Local 144, Service Employees

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 17, 1974

208 N.L.R.B. 483 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

LOCAL 144, SERVICE EMPLOYEES 483
Local 144, Hotel , Hospital , Nursing Home & Allied
Service Employees Union , Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO (Charles A. Sigety,
d/b/a Florence Nightingale Nursing Home) and
Jasmine Spence . Case 2-CB-5205
January 17, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENEI.LO
On September 10, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas S. Wilson issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter. General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent
filed a brief in opposition to exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
i In adopting the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge , we do so
only because we agree with and rely on his findings that Spence was never
given and never exercised supervisory authority . Inasmuch as Respondent
never specifically requested the Administrative Law Judge to defer to
arbitration under our decision in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837. we
find that question not properly raised and therefore conclude it unnecessary
for us to pass upon or adopt that part of the said Decision MacDonald
Engineering Co, 202 NLRB 748
DECISION
STArEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS S. WILSON, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a
charge alleging a violation of Section 8(b)(2) duly filed on
August 18, 1972, and amended on December 13, 1972, to
allege a violation of "Section 8(b), subsection (s)(l)(B)8(2)
[sic]" by Jasmine C. Spence, herein referred to as the
Charging Party, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, herein referred to as the General
Counsel,' and the Board respectively, the Regional
Director for Region 2 (New York, New York), issued its
complaint dated March 30, 1973, against Local 144, Hotel,
Hospital, Nursing Home & Allied Service Employees'
Union, Service Employees International Union, AFL-
CIO, herein referred to as the Respondent.
The complaint alleged that Respondent had engaged in,
and was engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) and
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947 as amended, herein referred to as the Act.
Respondent duly filed its answer admitting certain
allegations of the complaint but denying the commission of
any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice , a hearing thereon was held before me
in New York City, New York, on June 11 , 12, 13, and 14,
1973. All parties appeared at the hearing , were represented
by counsel, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to produce and cross -examine witnesses, and to produce
evidence material and pertinent to the issues. At the
conclusion of the hearing oral argument was waived. Briefs
were received from General Counsel and Respondent on
August 3, 1973.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Charles A. Sigety is, and has been at all times material
herein, an individual proprietor doing business under the
trade and style of Florence Nightingale Nursing Home,
herein called the Employer. At all times material herein the
Employer has maintained a nursing home and place of
business at 175 East 96th Street in the city and State of
New York, herein called the nursing home , where it is, and
has been at all times material herein , continuously engaged
in providing nursing and convalescence care and services
and related services for profit. During the past year, which
period is representative of its annual operations generally,
the Employer, in the course and conduct of its operations,
derived gross revenues therefrom in excess of $100,000.
During the past year , which period is representative of its
annual operations generally, the Employer , in the course
and conduct of its business, purchased and caused to be
transported and delivered to its nursing home pharmaceu-
tical supplies and other goods and materials valued at an
excess of $5,000 of which goods and materials valued in
excess of $5,000 were transported and delivered to its
nursing home in interstate commerce directly from States
of the United States other than the State in which it is
located.
Accordingly, I find that the Employer is now, and has
been at all times material herein , an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
Ii. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home & Allied
Service Employees' Union, Service Employees Internation-
I term specifically included the attorney appearing on behalf of the
General Counsel at the hearing
208 NLRB No. 65
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
al Union , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admitting to
membership employees of the Employer.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
At all times material herein and since June 18, 1970, at
least, Respondent and the Guild of New York Nursing
Homes, Inc., have been parties to a master collective-
bargaining agreement covering the wages, hours, and
working conditions of certain specified employees, includ-
ing those in the dietary department, employed by various
nursing homes which were members of said Guild. As such
a member of the Guild, the Employer here was bound by
this master agreement. The master agreement provided for
final and binding arbitration for differences of interpreta-
tion in the terms and conditions of such agreement.
