Litton Industries

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 8, 1971

190 N.L.R.B. 757 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

LANDIS TOOL COMPANY
Landis Tool Company . Division of Litton Industries
andInternational Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Lo-
cal Union No. 110. Cases 6-CA-5021 and 6-RC-
5191
June 8, 1971
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On February 22, 1971, Trial Examiner Henry L.
Jalette issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at-
tached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found
that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommended that such allegations be dismissed. In
addition, the Trial Examiner found an interference
with the election held in Case 6-RC-5191 and recom-
mended that the election be set aside. Thereafter, the
Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs
and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with these cases to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the
entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re-
spondent, Landis Tool Company, Division of Litton
Industries, Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order.
' In view of the Trial Examiner's findings and recommendations which
are adopted herein, Member Brown finds it unnecessary to decide whether
Respondent's campaign literature also violated the Act and interfered with
the election
757
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election con-
ducted on May 7, 1970, in Case 6-RC-5191 be, and it
hereby is, set aside and that Case 6-RC-5191 be, and
it hereby is, remanded to the Regional Director for
Region 6 for the purpose of conducting a new election
at such time as he deems that circumstances permit the
free choice of a bargaining representative.
[Direction of Second Election2 omitted from publica-
tion.]
' In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to
be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all
parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their ad-
dresses which may be used to communicate with them Excelsior Underwear
Inc., 156 NLRB 1236, NL.R B v Wyman-Gordon Co, 394 U S 759
Accordingly, it is hereby directed that an election eligibility list, containing
the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be filed by the
Employer with the Regional Director for Region 6, within 7 days after the
date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the Regional Director
The Regional Director shall make the list available to all parties to the
election No extension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional
Director except in extraordinary circumstances Failure to comply with this
requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper
objections are filed
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HENRY L. JALETTE,, Trial Examiner: These cases involve
allegations of independent 8(a)(1) conduct and the alleged
discriminatory discharge of two employees in a complaint
issued on July 29, 1970,' pursuant to an unfair labor practice
charge filed on May 14, by International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Local Union No. 110, herein called the Union, and
objections to conduct affecting the results of an election
which had been conducted on May 7, pursuant to a petition
filed by the Union on January 20, and a Decision and Direc-
tion of election issued on April 3 The tally of ballots in-
dicated that of approximately 751 eligible voters 252 had cast
votes for the Union and 432 had cast votes against union
representation. On May 13, the Union filed timely objections
to conduct affecting the results of the election and, on July
31, the Regional Director for Region 6 issued a Supplemental
Decision in which he directed a hearing on the objections. On
July 31, the Regional Director issued an order consolidating
Case 6-CA-5021 and Case 6-RC-5191. The cases were tried
in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, on October 27, 28, and 29.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
General Counsel, the Union, and the Respondent, I make the
following:'
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation with its princi-
pal office and manufacturing facility located in Waynesboro,
Pennsylvania, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale,
and service of machine tools and related products During the
12-month period immediately preceding issuance of the com-
plaint, Respondent purchased and received at its Waynesboro
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter refer to 1970
Counsel for the General Counsel filed a motion to correct the record
After due consideration, I conclude that the motion is well made and it is
hereby granted The motion to correct the transcript is hereby made part of
the record as TX Exh 1
190 NLRB No. 140
758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plant directly from points outside the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 . During the same 12-month period , Respondent
shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 from its Waynes-
boro plant directly to points outside the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No.
110, is now , and at all times material herein has been , a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Independent 8(a)(1) Conduct
1. The interrogation of employees about their gripes and
complaints by Respondent President Ralph E. Price
It is undisputed that prior to the election on May 7, Re-
spondent's president , Ralph E . Price, conducted three meet-
ings of employees . The exact dates of these meetings were not
established (it is clear one meeting was held May 6), nor is
it clear at which of the meetings the alleged unlawful remarks
were made . The dates are not important ; the remarks were
made after the filing of the petition in Case 6-RC-5191 and
before the election , and within the 10(b) period.
