Local 1066, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Etc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 2, 1962

137 N.L.R.B. 45 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

LOCAL 1066, INT'L LONGSHOREMEN' S ASS 'N, ETC. 45
activity, showed that it was not to Respondent 's interest that she be retained in its
employ . The record made by General Counsel does not warrant a holding that in
the context of this case the words stated by McGrath carried the special meaning
that she had joined the Union or had engaged in union or other concerted activity.
There was no burden on Respondent to show that the words did not have this special
meaning.
Dagan's testimony in regard to her disposition of .the check Respondent sent to her
in error discloses to the Trial Examiner that her credibility was not of the caliber
that would justify accepting her testimony at face value , but, on the other hand, was
of a nature that calls for a careful analysis of testimony . Garfield's testimony did
not strengthen General Counsel 's case. Riley 's. testimony at most showed that
the Union was engaged in organizational activity and that Respondent was aware of
it. It did not disclose that Respondent had knowledge of Dagan 's participation in it.
In sum , my evidentiary findings show that while the evidence . discloses there could
have been an illegal motive as well as a legal motive behind the discharge , it fails to
disclose that an illegal motive was present.
For the above reasons, I conclude and find that General Counsel has failed to
prove the allegations of his complaint by substantial evidence . on the record con-
sidered as a whole . I will, therefore , recommend that the complaint be dismissed
in its entirety.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent A.P.W. Products Co., Inc ., is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act, and United Papermakers and Paperworkers,
.AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Respondent has not engaged in conduct violative of Section 8 ( a)(1) and (3)
of the Act, as alleged in the complaint.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Local 1066 , International Longshoremen 's. Association, AFL-
CIO, and its agents Edward Dalton and Paul Callinan and
Wiggin Terminals, Inc. Case No. 1-CC-290. May 2, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 17, 1961, Trial Examiner Albert P. Wheatley issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the. Respondent, Local. 1066, had engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
,certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Coun-
sel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and briefs in support
thereof.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
-it the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire
record in this case, including the Intermediate Report and the excep-
tions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following
modifications.'
I The General Counsel excepts to the omission of Edward Dalton and Paul Callinan
from the recommended order and notice . Since Dalton and Callinan were the principal
actors in the dispute with Renault which culminated in the slowdown against Bay State,
we find merit in this exception and, accordingly , amended the conclusions , order, and
motice to hold Dalton and Callinan individually liable.
137 NLRB No. 3.
46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
There are three employers involved in this proceeding : Wiggin
Terminals, which operates a marine terminal at the port of Boston;
Bay State Stevedoring, which provides stevedoring services at the
same port ; and Renault Distributors, which imports and distributes.
the Renault automobile in the New England area. Before June 28,,
1961, Renault had handled imports at the port of Boston in the fol-
lowing manner : cars were unloaded at the dock by Bay State and
then hauled away on trailer trucks to a facility about 20 miles from the
port. Under this procedure, it usually took several days to clear a
shipload of automobiles from the dock area. The longer it took to
clear the imports the more work was available for the clerks, who
were employed by Bay State and were represented by Respondent
Union.
In June 1961, Renault decided to change its method of handling
the imports. To do this, it leased space at the Wiggin terminal to
which it proposed driving the newly unloaded cars directly from the
dock with employees borrowed from Wiggin. This would have re-
sulted in quicker removal of the cars from the dock and, hence, less
work for the clerks. The Respondents objected to the new procedure
and made known their objections first to Wiggin and then to Renault.
The Respondents told both these companies that the cars would not
be moved from the dock area unless the clerks were guaranteed 5 days'
pay after completion of the discharge of a vessel. The Respondents-
said that they had such a guarantee from Saab and Volkswagen, other
importers of foreign cars, and that Renault should give a similar
guarantee. It is significant in this connection that no request for a
5-day guarantee was made to Bay State, which was the employer of
the clerks. Renault agreed to give guarantee. When Wiggin was
asked if this assurance by Renault was satisfactory, Wiggin replied
that it did not employ the clerks and that any agreement should be
made with their employer, Bay State.
