Local 182, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 5, 1962

135 N.L.R.B. 851 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

LOCAL 182, TNT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC . 851
Local 182 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Woodward Motors,
Inc. Case No. 3-CP-16. February 5, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 19, 1961, Trial Examiner Thomas F. Maher issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
to the Intermediate Report together with a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the Board has delegated its powers in con-
nection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Leedom,
Fanning, and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and the brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions,' and recom-
mendations 3 of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Local 182, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, its officers, representatives, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the act of placing the usual picket signs in the
snowbank abutting Employer's premises constituted picketing within the meaning of the
Act. These signs were watched by Respondent's agents from a car parked on the shoulder
of an adjacent highway to make sure they were not removed or destroyed during the
entire working day.
2 We also agree with the Trial Examiner in finding that the picketing was for an objec-
tive proscribed by Section 8(b) (7). Although designated "protest picketing" by Respond-
ent's assistant business manager, the protest was directed to the Employer' s withdrawal
of recognition and discontinuance of bargaining negotiations . Satisfaction of such pro-
test required a renewal of recognition and resumption of negotiations . Cf. Fanelli Ford
Sales, Inc., 133 NLRB 1468.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the second or so-called publicity proviso to
Section 8 ( b) (7) (C) does not apply to Section 8(b) (7) (B ). In establishing a violation
of 8(b) (7) (B) it is therefore unnecessary to show that picketing after the election had
the effect described in that proviso.
3 The order herein has been modified in accordance with Retail Store Employees ' Union,
Local No. 693, Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO (Irvine, Inc.), 134
NLRB 686.
135 NLRB No. 90.
852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Picketing or causing to be picketed, or threatening to picket
Woodward Motors, Inc., where an object thereof is to force or require
Woodward Motors, Inc., to recognize and bargain with it as the repre-
sentative of its employees, or to force or require the employees of
Woodward Motors, Inc., to accept or select it as their bargaining rep-
resentative, for a period of 1 year from March 1, 1961.
(b) Picketing or causing to be picketed, or threatening to picket
Woodward Motors, Inc., for either of the aforementioned objects,
where within the preceding 12 months a valid election under Section
9(c) of the Act'has been conducted which the Respondent did not win.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its respective offices in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the
notice attached hereto marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Third Region, shall,
after being duly signed by representatives of the Respondent, be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign as aforesaid and mail sufficient copies of said notice to
the Regional Director for the Third Region for posting, Woodward
Motors, Inc., willing, at all locations where notices to its employees
are customarily posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Third Region, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken
to comply herewith.
'In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 152, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF WOODWARD MOTORS, INC.
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to
picket, Woodward Motors, Inc., where an object thereof is to force
or require Woodward Motors, Inc., to recognize or bargain col-
lectively with us, or to force or require its employees to accept or
LOCAL 182, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 853
select us as their collective-bargaining representative, for a period
of 1 year from March 1, 1961.
WE WILL NOT picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to
picket, Woodward Motors, Inc., where an object thereof is to force
or require Woodward Motors, Inc., to recognize or bargain col-
lectively with us, or to force or require its employees to accept or
select us as their collective-bargaining representative, where a-
valid election which we did not win has been conducted by the
National Labor Relations Board among the employees of Wood-
ward Motors, Inc., within the preceding 12 months.
LOCAL 182, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WARE-
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 122• U.S. Courthouse Building, 68 Court Street, Buffalo, New
York, Telephone Number TL 4-4780, if they have any question con-
cerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and amended charge filed, respectively , on February 2 and 6, 1961,
the Regional Director for the Third Region on March 14, 1961, issued his complaint
against Local 182, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America , Respondent herein , alleging violations of Section
8(b) (7) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.),
herein called the Act. In its duly filed answer, Respondent , while admitting certain
allegations in the complaint , denied the commission of any unfair labor practice.