Several employees ' testified that at one of the meetings
Price initiated a question -and-answer session stating that he
wanted to know the employees ' gripes and complaints. He
told the employees he could make no promises , but he stated
in the course of the meeting that he did not think the em-
ployees needed the Union to straighten out whatever prob-
lems existed , that they could do it among themselves, the
company and the employees David Fair testified that, in
stating that he wanted to know about their gripes and com-
plaints, Price stated that he wanted to know why the fellows
would want the Union.
Price did not testify, nevertheless Respondent contends
that Fair cannot be credited as to that portion of his tes-
timony attributing to Price the remark that he wanted to
know why the employees would want the Union. Moreover,
Respondent contends that "solicitation of employee griev-
ances by an employer is not illegal unless accompanied by an
express or implied promise of benefits specifically aimed at
interfering with , restraining , and coercing employees in their
organizational efforts." ITT, Telecommunications, 183
NLRB No. 115.
Respondent 's first contention is predicated on the fact that
of the employees who testified about the meetings with Price
only Fair attributed to him the remark that he wanted to
know why the employees would want the Union and that Fair
did not include that remark in his pretrial statement . Despite
this, and although the finding of a violation does not turn on
whether or not Price made that or a similar statement, I am
disposed to accept Fair's testimony. It is abundantly clear
from the testimony of all the employees that the purpose of
the meeting , whether or not it was so stated , was to find out
why the employees had sought out a union to represent them.
Meetings such as Price held were not regular meetings but
were held solely because of the Union 's organizational cam-
paign and the employees had every reason to understand this
because it is undisputed that Price did tell them they did not
need a union , that they could solve their problems by them-
selves.
' David Fair , Earl Baer , Ronald Mellott , William Morin , and Charles
Bieseacker
As to Respondent 's second contention , I conclude that its
reliance on ITT, Telecommunications is misplaced . That case
is entirely different on its facts. The gravamen of the com-
plaint in that case was that the employer had unlawfully
interrogated its employees . The complaint allegation in this
case is cast in terms of interrogation , which in a sense is an
accurate description of Price 's conduct , but the illegality of
Price 's conduct lies in the fact that the solicitation of griev-
ances, in a preelection context , carries with it the implied
promise that the grievance will be remedied.' Price said he
could make no promises and no express promises were made.
It was not necessary for Price to make express promises. A
promise is patently implied when an employer tells employees
they do not need a union to straighten out their problems.
The record supports only one conclusion : that the purpose of
Respondent in soliciting employee grievances was to under-
mine the Union. In the circumstances , such conduct con-
stituted interference with the right of employees guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act and Respondent thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Texaco, Inc., 178 NLRB No. 72;
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 171 NLRB No. 44.
2. The alleged threat by Roy Potts
Lee Miller , alleged discriminatee, testified that on an un-
specified date after his layoff, while at the used -car lot of one
Obie Jones , he overheard a conversation between Jones and
Foreman Roy Potts in which Jones asked Potts how many
employees had been laid off at Respondent 's plant. Potts
replied 26 or 27 and Jones asked him if there would be more
and Potts replied that Respondent planned to lay off about
90 more employees . Jones asked if there was a lack of work
or "does it have something to do with the union business?"
Potts said , "Well, the work isn't as good as it could be and
the Union could have something to do with it."
General Counsel contends that the remarks of Potts con-
stituted a threat of loss of employment because of the implica-
tion that the union activities of the employees were the cause
of the layoffs In my view , the evidence does not support such
a finding . In the first place , at the time Potts made the remark
attributed to him by Miller , he was not an agent of Respond-
ent. He was merely a supervisor of Respondent engaged in a
personal transaction. In my opinion , a violation of the Act
cannot be predicated on statements of a supervisor in a pri-
vate conversation not intended to be heard or communicated
to employees .' Secondly, Miller 's own version of the conver-
sation indicates not a threat but the personal conjecture of a
low-ranking supervisor who was not privy to Respondent's
decisionmaking process insofar as the size of its working force
was concerned.'
For the foregoing reasons, I shall recommend that para-
graph 6(g) of the complaint be dismissed.
