LM Waste Service Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Oct 22, 2010

24-CA-010837 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 22, 2010)

JD(ATL)–20–10
Juana Diaz, PR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
LM WASTE SERVICE, CORP.
and CASES 24–CA–10837
24–CA–10894
UNION DE TRONQUISTAS DE
PUERTO RICO, LOCAL 901, IBT
and
MARVIN J. CARDONA, An Individual
and
DS EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, INC.
Party in Interest
Ayesha K. Villegas Estrada, Esq. and
Maria M. Fernandez, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Carlos George, Esq. (O'Neill & Borges), for the Respondent.
Jose Budet, for the Charging Party.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
KELTNER W. LOCKE, Administrative Law Judge. On June 10, 2009, I issued a
decision in this matter. By Order dated May 11, 2010, the Board remanded the case for further
findings and conclusions.
Complaint Paragraph 7
The Board remanded for further explanation the interrogation and solicitation allegations
raised in paragraphs 7(a) and (b) of the amended complaint (the complaint). Paragraph 7(a)
JD(ATL)–20–10
2
alleges that Respondent engaged in an unlawful interrogation of employees and solicited their
support to get rid of the Union. Paragraph 7(b), alleges that Respondent threatened its
employees with discharge if they continued with their support for the Union.
The Board’s remand Order stated, in part, “based on [employees’] testimony, the judge 5
stated that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by creating the impression of surveillance,
but made no express finding with respect to the unlawful interrogation and solicitation violation
alleged in the Complaint.” (Emphasis added.)
My initial decision stated “I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by the 10
conduct alleged in Complaint paragraph 7(a), but it did not violate the Act as alleged in
Complaint paragraph 7(b) because it did not engage in that conduct.” LM Waste Service, Corp.,
JD(ATL)–13–09, slip op. at 7, lines 11–13. Here, I revisit and revise those conclusions.
Although the decision included an express finding with respect to complaint paragraph 15
7(a), it failed to analyze the evidence in accordance with Board precedent governing the analysis
of interrogation and solicitation violations. Instead, because the allegedly unlawful statements
did not sound like questions, I applied the standards used to analyze another type of Section
8(a)(1) violation, the creation of an unlawful impression of surveillance, even though Section
7(a) did not allege such a violation.20
As already noted, complaint paragraph 7(a) alleges that on January 11, 2008, Respondent,
by its operations manager, Armando Ramos, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating
certain employees and soliciting their support to get rid of the Union. Complaint paragraph 7(b)
alleges that, on this same day, Ramos threatened employees with discharge if they continued to 25
support the Union. The complaint identified these employees as Reinaldo Santiago, Felipe
Espada, and Rafael Maldonado. Both clarity and brevity may be served by discussing first the
threat allegation raised in complaint paragraph 7(b) and then returning to the interrogation and
solicitation allegations in paragraph 7(a). Therefore, I will begin with complaint paragraph 7(b).
30
Santiago, whose full name is Reinaldo Santiago Rodriguez, testified that on January 11,
2008, he was working in the shop area when Operations Manager Ramos called him in to Ramos'
office. According to Santiago, Ramos “told me that he had received information from a
trustworthy source, that I was helping the guys with the syndicated movement.” (The term
“syndicated movement” refers to the union organizing efforts.)35
Santiago replied he was not doing anything illegal. According to Santiago, Ramos then
told him “to give it thought, that work––that jobs were scarce these days, to think about my
family, and that if I had any doubts or any situation or anything that I was concerned with, to
come to him and tell him. After that, he told me to think about it and then he shook my hand.”40
Based on my observations of the witnesses, and for the reasons discussed in my initial
decision, I credit Santiago's testimony. Therefore, I find that Ramos did make the statements
which Santiago attributed to him.
45
According to employee Rafael Maldonado Leon (Maldonado), Ramos called him and
another employee, Felipe Espada, into Ramos’ office on January 11, 2008. Maldonado testified
JD(ATL)–20–10
3
“he had received information from a good source, that I was making efforts to coordinate
something with the union, and he wanted to know if I was clear with what I was doing, because
this was a Puerto Rican company that was beginning and that the union did––and what the union
did was actually to annoy small companies like that.” (Maldonado testified in Spanish. The
interpreter stated that the Spanish word rendered above as “annoy” also could be translated as 5
“hassle.”)
Maldonado further testified that Ramos said “to please help him and that if I continued on
with the syndicated effort, that I could end up without a job.” The term “syndicated effort”
referred to the union organizing campaign.10
The other employee present, Felipe Espada, corroborated part of Maldonado’s testimony.
According to Espada, “Ramos asked [Maldonado] that he had a good source informing him that
he was involved in conversations with the union.” Although Espada used the verb “asked,” the
testimony otherwise does not indicate that Ramos posed to Maldonado any specific question. 15
Espada does not corroborate Maldonado’s testimony that Ramos “wanted to know if I was clear
with what I was doing.”
Espada also does not corroborate Maldonado’s testimony that Ramos said Maldonado
could “end up without a job” if he continued with the union organizing effort. In my initial 20
decision, I discussed a credibility problem with this part of Maldonado’s testimony but did not
explicitly state that I rejected this testimony. For the reasons stated in the initial decision, I do
reject it.
Espada testified that he had become “really nervous” when Ramos began talking about 25
the union campaign. In the initial decision, I reasoned that this anxiety made it more likely that
Espada would remember a threat if Ramos had made one: “Considering that Espada already was
apprehensive, a threat to discharge another employee would resonate on existing fears and be
difficult to forget.” LM Waste Service, Corp., JD(ATL)–13–09, slip op. at 6, lines 30–31.
