case concerns itself with Respondent's picketing at a place where Iovine and other persons, including Peterson, were performing construction work. The purpose of the picketing, Respondent stated at the opening of the trial, was to advertise that "the wages paid [by lovine who, apparently, is not a party with respondent to a collective agreement] did not meet wages which were paid to employees [by employers] under contract with" Respondent. The General Counsel asserts, and Respondent denies, that the picketing at the construction site was violative of Section 8(bx4)(B) of the Acts because it occurred at times when Iovine's employees were not working there. The General Counsel further asserts, and Respondent denies, that Section 8(bX4XB) was also violated by the pickets' blocking an employee of a materialman from entering the site to make a delivery to Peterson. (4Xi) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use , manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (u) to threaten , coerce , or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce , where in either case an object thereof is: (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer , or to cease doing business with any other person ... Provided that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful , where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing; LOCAL 25, IBEW 533 IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS6 A. The Construction Site At all material times a garage was being built for Hempstead at the intersection of Cerro Street and Nassau Avenue in Inwood, New York. On Nassau Avenue, directly facing Cerro Street was the construction site's only entrance.? This was used in common by all employees working there . Being wide enough to accommodate trucks, the entrance was also used by employees of materialmen when making deliveries. As is usual in construction work, and as has already been noted, several employers, including Iovine, were involved in building Hempstead's garage. The location at which this work was done may, therefore, be considered to have been a common site, "i.e., one where . . . neutral employer[s] [are] engaged along with the primary employer [lovine] in different activities on the same premises." N.L.R.B. v. International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 41, AFL-CIO, 285 F.2d 397, 400 (C.A. 8), cert. denied 366 U.S. 903. B. The Contractors and the Dates on Which They Worked at the Sites Hempstead let the general contract for the construction of its garage to Peterson. Peterson subcontracted the concrete work to Farran and ordered metal frames and doors from Reliable. lovine received a prime contract from Hempstead to furnish and install the garage's electrical equipment. lovine's employees worked at the construction site on December 29, 1971, and on January 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 21, and 24, 1972. The employees of the subcontractor retained by Peterson to erect steel stairs9 performed their work on December 21, 1971. Farran's employees worked at the site on January 19, 20, 21, and 24, 1972. The findings set forth in the last paragraph are based on testimony given by Walter Bergskaug, Peterson's superin- tendent. Bergskaug further testified that "from December 21, 1971 through January 24, 1972 . . . there were [also] plumbers working on the job [as well as] carpenters, lathers ... laborers [and] bricklayers." 10 In contrast to his testimony as to the actual dates on which employees of lovine, Farran, and the subcontractor who erected the stairs worked at the site, Bergskaug did not say when, during the period in question, the plumbers, carpenters, lathers, laborers, and bricklayers performed their work; nor does evidence as to this appear elsewhere in the record. In view of Bergskaug's inconclusive testimony regarding the matter here under discussion and the absence of other evidence on this point, it is my 6 The purpose of these findings is to furnish a frame of reference within which to consider the facts relating to respondent 's alleged unfair labor practices and the conclusions to which they may give rise To the extent that the contentions of the parties relate specifically to the findings made here they will be treated here , although they, as well as the findings , may again be considered in other contexts. T A rough diagram of the construction site was received in evidence as G.C Exh 2 8 The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sec . 8(bX4XB) of the Act by picketing on various dates between December 21, 1971, and January conclusion that the proof does not warrant a finding as to the particular days within the time span involved that plumbers , carpenters , lathers, laborers, and bricklayers worked at the site . Nor does the proof warrant a finding that they worked on any day on which employees of Iovine or of any other contractor did not work. V. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts Concerning Respondent 's Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Related to Picketing" Respondent picketed at the location where Hempstead's garage was being built on December 21, 22, 23, 28, and 29, 1971, and on each day from January 3 through January 24, 1972, except Saturdays and Sundays. The pickets, two in number, walked in front of the only entrance to the construction site carrying signs stating: TO THE PUBLIC ELECTRICIANS WORKING ON THIS JOB FOR IOVINE DO NOT RECEIVE WAGES & WORKING CONDITIONS AS GOOD AS THOSE ESTABLISHED IN CONTRACTS OF LOCAL UNION 25 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS THIS SIGN IS NOT DIRECTED TO ANY OTHER EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYEE ON THIS JOB AFL-CIO As has been found, during the days on which Respon- dent's picketing was conducted Iovine 's employees worked at the site only on December 29, 1971, and on January 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 21, and 24, 1972. As has also been found, employees of Peterson's stair subcontractor worked on the first day of the picketing and Farran's employees worked on the last 4 days. Employees of other contractors, described as plumbers, carpenters, lathers, laborers, and bricklayers by Walter Bergskaug, Peterson's superintendent, also performed services at the construction site while the picketing was in progress. However, as I previously concluded, the record does not warrant a finding as to the particular days on which they worked while picketing was conducted or that they worked on any day during the picketing on which employees of lovine or of any other contractor did not work. From all that appears from the evidence the only days on which they were present at the site might have coincided with days on which Iovine's employees worked there. In sum, therefore, my findings as to this branch of the case are: 1. On December 21, 1971, and on January 19 and 20, 1972, Respondent picketed at the site at which Hemp- stead's garage was being built while Iovine's employees 24, 1972. The General Counsel makes no contention that unfair labor practices were committed at any other time. Accordingly , my findings as to the dates on which contractors performed their work at the construction site will be limited to the period set forth in the complaint. 9 The name of this subcontractor does not appear in the record. rU The names of the contractors who employed these building tradesmen do not appear in the record. rr The period encompassed by my findings as to Respondent's picketing is that set forth in the complaint ; namely, December 21, 1971, to January 24, 1972. See, in this connection , fn. 8 above. 534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD were not working there, but while employees of other contractors were working. 2. On December 29, 1971, and on January 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 21, and 24, 1972. Respondent picketed at the garage construction site while lovine's employees were working there. 3. The evidence does not establish that any employees worked at the construction site on any day other than those mentioned in 1 and 2, above, on which picketing was carried on there. B. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondent's Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Related to Picketing Relying on Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547, the General Counsel contends that Respondent violated Section 8 (b)(4)(B) of the Act by picketing at the site at which Hempstead's garage was being built on the days on which Iovine's employees did not work there. 12 I agree with the General Counsel's position insofar as it relates to the picketing conducted on December 21, 1971, and January 19 and 20, 1972. On those days lovine's employees were not working on the site and employees of other contractors were. Accord- ingly, Respondent's picketing did not conform to the standards established by the Board in Moore Dry Dock, supra at 549, for determining when picketing at a common site is primary. Among these is one requiring that "at the time of the picketing the primary employer [here lovine] is engaged in its normal business at the situs." It is readily inferable from Respondent's unlawful picketing that objects thereof were to cause a cessation of business between Peterson and its subcontractors, between Peterson and Hempstead, and between Hempstead and lovine. Farmers and Merchants Bank of Menomonee Falls, 196 NLRB No. 60; Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc., 87 NLRB 502, 505. There being, thus, a concurrence of unlawful conduct and proscribed object I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by its picketing on December 21, 1971, and January 19 and 20, 1972, at the location where Hempstead's garage was being built.13 I come to a different result concerning Respondent's picketing on other days within the period encompassed by the complaint on which lovine's employees did not work at 12 As the picket signs indicate . lovine was disfavored by Respondent because , in its opinion , lovine 's employees "do not receive wages & working conditions as good as those established in [Respondent's] contracts" In view of this, and considering the employers and persons involved in this proceeding in the light of the "primary-secondary" gloss placed on Sec 8(b)(4)(B ) by the Board and the courts, lovine is the primary employer and all the other contractors engaged at the site and Hempstead fall into the secondary category See Moore Dry Dock, supra, at 549; N LR B. v. Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, 400 U S. 297, 302-305. 13 Picketing such as was engaged in by Respondent on the dates set forth in the text induces and encourages individuals to refrain from working and coerces and restrains persons within the meaning of Sec 8(b)(4 ). Boulder Master Plumbers Association, 132 NLRB 1355, 1356. 14 The findings which follow bear on the General Counsel 's blocking contention As appears in the introductory portion of this Decision, it is the General Counsel 's position that Sec 8(b)(4XB) was violated not only by the picketing at the common site here involved in the absence of lovine's employees , but also by the pickets' conduct in assertedly blocking an the site . To prove a common site picketing violation of Section 8(bx4)(B) of the Act on the theory advanced by the General Counsel not only must it be shown that the picketing occurred at the site in the absence of primary employees, but also that secondary employees , here those employed by contractors other than Iovine , were there during the picketing. If they, too, were not present while the picketing was carried on, there was no one who could be induced or encouraged to refuse to perform services or who could be coerced or restrained within the intendment of Section 8(b)(4). See , in this connection , Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 138 NLRB 315, 317-318. Having concluded that the record does not warrant a finding that any employees worked at the construction site on any day on which lovine's employees did not, except December 21, 1971, and January 19 and 20, 1972, it is my further conclusion that the General Counsel has not established that Respondent 's picketing conducted on days other than those specifically mentioned above was viola- tive of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. C. Facts Concerning Respondent 's Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Related to the Conduct of the Pickets 14 On January 3, 1972, Reliable, from whom Peterson had ordered metal frames and doors, sent its truckdriver, Julius Christie, to the place where Hempstead's garage was being built for the purpose of delivering doors to Peterson. Christie approached the building location by driving on Cerro Street directly toward its entrance.15 Upon his arrival at the site's entrance Christie saw Respondent's pickets. By reason of the direction in which Christie was traveling the pickets were in front of his truck when Christie first saw them. Christie was under standing instructions from his employer "not to cross picket lines." In addition, he had a personal aversion to doing so "because [the pickets were] there with a picket sign and if we was on strike with a picket sign they wouldn't pass us." 16 Accordingly, Christie made no attempt to enter the construction area, nor did he request the pickets to "step aside." Instead, Christie stopped his truck and asked the pickets "if they were on strike." In response the pickets suggested that Christie read the picket sign. After his conversation with the pickets Christie drove to employee of a matenalman from entering the site to make a delivery to Peterson , Hempstead 's general contractor is My finding as to Chnstie's route on this occasion is based on his testimony. In this regard , Christie stated that he "came straight down the street to the entrance of the place ." One of the pickets testified that Christie used Nassau Avenue in coming to the site As between these two divergent accounts it seems to me that the driver 's should be given precedence Furthermore , if Christie had driven to the construction location via Nassau Avenue , as the picket stated , he could not have come "straight down the street to the entrance of the place ," but would have had to make a turn in order to enter the site (See G C. Exh 2) Additionally, as will appear, Christie left the site after talking to the pickets and returned a short while later Concerning this, Christie testified that "the second time [he ] was coming from a different direction [and] would have had to make a left turn into the entrance of the )obsite " All things considered , therefore, I accept the version given by Christie as to the route he followed in coming to the site the first time. 16 Christie is a member of a local of the Carpenters and Joiners Union. LOCAL 25, IBEW 535 a telephone and called Reliable's office. Upon informing his supervisor of his encounter with the pickets, Christie was directed to go back to the building site, "find out if there was a shop steward [and without giving or causing] trouble . . . explain to the shop steward what [he was] delivering and see if it [was ] all right to deliver that part of the stuff ... . Christie returned to the construction location and again spoke to the pickets, who this time were at the side of his truck . He asked them, in accordance with his supervisor's directive, "if [there] was a shop steward on the job." The pickets replied in the negative and once more suggested that Christie read the picket sign.17 His employer 's standing instructions not to cross picket lines not having been altered by what his supervisor had just told him, Christie "used [his] own judgment [and] drove away" from the site without delivering the doors to Peterson , Hempstead 's general contractor . These were delivered at a later time by another employee of Reliable.18 D. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondent's Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Related to the Conduct of the Pickets The General Counsel contends, insofar as this branch of the case is concerned, that on January 3, 1972, Respon- dent's pickets blocked Reliable's truck from entering Hempstead 's garage construction area to deliver doors to Peterson, Hempstead's general contractor, and that in this manner Respondent further violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. However, the proof does not support this contention. On January 3, 1972, Respondent's pickets were lawfully patrolling across the building project's only entrance.19 While they were so engaged, Reliable's truck, driven by Julius Christie, twice came to the site. On its first arrival, Reliable's truck approached the site's entrance head on. By reason of the truck's path and the place where the pickets were stationed they were in front of the truck when Christie brought it to a halt at the picket line. It does not appear from the proof that the pickets would have maintained their position had Christie indicat- ed a desire to cross this line and enter the construction area. However, Christie did not do this. As the evidence makes clear, Christie stopped his truck not because the pickets impeded its further progress, but because of specific standing instructions from Reliable, his employer, not to 17 Christie gave conflicting testimony as to what the pickets said in answer to his question concerning the presence of a shop steward. At one point Christie stated that one of the pickets, on this occasion. "instructed [him ] not to argue or to pass." At a later point in his examination Christie said that the pickets "didn ' t [ever ] tell [him that he] couldn 't go into the construction site," or say much to him beyond suggesting that he read the picket sign . Christie's latter testimony was confirmed by Andrew Duff, one of Respondent's pickets at the site . In view of this and the conflict between Chnstie's two statements , I do not credit his assertion that he was "instructed ," by the pickets , "not to argue or to pass." My refusal to accept Christie's first version as to what the pickets said should not be taken as an indication by me that Christie was, in general, an unreliable witness. "It is no reason for refusing to accept everything that a witness says because you do not believe all of it; nothing is more common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some and not all." NLRB v. Universal Camera cross picket lines and his general disinclination to pass pickets.20 The record is likewise devoid of proof showing that the pickets blocked Reliable's truck from entering the site upon its second arrival there on January 3. When Christie stopped the truck on this occasion the pickets were at its side. That Christie did not drive into the construction area on this arrival was attributable to the instructions he had received only a few minutes earlier during a telephone conversation with his supervisor and not to any physical obstacle placed in the truck's way by the pickets, who, this time were not even in front of the truck. In view of the foregoing, I conclude that it has not been established that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) by any blocking action taken by its pickets with respect to Reliable's truck. One further matter relating to the confrontation on January 3, 1972, between the pickets and Christie, Reliable's driver, remains for consideration . Did respon- dent by its pickets' suggestions that Christie read their picket sign "induce and encourage" Christie, within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act, to refuse to.deliver the doors ordered by Peterson, Hempstead 's general contractor from Reliable? "[W]here a union representative , in answer to an inquiry on the matter, informs an employee [neutral to its dispute] that a picket line exists , he has engaged in no unfair labor practice [within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act] by such statement." Howard C. Edmiston, 174 NLRB 996, 997. It is likewise not transgressive of Section 8(bX4) for a union agent to advise neutral employees to use their own judgment with respect to crossing a picket line directed at an employer with whom the union is in the dispute . Weyher Construction Co., Inc., et al., 148 NLRB 118, 119-120; Independent Contractors Association, 137 NLRB 1125, 1128-29, 1142. Accordingly, had Respondent's pickets , in response to this inquiry as to whether they were on strike, merely called the attention of Christie , Reliable's driver, to the existence of their picket line against Iovine respondent would not have violated Section 8(b)(4XB) of the Act. It