On June 28, 1961, the SS Vire docked at the port of Boston with a,
shipload of Renault cars. The unloading was completed on the fol-
lowing day. On June 30, before the unloaded cars could be removed
from the dock, Renault called the Respondents to say that the 5-day
work guarantee was withdrawn because officials in New York would
not approve it. Thereupon the executive board of Respondent Union
approved a slowdown procedure for handling the Renault car im-
ports which was outlined by the chief clerk for Bay State, Respondent
Callinan, a union member,' which, when carried out, resulted in such
delay in clearing imports that Renault reverted to its old procedure of
having the imported cars trucked to its former out-of-town facility.
2 Although Bay State later agreed to the new procedure which resulted in the slow-
down, the facts show, as found by the Trial Examiner, that this agreement was not
voluntary
LOCAL 1066, INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASS'N', ETC. 47
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that Respondent Union's
primary dispute was with Renault, that Bay State was a secondary
employer, and that the Respondents induced employees of Bay State
to engage in a slowdown with an object of forcing Bay State to cease
handling products of Renault or to cease doing business with that
company, thereby violating Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act. More
specifically, we conclude that Respondents engaged in, and induced
the employees of Bay State to engage in, a, refusal to handle Renault's
cars or to cease doing business with Renault under the then existing
procedures.
Our dissenting colleagues view the dispute as "merely one of the-
myriad types of traditional primary disputes between employees and
their own employer [Bay State] respecting their wages and other
terms and conditions of employment." Whether a dispute is primary
or secondary must be determined on a case-by-case basis and not on
a priori assumptions. Here the Respondent's own conduct is revealing
and significant. The Respondents asked Wiggin and Renault, but not
Bay State, for the 5-day guarantee, pointing out that Saab and Volks-
wagen, foreign car importers like Renault, were giving such guarantee.
When Renault gave the requested guarantee, the Respondents pro-
fessed themselves satisfied, and when Renault withdrew the guarantee,
the Respondents instituted the slowdown procedure. It is apparent
therefore that the Respondents looked to Renault and not to Bay
State to satisfy their demands, just as Renault's competitors had al-
ready done, and that when Renault refused, the Respondents took
measures to force compliance with them. An analysis by Judge Al-
drich in a related case involving the same parties is pertinent here: 8
It may be admitted that if a union were to strike its employer
because it did not approve of handling certain types of goods, no,
matter what the reason was, it would lead to the cessation of busi-
ness between the manufacturer of the goods and the employer. If
this cessation were the incidental result of a primary dispute with
the employer it would not be a secondary boycott. But in the
case at bar the union is refusing to work on certain goods as part
of a direct move against the third party, the person with whom
the dispute really lies. The test is one of purpose, not effect.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, we find, on the facts as they appear in this case, that
Respondent Union's real dispute was with Renault which therefore
was the primary employer and that Bay State was a secondary em-
ployer. Hence, the inducement of Bay State's employees to engage in
a slowdown for an objective proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (B) was
unlawful.
3Bernard L Alpert v Local 1066, International Longsho,omnen's Assn (Te,tninal
Ope,ators , Inc ) 116 F Supp 22, 25 (D C Mass )
48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The dissent also charges the majority with "inferentially also hold-
ing that it would have been lawful in the circumstances of the present
dispute for these employees to have engaged in economic action-pick-
eting, for example-against Renault" but unlawful to engage in a
strike against their own employer. There is only one question posed
by this case and only this question is answered, namely, whether, in
inducing a slowdown by Bay State 's employees, the Respondents
engaged in unlawful conduct. We have not decided inferentially or
otherwise whether and to what extent picketing of Renault would or
would not be lawful.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case , and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents , Local 1066,
International Longshoremen 's Association, AFL-CIO, and its agents
Edward Dalton and Paul Callinan , its officers , representatives , agents,
successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging any individual
employed by Bay State Stevedoring Co., or any other person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in strikes
or refusals in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport , or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials , or commodities , or to perform any services , where an object
thereof is to force or require Bay State Stevedoring Co. to cease han-
dling products of or to cease doing business with Renault Distributors
Corporation.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at Respondent Union's business offices and meeting places
in Boston , Massachusetts , copies of the notice attached hereto marked
"Appendix A." 4 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Re-
gional Director for the First Region, shall, after being duly signed by
the authorized representative of the Respondent Union, and by Ed-
ward Dalton and Paul Callinan , be posted by the Respondent Union
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for a period of
60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the Regional
Director for the First Region for posting, Bay State Stevedoring Co.,
4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
LOCAL 1066, INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASS'N, ETC. 49
Wiggin Terminals, Inc., and Renault Distributors Corporation will-
ing, at all locations where notices to their respective employees are
customarily posted.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondents have taken
to comply herewith.
