Local 117

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 14, 1957

117 N.L.R.B. 622 (N.L.R.B. 1957)

622 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. Mitchell Plastics, Inc., is engaged in commerce and in activities affecting com-
merce. Its operations constitute trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States within the meaning of Section 2 1(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 743, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Is a labor ,organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that the Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of
the Act have not been sustained.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Local 117, of United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO and The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc.
Local 117, of United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO and Silver Fleet Motor - Express, Incorporated
United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, AFL-CIO
and The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc.
United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America , AFL-CIO
and Silver Fleet Motor Express , Incorporated . Cases Nos.
10-CC-905, 10-CC-206, 1O-CC-f11, and 10-CC-21f. March 14,
1957
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 11, 1956, Trial Examiner Arthur E. Reyman issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondents
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case , and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, as modified hereafter.'
1. The Trial Examiner found in substance that, by picketing, the
Respondents induced and encouraged employees of various secondary
employers to cease work as a means of compelling the secondary em-
ployer to discontinue business with the primary employer. We agree.
The Trial Examiner, however, based his conclusions in this respect on
the fact that the requirements for "ambulatory situs" picketing, as
1 The Respondents ' request for oral argument is hereby denied , as the record , including
the exceptions and brief , adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties.
117 NLRB No. 94.
LOCAL 117 623
established by the Board in Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL
(Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547, had not been met, and
for the additional reason that the criteria laid down in Washington
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 107 NLRB 299, had not been met.
As the primary employer had a separate place of business at which
the Respondents could and did effectively publicize their dispute, we
hold, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Respondents' conduct was
unlawful under the rule laid down in the Washington Coca-Cola case
independently of any determination that the requirements for "ambu-
latory situs" picketing established in the Moore Dry Dock case, had or
had not been met.'
The Respondents contend that the Trial Examiner made inadequate
findings of fact-and erred in failing to make credibility findings to sup-
port his factual determinations. The Respondents do not otherwise
point out in what respect these fact findings are deficient. The Inter-
mediate Report does not specifically state that the Trial Examiner
credits any testimony. However, the General Counsel's case con-
sisted of stipulations of fact, a stipulation as to what a certain indi-
vidual would testify to if called as a witness, and undenied testimony
of witnesses.' In addition to setting forth the stipulations, the Inter-
mediate Report summarized the testimony of the witnesses, and stated :
"The stipulated facts set forth above and the uncontradicted testimony
of the witnesses called by the General Counsel and the witness called
by the Respondents, clearly show that the main facts in the case are
not in dispute." Based on the foregoing, the Trial Examiner con-
cluded that . . . "the Respondents engaged in the picketing described
and proved in order to induce and encourage the employees of the
secondary employers to engage in strikes . . . and that the Respond-
ents engaged in this picketing for the purpose or object of forcing
or requiring the secondary employers to cease doing business with"
the primary employer. Under all the circumstances, we credit all
material testimony introduced in this case, as set forth in the Inter
mediate Report, and adopt the factual findings of the Trial Examiner.
2. With respect to all the secondary picketing incidents set forth
in the Intermediate Report, except that at the premises of East Ten-
nessee and Western North Carolina Freight Lines, herein called East
Tennessee, the fact that the Respondents engaged in the picketing in
question is established either by stipuation or undenied testimony.
However, as to the incident at East Tennessee, the record shows only
that there was a picket there, and the lone picket is not identified by
name or otherwise. As the record is insufficient to establish that the
2 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, etc. (Barry Controls, Inc.), 116 NLRB
1470
8 The Respondents called one witness ; his testimony did not contradict the testimony
introduced by the General Counsel ; in fact, it lent support to the General Counsel's case.
624 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondents picketed at East Tennessee, we, unlike the Trial Ex-
aminer, find no violation of the Act with respect thereto and shall
accordingly issue no order based thereon.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Local 117, of
United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, AFL-CIO,
and United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, AFL-CIO,
their officers, representatives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from engaging in, or inducing or encouraging
the employees of The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., Silver Fleet Motor
Express, Incorporated, Robinson Freight Lines, and The Holston
Glass Company, Inc., or any other employer, to engage in a strike or
concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials or commodities, or perform any services, where an
object thereof is to force any of the aforesaid employers, or any other
employer or person, to cease doing business with Blue Ridge Glass
Corporation.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at the business offices of United Glass and Ceramic
Workers of North America, AFL-CIO, and in the business offices of
Local 117, of United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America,
AFL-CIO, in Kingsport, Tennessee, copies of the notice attached to
the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix A." 4 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region,
after being signed by official representatives of each of the Respond-
ents, shall be posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by them for a period of sixty (60) consecu-
tive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to members of Local 117 and the International are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other ma-
terial. The Respondents shall also sign copies of the said notice which
the Regional Director shall submit for posting, the Employer willing,
at the Kingsport, Tennessee, premises of the employers listed in Ap-
pendix B, attached to the Intermediate Report.
4 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations
of it Trial Examiner " in the caption thereof the words "A Decision and Order " In the
event this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall
be substituted for the words , "Pursuant to a Decision and Order ," the words , "Pursuant
to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
LOCAL 117 625
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region , in writing,
within ten ( 10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended.'