30
Also in the initial decision, I noted that Maldonado had some reason to exaggerate his
testimony because he was an alleged discriminatee. If proven, the threat which Maldonado
attributed to Ramos would provide evidence that Maldonado’s discharge had been unlawful.
Additionally, Ramos clearly denied making the threat. Thus, the testimony of only one 35
of the three participants in the meeting supported the allegation that Ramos had made an
unlawful threat.
For these reasons, I concluded that Maldonado’s uncorroborated testimony about the
alleged threat should not be credited, even though I did credit that portion of his testimony 40
corroborated by Espada. The Board has long held that failure to credit one part of a witness’
testimony does not preclude crediting other parts of the testimony. Service Employees Local
1877 (American Building Maintenance), 345 NLRB 161 fn. 3 (2005).
Although the initial decision explained the reasons for not crediting part of Maldonado’s 45
testimony, it did not explicitly state that I was rejecting the testimony. Instead, it leapfrogged to
the ultimate conclusion that Respondent “did not violate the Act as alleged in Complaint
JD(ATL)–20–10
4
paragraph 7(b) because it did not engage in that alleged conduct.” That conclusion, however, is
erroneous. Although the government could not establish this allegation through the testimony of
Maldonado, which I did not credit, it did through the credited testimony of Santiago.
Specifically, as discussed above, in a January 11, 2008 conversation with Santiago, 5
Ramos brought up the subject of the union organizing campaign and then said “to give it
thought, that work––that jobs were scarce these days, to think about my family, and that if I had
any doubts or any situation or anything that I was concerned with, to come to him and tell him.”
Even though this statement is somewhat vague, and does not specifically equate union 10
activity with job loss, still it interferes with, restrains, and coerces an employee in the exercise of
Section 7 rights. The Board has held that similarly oblique comments amounted to unlawful
threats. Thus, in L.W.D., Inc., 335 NLRB 241, 242 (2001), the Board found violative a statement
that on the day of the representation election, the employees should “vote as if your job depends
on it.” In Clinton Electronics Corp., 332 NLRB 479 (2000), a supervisor told an employee that 15
“it’s my opinion that we could all be looking for a job.” The Board held that the comment
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In the present case, the supervisor went further than merely stating that jobs were scarce.
He also urged Santiago to think about his family. In that context, the “jobs were scarce”20
comment cannot be considered merely a casual remark about the unemployment rate. When
Ramos added that Santiago should think about his family, he personalized the matter and made
clear that Santiago could endanger his employment by engaging in union activity.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Government has proven the allegation raised in 25
complaint paragraph 7(b). Further, I conclude that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
Now, I will return to complaint paragraph 7(a), which alleges that about January 11,
2010, Respondent “interrogated its employees about their Union activities and solicited their 30
support to get rid of the Union.” The credited testimony offered to support this allegation comes
from witnesses Santiago, Maldonado, and Espada, and has been quoted above.
Santiago’s testimony establishes that Ramos told Santiago that Ramos “had received
information from a trustworthy source, that I was helping the guys” with the union organizing 35
effort. This comment by Ramos, although coercive, does not fall comfortably within the
definition of interrogation because it doesn't ask a question. However, the statement does, I
believe, create an unlawful impression of surveillance. In particular, Ramos’ reference to a
“trustworthy source” implies that management had a spy in the Union’s camp.
40
The credited testimony of Maldonado and Espada establishes that Ramos made a similar
statement in their presence. (One difference is that Ramos told Maldonado and Espada that he
had received information about Maldonado’s union activity from a “good source” rather than a
“trustworthy source.” This change of adjective, of course, does not alter the character of the
statement or the effect it reasonably would have on employees' willingness to exercise their Sec.45
7 rights.)
JD(ATL)–20–10
5
Maldonado also testified that Ramos asked Maldonado “to please help him and that if I
continued on with the syndicated effort, that I could end up without a job.” However, Espada
does not corroborate this portion of Maldonado’s testimony. For the reasons discussed above, I
do not credit it.
5
Accordingly, for the Government to prove that Ramos solicited an employee’s support to
“get rid of the Union,” it must rely on Santiago’s testimony, discussed above. That testimony
only establishes that Ramos asked Santiago to tell him if Santiago had any doubts or concerns.
Santiago did not testify that Ramos made any request for Santiago’s assistance in defeating the
Union. Therefore, I must conclude that credited evidence does not establish that Respondent 10
solicited employees' support to “get rid of the Union,” as complaint paragraph 7(a) alleges.
Because I have difficulty finding a question in Ramos’ statements, I do not recommend
that the Board find the interrogation violation alleged in Complaint paragraph 7(a) but instead
recommend that the Board conclude that Respondent violated the Act by creating an unlawful 15
impression of surveillance. However, as already noted, complaint paragraph 7(a) does not allege
that Ramos’ January 11, 2008 remarks created an impression of surveillance. The Board's
remand Order directs me to address the issues raised by my finding this unalleged violation.
The words Ramos spoke––that he had received information from a “trustworthy source”20
that Santiago was helping with the union organizing effort and that he had received information
from a “good source” that Maldonado was involved in that effort––form the basis for the
interrogation allegation in complaint paragraph 7. Because Ramos’ remark did not ask a specific
question, characterizing it as interrogation did not appear to be appropriate. At the same time,
Ramos’ words predictably would have a chilling effect on employees’ willingness to exercise 25
their Section 7 rights because they conveyed that Respondent was observing their union
activities.