' .As a matter of fact, one complaint about the absence of a cutting torch
(perhaps a small matter , but nonetheless serious enough to one employee to
be voiced) was immediately remedied
' This is not to say that such a statement may not constitute evidentiary
support of an employer 's motive for a layoff
According to Potts, Jones suggested that the layoffs were occasioned by
the union activities at the plant and Potts said, "Well, I wouldn ' t want to
quote on that " This is not too different from "the Union could have some-
thing to do with it " Potts impressed me as a credible witness, but admitted
to such a faulty memory that I accept Miller's version of the conversation,
but find no violation
LANDIS TOOL COMPANY 759
3. The alleged threat by W. Elliott Angle
According to employee Arlen Reed, on an occasion in May
1970, he was on a chore with his supervisor, Ed Washabaugh,
and Superintendent Elliott Angle, and Washabaugh and An-
gle were talking and Angle remarked to Washabaugh, "We
could use two more men." He said, "We would hire two or
call back two excepting that the Labor Board has (what did
he call it?) involved with the union now and they have pressed
charges against us."
Both Angle and Washabaugh denied that Angle made any
such statement. I was very favorably impressed by Angle's
demeanor and, although he was night superintendent, I can-
not believe that he was privy to Respondent's councils to have
made a statement such as that attributed to him by Reed.
Since I credit Angle, perforce I credit Washabaugh.
Since I find that Angle did not make the statement at-
tributed to him by Reed, I shall recommend that paragraph
6(f) of the complaint, as amended, be dismissed.
4. The allegations concerning Olen Stoops
Employee William Monn testified that, on an occasion in
early 1970 before the March 20 layoffs, he asked Assistant
Foreman Olen Stoops about a meeting of supervisors they
had just attended. Stoops told him that Price had told the
supervisors to ask each of the employees under his super-
vision why each one wanted the union in the shop. Stoops
asked Monn his reason and Monn replied for better benefits,
better retirement, and seniority.
Stoops admitted that Monn asked him about the super-
visors' meeting but he denied the remainder of Monn's tes-
timony. Respondent contends I should not credit Monn, be-
cause he did not include this conversation with Stoops in the
prehearing statement, and because it is incredible that a
supervisor could make such a statement as Monn described
when he was "just returning from a supervisors' meeting
where he is told by the Company's attorney he should not
interrogate employees about the Union ....
As to the first point, I am not persuaded in this instance
that it is sufficient reason to discredit Monn. As to the second
point, the record does not bear out Respondent's assertion
that Stoops was returning from a meeting where company
attorneys advised them not to interrogate employees. There
were such meetings, but there were also other meetings of
supervisors not attended by company attorneys at which
Price spoke. This was admitted by Foreman Washabaugh
who testified they were to get "across to the people that we
have problems and that those problems will try to be resolved
as quickly as possible." Washabaugh's testimony further indi-
cates that Price wanted to learn from his supervisors what
problems the employees had. Under the circumstances, in-
cluding the fact that Respondent's own president violated the
Act, I can attach no significance to the instructions given by
counsel to the supervisors.
In the case of Stoops, I was not particularly impressed by
his demeanor on the witness stand and I cannot help but note
that apart from denying the statements attributed to him by
Monn he said almost nothing. Thus, after admitting that
Monn asked him about the supervisors' meeting, he testified
he replied, "It's about the election-the union campaign." He
did not explain what was said at the meeting about the elec-
tion and when asked if there was anything else, he replied,
"Well not that I remember-I mean , he would ask me ques-
tions and I would answer them, but nothing important."
Stoops was unduly reticent. I do not credit him. Monn ap-
peared to me to be a truthful witness testifying to the best of
his recollection. I credit him.
Respondent contends that even if Stoops did ask Monn
why he wanted the Union, such a "casual question" in nonco-
ercive circumstances does not violate the Act. However, the
statement made by Stoops before his questioning of Monn
was that Price had instructed all supervisors to ask employees
such a question. This is not casual conduct. It is systematic.