On May 9, 1956, The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., hereinafter sometimes called
Mason and Dixon, and Silver Fleet Motor Express, Incorporated, hereinafter some-
times called Silver Fleet, each filed a charge against United Glass and Ceramic
Workers of North America, AFL-CIO, and its Local 117, hereinafter sometimes
called the International and Local 117, respectively, charging that the International
and Local 117 had engaged and were engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (b), subsection (4) (A) of the Act; and on May 21, 1956,
Mason and Dixon and Silver Fleet filed amended charges charging violations of the
same section of the Act by Local 117 only (Cases 10-CC-205, 10-CC-206). On May
21, 1956, each of these employers filed a charge against the International '(Cases
10-CC-211, 10-CC-212), charging violations of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) 2 There-
after, on May 25, 1956, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board on behalf of the Board, by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, issued
a complaint against the International and Local 117, alleging contraventions of
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act On the issues drawn
by the complaint and certain oral admissions and denials made on behalf of each
of the Respondents by counsel, the case was heard before a duly designated Trial
Examiner on June 26, 1956.3
At the hearing the General Counsel and the Respondents were represented by
counsel and participated in the hearing. Full opportunity was afforded each party
to be heard, to introduce evidence relevant to the issues, and to argue orally upon
the record, to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to file briefs.
The General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent Unions presented oral argu-
ment which appears upon the record, and briefs were filed on behalf of the General
Counsel and the Respondents after the close of the hearing. Argument and briefs
have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial
Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESSES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIMARY EMPLOYER AND THE SECONDARY
EMPLOYERS INVOLVED HEREIN
At the hearing, the following allegations of the complaint were conceded and
stipulated to by counsel for the International and Local 117:
1 61 Stat 136 , 29 U S C Supp I, Sec. 141 et seq , herein called the Act
9 Section 8 (b) (4) (A) provides .
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of then employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or any employer or othei person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
peison, .
The complaint herein is a consolidated complaint, issued upon an Order consolidating
cases, entered by the Regional Director pursuant to Section 102 33 (b) of the Rules and
Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, Series 6, as amended.
42 3 7 54-5 7-vol 117-41
626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. The Mason and Dixon Lines , Inc., herein called Mason and Dixon , Silver
Fleet Motor Express, Incorporated , herein called Silver Fleet, Robinson Freight
Lines, herein called Robinson , and East Tennessee and Western North Carolina
Freight Lines, herein called East Tennessee , are all corporations having freight
terminals at Kingsport , Tennessee , where they are engaged in interstate trans-
portation of freight by motor carrier throughout the United States. During the
12 months ' period ended May 1, 1956 , each of said corporations received income
in excess of $100,000 from the interstate transportation of freight.
2. The Holston Glass Company, Inc., herein jointly with the corporations
named in paragraph 1 above, called the Secondary Employers , is a Tennessee
corporation having its principal office and place of business at Kingsport,
Tennessee , where it is engaged in the sale , distribution , and installation of
various types of glass. During the 12 months' period ended May 1, 1956,
said corporation sold and shipped finished products of a value in excess of
$ 50,000, directly to points outside of the State of Tennessee.
3. Blue Ridge Glass Corporation , herein called Blue Ridge , is a New York
corporation , having its principal office and place of business in Kingsport,
Tennessee , where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of glass products.
During the 12 months ' period ended May 1, 1956 , said corporation sold and
shipped finished products of a value in excess of $ 1,000,000 directly to points
outside of the State of Tennessee.
On the basis of the allegations of the complaint and the stipulations of counsel,
the Trial Examiner finds that each of the corporations mentioned in the above -quoted
paragraphs of the complaint is, and has, at all of the times material to 'the issues
of this case , engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of
the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America , AFL-CIO, and its Local
117, Respondents herein, are, and have been at all limes mentioned herein, labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that since on or about January 28, 1956, the Respondents
have been engaged in a strike against Blue Ridge and have been picketing its premises
in Kingsport , Tennessee , that on certain specific dates the Respondents picketed the
premises of the secondary employers with whom the Respondents had no labor
dispute; that the Respondents engaged in the picketing in order to induce and
encourage the employees of the secondary employers to engage in strikes or con-
certed refusals , in the course of their employment to use , manufacture , process,
transport , or otherwise handle or work on any goods , articles , materials, or com-
modities, or to perform services for their Employers , and that the Resnondents
engaged in this picketing for the purpose or object of 'forcing or requiring the
secondary employers to cease doing business with Blue Ridge.
The Respondent asserts that the allegations in the consolidated complaint asserting
certain incidents at Robinson on March 9, and April 21, at East Tennessee on April
26, and at Holston on May 1, are not founded on any charge and, therefore, are
beyond the jurisdiction of the Board and the testimony taken with reference to such
incidents is irrelevant , and the Respondents move to dismiss so much of the con-
solidated complaint as alleges such incidents and to strike out of the record all testi-
mony relating thereto, and to dismiss so much of the consolidated complaint as
relates thereto.
In support of their motion to dismiss and to strike , the Respondents correctly say
that the charges and amended charges in these several cases are signed only by Mason
and Dixon and by Silver Fleet; that the original charges in Cases Nos 205 and 206
related only to activities on the premises of the Charging Party and were against
the International and its Local 117, and further , that the amended charges in Cases
Nos. 205 and 206 cut down the charges so as to be only against Local 117 and added
separate charges in Cases Nos . 211 and 212 against the international.