It is well settled that the Board may find and remedy a violation even in the absence of a
specified allegation in the complaint if the issue is closely connected to the subject matter of the 30
complaint and has been fully litigated. Pergament United Sales, 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989);
Letter Carriers, Local 3825 (Postal Service), 333 NLRB 343 fn. 2 (2001); Garage Management
Corp., 334 NLRB 940–941 (2001); and Earthgrains Co., 351 NLRB 733, 737 (2007). Each
prong of this test will be discussed separately.
35
To prove that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by conducting an unlawful
interrogation, the General Counsel relied on the same words which, in my view, violated Section
8(a)(1) by creating an unlawful impression of surveillance. This identity militates in favor of a
finding that the unalleged violation was closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint.
40
Moreover, the violation found involved the same section of the Act as the violation
alleged. That, too, weighs in favor of finding that the unalleged violation was closely connected
to the subject matter of the complaint.
In Food & Commercial Workers Local 4 (Safeway, Inc.), 353 NLRB 469 (2008), the 45
complaint alleged that the respondent local union had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to
provide a bargaining unit employee with an adequate explanation of the discrepancy between the
JD(ATL)–20–10
6
international union’s total amount for chargeable expenses and the local union’s total amount for
chargeable expenses. At the hearing, however, much of the parties’ testimony and arguments
focused on whether the expenditure information provided by the local union was verified
sufficiently to satisfy the Board’s standards under California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB
224 (1995); and Television Artists AFTRA (KGW Radio), 327 NLRB 474 (1999), reconsideration 5
denied 327 NLRB 802 (1999). The judge analyzed the facts under the latter theory. Although
the Board disagreed with the judge's conclusion on the merits, it held that the judge properly
addressed the unalleged issue.
In Airborne Freight Corp., 343 NLRB 580, 581 (2004), the complaint alleged that the 10
respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling an employee that he was not being allowed to
transfer to a different route because of union activity, and violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
preventing the employee from changing his route. At hearing, the evidence established that a
supervisor also had told the employee that he was not being allowed to transfer because he had
filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board. The complaint only had alleged 15
discrimination because of union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3), and not discrimination
because of filing charges, in violation of Section 8(a)(4). Nonetheless, the judge found that the
respondent had violated Section 8(a)(4) as well as Section 8(a)(3), and the Board upheld this
finding.
20
In Park ‘N Fly, Inc., 349 NLRB 132, 133 (2007), the Board held that a supervisor’s
statement to an employee that the respondent probably would go broke was closely connected to
other comments, in the same conversation and alleged in the complaint, that employees would
get less money if the union came in and that the respondent’s owner would not go for a union.
25
The unalleged violation in the present case bears at least as close a connection to the
alleged violation as those in Food & Commercial Workers Local 4 (Safeway, Inc.), Airborne
Freight Corp. and Park ‘N Fly. Moreover, the connectedness of the two allegations becomes
even more apparent from the General Counsel's closing argument. Specifically, the General
Counsel stated:30
The interrogation of employees about the union activities and solicitation of
support to get rid of the union through the discharge––employees’ union
activities, created an impression among its employees that their union activities
are under surveillance, and informing employees that the discharge was due to 35
employees’ union activities. On January 11th, 2008, in the midst of the
employees' organizing drive, Respondent's operation[s] manager, Armando
Ramos, interrogated employees Santiago, Maldonado and Espada about their
union activities and solicited their support to get rid of the union. (Emphasis
added.)40
In effect, the General Counsel argues that the words which constituted the alleged
unlawful interrogation also created the impression of surveillance.
In sum, the unalleged violation bears a close connection to that alleged in the complaint. 45
Accordingly, I conclude that the first prong of the Pergament test has been satisfied.
JD(ATL)–20–10
7
To satisfy the second prong, the unalleged violation must have been fully litigated. That
determination rests in part on whether the absence of a specific allegation precluded a respondent
from presenting exculpatory evidence or whether the respondent would have altered the conduct
of its case at the hearing, had a specific allegation been made. Pergament, above, 296 NLRB at
335.5
Here, the same words constitute the unalleged violation and the violation alleged in the
complaint. Respondent denied that Ramos was a supervisor and also presented essentially an
alibi defense, eliciting testimony from Ramos that he was somewhere else on January 11, 2008,
the date he supposedly made the “trustworthy source” and “good source” statements to Santiago 10
and Maldonado. Thus, Respondent’s defenses would not change because the words were found
violative under an “impression of surveillance” theory rather than an interrogation theory.
However, the Board applies somewhat different tests in determining whether a statement
constitutes an unlawful interrogation and whether it creates an unlawful impression of 15
surveillance. Therefore, I must consider whether Respondent would have made different legal
arguments if the complaint had alleged that Ramos' statement violated the Act by creating an
unlawful impression of surveillance.
In analyzing allegations of unlawful interrogation, the Board asks whether, “under all 20
circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.” See Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984).
The Board’s test for determining whether an employer has created an impression of surveillance
is whether employees would reasonably assume from the statement that their union activities had
been placed under surveillance. Park ‘N Fly, Inc., above, at 133, citing Register Guard, 344 25
NLRB 1142, 1145 (2005), Flexsteel Industries, 311 NLRB 257 (1993).
These tests appear to be quite similar. In both, the Board applies an objective standard to
determine whether the words in question reasonably would chill the exercise of Section 7 rights.
However, the Board has established a separate framework, under Rossmore House, to take into 30
account how the circumstances surrounding the interrogation affected its coercive impact. The
Board considers whether there is a history of employer hostility and discrimination, the nature of
the information sought, the identity of the questioner, the place and method of interrogation, and
the truthfulness of the questioned employee’s reply. The Board does not apply this framework to
impression of surveillance allegations.35
If this case involved the exact opposite situation, that is, if the violation not alleged in the
complaint concerned unlawful interrogation, Respondent might argue that it had not been placed
on notice of the need to argue that the Government’s evidence failed to satisfy the Rossmore
House criteria. However, the unalleged violation does not require evaluation under the 40
Rossmore House standards.