MEMBERS FANNING and B ROWN dissenting :
Bay State pays its employees, in the case of imported cars handled
by it, according to the length of time the cars remain in Bay State's
custody. Until the dispute under consideration here, Bay State re-
tained custody of shipments of Renault cars for approximately 5 days
and paid its employees accordingly for the number of days the cars
remained on its premises. The present dispute arose when Renault
arranged to withdraw its cars from Bay State within 1 or 2, rather
than 5 days, which had the effect of reducing the work and net wages
paid by Bay State to its own employees.' In an effort to prevent this
loss of work and income for the Bay State employees it represented,
the Union solicited Renault for a 5-day guarantee of work for all
shipments handled by Bay State's employees. Renault, at first ap-
parently agreed, but later refused, to guarantee that cars would
remain on Bay State's premises for 5 days. The Union and Bay State
employees thereupon addressed their demand to their employer (Bay
State) in the form of a slowdown to the extent of taking a full 5 days
to process the shipment of Renault cars.
The dispute thus presented here is, in our opinion, merely one of
the myriad types of traditional primary disputes between employees
and their own employer respecting their wages and other terms and
conditions of employment. Here, Bay State's employees were demand-
ing of their employer, Bay State, that Bay State continue giving
them 5 days' work and pay for each shipment of cars handled by
them in the course of their employment. While they were attempting
to achieve this objective within the framework of and without modi-
fying their existing collective-bargaining agreement with Bay State,
their objective was the same as it would have been, for example, had
they struck their employer to obtain a guarantee of 5 days' pay re-
gardless of how long Renault cars remained on Bay State's premises.
Had Respondents struck in support of the latter objective, there would
be no question about the primary nature of their activity. The funda-
mental character of the primary dispute involved herein is in no way
altered by the fact that the Respondents first appealed to Renault to
take action which it could have taken without disrupting or affecting
5 The change , however, did not affect Bay State's own income from Renault, insofar
as the record indicates , Bay State continued to be paid on the basis of a minimum 5-day
custodial period.
649856-63-vol. 137-5
50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
its business relationship with Bay State, and which would have made
it necessary for Respondents to move against their own employer.6
The usual strike over wages almost always has a proliferating effect
on the struck employer's business arrangements with his customers,
suppliers, and other employers. These other arrangements of the
struck employer similarly impinge materially on his own ability to
grant the wage and other employment demands of his striking em-
ployees. These effects and/or causes respecting so-called secondary
employers are nevertheless regarded as incidental so far as the Act is
concerned because they do not change the fundamental character of a
primary dispute between an employer and his employees over the
wages and terms and other conditions of their own employment. To
hold otherwise would, as the Supreme Court has stated, "ban most
strikes historically considered to be lawful, so-called primary ac-
tivity." I And the proviso to Section 8 (b) (4) (B) 8 itself under-
scores this congressional intention.
In holding that Bay State's employees in effect violated Section
8(b) (4) (B) by striking Bay State, our colleagues are inferentially
also holding that it would have been lawful in the circumstances of the
present dispute for these employees to have engaged in economic
action-picketing, for example-against Renault. In a dispute con-
cerning the terms and conditions of their own employment, we must
dissent to our colleagues' conclusions that the striking employees' em-
ployer is a neutral secondary employer and that another employer is
the primary employer; and we accordingly also disagree that it would
be lawful here to picket the other employer and unlawful to strike
their own employer.