In R. H. Osbrrnk Manufacturing Company, 104 NLRB 42, 43-44, the Board said:
The only purpose of the charge is to set in motion the Board's investigatory
machinery in order to determine whether a complaint should issue . There is
no requirement that the charge set forth each unfair labor practice to be litigated;
this is a function of the complaint . The Board is therefore free to add to its
complaint allegations of unfair labor practices discovered in the course of its
investigation , although not alleged in the charge, provided only that these did
LOCAL 117 627
not occur more than 6 months before the filing and the service of the original
charge. As the allegations of independent violations of Section 8 (a) (1) con-
tained in the complaint pertained to events which occurred within 6 months of
the filing and service of the original charge, the Respondent's argument based on
Section 10 (b) of the Act is hereby rejected.
See also N. L. R. B. v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F. 2d 748 (C. A. 9); N. L. R. B. v.
Westex Boot & Shoe Company, 190 F. 2d 12, enforcing 82 NLRB 497, rehearing
denied 190 F. 2d 556 (C. A. 5).
The allegations of the complaint to which the Respondents object are a part of
the whole course of conduct complained of and are closely related to the matters
set forth in the charges and amended Charges insofar as disclosed on the face of the
consolidated complaint. The motion of the Respondents to dismiss and to strike
is hereby denied.
Stipulated Facts
At the hearing it was stipulated between counsel that witnesses for the General
Counsel, if called, would testify to the following facts and that the Respondents
conceded that the testimony would be accurate:
A series of bargaining conferences were held between the primary employer, Blue
Ridge, and both Respondents, Local 117 and the International, representatives of
both appearing in the bargaining conferences; the parties executed a contract effective
January 30, 1955, and expiring January 28, 1956; thereafter a series of bargaining
conferences were held in an attempt to arrive at a new bargaining agreement upon
the expiration of the contract January 28, 1956, and at these conferences both the
International and the Local appeared and engaged in the bargaining negotiations;
the parties were unable to reach an agreement, with the result that at 12:05 a. in.,
January 29, 1956, the Respondents went on strike and set up a picket line at the
premises of the primary employer; and the strike "has continued down to the present
time, down to the present day."
The parties stipulated further:
That on March 5, 1956, an employee of Blue Ridge, B. L. Moser, was instructed
to deliver a loaded trailer and pick up an empty trailer at Mason and Dixon; that
when he left the Blue Ridge premises, about 4 p. in., he was followed by pickets in
an automobile; that upon arriving at the Mason and Dixon terminal, he placed the
loaded trailer at the dock of the terminal; that the pickets following him got out of
their automobile and picketed the premises of Mason and Dixon, picketing from
the street where the premises begin, a location of approximately 500 feet from the
point at which the trailer and truck had been parked at the terminal. It is agreed
among the parties that no request was made of Mason and Dixon for authority to
come onto the property to picket at the immediate location of the trailer and that
there was no attempt to go upon the property of Mason and Dixon; that the picketing
occurred on the street "immediately adjacent to the entrance of the property of that
Company." It is agreed that Moser was instructed by Mason and Dixon to wait
until 'the following morning to pick up the empty trailer. (The fact as to whether
the picketing continued after the driver left the premises was not stipulated.)
It is further stipulated that on March 9, 1956, Blue Ridge sent a load of glass to
Robinson's terminal in Kingsport, Tennessee; that on that occasion the Respondents
did not picket the premises of the terminal or Robinson, but that, however, a driver
of Robinson's was sent out of Knoxville, Tennessee, to the Kingsport terminal of
the freight lines to pick up this load and drive it to Knoxville; that he did pick up
the load and drive it to Knoxville, and was followed in an automobile by pickets
of the Respondent all the way to Knoxville; that he drove upon the premises of
Robinson in Knoxville and parked his truck and trailer at,the terminal immediately
adjacent to the street; that the pickets got out of their automobile and proceeded to
picket the premises of Robinson and continued to picket all of that day; that the
picketing was in the immediate proximity of the truck of Robinson which had the
so-called "hot cargo" upon it; and that the picketing continued on the street, not on
company premises, during the time the loaded truck was on Robinson's premises;
that the next day the truck and trailer were moved to a parking lot belonging to
Robinson across the street from the terminal and that the pickets then transferred
the situs of the picketing to the parking lot and proceeded there to picket; and that
in each instance the picketing was conducted on public property and not on company
premises.
It is further stipulated between the General Counsel and the Respondents that on
April 20, 1956, an employee of Blue Ridge, Belmer Harris, drove a truck and
trailer loaded with Blue Ridge Blass to the Silver Fleet terminal; that he was followed
by pickets in an automobile; that he did not unload the glass he had to deliver at
628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Silver Fleet because he had been instructed that if a picket line formed, he was not
to unload the shipment; that he backed the truck up to a Silver Fleet trailer which
was loaded with an incoming shipment for Blue Ridge; that for approximately 11/2
hours thereafter he transferred the incoming shipment from the Silver Fleet trailer
to his truck; that during this time a picket line picketed the terminal property during
the entire time he was on the premises; and that when he left the premises the pickets
followed him and ceased to picket at the premises of Silver Fleet.