In Dilling Mechanical Contractors, 348 NLRB 98, 105 (2006), the Board, citing Piqua
Steel Co., 329 NLRB 704 fn. 4 (1999), held that the presentation of evidence associated with an
alleged claim was insufficient to put the parties on notice that another unalleged claim (for which 45
that evidence might also be probative) is being litigated, especially when the two claims relied on
different theories of liability. However, I conclude that the facts in Dilling Mechanical
JD(ATL)–20–10
8
Contractors distinguish it from the present case.
In Dilling Mechanical Contractors, the judge had found that the respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) by failing to hire certain job applicants, even though the complaint did not allege
such a violation. The General Counsel had presented evidence about this matter because the 5
complaint had alleged that the respondent had breached a non-Board settlement agreement and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1). Because the Government had a reason to present this evidence
to establish the 8(a)(1) violation, doing so would not signify to the respondent that it had to
defend against an 8(a)(3) refusal-to-hire allegation.
10
Moreover, the defenses relevant to the unalleged 8(a)(3) violation went beyond what
would be relevant to the 8(a)(1) allegation. The respondent, not knowing that it needed to
present these additional defenses, suffered prejudice. Therefore, the matter could not be
considered fully and fairly litigated.
15
In the present case, the General Counsel’s evidence clearly placed Respondent on notice
of the words that allegedly violated Section 8(a)(1). Respondent defended by asserting that
Ramos had not spoken those words and by denying his supervisory status. Alleging that these
words created an impression of surveillance would not require Respondent to present any
evidence or argument that would not be relevant to the allegation that the words constituted 20
unlawful interrogation. Therefore, distinguishing Dilling Mechanical Contractors, I conclude
that the issue was fully and fairly litigated. See Airborne Freight Corp., above, 343 NLRB at
581; Park ‘N Fly, Inc., above, 349 NLRB at 133.
Accordingly, I recommend that the Board find that Ramos' statements to Santiago and 25
Maldonado, discussed above, created an unlawful impression of surveillance in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As already noted, I do not find that the conduct alleged in complaint
paragraph 7(a) constituted unlawful interrogation or solicitation. Additionally, for the reasons
discussed above, I conclude that I erred in recommending the dismissal of complaint paragraph
7(b). Instead, I recommend that the Board find the violation alleged.30
Allegations of Unlawful Conduct By Supervisor Santiago
In its remand Order, the Board directed me to “make an express finding as to the
credibility of [employee Rafael] Cruz’s testimony, and, if credited, whether [supervisor José] 35
Santiago violated Section 8(a)(1) by stating that employees were discharged because of their
union activities.”
To comply fully with the Board’s instruction to “make an express finding as to the
credibility of Cruz’s testimony,” I first must consider how the credibility determination in the 40
initial decision was insufficient. The initial decision discussed Cruz’ credibility for three
paragraphs––noting both some concerns and that his testimony was uncontradicted––and then
concluded as follow:
My doubts about Cruz’ testimony, however, do not outweigh the fact that 45
it is uncontradicted. Accordingly, I credit it.
JD(ATL)–20–10
9
LM Waste Service Corp., JD(ATL)–13–09, slip op. at 10, lines 5–6.
The remand Order did not indicate in what way the Board concluded that this discussion
was not an “express finding” as to the credibility of Cruz’ testimony or state how the Board
wished me to expand on it. Perhaps the Board wishes me to explain why the uncontradicted 5
nature of the testimony outweighed, in my mind, my doubts about it.
The Board has, on occasion, rejected uncontradicted testimony. See Sioux City Foundry
Co., 323 NLRB 1071 (1997). In this instance, however, I believe that doing so would be
inappropriate.10
During the hearing, Respondent stipulated that José Santiago was its supervisor within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and its agent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the
Act. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be presumed that Respondent has control
over its own supervisors and can direct them to appear at the hearing. Moreover, Respondent has 15
the power to subpoena witnesses, including its supervisors. Therefore, in the absence of a
showing of unavailability, it is logical to infer from Respondent's failure to call Santiago that his
testimony would have corroborated rather than contradicted Cruz’ testimony. DMI Distribution
of Delaware, 334 NLRB 409, 412 (2001).
20
Whether to draw such an inference lies within the judge's sound discretion. Tom Rice
Buick, Pontiac & GMC Truck, 334 NLRB 785, 786 (2001). The present record does not suggest
that Supervisor Santiago, had he taken the witness stand, would have contradicted Cruz’
testimony. Accordingly, I conclude that it is appropriate to credit Cruz’ testimony.
25
In the event I credited Cruz’testimony, which I did, the Board’s remand Order directed
me to make a finding as to “whether [supervisor José] Santiago violated Section 8(a)(1) by
stating that employees were discharged because of their union activities.” The initial decision, in
paragraph 3 of its Conclusions of Law, stated as follows:
30
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the following
conduct: Interrogating employees about their Union activities and soliciting their
support to get rid of the Union; creating the impression among its employees that
their union activities were under surveillance; informing employees that they were
discharged because of their activities on behalf of the Union; and discharging its 35
employees Rafael Maldonado, Rafael Cruz, Felipe Espada, and Reinaldo
Santiago.