Subsequent to the filing of the charges herein , the Regional Director , pursuant to
Section 10(1) of the Act, instituted in the United State District Court for the North-
ern District of New York injunction proceedings entitled Merle D. Vincent, Regional
Director, etc v. Local 182, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Civil No. 8481. Following hearing thereon,
Judge Stephen W. Brennan, United States District Judge, on March 1, 1961, issued
his memorandum decision finding reasonable cause to believe violations of the
amended Act had been committed . He accordingly ordered certain temporary in-
junctive relief pending final disposition of the matter before the Board.
Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held before me at Utica, New York, on April I 1
and 12, 1961 . All parties were represented at the hearing and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence , to present oral argument,
and to file briefs with me. Respondent waived oral argument , but in lieu thereof,
together with counsel for the General Counsel, filed briefs with me on May 8, 1961.
Upon consideration of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, and upon
my observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Woodward Motors, Inc., herein referred to as the Company, the employer at or
adjacent to whose establishment the alleged unlawful conduct occurred , is a New
854 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
York corporation with its office and place of business located along the Horatio
Arterial in the town of Deerfield, New York, and adjacent to the city of Utica,
New York, where it is engaged in the sale and service of new and used automobiles.
During 1960, it sold automobiles valued at approximately $600,000, which auto-
mobiles, manufactured outside the United States of America, and shipped by sea to
Port Newark, New Jersey, were transported to the Company in interstate commerce
directly from a,point outside the State of New York. Upon the foregoing facts
admitted in the pleadings and established by credible testimony, I find and conclude
that the-Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE STATUS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent admits that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act. I find accordingly and likewise find that it is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (7) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
1. Respondent's activity constituted picketing.
2. There is substantial evidence to conclude that the picketing induced employees
to refuse to make deliveries.
3. Any possible informational character of which the activity partook does not
exempt it from the proscriptions of subsection (B) of Section 8(b).(7).
4. The General Counsel's prior disposition of other unfair labor practice charges
and a representation petition is conclusive, irrespective of the effect of such action
upon the instant proceeding.
IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Sequence of events
On August 1, 1960, Warren Woodward, president of Woodward Motors, Inc., re-
ceived a letter from Respondent informing him that it represented a majority of the
Company's employees and requesting him to communicate with it for the purpose
of entering into negotiations. Whereupon, on the following day, Woodward polled
his 15 employees and learned that all wished to be represented by Respondent.
Woodward thereupon arranged with William Belden, Respondent's assistant business
representative, for the commencement of contract negotiations, and on August 8 for-
warded a signed agreement to Belden wherein he (1) "certified" that the Company
recognized the Respondent as representative of all its full-time employees in a speci-
fied bargaining unit, (2) "pledged" the Company to enter negotiations for the pur-
pose of reaching effective agreement, (3) agreed to the immediate establishment of
union-shop conditions among the Company's employees whereby they and any em-
ployee thereafter hired would have 31 days within which to join the Union following
the effective date of the contract or the date of hire, whichever be applicable, and
(4) agreed to submit to arbitration the case of a previously discharged employee,
William Gorecki.' In his letter of transmittal, Woodward, after referring to the sub-
stance of the agreement thus executed, stated:
I The entire agreement, as signed by Woodward, reads as follows:
This is to certify that Woodward Motors, Inc., hereinafter called the "Company",
having been presented with certain evidence that certain of its employees wish to
establish their terms of employment through collective bargaining, do hereby recog-
nize the Temasters [sic], Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union 182,
Utica, New York and Vicinity, hereinafter called the "Union", as the representatives
of said certain of its employees.
The Company pledges that it will enter negotiations with the Union for the pur-
pose of arriving at an Agreement specifying the terms and conditions of employment
for all full time employees in the Bargaining Unit as defined below at any and all
mutually convenient times and places necessary to arrive at mutually acceptable
terms.
This recognition extends to all full time employees who are employed as Working
Foremen, Mechanics, New Car Processing Men, Parts-department employees, Body
Repairmen, Maintenance employees, Janitors, Helpers, Greasers, and Washers or
members of the duly defined bargaining unit should the matter have to be determined
by the National Labor Relations Board authorities.