In this connection the Respondents do not stipulate as to the accuracy of the
stipulation as to fact, but do stipulate that if called to testify by the General Counsel,
the division manager of Silver Fleet, eastern division, would testify that the picketing
on April 20, 1956, at the Silver Fleet terminal was effective in that there was a work
stoppage so long as the picketing continued at those premises; and that the Silver
Fleet employees did honor the picket line by refusing to work so long as the picket
line was up. The Respondents deny knowledge as to the work stoppage alleged to
have occurred at the Silver Fleet terminal.
It was further agreed between the General Counsel and the Respondents that each
of the secondary carriers named above was covered by an agreement between it and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, AFL (Southern Conference Local Freight Forwarding, Pick-up and
Delivery Agreement for the period June 21, 1955, to January 31, 1961) containing
the usual "hot cargo" Teamsters' clause with reference to crossing a picket line. An
agreement called the Southeastern Area Over-the-Road Motor Freight Agreement
covering the period February 1, 1955, to January 31, 1961, containing the "hot
cargo" clause is also in evidence. The over-the-road agreement likewise covers each
secondary carrier and is with the Teamsters' Union. The "hot cargo" clause in
each of these agreements reads as follows:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be cause for dis-
charge if any employee or employees refuse to go through the picket line of
a Union or refuse to handle unfair goods. Nor shall the exercise of any rights
permitted by law be a violation of this Agreement. The Union and its members,
individually and collectively, reserve the right to refuse to handle goods from
or to any firm or truck which is engaged or involved in any controversy with
this or any other Union; and reserve the right to refuse to accept freight from,
or to make pickups from, or deliveries to establishments where picket lines,
strikes, walkout or lockout exist.
At the hearing, the following colloquy took place:
TRIAL EXAMINER: Let me ask you, Mr. Patton, my recollection is that one
portion of the stipulation this morning was to the effect that the employees of
Mason and Dixon, who are so-called secondary employees, employed members
of the Teamsters' Union. That is, they are the only ones that we are concerned
here with respect to refusing to go through a picket line?
Mr. ROTHBARD [for Respondents]: That is right.
Mr. PATTON [for General Counsel] : As far as we know, they are the ones
involved in the work stoppage. I am a little hesitant, at this time, to make a
positive statement that there were no other employees that could work. I'll be
glad to ascertain that fact. I am not sure that it is particularly necessary. I
just want to be sure in my own mind what the content of the stipulation was.
Mr. ROTHBARD: That is substantially correct .4
The parties have stipulated and agreed that the picket sign carried on each of the
above-mentioned occasions which had been stipulated to and admitted on the record
read:
Please do not help move Blue Ridge glass.
Local 117 is on strike at Blue Ridge
* The extent to which the stipulation concerning picketing is to be viewed is stated by
counsel for the Respondent Unions at the hearing:
. Our position is this, the only times we picketed were the times we have stipu-
lated to that we did picket and that was a time when a Blue Ridge employee was
making a delivery of Blue Ridge glass to the terminal We say we weie picketing
at those occasions We were picketing the Blue Ridge employees, the primary
employer's employees making'a delivery of Blue Ridge glass at these truck terminals
where the truck company was under contract with the Teamsters' Union with a
"hot cargo" clause in its contract That is the only kind of picketing we concede
we did
LOCAL 117 629
The Testimony Concerning Facts not Stipulated or Agreed
According to the testimony of Edgar W. Lane, terminal manager of Mason and
Dixon , there was a short work stoppage at the Mason and Dixon terminal on March
5 when, according to the stipulation herein, Moser, an employee of Blue Ridge Glass,
delivered a loaded trailer to Mason and Dixon with instructions to pick up an empty
trailer there. Moser, the driver of the Blue Ridge Company, on this day was driv-
ing a Blue Ridge trailer of Mason and Dixon which had been leased by Blue Ridge
from Mason and Dixon ; after driving this trailer onto the premises of Mason and
Dixon, he disconnected the truck from the trailer and left the premises and the
truck; that the picketing continued after he had left the premises ; that so long as the
trailer with the Blue Ridge glass remained upon the premises the picketing continued;
that the trailer was moved sometime between midnight and 12:30 a . in., and when
it was moved the pickets left the premises . The picketing at Mason and Dixon
premises on this day was effective in that there was a work stoppage of some 5 or
6 hours and that the employees of Mason and Dixon did honor the picket line and
ceased their work activities.