For the 3-1/2 years prior to June 30, 1972, Jasmine
Spence had been employed by the Employer here as one of
its five "dieticians" in its kitchen. She was being paid $156
per week. Despite her 3-1/2 years of steady employment
Spence was the next to last dietician in the Employer's
employ in seniority.
During the period of time prior to June 30, 1972, it was
the duty of each of the Respondent's dieticians to consult
daily with the patients on two floors about their menu
preferences for the following day's meals. In view of the
fact that only 40 odd of the Employer's 407 patients were
competent to make their own menu selections, this daily
consultation could not have taken too much time.
Thereafter these dieticians were responsible for "calling
food line"; i.e., seeing to it that the Employer's cooks
served each patient's tray in accordance with the patient's
personal desires and according to his or her doctor's menu
orders. After the trays had been properly serviced, they
were delivered to the individual patient by the tray girls or
waitresses.
In or prior to June 1972 the Employer, as an economy
measure, decided to change its food distribution system by
eliminating its chef and the dieticians' daily visits to the
patients. Instead of giving the patients a daily menu
selection, the patients' food preferences were recorded on a
permanent laminated card kept in the kitchen plus orders
telephoned to the kitchen by the nurses for the patients.
This new system provided that the "calling of the line" was
thereafter to be done from these permanent laminated
cards, thus eliminating the necessity for the daily visits to
the patients by the dieticians. Thus theoretically, at least,
the five dieticians were to be eliminated along with the chef
by the new system.
Upon learning of the proposed elimination of the
dieticians, the Union protested that the master agreement
prevented the elimination of the five dieticians on the
grounds that their elimination would increase the workload
of the other unit employees and was thus in violation of the
2 According to Spence, before accepting this job she inquired whether
Steiner had received any legal advice as to whether this new job would
violate union rules in any way At some unknown time Steiner informed
Spence that the Employer's attorney answered that question in the negative
on the ground that the new job was not a unit job It is interesting that
Spence, a union member, made no inquiry to that effect of her then
representative , the Union
master agreement. The Union carried this matter to
arbitration before Arbitrator Julius J. Manson.
After hearing the evidence the arbitrator found in
pertinent part as follows:
The hearing produced no evidence to show that the
employer is arbitrary or discriminatory in using his
power to layoff the dieticians. It is too early to
determine whether there would be a sufficiently
appreciable increase in the workload of others in the
work unit to bar any of the layoffs. If the Union should
find a significant addition in work-load it would be free
to use the grievance machinery later.
It would be equitable to provide a time interval with
the layoffs spaced out, so that the phasing-out process
would be completed by the end of August. During this
period the parties could assess the impact of the lay-
offs.
Having heard the testimony, proofs and arguments, I
make the following award:
Award
The intended permanent layoff of five dieticians is
proper under the contract. The lay-offs shall be spaced
out at intervals , and be completed by the end of
August.
Thereafter it was decided between the arbitrator and the
attorneys that the layoffs would be made according to
seniority, that dieticians Dorothy Green and Spence would
be laid off by the end of June, and that the other three
dieticians, Pearl Greene, P. Etienne, and R. Davenport,
would be dismissed by the end of August.
So, on June 30, in accordance with that arrangement,
dieticians Green and Spence were discharged. Green never
returned.
However the next day, Sunday, July 1, Employer's food
service manager, Helmut Steiner, telephoned Spence at her
apartment and inquired if sh•^ would become his assistant.
As she had no job, Spence accepted.2
On Monday, July 2, Spence reported for work as usual
but this time if Spence and Steiner are to be believed, not
as a dietician but as "assistant food service director," a
supervisory nonunit position.3 That day Steiner instructed
her that she would be assisting in putting in the new
system, would be doing purchasing, taking inventory, and
would be in full charge of the kitchen in Steiner's absence.