It shall be a condition of employment that all employees of the employer covered
by this Agreement who are members of the Union in good standing on the effective
date of this Agreement shall remain members in good standing and those who are not
LOCAL 182, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 855
We now feel that it is your turn to make some major concessions to us on the
economic issues in the rest of your original proposal. We are committed to
the principle of collective bargaining as a process of proposal and counter-
proposal between the respective parties, steering them from their original start-
ing positions towards a point of mutual agreement on all issues.
Accordingly, we feel that it is your move next and expect as stated above,
major concessions from you on the economic issues which remain to be nego-
tiated . [Emphasis supplied.]
Following the Company's execution of the foregoing agreement approximately seven
bargaining sessions were held during the 6-week period ending September 21, 1960.
On that date the Company was presented with a petition of the same date, on sta-
tionery bearing the letterhead of Woodward Oil & Distributing Company, and signed
by eight employees, stating:
We the undersigned do not want to become associated with the Local Teamsters
Union. But do want to form our own independent shop Union.
Several days thereafter , at the next regularly scheduled bargaining conference,
Woodward informed Belden that the Company could not continue negotiations "be-
cause it was obvious that they no longer represented the men ." No bargaining has
since been had.
On October 5, 1960 , Respondent filed a charge with the Regional Director in
Case No. 3-CA-1508 alleging the Company's violation of Section 8(a) (1), (2), (3),
and (5 ) of the Act. Thus, in addition to the Company 's failure to continue bargain-
ing, Respondent alleged as objectionable its earlier discharge of one William Gorecki
and its sponsorship and formation of an independent association of its employees.
Two days following the filing of charges against it , the Company, on October 7,
filed with the Regional Director its petition for an election , wherein it stated that a
claim dated August 8 , 1960, had been made by Respondent that it be recognized as
majority representative of the Company's employees? In its petition the Company
indicated that its employees were eight in number , that there was no strike or
picketing at its establishment, and that the Respondent was the recognized bargaining
agent , the date of recognition being August 8, 1960.3
On the following Monday morning , October 10 , representatives of Respondent
appeared at the entrance to the Company 's property carrying signs which read:
WOODWARD MOTORS, INC.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND
VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT
PICKET LINE
UNFAIR
TO ORGANIZED
LABOR
DO NOT PATRONIZE
TEAMSTERS-CHAUFFEURS
WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS
AFL LOCAL 182
UTICA & CENTRAL N.Y. STATE
members on the effective date of this Agreement , become and remain members in
good standing in the Union . It shall also be a condition of employment that all
employees covered by this Agreement and hired on or after its effective date shall,
on the 31st day following the beginning of such employment become and remain mem-
bers in good standing in the Union.
In accordance with this Recognition and Union Shop Agreement , it is further
agreed that the case of William Gorecki, discharged on August 2, 1960 will be de-'
cided by Arbitration. It is the preference of the Company that this be submitted to
a Board of Arbitration of 3 or 5 people , selected according to prevailing custom, and
subject to further discussion with the representatives of the Union.
2 Case No . 3-RM-223.
9 I am not disposed to attach any significance to the Company 's statement that it thus
recognized the very labor organization whose claim for recognition it sought to resolve by
the election petition . This obvious contradiction is unquestionably an oversight on the
Company ' s part in filling out the petition form, and indicates a lack of familiarity with
such matters rather than any attempt to obfuscate.
$56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The pickets continued to walk in front of the Company's premises until January 17,
1961, the date of an election eventually held by the Board.
Following the appearance of Respondent's pickets in front of its establishment
the Company, on October 28, filed charges against Respondent with the Board in
Case No. 3-CP-10 alleging that it was engaged in picketing which violated Sec-
tion 8(b) (7) (C) of the amended Act in that its object was to force or require an
employer to recognize and bargain with it and to force or require the employees to
accept or select it as their bargaining representative when an election petition had not
been filed within a reasonable time.
Meanwhile, it appears from the record, the Regional Director was processing the
earlier charge filed by Respondent against the Company-Case No. 3-CA-1508.
On November 9, 1960, he accepted a settlement from the Company of the dis-
criminatory discharge allegations of the charge relating to employee Gorecki, and
upon Respondent's failure to become a party to the agreement, notified it that he
was dismissing the remainder of the charge, to wit: the Section 8(a)(5) allegation-
the Company's refusal to continue bargaining-and the Section 8(a) (2) allegation
pertaining to the sponsorship and formation of an independent employee association.