Earnest Barrett, an employee of Holston, testified that on April 26, he delivered
two cases of Blue Ridge glass to Eastern Tennessee for shipment ; that the cases had
not been labeled so that he was instructed upon his return to Blue Ridge to go back
to East Tennessee and label the cases. He said as he went in, there was a picket line
set up about 200 yards from the East Tennessee terminal , consisting of one man
"walking back and forth across the road." He testified that nothing whatsoever was
said to him , so he went on in and labeled the cases , and then returned to his work
at Blue Ridge. Edgar Lane, and other witnesses called by the General Counsel,
testified concerning incidents which occurred on May 1; Lane, A. E. Greene , terminal
manager for Mason and Dixon, Gene Bowers, road driver supervisor for Mason
and Dixon, and G. D. Lane, Jr., second shift foreman for Mason and Dixon, each
testified in effect that on May 1 , employees of Holston drove to Blue Ridge and
picked up a shipment of glass and drove back to the Mason and Dixon terminal
where they were told to take the glass back to Holston where Mason and Dixon
would pick it up later. During the time the Holston truck was at Mason and Dixon
a picket line was set up and lasted for something less than one-half hour. No
stoppage of work took place as the incident occurred at lunch time. On the same
day while the same Holston truck was at the Holston property, still loaded with
Blue Ridge glass, picketing occurred and when the truck was moved across the street
to a parking lot the picketing ceased. C. B. Duke, president of Holston, testified
that when the truck loaded with Blue Ridge glass came back from Mason and
Dixon, it first was pulled in against the front of the Holston plant , but not inside
the plant; but that, at 5 o'clock, closing time, it was pulled inside the plant and the
entrance door was shut and locked. He said the picketing continued from around
2:30 to 3 p. in., until 5 or shortly thereafter, that the pickets patroled the length of
the building in front of the entrance doors at about 10 to 15 feet away from where
the truck first was parked. He testified that the pickets again appeared on the follow-
ing morning; that the truck was still in the warehouse, but that about 8:30 a. in , it
was taken across the street and parked in a vacant lot. He said that about that time
the picket line was withdrawn, but that the "cars and the people in the cars remained
in observation of the truck , one on the outside of the street , one in the parking lot."
Calvin Mauk and Bruce Wade, the two Holston employees sent on May 1 to Blue
Ridge by Holston, picked up two cases of glass and then were sent to Mason and
Dixon to ship two other cases that were packed and upon being informed by two
Mason and Dixon officials that they would rather not accept the glass, they took
it back to Holston. Their testimony simply corroborates the stipulation as previously
entered and corroborates the testimony concerning picketing of the Holston property
on that day.
On May 1, according to testimony of certain supervisory personnel of Mason and
Dixon, the picketing at its terminal caused these officials to request a Holston driver
to remove the Holston truck and shipment from Mason and Dixon property, which,
as has been noted, the driver did. On the same day one of the drivers for Holston
was called a scab and another employee of Holston testified that he was told by a
picket (one Larkin, his cousin) that he ought to be ashamed of himself, the implica-
tion being that this employee should have observed the picket line set up by the
Blue Ridge strikers.
Nowhere in the record does it appear that the Respondent Unions or any of their
members had a dispute with any one of the neutral employers whose premises were
picketed at the times mentioned.
630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Don Burger, president of District 2 of the International and a member of the
General Executive Board of the International, testified on behalf of the Respondents.
He said that Local 117 is in his district; that he participated in the contract negotia-
tions with Blue Ridge and was in charge of strike activities; that he knew nothing of
any picketing at Holston or of Holston employees, or at Mason and Dixon on
May 1, or at East Tennessee on April 26; that he ordered no picketing at Mason and
Dixon or anywhere else where the Holston employees were; and that there was no
such picketing to his knowledge. He testified further that during the strike, some
of the union members discussed with him the possibility of picketing Holston and
his instructions were that Holston was a nonunion outfit and "they could lend
nothing to, or take nothing away from, what they might do" and, therefore, the
members should not do any picketing at all at Holston; that to his knowledge, none
was done. His instructions, he said, were to the effect that if the union pickets
saw any of the employees of Blue Ridge leave the Blue Ridge plant they were to
follow that truck and set up a picket line against such employee of Blue Ridge .5
The "Hot Cargo" Clauses in the Teamsters' Contracts
The Respondents contend that because of the existence of the "hot cargo" clauses
in the Teamsters' contracts, it was lawful for the employees of the carriers to refuse
to handle the Blue Ridge glass and, hence, any act of the Respondent, in inducing
such lawful activities, could not be an unfair labor practice proscribed by the Act.
It is argued on behalf of the Respondents that even assuming they had actually
solicited the employees of the secondary employer not to handle the "hot glass,"
the Respondents were still within their legal rights and by such conduct did not
violate any section of the Act. They rely on Madden v. Local 442, 114 Fed. Supp.
932, and cite Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass), 105 NLRB 740, quoted in the Madden case.
Here the Respondents, the Glass Workers International, and its Local 117, were
not parties to the agreements which contain the "hot cargo" clauses. In effect, the
Respondent argues that the members of the Glass Workers unions had a perfect
right to advise members of the Teamsters, employed by the secondary employers,
of the existence of the dispute between the Glass Workers and the primary em-
ployer. It seems clear enough that the purpose the Respondent unions had in
mind in picketing the terminals and places of business of the secondary employers
was to let the employees of secondary employers know of the existence of that
dispute in the hope that the employees of the secondary employers would be
induced to refuse to handle the goods of the primary employer.
There is no evidence in the record here that anyone of the secondary employers
involved instructed any of its employees that they need not handle the "hot glass."
In Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. (Sand Door and Plywood),
113 NLRB 1210, the Board, while discussing "hot cargo" clauses in union agree-
ments, said that insofar as such contracts govern the relations of the parties thereto
with each other it did not regard it as the Board's province to declare such clauses
contrary to public policy. The Board went on to say:
However, we do not agree that Unions, which are parties to such contracts,
may approach employees of the contracting employer and induce or encourage
them to refuse to handle the goods of another employer with immunity from
the sanctions of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). In our opinion, such conduct consti-
tutes inducement or encouragement of employees to engage in a considered
refusal to handle goods for an object proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) no
less than it does in the absence of such agreement. Such conduct is contrary
to the express language of the Statute, and therefore cannot be validated by
the existence of a contract containing a "hot cargo" clause. In enacting
Section 8 (b) (4) (A), Congress intended to protect the public from strikes or
from concerted refusal interrupting the flow of commerce at points removed
from primary labor-management disputes.