LM Waste Service, Corp., JD(ATL)–13–09, slip op. at 27, lines 22–27 (emphasis added). The
italicized portion pertains both to Supervisor Santiago's statement to Cruz that the discharged 40
employees had brought it upon themselves because they decided to unionize, alleged in
complaint paragraph 9(a), and also to the conduct alleged in complaint paragraph 9(c), that about
March 17, 2008, the Respondent, by José Santiago, informed an employee that Respondent had
discharged another employee because of his union activities. In its remand Order, the Board
specifically indicated that this latter allegation is not part of the remand.45
JD(ATL)–20–10
10
My initial decision did not, in the section discussing the violations alleged in complaint
paragraph 9(a), include a specific finding that Supervisor Santiago’s January 15, 2008 statement
to Cruz, that the discharged employees had brought it upon themselves because they decided to
unionize, violated Section 8(a)(1). Here, I correct that error.
5
Crediting Cruz’ testimony, I find that on or about January 15, 2008, Supervisor José
Santiago told Cruz that Cruz and other discharged employees had brought it on themselves
because they had decided to unionize, which is tantamount to saying that the Respondent had
discharged the employees because of their union activities. Accordingly, I conclude that
Supervisor Santiago did inform an employee that the employees had been discharged because of 10
their activities on behalf of the Union, as alleged in complaint paragraph 9(a)(ii). It may be
noted that although Cruz had been discharged at the time Supervisor Santiago made the
statement, the discharge was unlawful and did not terminate Cruz’ employee status for purposes
of the Act. Therefore, these statements interfered with, coerced and restrained an employee in
the exercise of Section 7 rights.15
In sum, I conclude that the Government has proven the allegations raised in paragraph
9(a) of the complaint, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Allegations of Unlawful Discharge20
In its Order, the Board remanded the allegations raised in complaint paragraph 11 that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) by discharging employees Maldonado, Cruz, Espada,
Santiago, and Cardona. The Board directed that I assess whether my further analysis of the
8(a)(1) allegations requires clarification or modification of my analysis of the discharge 25
allegations. Further, the Board instructed that, with respect to the discharge of Maldonado, I
should further “determine the credibility of Joel Cruz’s testimony and whether that testimony, if
credible, has an impact on the analysis of the allegation that Maldonado’s discharge violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.”
30
Effect of 8(a)(1) Allegations
The further analysis of the 8(a)(1) allegations, discussed above, does not affect my
conclusion that Respondent’s discharge of Rafael Maldonado, Rafael Cruz, Felipe Espada, and
Reinaldo Santiago violated Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. For the reasons stated below, 35
it also does not affect my conclusion that Respondent did not violate the Act by causing the
termination of employment of Marvin J. Cardona, an employee of DS Employment Agency, Inc.,
as had been alleged in complaint paragraph 11(b).
Because of this further analysis, I concluded above that my initial decision erred by 40
recommending that the Board dismiss the allegation raised by complaint paragraph 7(b).
Additionally, in this supplemental decision, I have found specifically that Supervisor Santiago
violated the Act by telling an employee that he and other employees had been discharged
because of their union activities, as alleged in complaint paragraph 9(a)(ii). Thus, this further
analysis has increased the number of 8(a)(1) violations.45
JD(ATL)–20–10
11
If anything, the addition of 8(a)(1) violations would strengthen rather than weaken the
General Counsel’s case. Moreover, my conclusion that the statements alleged in complaint
paragraph 7(a) should be considered as creating an unlawful impression of surveillance, rather
than an unlawful interrogation and solicitation, does not lessen the significance of these
statements as evidence of animus. Accordingly, I adhere to the conclusions in the initial decision 5
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Maldonado, Cruz,
Espada, and Santiago.
Discharges of Maldonado, Cruz, Espada, and Santiago
10
In its remand Order, the Board directed me to consider further whether Respondent had
met its rebuttal burden of demonstrating that it would have discharged Maldonado even absent
his union activities. This further analysis does not affect my conclusion that Respondent also
violated the Act by discharging Cruz and Espada, but it does affect my reasoning in reaching that
conclusion. In the original decision, I had found that the reasons Respondent gave for 15
discharging Santiago were pretextual. Here, I conclude that Respondent’s asserted reasons for
discharging Maldonado, Cruz, and Espada also were pretextual.
The Board’s remand Order noted that Maldonado’s former helper, Joel Cruz Velasquez,
testified that he saw Maldonado make unauthorized trash pickups and collect payment for this 20
service and that Maldonado threatened him with physical harm when he would not accept any of
the money. (For clarity, I will refer to Joel Cruz Velasquez as “Cruz Valasquez” to distinguish
him from Rafael Cruz Cruz, referred to above simply as “Cruz.”)
The remand Order directed that “the judge shall determine the credibility” of Joel Cruz 25
Valesquez’ testimony and “whether that testimony, if credible, has an impact on the analysis of
the allegation that Maldonado’s discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.”
Cruz Velasquez testified that from June 2006 until June 2007, he worked as a helper on
the truck driven by Rafael Maldonado. From some time in June 2007 until October 2007 he was 30
on leave. When he returned to work, he became a residential driver.
According to Cruz Velasquez, while he was working as Maldonado’s helper, Maldonado
would make him pick up garbage cans “from clients that were not listed in the route, while he
would go inside the business of the Pomales Market and get some money and put it in his pocket. 35
He would offer me some of it, but I always told him that I never accept presents from people.”
Even though Cruz Velasquez stopped being Maldonado’s helper in June 2007, he did not
tell management about Maldonado’s conduct until January 2008. Cruz Velasquez testified that
“Maldonado kept me under a threat. He wanted to keep Pomales Market and get some money 40
and put it me with my mouth shut. He had me intimidated and to the point that, upon my talking
out, he would give me four blows wherever could grab me.”