The Respondent, Charging Party in that proceeding, appealed on November 18, 1960,
to the General Counsel upon the Regional Director's refusal to issue a complaint on
its charge. On December 23 the General Counsel denied Respondent's appeal on the
ground of insufficient evidence.
During all of the foregoing period, it will be recalled, the Company's petition for
an election in Case No. 3-RM-223 remained outstanding, presumably held in
abeyance by the Board's established practice of not processing a representation
petition while an unfair labor practice charge was outstanding.4 Following the
dismissal of the refusal-to-bargain charge the Regional Director, on January 6, 1961,
also dismissed the Company's charge.against Respondent in Case No. 3-CP-10,
wherein Respondent's picketing was alleged to be unlawful in the absence of a
timely filed election petition. In dismissing the Company's charge, the Regional
Director indicated that a timely petition had been filed and that in view of the cir-
cumstances an expedited election had been ordered and accordingly no violation of
Section 8(b) (7) (C) could lie. Although the Regional Director did not so state in
his correspondence with the Company, the timely petition referred to was the petition
in Case No. 3-RM-223, filed by the Company immediately upon Respondent's filing
of unfair labor practices against the Company and several days before the com-
mencement of the picketing activities at the Company's premises .5
On January 17, 1961, an election in Case No. 3-RM-223 was held. The Re-
spondent lost by a vote of one to seven with six additional votes being challenged,
a number not sufficient to affect the outcome of the election.
On or about January 30, 1961, Respondent's representatives reappeared at the
company premises, having stopped all picketing on the day prior to the election.
They stationed themselves in autos parked on the shoulder of the adjacent highway
and stuck two signs in a snowbank abutting the entrance to the company premises.
One sign read:
WE ARE NOT PICKETING FOR ORGANIZATION OR RECOGNITION.
The other sign read:
THE EMPLOYEES OF WOODWARD MOTORS, INC., ARE NOT PRO-
TECTED BY A UNION CONTRACT. .
Business Representative Belden insisted at the hearing that there was no picketing
after the election. This, despite the presence of the signs posted at the Company's
driveway, with Belden or some other representative of Respondent in a nearby parked
car, so stationed to insure that the signs were not removed or damaged. This activ-
ity-the placing of the signs-Belden stated was a "general protest." 6 In this
respect he further testified that had Respondent had a contract with the Company at
that particular time "there would be no reason to place a sign out," and he would
not have done so, thus conceding the purpose of the sign to be a protest of the
absence of contractual relations. The picketing activity thus described continued
4 Cf Cuneo Press of Indiana, 114 NLRB 764
B The Regional Director's procedure in this matter conforms with Sec 101 22 (b) of the
Board's Statements of Procedure, Series S.
9 "[Ilf someone stopped and asked me or one of my members what is the problem there
I would tell them we had a signed Union agreement wtih this Company and there are
certain things that happened, we had lost the people, some were discharged for unjust
cause, some were laid off."
LOCAL 182, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 857
until March 1, 1961, the date upon which Judge Brennan granted a temporary in-
junction as previously described.
During this intervening period deliveries to the Company were interrupted by the
failure or refusal of delivery drivers to pass the picket signs posted at the entrance to
the company property. Illustrative of such instances was a delay of 4 hours on
February 8 in the delivery of an order of steel by a driver from Woodm's Express,
which delay was occasioned by the successful persuasion of the driver by the pickets,
and the driver's subsequent return to make the delivery when the pickets had departed.
Another instance was the failure or refusal of the drivers from Mobil Oil Company
to make regular deliveries, thus requiring the Company to pick up bulk oil at the
terminal.?
B. Contentions of the parties
It is General Counsel's contention that the Respondent, by the activity at the
company premises and the signs there displayed, following the January 17 election,
violated Section 8(b) (7) (B) of the amended Act by engaging in a form of picketing
the object of which was shown to be to force or require the Company to recognize
and bargain with it despite the fact that it had lost the January 17 election.