We hold that, regardless of the existence of a "hot cargo" clause, any direct
appeal to employees by a Union to engage in a strike or concerted refusal to
5 None of the Blue Ridge strikers were identified by name except Carl Larkin, who
was said by Gale Johnson, an employee of Holston, to have been on the picket line at
Holston on May 1, 1956. The witness did not identify Larkin too positively as having
been an employee of Blue Ridge at that time Counsel for the Respondent made an
effort to locate Larkin (whose name he previously understood to be Lawson) without
spccess.
LOCAL 117 631
handle the product is proscribed by the Act when one of the objectives set
forth in Section 8 (b) (4) (A) is present. Accordingly, having found that
such conduct occurred, for a proscribed object, we conclude that the Re-
spondents violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A).
It seems clear enough that here the purpose of the picketing by the Glass Workers
of the premises of the secondary employers was to induce the Teamsters to cease
handling the goods of the primary employer and also to induce the secondary
employers to cease doing business with Blue Ridge. Certainly, it cannot be said
that the Respondent unions had a right to assume any rights under or protection to
be derived from whatever contract rights the Teamsters might have because of the
existence of the "hot cargo" clauses in their agreements with the secondary
employers.
Free Speech
Relying in part on the language of Section 8 (c) of the Act, it is argued for the
Respondent that since there is no evidence that there was any spoken threat of
reprisal of force or promise of benefit by the Respondents or the pickets to any
employee of any secondary employer, the expression in writing or orally by the
pickets could not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of the Acts The Respondents point out too that peaceful picket-
ing is protected by the 1st and 14th amendments and cite Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88, 102; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 113 and other cases holding
in general that publicizing the facts of a labor dispute by peaceful picketing is not
illegal activity and such dissemination of information to the general public by picket
signs or otherwise is protected activity under the 1st and 14th amendments.
The position of the Respondents in this regard would be well taken if the picket-
ing here had been confined to picketing the premises of Blue Ridge, the primary
employer. When the Respondents undertook to picket premises other than those
of the primary employer, where adequate opportunity obtained to publicize their
dispute, they removed themselves from a position of being able to invoke the bene-
fits of Section 8 1(c) and 'brought themselves within the purview of the provisions of
Section 8 (b) (4) (A).
The Effect of the Respondent's Activities
The stipulated facts set forth above and the uncontradicted testimony of the wit-
nesses called by the General Counsel and the witness called by the Respondents,
clearly show that the main facts in the case are not in dispute. From the testi-
mony of International Representative Burger, it is clear that the International
Unions did not attempt to inform the employees of the secondary employers, partic-
ularly those that engaged in work stoppages, that the picket line was aimed only at
Blue Ridge and not at the employees of the neutral contractors. It seems plain
enough that the Respondents, being unable to interrupt business between the sec-
ondary employers and the primary employer by direct picketing at the premises of
Blue Ridge, then tried to accomplish that objective through a picket line appeal to
employees of the secondary employers. It should be noted, too, that the main
situs of the picketing was at the plant of Blue Ridge, located in Kingsport, and that
the secondary picketing was conducted at or near the premises of the secondary
employers in the same city. Obviously, the Respondents were able to inform all
of the employees of Blue Ridge of the nature of the dispute between the parties
by picketing at the premises of Blue Ridge. Drivers of Blue Ridge trucks, engaged
in delivering Blue Ridge glass to Holston and to the terminals of the other secondary
employers, made several, if not many trips 'a day from the Blue Ridge plant to the
premises of the other employers.
The area -of dispute here is between the asserted right of the Respondents to
conduct the strike and picketing in the way they did, against the charge by the
General Counsel that the Respondents' activities were engaged in to induce and
encourage employees of the secondary employers to engage in strikes or con-
certed refusals, in the course of their employment to transport or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform services
for their employers, and further that the Respondents engaged in the picketing for
6 Section 8 (c) provides as follows
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the purpose or object of forcing or requiring the secondary employers to cease doing
business with Blue Ridge.
In support of their position that the picketing which took place, limited to times
when Blue Ridge employees had a work situs at the places picketed, must be viewed
as permissible primary strike activity insulated by Sections 7 and 13, from the sec-
ondary boycott provisions of the Act, the Respondents rely on N. L. R B v. Business
Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics, etc., Local 459 (Royal Typewriter Com-
pany), 228 F. 2d 553 (C. A. 2), certiorari denied 351 U. S. 962. The facts in that
case are considerably different from the facts of the instant case. In Royal Type-
writer, after a strike of employees of that Company, the Union picketed some of
Royal Typewriter's larger customers in the belief that they were having independent
companies do repair work on Royal contract machines. In that case, work nor-
mally performed by the strikers actually was being performed at the premises of
the secondary employer and the premises of the secondary employers became the
primary situs for farmed-out work.