Respondent discharged Maldonado. (The asserted reasons for the discharge will be
discussed below.) Cruz Velasquez testified that after Maldonado’s discharge, Maldonado 45
telephoned him “threatening me, saying that I had been the rat who talked and that he was
going––whenever he catched with me, he was going to give me four blows.”
JD(ATL)–20–10
12
Cruz Velasquez took the witness stand after Maldonado, who was not recalled as a
rebuttal witness. Cruz Velasquez’ testimony about Maldonado’s conduct is unrebutted.
However, I have some concerns about it which lessen its probative value.
5
Cruz Velasquez stopped working with Maldonado in June 2007 but did not report
Maldonado’s activities to management until January 2008. When asked about the half-year
delay, Cruz Velasquez explained that he “could no longer take the humiliation and the threats.”
That testimony would be more plausible if Maldonado and Cruz Velasquez had been working
together, but it makes little sense considering that the two had different assignments.10
After the change in Cruz Velasquez’ assignment, Maldonado had little opportunity to
threaten him, but even more significantly, Maldonado would have had scant motivation to do so.
Cruz Velasquez no longer was in a position to observe Maldonado’s activities, so Maldonado
would have had no immediate reason to threaten him into silence.15
Arguably, Maldonado might have continued to seek out Cruz Velasquez and might have
made threats to keep Cruz Velasquez silent about the conduct he had observed before June 2007.
However, when asked on cross-examination, Cruz Velasquez did not identify even a single
specific instance when Maldonado made such a threat before his discharge. He only recounted 20
the January 14, 2008 telephone conversation which took place after Maldonado had been fired.
If Cruz Velasquez really “could no longer take the humiliation and the threats,” he should
have been able to point to at least one specific occasion, after June 2007 but before Maldonado’s
discharge, when Maldonado humiliated or threatened him. However, Cruz Velasquez did not. 25
The generality of Cruz Velasquez’ testimony may well mask blatant exaggeration. Accordingly,
I give little weight to his testimony, even though it is uncontradicted.
The Board has established a framework for evaluating discharges in which more than one
motive prompted the decision to terminate employment. See Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 30
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under this
framework, the General Counsel bears the burden of establishing certain elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the Government proves these elements, the burden of
proceeding shifts to the respondent to show that it would have taken the same action even in the
absence of protected activity.135

1 In fn. 3 of the remand Order, the Board stated, “We note that the judge described the General
Counsel’s initial burden in terms of four evidentiary elements, rather than the Board’s traditional
description of three elements: union or other protected activity by the employee, employer
knowledge of that activity, and antiunion animus on the part of the employer.”
However, the four-element framework in my initial decision mirrors, essentially
verbatim, the Board's language in American Garden Management Co., 338 NLRB 644, 645
(2002), which in turn cites Tracker Marine, 337 NLRB 644, 646 (2002). (The language in my
initial decision differs from that in American Garden Management Co. in two ways: The word
“government” sometimes is used instead of “General Counsel,” and my initial decision simply
refers to a “link” rather than a “motivational link.”)
See also Mid-Mountain Foods, 332 NLRB 229 fn. 1 (2000), in which the judge followed
the same four-element framework used in the initial decision herein. In a footnote, the Board
JD(ATL)–20–10
13
The initial decision concluded that, with respect to Maldonado’s discharge, the General
Counsel had established the initial elements, shifting the burden of proceeding to Respondent.
Nothing here changes that conclusion. If my assessment of Cruz Velasquez’ credibility has any
effect, it will concern whether Respondent has met its rebuttal burden.5
Although I give little weight to Cruz Velasquez’ testimony, I do not doubt that, in
January 2008, he made statements to management about Maldonado similar to his testimony at
the hearing. In other words, he told management that Maldonado had picked up trash from
businesses that were not Respondent’s customers, had received money, presumably for the 10
pickups, and that he had threatened Cruz Velasquez.
In the initial decision, I concluded that “Respondent has not presented evidence showing
that it has discharged other employees in circumstances similar to those in Maldonado’s case.”
LM Waste Service, Corp., JD(ATL)–13–09, slip op. at 15, lines 34–35. A second evaluation of 15
the evidence does not change my conclusion that Respondent has not met its rebuttal burden, but
I reach that conclusion along a somewhat different path.
The initial decision concluded that Respondent's discharge of Reinaldo Santiago was
pretextual. Further evaluation of the evidence now causes me to reach the same conclusion with 20
respect to the discharges of Maldonado, Cruz, and Espada.
The discharge letter which Respondent gave to Maldonado did not state any reason for
the termination, so it is not helpful in determining what the decision makers considered.
However, the three supervisors who participated in the discharge decision testified about it. 25
They were Human Resources Manager Maria Montalvo, General Operations Manager Armando
Ramos, and Residential Routes Supervisor Julio Torres Torres.
Human Resources Manager Montalvo testified that Respondent discharged Maldonado in
part because “some audits were carried out” regarding Maldonado’s route that that “some 30
deficiencies” were found. Montalvo further testified that Maldonado “was administering, for his

stated, in part, as follows: “The General Counsel excepts to the manner in which the judge
articulated the burden borne by the General Counsel in cases involving alleged violations of Sec.
8(a)(3) of the Act. We believe that the judge’s formulation does not depart substantively from
Board doctrine. In any event, we have reviewed these matters under the standard articulated in
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S.
989 (1982), and approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393, 399–403 (1983), and we reach the same results reached by the judge.” The
Board’s subsequent use of the four-element test in American Garden Management Co., above,
suggests that the Board endorsed this framework or at least found it acceptable.