We would dismiss the complaint.
e Retail Clerks Union Local 770, Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO v
N L R B. ( Food Employers' Council, Inc ), 296 F. 2d 368 , 373 (CAD C ) ; Plumbers and
Pipefitters Local No 471 , United Association of Journeymen if Apprentices of the Plumb-
ing if Pipefitting Industry of the United States if Canada , AFL-CIO (Wyckoff Plumbing),
135 NLRB 329
7Local 761 , International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Worker, AFI CIO c
N L R B. and General Electric Company, 366 U S 667, 672
8 "Provided, That nothing contained in this clause ( B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful , any primary strike or primary picketing"
[Emphasis supplied ]
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 1066, INTERNATIONAL LONG-
SHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF
BAY STATE STEVEDORING CO., WIGGIN TERMINALS, INC., AND
RENAULT DISTRIBUTORS CORPORATION
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
LOCAL 1066, INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASS'N, ETC. 51
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage any individual employed by
Bay State Stevedoring Co., or any other person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in strikes
or refusals in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services,
with an object of forcing or requiring Bay State Stevedoring
Co. to cease handling products of or doing business with Renault
Distributors Corporation.
LOCAL 1066, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
AssoCIATION, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
-------------------------------------
EDWARD DALTON, Business Agent
PAUL CALLINAN , Temporary Chief Clerk
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Regional Office (24
School Street, Boston 8, Massachusetts; Telephone Number, LAfay-
ette 3-8100) if they have any question concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges and amended charges duly filed by Wiggin Terminals, Inc., some-
times referred to herein as Wiggin , a complaint was duly issued herein against Local
1066, International Longshoremen 's Association , AFL-CIO, and its agents Edward
Dalton and Paul Callinan, charging violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i )(B) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended , herein called the Act . This proceeding
with all parties represented was heard before me, Albert P. Wheatley , the duly
designated Trial Examiner in Boston, Massachusetts , on September 26, 1961. At
the hearing , it was stipulated that the record before the Board in this proceeding
should be the same as the record before the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts , in the case of Bernard L . Alpert v. Local 1066, ILA, AFL-
CIO, at al ., Civil Action No. 61-586-C. After the close of the hearing the General
Counsel , the Charging Party, and the Respondents filed briefs which I have con-
sidered in the preparation of this report . The Charging Party and Respondents
also filed requests for findings of fact which findings are hereby adopted to the.
extent they are consistent with the findings of fact made in this report.
Upon the entire record I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESSES INVOLVED
Wiggin Terminals, Inc. (Wiggin), is a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the
operation of marine terminals in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including
warehousing and other facilities at the port of Boston. Wiggin annually receives
revenues in excess of $50,000 for the use of its facilities in the temporary storage
of goods and materials being shipped from various States to other countries.
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Wiggin annually receives revenues in excess of $50,000 from companies which an-
nually ship goods and materials valued at in excess of $50,000 to States other than
the States wherein the said companies are located.
Bay State Stevedoring Co., herein called Bay State, is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Furness Withy & Company. Furness Withy & Company is engaged in the steam-
ship business . Bay State is engaged in providing a stevedoring service in the port
of Boston , including the loading and unloading of ocean-going vessels and also
maintains records on cargo loaded and discharged . For this latter purpose, Bay
State employs clerks. Bay State pays the clerks hired by it for the handling of a
particular cargo from the time the cargo is unloaded until the cargo is delivered.
The clerks are hired for a particular job through a permanent clerk, who engages
the chief clerk for the cargo, who in turn hires the other clerks.
Bay State annually receives revenues in excess of $50,000 from services per-
formed in connection with the shipment of goods and materials in foreign countries
and various States in the United States.
Renault Distributors Corporation, herein called Renault, is a Massachusetts
corporation engaged in the business of importing and distributing or selling Renault
automobiles to dealers in the New England area. All Renault cars for this area are
received from France in the port of Boston . Renault annually ships to points outside
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts cars valued at over $50,000.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 1066, International Longshoremen 's Association , AFL-CIO , is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Facts
Prior to June 28 , 1961, Renault had used the following practice with reference to
receipt and distribution of Renault cars in this country. Upon arrival of a freighter
at Boston, Massachusetts, the automobiles would be unloaded onto the dock and
placed at what is called in the trade a "point of rest." 1 Thereafter, under a contract
with a company referred to as University Overland Express, Renault would cause
trailer trucks specially equipped for transportation of automobiles to remove the auto-
mobiles from the point of rest in lots of five, six, or seven cars per trailer to a
storage area in the town of Hingham , Massachusetts-about 20 miles from the point
of rest . Some of the cars were serviced at Hingham; others were moved to Water-
town, Massachusetts , for servicing . In any event , after servicing at one or the other
of these locations the cars were delivered to various Renault dealers in New England,
who in turn sold them to the ultimate purchasers.