It was also arranged that Spence's salary would be $190 per
week. About 11 a.m., dust before the lunch hour , Steiner
called a meeting of the kitchen staff and announced to
them that Spence was now his assistant "with the power to
hire and fire."4
Again according to the testimony of Spence and Steiner,
it was also on July 2 that, upon the recommendation of
Spence, tray girls (waitresses) Diaz and Poulson were
3 This title was selected because it was thought to give the Employer a
"stronger argument " It was not , however, ever recorded on Spence 's payroll
sheet although her salary increase was
4 This testimony by Steiner and Spence does not quite appear to accord
with Spence's affidavit to the Board on August 18, 1972, as will be more
fully developed hereinafter.
LOCAL 144, SERVICE EMPLOYEES
promoted to the newly established position of "diet clerks"
whose duties were to take orders for patients' food by
phone from the nurses on the floor and to call the food
line. However it was established that this promotion
entailed no pay increase until August 15 and subsequent to
Spence's dismissal.
Spence worked steadily from July 2 to July 10.
Apparently she was learning how to take inventory and
make purchases. In addition she was also engaged in
making up the new permanent laminated cards for the
installation of the new food distribution system.
On or about July 10 Union Business Representative
Pagan came into the Employer's kitchen and discovered
Spence "calling the line" just as she had formerly as a
dietician. Pagan objected that this was a violation of the
arbitration award and that, if Spence was to continue to do
unit work, that job must be offered to the displaced
dieticians in order of seniority as provided in the master
agreement.
Acting upon advice of counsel, the Employer thereupon
decided to put Spence "on ice," the attorney's phraseology,
by sending her home to work on the new permanent
laminated cards required under the new proposed food
distribution system. The purpose of this was to keep
Spence out of the Union's sight and mind until after all the
dieticians had been released. Spence did not reappear at
the nursing home until at least July 225 when she was seen
by the last remaining dietician, Davenport, who again
complained to the Union.
Davenport was dismissed about the first of August.
Business Representative Pagan returned from his vaca-
tion about August 14 when he next appeared at the nursing
home at a mealtime and discovered Spence again calling
the food line. He immediately sought and secured an
appointment on that matter with DiRubbio for early the
following morning. DiRubbio was the home's Administra-
tor.
Because of this appointment with Pagan, DiRubbio
ordered Spence not to appear for work the following
morning and for her to so inform Steiner who was away
from work that day.
However, on August 15, Spence did appear for work
contrary to these orders because she had been unable to
contact Steiner and because she realized that diet clerk
Diaz would not be in at work that morning to call the line
for the breakfast meal. Spence's conscientiousness in this
regard caused a great deal of trouble. Because of this when
Pagan appeared for his early morning appointment with
DiRubbio, he went i.ito the kitchen and discovered Spence
again calling the line for the breakfast meal.
Admittedly Pagan thereupon "blew his stack" when he
and DiRubbio got to the Employer's penthouse offices for
their conference. Pagan claimed that the Employer was
violating the arbitration agreement as well as the master
agreement because, if the Employer intended to retain any
of the dieticians under this new food distribution system,
then the job or jobs should be offered to the dismissed
5 The dates here depend upon the witnesses ' recollections because
mysteriously a number of the nursing home's records turned up missingjust
poor to the hearing
6 Although Steiner had ordered the consul ting certified dietician,
485
dieticians in accordance with their seniority rather than
giving the job to a unit employee with lesser seniority.
Pagan promptly attempted to contact the arbitrator to get
the arbitration reopened on the grounds that the retention
of Spence violated that award as well as violating the
master agreement which required a unit job to be offered
in accordance with seniority. However Pagan was unable
to contact the arbitrator by phone. He did go to the kitchen
and issue order that no unit employees were to call the
lunch line .6
It so happened that inspectors for Medicaid were in the
building on an inspection that morning. Thus a foulup of
the distribution of the lunch meal would have had serious
consequences for the nursing home. DiRubbio consequent-
ly became very busy talking over the phone with the owner,
Sigety, as well as the Employer's attorney who advised
that, if Pagan succeeded in reopening the arbitration, the
Employer would probably be found to have violated the
award by its actions in the Spence matter as well as the
master agreement.