If the Board prefers a three-element test I will, of course, use it. However, I believe the
four-element test the Board applied in American Garden Management Co. provides a more
precise measure. It includes the requirement that the General Counsel prove that there has been
an “adverse employment action.” Sometimes, that fact is in dispute. See Leiser Construction,
LLC, 349 NLRB 413, 415–416 (2007), citing Nations Rent, Inc., 342 NLRB 179 (2004). Also,
reference to a “link” rather than a “showing of antiunion animus” recognizes that animus
manifested by a supervisor not involved in the discipline decision may not be probative of the
employer’s motivation in making that decision.
JD(ATL)–20–10
14
own profit, the pickup service of a person that was not one of LM’s clients.” However,
Montalvo made no mention of Maldonado threatening Cruz Velasquez.
General Operations Manager Ramos also participated in the discharge decision. His
testimony suggested that Maldonado’s threat to Cruz Velasquez was a significant, and perhaps 5
decisive, factor in the decision to terminate Maldonado’s employment: “We cannot allow to
have an employee with a high risk against his safety and health, an employee that feels
intimidated. And, on the other hand, it’s a company policy and you can find it in the employees'
manual, that that sort of irregularity is to be sanctioned at the first of those irregularities.”
10
Like Montalvo, but unlike Ramos, the third supervisor involved in the decision to
discharge Maldonado, Julio Torres Torres, did not refer to the threat when he testified. If the
managers who decided to discharge Maldonado had based their decision on his supposed threat
to Cruz Velasquez, almost certainly Human Resources Director Montalvo and Supervisor Torres
would have mentioned it in their testimony. Workplace safety is highly important and a threat is 15
so dramatic it likely would be remembered. The disparity between the reasons offered by
Montalvo and Torres, on the one hand, and Ramos, on the other, suggests pretext.
In addition to the differences in testimony regarding the reason for the discharge, other
evidence persuades me that the asserted reasons were pretextual. Although Respondent’s 20
witnesses denied knowing about the union organizing campaign at the time of this decision, I
have not credited that testimony.
The initial decision found that on January 11, 2008, Ramos told employee Reinaldo
Santiago Rodriguez that he had received information from a “trustworthy source” that the 25
employee was helping with the union organizing effort. That same day, Ramos made a similar
statement to Maldonado. Three days later, Respondent discharged both of these employees.
The timing of the discharge decision, so soon after Respondent revealed both its
knowledge that specific employees were involved in a union organizing effort and its hostility to 30
that effort, strongly suggests a connection. Respondent manifested this hostility through the
coercive statements of its manager, Ramos, who also participated in the discharge decision.
Ramos testified that one reason they decided to discharge Maldonado concerned threats
made to Cruz Velasquez. However, I have discredited Ramos’ testimony and have found that he 35
was not telling the truth when he denied having knowledge of the union organizing campaign on
January 11, 2008. Likewise, I conclude that he lacked candor when he testified that the decision
to discharge Maldonado rested, in part, on the belief that Maldonado had threatened Cruz
Valasquez. Because Ramos offered a specious reason, I infer that the real reason was unlawful.
40
Stated another way, the untrue reason was pretextual. A finding of pretext defeats any
attempt by the Respondent to show that it would have discharged the discriminatees absent their
union activities. Rood Trucking Co., 342 NLRB 895, 898 (2004), citing Golden State Foods
Corp., 340 NLRB 382 (2003). Accordingly, Respondent has not met its rebuttal burden of
showing that it would have discharged Maldonado even in the absence of protected activities.45
JD(ATL)–20–10
15
Respondent discharged Cruz and Espada the same day it terminated the employment of
Santiago and Maldonado. The initial decision discussed the reasons Respondent gave to
discharging these two employees and why I concluded that Respondent had failed to meet its
rebuttal burden. Were I again to examine these asserted reasons in light of the credited evidence,
I would adhere to my original determination that Respondent had not rebutted the General 5
Counsel’s case. However, in view of the timing of these discharges, and for reasons similar to
those discussed above in the case of Maldonado’s termination, I now conclude that Respondent’s
ostensible reasons for firing Cruz and Espada were pretextual as well. As discussed above, a
finding of pretext results in the conclusion that Respondent has not carried its rebuttal burden.
10
In the case of Rafael Cruz, I also considered it significant that Respondent had tolerated
and accommodated this employee’s lack of a “Category 8” commercial driver’s license for some
time. Only after Respondent learned of Cruz’ union activity did the absence of this license
become, supposedly, so important that it necessitated his prompt discharge. Moreover, the day
after Cruz’ termination, the person who had been his immediate supervisor told him that union 15
activities had been the reason Respondent discharged Cruz and the other three employees who
had been terminated at the same time. Considering these circumstances, I conclude that
Respondent’s asserted reasons for Cruz’ discharge were pretextual.
Similar reasons apply to Respondent’s discharge of Felipe Espada. When the 20
Department of Transportation and Public Works suspended Spade’s “Category 6” driver’s
license, Respondent assigned him to work as a helper rather than as a driver. Respondent
accommodated Espada until the union organizing effort. I conclude that Respondent’s asserted
reasons for Spade’s discharge were pretextual.
25
Discharge of Marvin J. Cardona
The Board’s remand Order instructed me to consider whether my further analysis of the
8(a)(1) allegations requires me to clarify or modify my analysis of the allegations that
Respondent unlawfully discharged Maldonado, Cruz, Espada, Santiago, and Cardona. In the 30
initial decision, I had concluded that the General Counsel had established the required Wright
Line elements with respect to Marvin J. Cardona’s discharge, thus shifting the burden of
proceeding to the Respondent, but that the Respondent had met its rebuttal burden. The analysis
above does not change this conclusion.