Prior to July 1, 1961, Wiggm Terminals, Inc. (operators of the Marine Terminal
at Castle Island , South Boston ), entered into an oral arrangement with Renault
under which Renault was to lease an area on Castle Island , located about a quarter
of a mile from the point of rest . Renault planned to cause the vehicles to be driven
from the point of rest to this newly leased area where the cars would be serviced by
employees of Renault and delivered directly to Renault dealers. Renault planned
to have the cars driven from the point of rest to the leased area by individuals
borrowed from Wiggin Terminals, Inc. (by employees of Wiggin's temporarily on
loan to, in the pay of , Renault).
Under the "old procedure" involving the use of trailer trucks to carry the auto-
mobiles approximately 20 miles it took several days to clear all the automobiles from
the point of rest. Under the "new procedure" all the automobiles could be removed
from the point of rest to the newly leased area one-quarter mile away in 1 or 2 days.
Consequently , the new procedure meant several days less pay to the clerks of the
stevedoring company (Bay State Stevedoring Company), who received a full day's
pay for each day a portion of the cargo of automobiles remained at the point of rest.
The Union which represented these clerks (Local 1066) disapproved of the adoption
of this new procedure and acted in a manner calculated to discourage the use thereof.
The issue herein is whether this conduct is violative of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of
the Act.
The first cargo of Renault cars to be processed under the new procedure was to
be that of the SS Vire, arriving June 28, 1961 . On June 26 , 1961, Callinan, the chief
1 A temporary storage area while the cargo is in the custody and control of the stevedor-
ing company.
LOCAL 1066, INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASS'N, ETC. 53
clerk of the Vire cargo and a member of Local 1066, heard a .rumor that Renault
was going to follow the new procedure-was going to take delivery of the cars and
take them to the storage area on Castle Island. Callinan called Dalton, business agent
for Local 1066, and told him the rumor he had heard. Dalton told Callinan "to
stand by until something was more definite"-"until something happens."
About 8:30 a.m. on Tuesday, June 27, Dalton and Callinan came to the office of
Paul. J. Whipple, vice president of Wiggin Terminals, Inc., and asked Whipple what
the story was on the Renaults which were coming off the Vire. Whipple answered
that Renault had leased an area of land for the handling of its cars and that it was
anticipated that the cars would go into this area. Dalton told Whipple that "they
were not going to go anywhere unless the clerks were guaranteed 5 days after com-
pletion of the discharge of the vessel," 2 and went on to say that Wiggin Terminals,
Inc., had no right to lease land at Castle Island or to take anything for storage.
Whipple disagreed with Dalton and Dalton again indicated that he was going to insist
on a guarantee of "5 days." Dalton and Callinan then indicated that clerks had a
5-day guarantee concerning Volkswagens and that a similar guarantee should apply
to the delivery of Renaults. Dalton also referred to another dispute wherein ap-
parently a 5-day guarantee was sought but not obtained and remarked "we killed
the Pope and Talbot deal; this is the same thing and you are not going to do this."
Immediately following this conversation Dalton instructed McIntyre and Hurley
(officials of the Union which represented Wiggin employees) not to move the ve-
hicles until he (Dalton) "said it was O.K."
About 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, June 27, 1961, Callinan introduced Dalton to
Talraas, Renault's regional manager. At this time Dalton sought from Talraas a
5-day guarantee. After some discussion Talraas agreed to a 5-day guarantee pro-
vided he could move his units in his own manner and as soon as he wanted after
they were put at the point of rest (provided he could move the cars in accordance
with the new procedure outlined above). Dalton agreed to take this matter up with
the Union's executive board which he did that day. Later that same day Dalton
looked into Paul Whipple's office where Talraas and others were present and asked
Talraas if the agreement he had made earlier still stood. Upon receiving an affirma-
tive reply Dalton asked Whipple if the agreement was satisfactory to Wiggin.