seems to me that the pickets did no more than that when they suggested , in answer to Christie's question, that he read their picket sign . They were , in essence, informing Christie of their picket line and inviting Christie to decide for himself as to whether he should cross it . This Christie did. As he testified, he "used (his] own judgment [and] drove away." I conclude, therefore, that the pickets ' suggestions that Corporation, 179 F.2d 749, 754 (C.A. 2), reversed on other grounds 340 U.S. 749. is Except for the matter of the route followed by Christie upon his first approach to the construction site the findings made in this section of this Decision are based on a synthesis of the evidence given by Christie, Reliable's truckdriver, Andrew Duff , one of Respondent's pickets, and Walter Bergskaug, Peterson's superintendent . The quotations appearing in the text are taken from Christie's testimony. 19 On the day in question , as I have found , lovine's employees were working at the site and the signs carried by the pickets clearly indicated that the picketing was directed at lovine. 20 Although Christie's reluctance to cross picket lines is, perhaps, irrelevant , his employer's directive that he not do so is important . Cf. St. Bridget 's Catholic Congregation, Inc., 122 NLRB 1341, 1345. 536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Christie read the picket sign did not constitute the inducement or encouragement proscribed by Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. James Julian, Inc., 147 NLRB 137, 138, 140, enfd. 351 F.2d 954 (C.A. 3), does not require a contrary conclusion. There, unlike the situation here , a union sent letters to its members stating that "union members are all brothers in the trades and . . . they should stick together and cooperate with one another." About a month later a trades council of which the union was a constituent began to picket Julian, a general contractor, with signs similar to those carried by the pickets here. A member of the union working at the picketed site for one of Julian's subcontrac- tors asked an officer of the union "what the pickets were for." In reply the union officer told the member that he should read the picket signs and "be guided by the letter" he had received. Considering together the union officer's allusion to the letter and his direction to read the picket signs, the Board found that "the plain message conveyed by these state- ments was that the [union member] should honor the Council's picket line." Accordingly, in Julian the Board concluded that the union officer' s "statements .. . constituted inducement and encouragement to cease work within the meaning of Section 8(bX4)(i) of the Act." The obvious important factual difference between the instant case and Julian is that there is no evidence here that Respondent sent letters like those in Julian to neutral employees such as Christie, Reliable's driver, or called their attention to a similar message. Although there was present in Julian, as there is here , a suggestion to a neutral employee that he read the picket sign, this, alone, was not the basis for the Board's conclusion in Julian that the union there "induc[ed] and encourag[ed] [neutral employ- ees] to cease work." This conclusion was founded, as the Board's Decision makes clear, upon the amplification of the union officer's suggestion concerning the reading of the picket sign by his reference to the letter.21 I am persuaded, in view of the foregoing that the result reached by the Board in Julian does not require me to conclude here that the pickets' mere suggestion that Christie read their picket sign constituted inducement and encouragement within the purview of Section 8 (b)(4) of the Act. VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Respondent's unfair labor practices, as found in section V, B, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Iovine, Peterson, and Farran set forth in section I, above, have a close , intimate , and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and 21 It is noteworthy, in this connection , that in setting forth the reason for its unfair labor practice holding in Julian the word "statements "(emphasis supplied) was twice used in the paragraph of the Decision immediately following the heading "Concluding findings," thereby emphasizing that the "read the picket signs" remark was not being considered alone, but in conjunction with the utterance concerning the letter. 22 See Alexander M Cutrone, d/b/a A C Electric, 148 NLRB 1560; New York Telephone Company, 162 NLRB 703, Building Trades Employers Association, 169 NLRB 856 23 To bolster his argument the General Counsel, during the trial, pointed tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. VII. THE REMEDY Because on three previous occasions Respondent has been found to have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(bx4)(B) of the Act22 the General Counsel urges that to remedy its current violation I recommend the entry of an order broader in scope than that normally entered in cases of this sort.23 The type of order sought by the General Counsel appears, and the reason for its entry is set forth, in United States Trucking Corporation (U. S. Trucking), 146 NLRB 956, 963-965, to which the General Counsel referred during the trial. In U.S. Trucking the union involved, like Respondent here, also had been found on three previous occasions to have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(bx4)(B) of the Act.24 These violations occurred within a period of 4 months, July through October 1961. As reported in U. S. Trucking, within a year from the date of its last violation, in October 1962, the union again violated Section 8(b)(4)(B). Upon finding this violation the Board entered an order requiring the union to "cease and desist from secondary activities against any person, in order to force such persons to cease doing business with U. S. Trucking or with any other primary employers." Such a broad order was "necessary," the Board stated, "because of the extent to which Respondent, in the past, has deliberately engaged in such unlawful secondary activities." In contrast to the pattern of unfair labor practices shown in U. S. Trucking., which were concentrated within a relatively short period of 16 months, the four violations of Section 8(bX4)(B) of the Act, including those in the instant case, which respondent has been found to have committed encompass a time span of some 9 years. Thus, the first occurred in October 1963 (Alexander M. Cutrone, etc., 148 NLRB 1560) and the second later the same year and early in 1964 (New York Telephone Company, 162 NLRB 703). Respondent's next violation was found to have taken place 3 years later, in July 1967 (Building Trades Employers Association, 169 NLRB 856). From that time until respondent's last brush with Section 8(bX4XB) as found in section V, B, above, more than 4 years elapsed. Considering the 9 years intervening between Respon- dent's first and last transgression of Section 8(b)(4XB) of the Act, the 3 years between Respondent's second and third violations, and the 4 years between its third and last violations, it cannot rightly be said of respondent, as was said of the union in U. S. Trucking., that it has "demon- strated [a] proclivity for engaging in secondary boycott activities in furtherance of its labor disputes." This being also to three instances in which respondent was found to have engaged in unfair labor practices covered by Sec 8(bX4XD) of the Act. While a union's previous violations of Sec 8 (bX4XB) may be taken into account in fashioning a remedy for a current violation , I perceive no relevancy in considering for that purpose its past violations of another section of the Act. See C d; T Trucking Co., 191 NLRB No. 2. 24 See Precon Trucking Corp ., et al , 139 NLRB 1077, Twin County Transit Mix, Inc, 137 NLRB 858; J J. While Ready Mix Corp, 141 NLRB 424. LOCAL 25, IBEW so, there appears to be no warrant for the entry of an order as broad as that sought by the General Counsel. Sam-Jo, Inc., d/b/a Smiser Freight Service, 174 NLRB 98. Accordingly, having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act my recommended Order will be no broader than those usually entered by the Board in such cases . 25 In my opinion , an order of this type will effectuate the purposes of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. lovine is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. 2. Peterson and Farran are persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. 3. Hempstead is a person entitled to protection from unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. 4. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 5. By picketing on December 21, 1971, and January 19 and 20, 1972, at the location of the construction of Hempstead 's garage , thereby inducing and encouraging individuals employed by Farran and other persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce to engage in a 537 strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to perform any services, objects thereof being to force or require Farran and other subcontractors of Peterson at the Hempstead garage construction site to cease doing busi- ness with Peterson, to force or require Peterson to cease doing business with Hempstead , and, in this manner, to force or require Hempstead to cease doing business with lovine , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 6. By picketing on December 21, 1971, and January 19 and 20, 1972, at the location of the construction of Hempstead's garage , thereby coercing and restraining Peterson, Farran, other persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce , and Hempstead for objects set forth in Conclusion of Law 5, above, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor of Law 5, above, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfari labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 7. It has not been established that Respondent has engaged in any other unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (bX4)(B) of the Act. 8. The unfair labor practices engaged in by Respon- dent, as set forth in Conclusions of Law 5 and 6, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 25 See, for example , Farmers and Merchants Bank of Menomonee Falls, 196 NLRB No. 60.