Lizandro Mateo-Ortiz, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency,

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 14, 2000
01992867 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 14, 2000)

01992867

11-14-2000

Lizandro Mateo-Ortiz, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency,


Lizandro Mateo-Ortiz, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01992867

) Agency No.4H-330-0135-97

) Hearing No. 150-97-8662X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency, )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from a final agency decision concerning his

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of �

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791

et. seq.<1> Accordingly, the appeal is accepted in accordance with 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644,37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether the agency discriminated against

complainant on the basis of physical disability (post dislocation of

the right shoulder) when he was denied a position with the agency on

October 16, 1996.

BACKGROUND

Complainant, a school bus driver, applied for a job at the agency's

Miami, Florida Post Office. On September 14, 1995, he was listed

as qualified for numerous positions on the agency's job register.<2>

Complainant's name was reached on the hiring register and he received

a Call-In-Notice on December 20, 1995, to report for an interview

for a Distribution and Window Clerk position (the Position), and was

subsequently scheduled for a pre-employment physical examination on June

26, 1996, as a pre-requisite to being offered the Position.

The agency medical officer (MO) referred complainant to an orthopedic

specialist (Doctor I) for further examination because of a shoulder injury

complainant suffered twelve years earlier in the military.<3> Doctor I

reported to the MO that complainant should avoid the type of activities

that were listed as the functional requirements of the Position, that

he was at high risk for future injury on the job and was not medically

qualified to perform the essential functions of the Position.<4> He

further noted that accommodation would not reduce the medical risk if

complainant had to lift heavy weights. On August 14, 1996, the agency

notified complainant that he was found medically unsuitable for the

Position because his multiple, re-current dislocations of the right

shoulder were incompatible with the strenuous activities required for

the Position and would place his health and safety at risk. <5>

The agency's notice informed complainant that he could request

reconsideration if he provided additional medical information indicating

that he was medically suitable. Complainant thus sought a second medical

opinion from another orthopedic specialist (Doctor II). Complainant

forwarded Doctor II's report and two Magnetic Resonance Images (MRIs)

taken in May 1994, and August 1996, to the agency. Doctor II reported

that complainant suffered fifteen dislocations of the right shoulder in

the past twelve years,<6> that the MRIs of the right shoulder were normal,

that complainant had full, unlimited range of motion in the shoulders,

and that he saw no reason why complainant could not perform the duties

of a postal worker.

Doctor I reviewed Doctor II's report and conceded that he may have

misheard complainant when complainant stated he had fifteen prior

dislocations. Doctor I stated that he believed complainant could do

light activities with his shoulder but did not feel that he should be in

a type of job where he would do twisting with his shoulder or extensive

heavy lifting with his arm because of the risk of further dislocation

and the need for surgery.<7>

Doctor I examined complainant again on October 16, 1996, and reported that

because Doctor II believed he could safely do the job, and complainant was

adamant in pursuing the Position, he could probably do the job. Doctor

I noted that there was a risk of re-dislocation but cleared complainant

for the Position.

On October 16, 1996, the Personnel Specialist (the Specialist) notified

complainant that the agency's decision remained the same and that there

was no provision for further reconsideration. The Specialist also

notified complainant that his name was removed from the register for

that position.

Complainant nevertheless sought a third medical opinion. Doctor III

reported that he examined complainant and reviewed the MRIs. He reported

that he read the job description for the Position and believed that

complainant appeared qualified to perform those duties.

Doctor I reviewed Doctor III's report and, reversing his earlier

statement, noted that, in his opinion, complainant was not able to perform

the functional requirements of the Position. The Specialist then wrote

to complainant on November 25, 1996, reaffirming the agency's position and

advising complainant that further reconsideration would not be granted.

Complainant filed an EEO complaint and requested a hearing. At the

hearing, the Specialist testified that she received very clear

recommendations from the MO and Doctor I, and based on their medical

opinions, denied complainant employment because he was at high risk

of injury. She decided that complainant was unable to perform in other

agency positions because the lifting requirement was the same in all of

the positions except that of Mark-Up. The Specialist testified that a

challenge to a determination of physical unsuitability had the effect

of removing an applicant's name from the active list of eligibles

for all other positions for which the applicant is rated and found

qualified. Thus, complainant received no other Call-In-Notices despite

the fact that his name was certified on several registers. She further

testified that the agency provides reasonable accommodation only if an

individual is a qualified disabled person and noted that complainant

was not considered to be disabled.

The EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a Recommended Decision finding

that the agency discriminated against complainant. The AJ found that

nothing in complainant's medical evaluations or employment history

suggested that his shoulder condition rose to the level of an impairment

that substantially limited a major life activity,<8> however, she found

that the agency regarded complainant as disabled within the meaning of the

Rehabilitation Act because it regarded him as substantially limited in his

ability to work. The AJ found that the agency believed that complainant

should not lift up to 70 pounds, pull hand over hand, or reach above his

shoulder level. She noted that such limiting criteria did not relate to

a unique aspect of the Position, but excluded complainant from a class

of jobs, and that the MO and Specialist determined that complainant's

shoulder condition prevented him from obtaining any position at the

agency aside from Mark-Up Clerk.