The Board, in Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92
NLRB 547, distinguished between permissible primary action and illegal secondary
action by setting out four criteria, all of which it stated, must be met for the picket-
ing to be ruled primary and therefore permissible. The Board said, in part:
We believe that picketing of the premises of a secondary employer is primary
if it meets the following conditions; (a) the picketing is strictly limited to times
when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises;
(b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal
business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to
the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the
primary employer.?
Since its decision in Moore Dry Dock, the Board in ambulatory situs situations such
as the one existing in the instant case, has in effect added to the four criteria ex-
pressed in Moore Dry Dock a fifth one, to the following effect: that such picketing
at neutral premises, as of trucks of a primary employer while making deliveries to
customers, will not be regarded as privileged primary picketing in the absence of
a showing that the primary employer has in the vicinity no permanent establishment
that may be effectively picketed. Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.,
107 NLRB 299; Thurston Motor Lines, Inc, 110 NLRB 748; Associated General
Contractors of America, Inc., Georgia Branch, 110 NLRB 2192; National Truck-
ing Company, 111 NLRB 483; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company of Alabama, 112
NLRB 30; Cisco Construction Co., 114 NLRB 27 8
On August 8, 1956, the Board issued its decision and order in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, etc., Local No. 659, AFL-CIO, etc., (As-
sociated General Contractors Employers Association of Omaha, Nebraska, Inc.). In
its decision, the Board (116 NLRB 461) said:
Part of the Respondent Unions' alleged unlawful conduct consisted of follow-
ing the trucks of Ready Mixed, the primary employer, to the job sites of A. G. C.
members and picketing these sites during the delivery of Ready Mixed con-
crete products. Relying on the Board's decisions in the Washington Coca Cola
[Brewery and Beverage Drivers and Workers (Washington Coca Cola Bottling
Works, Inc.), 107 NLRB 299 enfd. 220 F. 2d 380 (C. A., D. C.) and Campbell
Coal Company Sales Drivers, etc., Local Union 859, 110 NLRB 2192; enforce-
ment denied 229 F. 2d 594 (C. A., D. C.), certiorari denied (U. S. Supreme
Court) 38 LRRM 22111-cases, the Trial Examiner found that this picketing
was per se unlawful because Ready Mixed, the primary employer, had a fixed
place of business in the area of dispute. Alternatively, the Trial Examiner
found the picketing to be unlawful because the record as a whole indicated that
the objects of this picketing was not to publicize the Respondents' dispute with
Ready Mixed, but rather unlawfully to induce the employees of the A. G. C.
members involved not to handle Ready Mixed products and therefore caused
the A. G. C. members not to do business with Ready Mixed. In agreeing with
° The criteria spelled out by the Board in Moore Dry Dock has been upheld as valid in
N. L. R. B v Service Trades Chauffeurs, etc., 191 F 2d 65, 68 (C. A. 2) ; N. L. R. B. v.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters, etc, 212 F 2d 216, 219 (C A 7) , N L R B v Associated
Musicians of Greater New York, etc., 226 F. 2d 900 (C. A. 2) ; Piezonki v. N L. It. B.,
219 F 2d 879, 883 (C A 4)
s Compare Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc., 87 NLRB 502, where the primary em-
ployer had no fixed location in the vicinity where its employees could be effectively
apprised of a labor dispute through picketing
LOCAL 117 633
the Trial Examiner that this picketing violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the
Act, the Board adopts both grounds relied upon by him.
The Board, on December 30, 1954, issued a Decision in Sales Drivers, Helpers cE
Building Construction Workers Local 859, etc. (Campbell Coal Company), 110
NLRB 2192, in which it was found that the Respondent had violated Section 8 (b)
(4) (A) of the Act by picketing the workplaces of certain secondary employers to
induce or encourage employees of those employers to engage in a strike with an
object thereof to force said employers to cease doing business with Campbell Coal
Company. To remedy the violation found the Board ordered the Respondent to
cease and desist from the conduct found to be unlawful and to take certain affirma-
tive action. In its decision the Board rejected the Respondent's contention that its
picketing of workplaces occupied by secondary employers fell within the area of per-
missible conduct recognized by the Board in Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB
547, and Stover Steel Service, 108 NLRB 1575, and applied its reasoning, as ex-
pressed in Washington Coca Cola Bottling Company, 107 NLRB 299, that picketing
at a common situs occupied by both the primary employer and secondary employers
is unlawful where the employer has a place of business in a locality occupied by it
alone which can be adequately picketed The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's Order (229 F. 2d 594), and
remanded the case to the Board, saying in part:
Since the decision of the Board, as shown by its findings and reasoning, turns
upon the fact of concerted activity at a common situs where one not common
was available, we will set aside the order, notwithstanding the picketing had in-
cidental effect upon employees of neutral employers, but will remand the case
to the Board for its further consideration, if desired. Otherwise, our decision
would constitute an approval of a rigid rule which the language of the statute
does not support.
The Board's petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court,
351 U. S. 972. After remand, the Board on September 7, 1956, issued a Supple-
mental Decision and Order, 116 NLRB 1020. In its Supplemental Decision, the
Board wrote:
The Respondent contends that its picketing was limited to the employees of
Campbell Coal and was not intended to induce a concerted refusal to work by
employees of the neutral contractors. The Respondent' s position is, in our
opinion, directly refuted by the evidence set forth above. Unable to cause a
cessation of business between certain neutral contractors and the primary em-
ployer by direst appeal to the former the Respondent sought to accomplish that
objective through a picket line appeal to employees of the secondary employers.