Whipple replied that Wiggin had no right to accept any agreement, that it did not
employ Dalton or the clerks, and that any agreement should be made with Bay
State Stevedoring, the employer of the clerks involved.
On the following day, June 28, the Vire docked at Castle Island. Her cargo
consisted of 519 Renault automobiles. She commenced discharging cargo on that
day and completed discharge on June 29. No cars were delivered to the consignee
on either of these days, the cars remaining at dockside, at point of rest.
On Friday morning, June 30, there was a further meeting of the executive board
of Local 1066. Fitzgerald, the vice president, called the meeting to order. The
telephone then rang and Fitzgerald picked up one of the two receivers and listened to
the conversation that ensued between Dalton, who was at the meeting, and Talraas,
who was at the other end of the line. Talraas then told Dalton that he was not going
through with the 5-day guarantee agreement, that Talraas' superiors in New York
could not,go along on any arrangement of this type. Dalton told the meeting what
Talraas had said. Callinan was present at the meeting and then he outlined the pro-
cedures which he proposed to follow (and later did follow), including the inten-
tion which he had of requiring a signature for each car. Dalton and the executive
board agreeed that this was proper.
During the morning on June 30, Dalton told Whipple of Wiggin Terminals, Inc.,
"You are not going to put those cars in storage or lease any land to anybody on
Castle Island unless we get what we want " When Whipple remarked that it was not
Wiggin's business what Dalton got, Dalton said, "We don't care about that, you
are not going to store anything or lease any land to anybody on Castle Island unless
we say it is 0 K." Dalton also complained about the form of delivery order, claim-
ing that since Wiggin's regular employees were to be used as drivers of the Renault
cars, Wiggin should sign for the cars. Whipple disputed this position, claiming that
Wiggin was not taking custody of the cars. When the delivery order referred to was
presented to Callinan, be (Callinan) rejected it claiming that since men from Wiggin
Terminals, Inc., were going to drive the cars the delivery order should show delivery
to Wiggin rather than Renault. The order was subsequently accepted (that day)
after Talraas clipped his business card to the order and the pier superintendent for
Bay State Stevedoring Company (Nash) telephoned Callinan and instructed him to
deliver the cars on the order presented. Deliveries of the Renault cars then com-
2 A guarantee that the clerks would get at least 5 days' pay
54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
menced but in a very cumbersome and unusual manner. The Renault representative
was required to sign for each car individually (instead of for groups as had been
done in the past) at the office (instead of at the loading point). This required a
great deal of walking between the point of rest and the office. In addition, a detailed
inspection of cars not made under the old procedure was invoked. As a result
of this change of method of delivery which took place in Dalton's presence, only
11 cars were processed in the first hour of the new procedure as against processing of
at least 40 cars under the old procedure. Deliveries of cars stopped entirely when
Callinan left the point of rest to pick up a payroll and no further deliveries were
made until July 5, 1961.
Representatives of Local 1066 met with representatives of the Boston Shipping As-
sociation on Monday, July 3. Wiggin and Renault did not have representatives
at this meeting, inasmuch as they were not members of the shipping association.
Callinan was present along with others representing Local 1066. The principal
views expressed at this meeting concerned the procedure detailed above. At this
meeting it was agreed that the office (the clerks' shack) would be moved nearer
to the point of rest so as to eliminate the walking operation and that the drivers of
the cars would sign for the vehicles as they took them away. A pivotal issue herein
is whether this agreement was voluntary. With respect to this matter, James M.
O'Connor, president of Bay State and also representing Furness Withy & Company
at the meeting, testified as follows:
Q. As a result of that meeting was there some agreement that was reached
by the parties at that meeting?
A. Eventually there was an agreement reached.
Q. There was an agreement reached?
A. The men brought it on themselves, an agreement, they decided to do what
he wanted them to do.
Q. There was an agreement.
A. To perform, the operation, by their manner of means.
Q. What was your last statement?
A. By their manner and not by the Boston Shipping Association.
Q. Was there an agreement reached as to how-
A. Eventually an agreement was reached, yes, we gave in to them.
Q. In any event, there was an agreement reached as to how they would
operate, is that so?
A. Yes.
Q. And you agreed with the clerks as to how they would make deliveries
in behalf of Furness Withy or Bay State Stevedoring Company?