So after considerable hubbub and innumerable confer-
ences, DiRubbio finally acceded to Pagan's demands that
Spence be dismissed, at least until those laid-off dieticians
holding greater seniority had been offered and refused the
job Spence was filling at that time. DiRubbio first ordered
Steiner to fire Spence. He refused. DiRubbio then had
Spence called to the penthouse office for the second time
that morning and told her that she was dismissed for her
"insubordination" in disobeying his direct order not to
appear for work that morning.7
At the time of the dismissal, Spence claimed that her
present position was supervisory and asked Pagan why he
was doing this to her. His answer was that the Employer
was violating both the award and the collective-bargaining
agreement by keeping Spence in a unit job and that he had
to represent not only Spence but also the other employees
in the unit.
So the Employer dismissed Spence on August 15 at the
insistence of the Union that the Employer abide by both
the arbitration award and the collective-bargaining agree-
ment . Spence had not since been reinstated.
B. Conclusions
This case started out badly on October 18, 1972, when
Spence, after her dismissal on August 15, appeared at the
Board's New York Regional Office and, after having been
interviewed, signed an affidavit and a charge against the
Union for allegedly violating Section 8(b)(2), which charge
read as follows:
Since on or about July 2, 1972 the above-named labor
organization by its officers , agents and representatives,
caused the Florence Nightingale Nursing Home, and
Employer to terminate the employment of Jasimine
[sic] Spence, an employee, in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Gdbrith, to leave the nursing home prior to Pagan's above order, Gilbrith
did remain and did call the line for lunch.
7 DiRuhbio acknowledged that he had to search for a cause for dismissal
and came up with the one given to Spence.
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
From that inauspicious start the case has steadily gone
from bad to worse.
By letter to Spence dated September 21, 1972, the
Regional Office refused to issue a complaint on the above
charge for the following reasons:
It appears from the investigation that the position
held by you and from which you were discharged, was
that of a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act. The Act, with
some exceptions not applicable here, does not afford
protection to individuals serving as supervisors.
However, assuming that it could be established, as
you contend, that we would be unable to assist you in
this situation for the following reasons. [sic] If the
position to which you were recalled were nonsuperviso-
ry than the evidence tends to establish that the Union
in asking the Company to lay you off and in obtaining
your layoff after you were recalled by the Company,
was acting within the bounds of its contractual right as
defined, in Article 6 of the collective-bargaining
agreement, since that agreement requires that the
Company recall laid-off employees in order of their
seniority and this provision was not followed by the
Company in your case. The evidence does not tend to
establish that the Union violated the Act in any other
manner encompassed by your charge.8
Spence appealed this dismissal to the Board in Washing-
ton but on December 13, 1972, also signed an amended
charge alleging a violation by the Union of "Section
8(b)(1)(B)8(2) [sic ]" in that:
Since on or about July 2, 1972, the above-named
labor organization by its officers, agents and represent-
atives has restrained and coerced Florence Nightingale
Nursing Home, an employer, in the selection of its
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances and has caused said
employer to terminate the employment of Jasimine
[sic] Spence in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act .9
On February 23, 1973, the Region's dismissal of the
8(b)(2) charge was sustained in Washington, but that
dismissal did not affect the amended 8(b)(1)(B) charge on
which the Region issued the instant complaint on March
30, 1973.
It is apparent that the 8(b)(2) and the 8(b)(1)(B) charges
are mutually exclusive in that the first would be applicable
only if Spence were an "employee" whereas the latter
would be applicable only in the event that Spence was at
the time of her dismissal a "supervisor."
Thus the initial point for determination here would seem
to be whether, as of the date of her dismissal on August 15,
1972, Spence was an employee or a supervisor. The
8 In the light of the evidence produced at the hearing , this dismissal of
the 8(b)(2) charge appears fully justified.