The AJ found that complainant was a qualified person with a disability

because he met the experience and educational requirements for the

position as evidenced by his initial selection by the agency. The AJ

further found that the agency's action of rejecting complainant for

the Position was causally related to his shoulder condition, since his

physical condition was the sole reason for the rejection.

The AJ noted that an employer does not escape responsibility by merely

stating that an applicant may injure himself,<9> noting the Commission's

decision in Burkey v. Department of Justice, EEOC Petition 03950146

(January 19, 1996) in which the Commission stated that the agency must

show more than that the individual with a disability stands an elevated

risk of future injury.

The AJ then considered the essential functions of the Position. She

reviewed the functions the agency witnesses insisted that complainant

was unable to perform; namely, lifting up to 70 pounds, reaching above

shoulder level, and pulling hand over hand, and examined the duties and

responsibilities of the Position.<10> The AJ stated that she was not

persuaded that performance of these duties posed a reasonable probability

complainant would injure himself and found that the agency failed to meet

its burden. The AJ found that the record did not indicate whether the

MO and Specialist considered complainant's work history in determining

that complainant was medically unsuitable. The AJ noted that the record

did not reflect what duties complainant performed in the military after

his first dislocation, but that complainant's current job, driving a

school bus, required using an oversized steering wheel and making sharp

twists and turns. The AJ further noted that Doctor I's conclusion that

complainant was at high risk for injuring himself was not explained or

substantiated in detail. The AJ found, consequently, that the agency

regarded complainant as disabled and discriminated against him on that

basis when it did not hire him for the Position, and that, as a qualified

individual with a disability, the agency had an obligation to accommodate

his physical impairment or demonstrate that such accommodation would

constitute an undue hardship on its operations.

The agency issued a final decision rejecting the AJ's recommended

decision. The agency found that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of disability discrimination because he did not show that

he had an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity,

or show that the agency considered him to be disabled. The agency noted

that the MO found complainant to be medically unsuitable to perform the

functions of the Position and incompatible with the position requirements.

The agency found that the record did not show that complainant was

unable to perform the duties of other jobs and that he was still being

considered for other jobs at the agency. The agency noted that the

trier of fact should not substitute her judgment for the legitimate

exercise of managerial discretion, and that the focus should be on the

employer's motive, not its business judgment, adding that nothing in the

record indicated that the agency's action was motivated by discrimination.

Complainant appealed, arguing that the agency offered no basis to disturb

the AJ's recommended decision. Complainant argued that the agency's

contention that he was considered for other jobs was false because the

Specialist testified that his shoulder condition would preclude him from

working at any agency job and his name was withdrawn from the agency

register for all jobs.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an

Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.�

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,

477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding that discrimination occurred

is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,

293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings and conclusions summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We find that complainant was

a qualified disabled individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act, and that the agency discriminated against him based on his disability

when it denied him a position because of his disability.

To bring a claim of disability discrimination, complainant must

first establish that he has a disability within the meaning of the

Rehabilitation Act.<11> Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527

U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999);

Albertsons, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Cook v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960015 (June 21, 1996)

(To merit the protection of the Rehabilitation Act, it is not enough

to have a particular medical condition that carries the potential for

substantial limitations).

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, complainant

must show that: 1) he is an individual with a disability as defined in 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(g), 2) he is a "qualified" individual with a disability

as defined in 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m), and 3) the agency took an adverse

action against him. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662

F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). Complainant also must demonstrate a causal

relationship between his disabling condition and the agency's reasons

for the adverse action.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g) defines an individual with a

disability as one who: 1) has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of that person's major life activities,

2) has a record of such impairment, or 3) is regarded as having such an

impairment. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(h)(2)(i) defines "major

life activities" as including the functions of caring for one's self,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working.

Complainant also must show that he is a "qualified" individual with a

disability within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). That section

defines a qualified individual with a disability as meaning, with

respect to employment, an individual with a disability who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions

of the position in question.

Once complainant establishes that he is disabled under the Rehabilitation

Act, he must show that the agency took an adverse action against him,

and that a causal connection exists between the agency's action and

his disability. Dougherty v. Department of the Army, EEOC Petition

No. 03960044 (July 12, 1996); Shoemaker v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Petition No. 03930160 (January 4, 1994); Perry v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 03930144 (December 16, 1993).

Upon review, the Commission finds that complainant is disabled within the

meaning of the regulations. Although complainant's shoulder condition

is not documented as substantially limiting one or more of his major

life activities, the Commission finds that the agency regarded him as

substantially limited in his ability to work based on Doctor I's first

diagnosis. Doctor I reported that complainant's shoulder condition

precluded him from performing the essential functions and strenuous

activities of the Position. The agency then denied complainant the

Distribution and Window Clerk Position and removed his name from the

register of all other jobs based on its perception that complainant

could not perform any strenuous activity.

The Commission further finds that complainant is a qualified individual

with a disability based on the evidence of record which shows that

complainant was listed as qualified for the Position and for several

other positions at the agency. The Commission finds that the agency's

action was causally related to complainant's shoulder condition. The

agency found complainant medically unsuited for the Position. But for

complainant's perceived disability, the agency would have hired him.

In effect, the agency claims that complainant probably would be injured.

However, the medical report from Doctor I noted that there was a risk that

complainant might require future surgery for his shoulder, but failed to

diagnose a condition that posed a substantial threat of serious injury.

In fact, in his October 16, 1996 report, Doctor I cleared complainant

for the Position.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that

the AJ's findings and conclusions summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We find

questionable the Specialist's decision to deny complainant the Position

after Doctor I cleared complainant in his October 16, 1996 report.

We find the Specialist regarded complainant as disabled and deemed

him medically unsuitable for the Position and all other positions for

which he qualified. Although Doctor I noted that there was a risk of

future injury to complainant's shoulder that would require surgery,

and that complainant should avoid twisting and turning motions with

his shoulder or lifting heavy weights, both Doctors II and III reported

that complainant could perform the essential functions of the Position.

The AJ noted that complainant was performing twisting motions with his

shoulder in his current job. As such, the Commission finds that the

agency discriminated against complainant when it did not hire him for

a position for which he was qualified.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the agency is REVERSED and REMANDED for

further processing in accordance with this decision and the proper

regulations.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

The agency shall place the complainant in either the Distribution and

Window Clerk position or a substantially equivalent position to that of

Distribution and Window Clerk no later than thirty (30) calendar days

after the date this decision becomes final.

The agency shall pay to complainant back pay retroactive to October 16,

1996, the date on which complainant was notified that he would not be

hired as a Distribution and Window Clerk. If complainant declines to be

placed in the Distribution and Window Clerk position, or a substantially

equivalent position, the agency shall pay complainant back pay and

other benefits for the period from October 16, 1996, until the date of

the offer.

The issue of compensatory damages is REMANDED to the Hearings Unit of

the Miami District Office. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall

issue a decision on these issues in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,657 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109), and the agency

shall issue a final action in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,657-58 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110) within forty

(40) days of receipt of the Administrative Judge's decision. The agency

shall submit copies of the Administrative Judge's decision and the final

agency action to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.

The agency shall pay complainant's reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay (with

interest, if applicable) and other benefits due complainant, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after

the date this decision becomes final. The complainant shall cooperate

in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits

due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the agency.

If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or

benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant for the

undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the

agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant

may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled

"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due complainant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Miami, Florida facility copies of

the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0900)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order

prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29

C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action

for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the

complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

November 14, 2000

Date

Frances

M.

Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated which found that a

violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq., has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL DISABILITY with respect

to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions

or privileges of employment.

The United States Postal Service, Miami, Florida supports and will

comply with such Federal law and will not take action against individuals

because they have exercised their rights under law.

The United States Postal Service, Miami, Florida has been found to have

discriminated against an applicant for employment through the hiring

process. The agency has been ordered to retroactively hire the applicant

as a result of the discrimination, and award back pay. The United States

Postal Service, Miami, Florida will ensure that officials responsible

for personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will

abide by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity

laws and will not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.

The United States Postal Service, Miami, Florida will not in any manner

restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who

exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or

who participates in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment

opportunity law.

_____________________________

Date Posted: _____________________

Posting Expires: __________________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding

the present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found

at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 These included clerk, carrier, distribution clerk, flat sorter machine

operator, markup clerk, mail handler, and mail processor.

3 Complainant has a service-related 20% disability for his right shoulder

through the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

4 Doctor I noted that complainant told him he suffered 50 dislocations

in the past 12 years and that when his shoulder dislocates, he repositions

it himself without further complication. He stated that complainant told

him that he does not swim or throw a ball because these motions would

dislocate his shoulder, but that as long as he did not have to perform

a throwing motion he would not have a problem with future dislocation.

Doctor I stated that he believed that if it were simply a matter of

refraining from performing throwing motions, complainant would not

have had 50 dislocations over the past 12 years. Doctor I noted that

until complainant's shoulder was stabilized by reconstructive surgery,

he should avoid the activities listed as the functional requirements of

the position.

5 The Position required heavy lifting of up to 70 pounds, heavy carrying

of over 45 pounds, straight pulling for eight hours, pulling hand over

hand, and repetitive use of the wrists and fingers.

6 Complainant stated that Doctor I misquoted him when he told Doctor I

that he had 15 dislocations.

7 Doctor I noted that complainant was able to lift 70 pounds but was

concerned that the rotating motion involved in lifting would cause

complainant's shoulder to dislocate.

8 The AJ noted that a determination by the VA that a person has a

service-related disability does not per se make that person a qualified

person with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.

9 Citing Bentivegna v. U.S. Department of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622

(9th Cir. 1982).

10 These included selling stamps, postal cards, and money order

certificates; accepting window deliveries of parcels, registered mail,

collecting postage due fees, issuing receipts and delivering mail to

customers; issuing and cashing money orders; renting post office boxes,

receiving rental payments, conducting reference checks and completing

forms; providing information to customers on postal regulations, rates

and mailing restrictions; setting postage meters, maintaining records of

mail, labeling and tying mail for dispatch, opening and dumping pouches

and sacks; and performing miscellaneous clerical duties.

11 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.