Respondent on the other hand contends that the activity in which it was engaged
was something other than picketing; that the activity constituted "other publicity"
within the meaning of and protection of Section 8(b)(7)(C), thus relating the
language of subsection (C) to the previous subsection of Section 8(b) (7); that, in
any event, the activity, whatever it was, did not have the effect of inducing anyone to
refuse to deliver goods or otherwise enter upon the Company's property; and finally
that because its refusail-to-bargain charge was improperly dismissed in the first instance
and because the petition leading to the holding of an expedited election was thus
improperly entertained thereafter, Respondent' s reliance upon its initially estab-
lished majority status is a complete defense to all that transpired thereafter.
C. Analysis and conclusions
Respondent's activity at the company premises during February 1961 clearly
contravenes the statute. I find as a fact that signs relating to a labor dispute were
stuck in snowbanks in front of the premises by Respondent's representatives, that the
custodians of these signs sat in a car parked nearby, and that on occasions thereafter
truckdrivers having business with the Company refused or failed to make deliveries.
Because this activity has all the appearance of picketing, because the signs announce
a labor dispute in the traditional fashion of a picket sign, because truckdrivers, as
well as company employees testifying at the hearing, have understood it to be picket-
ing, and as I have been referred to no decision or rule of law to the contrary I have
no reasonable alternative but to conclude as I do that during February 1961 Re-
spondent picketed the Company's premises.
For reasons which I shall enlarge upon hereafter, it is not necessary to consider
Respondent's argument that by the terms of subsection (C) of Section 8(b)(7)
there must be a finding that the picketing did "induce any individual." In the first
place I have made such a finding with respect to the Woodin's Express driver and
the Mobil Oil deliveries. But in any event this inducement or the effectiveness of
the picket, being a condition imposed upon the application of subsection (C), has no
relevance where, as here, no provision of that subsection has even been alleged as a
basis for any violation of the Act.
The undenied assertion of Respondent's own representative, Belden, best character-
izes the object and purpose of this picketing, Thus when he testified that if they
then had a contract with the Company "there would be no reason to place a sign out,"
he could not have affirmed in language more plain or precise that the signs were there
to obtain a contract. In other words, the reason for maintaining the picket signs
was to obtain that which is the end product of recognition and bargaining-contrac-
tual relations.
Section 8(b)t(7)'(B) of the amended Act, by its clear terms, proscribes picketing
by an uncertified labor organization such as Respondent, when such picketing, as
here found, has as its objective the "forcing or requiring an employer to recognize
or bargain," where a valid election has been conducted within the previous 12-month
9 The credited testimony of Parts Manager Lloyd Straub I do not credit Business
Representative Belden's contrary testimony to the effect that trucks did not honor the
picket signs and that no drivers were warned or requested not to make deliveries to the
Company.
858 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
period .8 This conclusion proceeds upon the validity of two basic assumptions:
(1) that the election which Respondent lost was, in fact, a valid election, and (2)
that any informational feature that might be inherent in the picketing did not insulate
it from the proscriptions of the statute.
The validity of the election derives exclusively from the validity of the earlier pro-
cedural steps taken. These began with the disposition of the charge filed by Respond-
ent against the Company for its alleged refusal to bargain by rejecting the Respond-
ent's majority status, which it had previously recognized. The General Counsel made
this determination by dismissing the refusal-to-bargain charge for lack of sufficient
evidence. By this action he has effectively removed the only procedural barrier to
the conduct of the election requested in the Case No. 3-RM-223 petition. To view
this consequence in any other light would be to place in issue the right and wisdom
of the General Counsel to dismiss Case No. 3-CA-1508. As I do not believe it
incumbent upon the trier of the facts in one case to reexamine an administrative
determination reached in another case,9 I have no alternative but to respect the regu-
larity of the General Counsel's actions in both his dismissal of Case No. 3-CA-1508
as well as his ordering and conducting of an election in Case No. 3-RM-223. I
would conclude, therefore, that the election herein which Respondent lost was a valid
one within the contemplation of the statute.