A. Under protest, yes, sir.
Q. You say under protest?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It was agreeable with your company, wasn't it?
A. It wasn't agreeable, no.
Q. Do you understand the question?
A. We gave in to them.
Q. Regardless of how you came about, the Company agreed they would
perform services for your company in a certain manner, isn't that so?
A. After we were forced-
In the light of the circumstances which caused this meeting to be held and O'Connor's
testimony quoted above, it appears and I find that the agreement was an "acquies-
cence" which was not free and voluntary.3
On Wednesday morning, July 5, deliveries were resumed. Renault at that time
supplied drivers from their own employment to drive the cars. Nineteen cars were
delivered. However, the Renault representative was required to sign separately for
each car. After these cars had been delivered, the clerks insisted that the drivers
sign for the cars rather than the Renault representative. During the afternoon 33
cars were delivered with the drivers signing for them. The next day only a small
portion of the cars in the aggregate having been taken to the storage area, Renault
had the balance of the 519 trucked to Hingham via University Overland Express
(Renault reverted to the "old procedure").
8 See Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL and
Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters and Nathan Fleisher ( Sand Door c6
Plywood Co ) v. N.L R B , 357 U.S. 93, 107.
LOCAL 1066 , INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASS'N, ETC. 55
Conclusions
Respondents would view this matter as a disagreement between Calhnan, the chief
clerk employed by Bay State for the delivery of cars to Renault, and his superiors
in the Bay State organization concerning the exact procedure to be followed in the
delivering of the cars. Such a view ignores too many facts and is entirely too lunited
in the light of the entire record. The record reveals that Callinan's requirement,
which was disputed by his superiors, was a tactic employed by Local 1066 to enforce
its demands made to Renault. In summary, the record reveals that Local 1066 had
a dispute with Renault and that in an effort to force Renault to capitulate to its
demands Local 1066 caused to be instituted among employees of Bay State an in-
efficient and cumbersome method of delivery of automobiles to Renault.
Local 1066 contends that the dispute herein was a disagreement between Bay
State and its employees concerning procedure-concerning the requirement of an
individual signature-and that this dispute was settled by the agreement reached be-
tween Boston Shipping Association (Bay State) and Local 1066. I cannot accept
this contention. Any dispute between Bay State and its employees was merely
incidental and a deliberate embroilment of Bay State in an effort to force Renault
to capitulate to the demands of Local 1066. It was not an actual dispute between
Bay State and its employees.
Local 1066 argues that assuming Bay State to be a secondary employer Re-
spondents' actions do not constitute unfair labor practices, "since Bay State has
voluntarily consented to the delivery procedure-to the interruption of operations.
As noted above, I find that Bay State "acquiescence" in the interruption of oper-
ations was not free.
The next question presented is whether the less efficient and less effective method
of delivery of automobiles was "a strike" within the meaning of the Act. As used in
the Act the term "strike" includes "concerted interruption of operations by employees"
and there is little or no doubt that Local 1066 brought about such interruption.
In view of the foregoing, I find and conclude that Local 1066 induced and en-
couraged employees of Bay State to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course
of "employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services"
with an object of forcing or requiring Bay State to cease handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of Renault and to cease doing business with Renault
and thereby violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Local 1066 has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation
of the Act, I recommend that Local 1066, to effectuate the policies of the Act, cease
and desist therefrom and take the affirmative action hereinafter specified.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In summary, I find and conclude:
1. The evidence adduced in this proceeding satisfies the Board's requirements for
the assertion of jurisdiction herein.
2. Wiggin Terminals, Inc., Renault Distributors Corporation, and Bay State
Stevedoring Co. are engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) of the Act.
3. Local 1066, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
4. The record herein reveals that Local 1066 had a dispute with Renault and with
Wiggin but not with Bay State Stevedoring Co., and that it caused a concerted
interruption of operations by Bay State employees which was calculated to cause
Renault and Wiggin to capitulate to the demands of Local 1066.
5. By inducing or encouraging employees of Bay State to engage in a strike or a
refusal in the course of their employment to perform services with an object of
forcing or requiring Bay State to cease doing business with Renault, Local 1066
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of
the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]