35
Cardona worked for DS Employment Agency. Complaint paragraph 11(b) alleged that
Respondent had caused the termination of Cardona’s employment with this agency on about
March 17, 2008, which was 2 months after Respondent had discharged Maldonado, Cruz,
Espada, and Santiago on the same day. In the case of these latter four employees, not only were
the discharges simultaneous, they also occurred just 3 days after Respondent had revealed its 40
knowledge of, and hostility to, the union organizing effort.
Unlike the other four alleged discriminatees, all of whom were discharged on the same
day, Cardona’s discharge stands alone and somewhat distant in time. Cardona credibly testified
that some time in January 2008, Supervisor Santiago told him that the Respondent had 45
discharged Maldonado, Espada, and two other employees and identified Maldonado as
responsible for the union organizing campaign. Santiago also asked Cardona if he had attended
JD(ATL)–20–10
16
union meetings, which Cardona denied.
Cardona had not engaged in union activity. However, after Cardona’s discharge,
Supervisor Santiago told him that he had been fired “because you were participating in the
Teamsters Union.” Based on Cardona’s credited testimony, I concluded that Supervisor 5
Santiago’s statement satisfied both the Wright Line requirement of employer knowledge and the
requirement that the Government must establish a link between the protected activity (or in this
case, Respondent’s belief that Cardona had engaged in protected activity) and the discharge.
Credited evidence of animus does not compel the conclusion that an employer’s asserted 10
reason for a discharge was pretextual. Indeed, if evidence of animus automatically resulted in a
finding of pretext, then an employer would have no opportunity to rebut the General Counsel’s
case. Considering that a finding of pretext precludes an employer from raising a defense,
making such a finding is a consequential matter.
15
Persuasive evidence––the timing of the other four discharges, which took place on the
same date and soon after Respondent manifested its hostility to the union organizing effort, and
my conclusion that Ramos was not telling the truth about the reasons for Maldonado’s
termination––convinced me that Respondent’s asserted reasons for discharging Maldonado,
Cruz, Espada, and Santiago were pretextual. Similar circumstances did not exist in the case of 20
Cardona’s discharge. Accordingly, I conclude that a finding of pretext is unwarranted and that
Respondent’s rebuttal evidence should be considered. Further, I conclude, for the reasons
explained in the initial decision, that Respondent met its rebuttal burden. Therefore, I continue
to recommend that the Board dismiss the allegation that Respondent, by causing the discharge of
Cardona, violated the Act.25
Although the Board’s remand Order did not include all issues decided in the original
decision, to avoid the possible confusion that might result from having to refer to two separate
documents, the conclusions of law below will repeat the conclusions of law set forth in the initial
decision, modified as necessary by this supplemental decision. A similar practice will be 30
followed with respect to the recommended Order. The Board’s remand Order did not direct me
to include a proposed remedy in the supplemental decision. I have modified the proposed notice
to employees to comport with the findings herein.
Conclusions of Law35
1. The Respondent, LM Waste Service, Corp., is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, IBT is a labor organization 40
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the following conduct:
Creating the impression among its employees that their union activities were under surveillance;
informing employees that they were discharged because of their activities on behalf of the 45
Union; and discharging its employees Rafael Maldonado, Rafael Cruz, Felipe Espada, and
Reinaldo Santiago.
JD(ATL)–20–10
17
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging its employees
Rafael Maldonado, Rafael Cruz, Felipe Espada, and Reinaldo Santiago.
5. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair labor practices affecting 5
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent did not violate the Act in any other way alleged in the complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the initial decision as 10
modified herein, and on the entire record in this case, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, LM Waste Service, Corp., Juana Diaz, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, 15
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Creating the impression among employees that their union activities are 20
under surveillance; informing employees that they are discharged because of their activities on
behalf of the Union; and discharging employees because of their union activities or to encourage
support for any labor organization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its 25
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any and all such activities.
30
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
(a) Offer Rafael Maldonado, Rafael Cruz, Felipe Espada, and Reinaldo
Santiago immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions, or to substantially equivalent 35
positions, and make them whole, with interest, as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), for all losses they suffered because Respondent discharged them
unlawfully.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Juana 40
Diaz, Puerto Rico, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A” in both English and
Spanish.3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 24, after

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, these
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board, and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the
JD(ATL)–20–10
18
being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has 5
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time since January 11, 2008.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director 10
a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Regional Director
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated Washington, D.C., October 22, 2010.
15
__________________________________
Keltner W. Locke20
Administrative Law Judge

notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD” shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
JD(ATL)–20–10
19
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us
to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of these rights,
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT create among our employees the impression that their union activities are under
surveillance.
WE WILL NOT inform employees that they have been discharged because of their union
activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees because they formed, joined or assisted a union or to
discourage membership in any labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Rafael Maldonado, Rafael Cruz, Felipe Espada, and Reinaldo Santiago
immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions
if their former positions are not available.
WE WILL make Rafael Maldonado, Rafael Cruz, Felipe Espada, and Reinaldo Santiago whole,
with interest, for all losses they suffered because of our unlawful discrimination against them.
LM WASTE SERVICE, CORP.
(Employer)
Dated: _________________________ By: ______________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret–ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
JD(ATL)–20–10
20
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
525 F. D. Roosevelt Avenue, La Torre de Plaza, Suite 1002, San Juan, PR 00918–1002
(787) 766–5347, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (787) 766–5377