9 From this verbiage it is clear that the charge was intended to indicate a
violation of Sec 8(b)(i)(B)
10 The effect of this appeal by Spence, however, can have little
importance in the decision of the issue because working people are not
trained lawyers with knowledge of the subtleties and distinctions which have
now grown up around this Act
Regional Office and Washington, acting upon some
evidence, obviously found Spence to be a "supervisor"
whereas Spence, acting on somebody's advice, appealed
that ruling thus obviously contending that as of that date
she considered herself still to be an "employee" without
supervisory status.io
At the heanng Spence and Steiner testified that on July
2 Steiner announced to the dietary employees that Spence
had been appointed his "assistant" and had "the power to
hire and fire," that on that same date at Spence's
recommendation tray girls Diaz and Poulson were promot-
ed to "diet clerks" resulting in a $15-per-week increase in
salary received for the first time after Spence 's discharge,
that Spence was authorized to approve timecards after
mathematically figuring out the hours worked by the
employee involved (which was subject to a second check in
the payroll department), and that Spence was informed
that in the future she would handle grievances and give
orders in Steiner 's absence.
On the surface this testimony would give the appearance
that Spence was in fact a supervisor . But this oral
testimony does not conform with the facts as stated in the
affidavit Spence signed at her interview at the Regional
Office on August 18. In this affidavit Spence stated:
In my job as assistant to Mr. Steiner, I was not given
the authority to hire anyone. I was not asked for my
recommendation on hiring anyone in the short time I
held the position so I do not know if I can recommend
hiring anyone. The same goes for firing or transferring
employees. I was not told I could do either nor did I
have the opportunity to recommend either.
To the best of my knowledge I could not promote or
recommend promotions.ii
The employees of the kitchen are assigned certain
jobs by Mr. Steiner . As his assistant I would check to
make sure Steiner's assignments were carried out. I
would tell the girls on the food line who should put the
desserts on the trays and who would put the coff.e on
and I would check to make sure it was done right on
each tray.i2
I could not and did not discipline any employees as
asst . to Steiner. If someone came in late Steiner would
speak to them. I could and did send an employee home
because they did not feel well.
I handled grievances when Steiner was not in. I also
took over his duties on his days off.13
It thus appears that the oral testimony at the hearing and
the facts stated in the affidavit are in substantial conflict.
The oral testimony appears to have become rather grossly
exaggerated following the dismissal of the 8(b)(2) charge
possibly in an effort to prove Spence a "supervisor."
Then it appears from the testimony of DiRubbio that the
alleged "promotion" of Spence to "supervisor" was, in fact,
ii Compare this statement with the alleged promotion of Diaz and
Poulson noted in the oral testimony
11 This was exactly what Spence had done as a dietician
i i The only "grievance" Spence mentioned in her oral testimony was a
disagreement between two tray girls as to who was to put the coffee on the
tray and who was to put the desserts on the tray This hardly classifies as a
"grievance "
LOCAL 144, SERVICE EMPLOYEES
a device drean-ed up by Steiner, DiRubbio, and the
Employer's attorney by which to avoid and evade both the
arbitration and the collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union. It appears that Steiner had ceased speaking to
dieticians Daverport and Etienne after their testimony at
the arbitration hearing. All five dieticians, including
Spence, had been in favor of the Union's efforts on their
behalf at the arbitration whose purpose was to prevent the
dismissal of all five dieticians . However the Union decided
to rely on the testimony of the two most senior dieticians.
Davenport and Etienne, at the arbitration so that the other
three did not tesify. Spence's feelings toward the Union's
arbitration attempt appeared to have changed with the
offer made her by Steiner on July 1.
Steiner obviously did not want to retain either Daven-
port or Etienne after the arbitration hearing. But he did
intend to retain Spence and Pearl Greene, dieticians who
had not testified at the arbitration but who were the third
and fourth in line of seniority. His plan was to give Spence
and Pearl Greeae the titles of "assistant food service
director" and "kitchen manager," respectively, both
supposedly supervisory positions, thus apparently remov-
ing the two from the unit and from the seniority clause
contained in the collective-bargaining agreement. As it
happened, Steiner had let the assistant director's job
remain vacant since September 1971. The kitchen manag-
er's job had been unfilled since May 1972 and remained
that way at least until October 1972.