That the picketing incorporated materials of an informational character does not,
in my opinion, legitimatize the otherwise proscribed features of the activity. Argu-
ment can be made, of course, that had the facts been such, and the allegations made,
so as to bring the issue within the purview of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the amended
Act, the informational material would provide insulation by virtue of the statutory
exemption of the so-called "second proviso." No such facts are present here.
The proviso in question states:
Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to
prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of,
or have a contract with, a labor organization ... .
By its explicit language, the exemption of this proviso applies solely to subsection
(C), of which it is a part. To hold, then, as Respondent insists, that it likewise
applies to subsection (B) under which the complaint here is brought, would amount
to nothing short of an attempted amendment of the statute. Certainly if the Con-
gress intended to incorporate the substance of the informational picketing proviso
into subsection (B) it would have to put it there and not elsewhere. Accordingly,
in the absence of any provision in the statute that would require the application of
one segment of it to another, or would otherwise exempt proscribed picketing when it
was also shown to be "for the purpose of advising the public," I conclude that the
proscribed objectives set forth in Section 8(b)(7) are absolute when they are related
to the conditions established by subsection (B). I conclude and find, therefore, that
picketing whose object it is to obtain recognition and bargaining, when conducted
s Section 8(b) (7) (B) of the Amended Act reads as follows*
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
s s ► e • s s
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recog-
nize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or
forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor
organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organiza-
tion is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
L t • # 4 • t
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 9(c)
of this Act has been conducted.
[I]t is well established that the disposition of charges filed and the question whether
a complaint should be issued, litigated, and brought to judgment is a matter which, by
statute, is within the exclusive province of the General Counsel. Section 3(d) of the
Act confers upon the General Counsel 'final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect
of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under Section 10, and In re-
spect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board' The Board, therefore,
may not review the General Counsel's administrative determinations as to the issuance,
refusal to issue a complaint upon unfair labor practice charges, or as to his election to
proceed upon one charge rather than upon another against the same respondent."
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local Union No 978, AFL-CIO,
et at.. 120 NLRB 610, 612, citing Times Square Stores Corporation, 79 NLRB 361, 364.
ARAGON MILLS, ETC. 859
within 12 months following the holding of a valid election , is unlawful regardless
of its added informational character . As Respondent 's activity during February
1961 , %s found above , constituted such picketing I find that it has violated Section
8(b)(7) (B ), as alleged.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in activities which violate Section
8(b)(7)(B ) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and
that it take certain affirmative action which I find necessary to remedy and to remove
the effect of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing and upon the entire record in this case, I make
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Woodward Motors, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Sections 2(2)
and 8 (b)^(7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Sections 2(5) and
8(b)(7) of the Act.
3. By picketing Woodward Motors, Inc., within a month following the conduct of
a valid election under Section 9(c) of the Act, with the object of forcing or requiring
Woodward Motors, Inc., to recognize and bargain as the collective -bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees of Woodward Motors, Inc., Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in an unfair labor practice proscribed by Section 8(b)(7)(B) of
the Act.
4. The foregoing unfair labor practice , having occurred in connection with the
operation of Woodward Motors, Inc.'s business as set forth in section I, above, has
a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the
several States and substantially affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7 ) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Aragon Mills, a Unit of United Merchants & Manufacturers,
Inc., Petitioner and Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO.
Case No. 10-RM-308. February 5, 1960
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
Pursuant to a stipulation for certification upon consent election
entered into by the parties hereto an election by secret ballot was con-
ducted on February 16, 1961, under the direction and supervision of
the Regional Director for the Tenth Region among the employees in
the stipulated unit. Following the election, the Regional Director
served upon the parties a tally of ballots which showed that of ap-
proximately 493 eligible voters, 482 ballots were cast, of which 193
were for, and 262 were against, the Union, 24 ballots were challenged,
and 3 ballots were void. The Petitioner filed timely objections to con-
duct affecting the results of the election.
In accordance with the Board's Rules and Regulations, the Regional
Director conducted an investigation, and thereafter issued and duly
served upon the parties reports on objections, in which he recom-
mended that the objection be overruled. However, during the course
of the investigation he uncovered other conduct not included in the
objections which, in his opinion, raised material and substantial issues
135 NLRB No. 117.