Only those employers who refused to accede to the Respondent's demands that
they cease doing business with Campbell Coal were picketed. When employees
of these employers ceased working as a direct result of the picketing, the picket
line had accomplished the Respondent's previously revealed objective of putting
pressure on neutral employers to force them to cease doing business with the
primary employer. No attempt was made by the Respondent to inform strik-
ing employees that the picket line was aimed only at Campbell Coal and not at
the employees of neutral contractors. As the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia indicated in its decision, evidence of this nature has been held
sufficient to establish the unlawful object of picketing under Section 8 (b) (4).
N. L. R. B. v. Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Local 802, 226 F.
2d 900 (C. A. 2).
A consideration of all these elements in the record, including, but not limited to,
the fact that the Respondent could have effectively picketed Campbell Coal at
its own business premises in the area, persuade us that the Respondent had vio-
lated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) within the meaning of the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, remanding this case to the Board for
further consideration, if desired.
These recent decisions of the Board in Associated General Contractors Employers
Association (116 NLRB 461) and Campbell Coal Company (116 NLRB 1020), in
each of which the Board has adhered to the principles expressed by it in Washington
Coca Cola (107 NLRB 299), impel the Trial Examiner to apply the principles enun-
ciated by the Board in those cases to the facts in the case at bar.
Concluding Findings
The General Counsel contends, and the Trial Examiner believes correctly, that
only the second of the four criteria established in Moore Dry Dock (that the trucks
634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
must be engaged in the normal business of the trucking company) has been met
here. The fifth condition, that picketing at neutral premises of trucks of a primary
employer while making deliveries to customers will not be regarded as privileged
primary picketing absent a showing that the primary employer has in the vicinity
no permanent establishment that may be picketed effectively, clearly has not been
met. It would seem that a finding on the facts that existing Board criteria has not
been adhered to by the Respondents herein would require this Trial Examiner
to make a finding of violations of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) without going further.
Further than this, the application of existing case law to the facts herein impels the
Trial Examiner to find that the record, as a whole, will support a finding here that
the picketing engaged in was aimed toward inducement of secondary employees in
a manner prohibited and proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A). Accordingly, it is
found that in full context as disclosed by the record herein, the Respondents en-
gaged in the picketing described and proved in order to induce and encourage the
employees of the secondary employers to engage in strikes or concerted refusals, in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform
services for their employers; and that the Respondents engaged in this picketing for
the purpose or object of forcing or requiring the secondary employers to cease
doing business with Blue Ridge.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operation of the employers set forth in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in activities violative of Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act, it will be recommended that they cease and desist
therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., Silver Fleet Motor Express, Incorporated,
Robinson Freight Lines, East Tennessee and Western North Carolina Freight Lines,
and The Holston Glass Company, Inc., are engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
2. United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, AFL-CIO, and Local
117, of the United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, AFL-CIO, are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By inducing and encouraging employees of The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc.,
Silver Fleet Motor Express, Incorporated, Robinson Freight Lines, East Tennessee
and Western North Carolina Freight Lines, and The Holston Glass Company, Inc.,
to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
use, process, handle, or work on products of Blue Ridge Glass Corporation, and/or
to perform services for their respective employers, with the object of forcing and
requiring such employers to cease doing business with Blue Ridge Glass Corporation,
the Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF UNITED GLASS AND CERAMIC WORKERS OF NORTH
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, AND TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 117, OF UNITED GLASS
AND CERAMIC WORKERS OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, we hereby notify you that:
LOCAL 135 635
WE WILL NOT engage in or induce or encourage employees of The Mason
and Dixon Lines, Inc., Silver Fleet Motor Express, Incorporated , Robinson
Freight Lines , East Tennessee and Western North Carolina Freight Lines, and
The Holston Glass Company , Inc., or of any other employer, to engage in a
strike or in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport , or otherwise handle or work on any goods , articles,
materials, or commodities , or to perform any services , where an object thereof
is to force or require any of the above-named employers , or any other employer
to cease doing business with Blue Ridge Glass Corporation.
UNITED GLASS AND CERAMIC WORKERS OF
NORTH AMERICA , AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated- ------------------ By-------------------------------------------(Representative ) ( Title)
LOCAL 117, UNITED GLASS AND CERAMIC
WORKERS OF NORTH AMERICA , AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be
altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
APPENDIX B
The Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc.
Silver Fleet Motor Express, Incorporated
Robinson Freight Lines
East Tennessee and Western North Carolina Freight Lines
The Holston Glass Company, Inc.
Local 135, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America , AFL-CIO and Capital
Paper Company and Consolidated Sales, Inc. Case No. 35-CC-
34. March 14,1957
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 24, 1956, Trial Examiner Robert E. Mullin issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.' The Board has considered the Inter-
IIn its exceptions , the Respondent urges that the Trial Examiner improperly admitted
hearsay evidence relating to certain statements and conduct of shop stewards at the
secondary employers premises involved herein to establish that the Respondent induced
or encouraged the secondary employees to refuse to handle the Charging Party's freight.
The Respondent contends that the General Counsel failed to establish that the shop
stewards were acting as agents for the Respondent and therefore evidence relating to their
117 NLRB No. 95.