Under these circumstances it seems quite clear that
Spence's "promotion" was purely verbal and made, in fact,
only for the purpose of avoidance and evasion of the
arbitration and the Union's collective-bargaining agree-
ment. During the weeks the Employer put Spence "on ice"
working at her home, she could under no circumstances
have exercised any of her alleged supervisory duties. Her
testimony as well as her affidavit prove that neither before
nor after her return to the nursing home from being "on
ice" did Spence exercise any supervisory functions. She
was merely teaching the new "diet clerks" how to call the
food line in place of the dismissed dieticians-when
Spence was not calling that line herself as she had done
previously. This was all unit work. Spence was not a
supervisor. I so find.
As Spence was still doing unit work even after July 2,
1972, she, like all the other employees in the unit, was
subject to the terms and conditions of the collective-
bargaining agreement between the Employer and the
Union.14
This finding that Spence was not a bona fide supervisor
at the time of her discharge in a fact concludes this unfair
labor practice case. As Spence was not a supervisor, it
necessarily follows that the Union could not have been
coercing the Employer in the selection of its agent for
collective bargaining or handling of grievances. Hence the
Union could not have violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the
Act.
Even if it could be found that Spence was in fact a bona
fide supervisor here, it is still highly doubtful that
14 Birmingham Country Club, 199 NLRB 854.
15 See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 134,
AFL-CIO v. N L R B, 487 F2d 1143 (C A D.C.. 1973) Contra: N L R B v.
487
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) for the reason that
its actions here were in no way related to or prompted by
any supervisory action taken by Spence 15 of which, of
course, there were none in the instant case.
In view of the Board's recent preoccupation with
deferring unfair labor practice cases to arbitration in an
ever increasing number under the Collyer'6 theory, the
question may arise why that procedure was not followed
here. It is clear that the instant unfair labor practice case
stemmed from and grew out of the arbitration award of
June 14, 1972, relating to the dismissal of the five
dieticians. Under these circumstances it might well appear
perfectly logical to defer-or refer-this matter to the
arbitrator so that he could take care of his own and at the
same time incidently ' help relieve the Board's allegedly
burgeoning caseload. This is especially so as the Board has
apparently taken the position that it is "inconceivable" to it
that an arbitrator would not consider the unfair labor
practice aspects of a case during an arbitration.17
However there were several reasons for not following
that procedure here. When the idea was suggested at the
hearing, neither General Counsel nor Respondent's attor-
ney expressed any enthusiasm for the idea although on
August 15 Pagan actively sought to reopen the award. Of
course the Employer was not represented there. Then,
although Spence had been a sort of "class action" grievant
during the original arbitration, and favored the arbitration
at that time, her position subsequently underwent a
change. Hence it was doubtful if either General Counsel,
Respondent, or the Employer could, or would, have
adequately presented her present position. Nor, in all
probability, would she have been financially able to appeal
from an adverse award whereas General Counsel can-and
hopefully will-appeal this decision. Finally, and most
importantly, once all the evidence had been presented in
the instant case which could have been presented to the
arbitrator, why expend the time and the money on another
arbitration hearing sometime in the future when it is, or
should be , clear that time is of the essence in handling
labor problems?
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in this case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 144, Hotel , Hospital , Nursing Home & Allied
Service Employees ' Union, Service Employees Internation-
al Union , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Charles A. Sigety, d/b/a Florence Nightingale
Nursing Home at all times material herein, has been and
now is an individual engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. Local 144, Hotel , Hospital , Nursing Home & Allied
Service Employees ' Union , Service Employees Internation-
al Union , AFL-CIO, has not herein committed any
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. 486 F 2d 602 (C.A 7, 1973).
IB 192 NLRB 837
17 Gulf States Asphalt Company, 200 NLRB No 100
488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the ORDER 18
following recommended:
I hereby recommend that this case be dismissed in torn.
18 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings . Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order , and all objections
conclusions , recommendations , and recommended Order herein shall, as thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes