Livbag S.A.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 29, 2002

No. 75490769 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2002)

Mailed: October 29, 2002
Paper No. 20
CEW
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Livbag S.A.
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Serial No. 75/490,769
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Paul W. Kruse and James R. Menker of Pillsbury Winthrop for
Livbag S.A.
David H. Stine, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 114
(Margaret Le, Managing Attorney).
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Before Seeherman, Walters and Chapman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Walters, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Livbag S.A. filed an application to register the mark
MGG for “gas generators for air bags protecting devices,” in
International Class 11, and “pyrotechnic gas generators;
pyrotechnic fillings for such generators and pyrotechnic gas
generators for seat belt retractors,” in International Class
THIS DISPOSITION
IS NOT CITABLE AS
PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Serial No. 75/490,769
2
13.1 The application was filed originally for the Principal
Register based on an allegation of a bona fide intention to
use the mark in commerce. Subsequently, applicant filed an
Amendment to Allege Use, alleging, for both classes, first
use and use in commerce as of May 4, 1998, as well as an
amendment of its application to the Supplemental Register.
The Trademark Examining Attorney initially refused
registration, under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), on the ground that applicant’s mark is
merely descriptive in connection with both of its classes of
goods. Following applicant’s amendment to the Supplemental
Register, the Examining Attorney refused registration, under
Section 23 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1091, on the
ground that applicant’s mark is generic in connection with
both of its classes of goods. This refusal has been made
final.
Applicant has appealed. Both applicant and the
Examining Attorney have filed briefs, but an oral hearing
was not requested. We reverse the refusal to register.
The Examining Attorney contends that “MGG” is an
acronym for “monopropellant gas generator,” and that it is
the name of the class or genus of chemical reaction gas
generators to which all of applicant’s goods belong. The

1 Serial No. 75/490,769 was originally filed on May 26, 1998. The
application filing date was amended to November 9, 2000, which is the
date applicant filed both its Amendment to Allege Use and its amendment
to the Supplemental Register.
Serial No. 75/490,769
3
Examining Attorney states that these goods are of a highly
specialized nature and, thus, only limited evidence
pertaining to these goods is available; but that the utility
patents of record are sufficient evidence of the generic
nature of the initials “MGG” in connection with the goods
identified herein. In this regard, the Examining Attorney
states the following:
The excerpts from utility patents … clearly show
generic use of the acronym “MGG” … to identify
“monopropellant gas generators.” It is noted that
applicant terms its goods “micro gas generators”;
however, the salient inquiry involved here is the
significance of the acronym itself, rather than
underlying wording it may represent. Review of
the patent excerpts clearly indicates that the MGG
devices described are essentially identical in
nature and function to applicant’s goods. All of
the items produce a supply of propellant gas via a
violent or vigorous chemical reaction, which may
be in the nature of a pyrotechnic explosion.
…
[A]pplicant’s employment of this same type of gas
generator in vehicular restraint systems, rather
than in the specific type of device described in
the patents, does not render the generic
designation of one of the employed components any
less generic than it would be in another
application. To draw a parallel, the term “wheel”
would be just as generic as applied to the wheel
of an automobile as it would when applied to the
wheel of a wheelbarrow or a toy train.
Applicant’s goods are exactly the type or genus of
product which is generically identified within the
evidence of record as an “MGG.”
The Examining Attorney submitted brief excerpts from two
patents in support of his position.2

2 The patent excerpts submitted by the Examining Attorney are so brief
that no conclusions can be drawn from these excerpts. We have, however,
considered these two patents because applicant submitted copies of the
two patents in their entireties.
Serial No. 75/490,769
4
Applicant contends that its goods are not
monopropellant gas generators; that the evidence of two
expired patents is insufficient to establish that
applicant’s mark is generic in connection with its
identified goods; and that if MGG is generic for
monopropellant gas generators, then it cannot also be
generic for applicant’s goods. In addition to submitting
complete copies of the patents referenced by the Examining
Attorney, applicant submitted its specification sheet.
One of the patents of record, for a “protective weapon
for attack aircraft” utilizes a monopropellant gas
generator, which is also referred to as an “MGG.” The other
patent is for a “portable underwater fuel feed system” that
also utilizes an “MGG” and the patent discusses several of
the different types of systems within the “family of MGGs”
for use in connection with portable underwater fuel feed
systems.
On its specification sheet, applicant’s product is
described as “MGG/MGC Micro Gas Generator For Belt- And
Buckle Pretensioner Systems.”3 One of the characteristics
of the product noted therein, within a list of five
characteristics, is “nitrocellulose or composite
propellant.” There is no further explanation or other

3 Nowhere in the record is there any indication as to whether “MGC” has
a meaning and, if so, what that meaning is.
Serial No. 75/490,769
5
evidence regarding the nature of applicant’s goods or the
nature and uses of monopropellant gas generators.
With respect to genericness, the Office has the burden
of proving genericness by “clear evidence” thereof. In re
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567,
4 USPQ2d 1141, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The critical issue in
genericness cases is whether members of the relevant public
primarily use or understand the term sought to be registered
to refer to the category or class of goods or services in
question. In re Women’s Publishing Co. Inc., 23 USPQ2d
1876, 1877 (TTAB 1992). Our primary reviewing court has set
forth a two-step inquiry to determine whether a mark is
generic: First, what is the category or class of goods or
services at issue? Second, is the term sought to be
registered understood by the relevant public primarily to
refer to that category or class of goods or services? H.
Marvin Ginn Corporation v. International Association of Fire
Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir.
1986). See also, In re American Fertility Society, 188 F.3d
1341, 51 USPQ2d 1832 (Fed. Cir. 1999); and In re Dial-A-
Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 57 USPQ2d 1807
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
The standard for determining that a term is generic in
connection with specified goods and/or services is difficult
to meet. In the case before us, we have only two patents in
Serial No. 75/490,769
6
evidence. In these patents, the acronym “MGG” is used in a
generic manner to mean “monopropellant gas generator,” which
appears, from the descriptions in the two patents, to be a
generic term for a class of gas generators using a single
gas as a propellant. Even if these patent excerpts are
sufficient to show that “MGG” is generic in connection with
the goods involved in the two patents, the evidence is not
sufficient to demonstrate that the relevant consumers for
applicant’s goods would view “MGG” as a generic term. The
patents in evidence are not in the same field or for the
products involved in this application.
It simply requires too much speculation for us to
conclude that “MGG” is generic in this case. We note,
however, that if applicant’s competitors believe “MGG” is
generic, a cancellation proceeding may be brought against a
registration on the Supplemental Register, where an inter
partes record could be presented.
Decision: The refusal under Section 23 of the Act on
the ground that the proposed mark is generic is reversed for
both classes of goods. The application will be forwarded
for registration on the Supplemental Register in due course.