It has no lawful purpose. It was part of Respondent's cam-
paign, as exemplified by President Price's own statements in
the employee meetings, to impress on employees that the
Union was not necessary to redress their grievances. Under
all the circumstances, I find the interrogation of Stoops as
alleged in paragraph 6(c) of the complaint, as amended, was
coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The allegations concerning Colin Beegle
Employee William Monn also testified that, shortly after
his conversation with Assistant Foreman Stoops described
above, Foreman Colin Beegle asked him why he wanted a
union and Monn told him the same thing he had told Stoops.
Beegle told Monn that back in 1946 one Hollengren, then
president of Landis Tool, had made the statement that he
would shut the gates before he'd let a union come in, and he
(Beegle) said he felt that current President Price would follow
in the same footsteps and that he would close the gates be-
cause he had other plants. Beegle said Price would not negoti-
ate and this would cause a strike which Monn could not
afford.
Beegle denied any conversation with Monn about the Un-
ion. To prove that he could not have referred to Hollengren,
he pointed out that he was in high school in 1946 at the time
Hollengren was president. For this reason, Respondent con-
tends I should not credit Monn. In addition, because the
interrogation Monn ascribed to Assistant Foreman Stoops
above occurred in Beegle's presence, Respondent says there
was no need for Beegle to ask the same question. An addi-
tional defense is the one I have already rejected relative to the
instructions to Respondent's supervisors by its attorneys.
Despite these contentions, I do not credit Beegle whose
demeanor did not impress me favorably, whereas, as I have
previously indicated, Monn appeared to me to be a truthful
witness. The fact that Beegle was not working at the plant
when Hollengren was president does not negate his having
been told of Hollengren's views by others who had been
working there in 1946. Monn was likewise not employed at
the plant in 1946, yet he heard about Hollengren. He likewise
could have heard about him from others, but he claims he
heard about him from Beegle.
As to the contention that Beegle would not have asked
Monn why he wanted the Union because Stoops had allegedly
asked him the same question earlier in Beegle's presence, I am
not persuaded from a review of the testimony that Beegle was
present when Stoops interrogated Monn. Rather, it appears
that Beegle at most overheard Monn ask Stoops what had
happened at the supervisor's meeting and then he walked
away.
In accordance with the foregoing, I find that on an occa-
sion before the election, Respondent, by its supervisor and
agent, Colin Beegle, interrogated an employee about his un-
ion sentiments and threatened plant closure if the employees
selected the Union as their bargaining representative. By such
conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. The conduct of Ralph Verdier
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Ralph Verdier,
production manager, created the impression that Respondent
was engaged in the surveillance of the employees' union ac-
tivities and that he interogated employees about their union
activities.
760 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employee Earl Baer testified that in the latter part of April,
Verdier asked him, "How are you and the Union getting
along?" Baer replied, "No better than anyone else, I suppose"
and Verdier rejoined that he had heard Baer was a pretty
strong unionman. Verdier remarked how he thought Baer
had been well treated by Landis, and Baer expressed his
complaint about his hourly rate of pay considering his years
of service and productivity. Verdier adverted to a more senior
employee and told Baer he was in line for his job. A few days
later, Verdier asked Baer if he had changed his mind about
how he was going to vote and Baer replied he might not vote
at all. Verdier told him the company wanted him to vote, one
way or the other.
Verdier admitted speaking to Baer, as to all employees
under his supervision, to tell him of the election and that he
expected Baer to vote. When Baer told him he might not vote,
Verdier told him he should vote regardless of how he voted.
Verdier denied asking Baer how he and the Union were get-
ting along or remarking he had heard Baer was a strong
unionman or asking Baer if he had changed his mind.
Apart from its reliance on Verdier's denial, Respondent
contends that the statements attributed to him by Baer, if
Baer is credited, are not violative of the Act.
I do not credit Verdier. I cannot believe that Verdier's
conversations with Baer were as innocuous as he suggested.
For example, he testified he knew Baer was a unionman
because Baer volunteered the information. According to Ver-
dier, this came about because Baer asked him not to talk to
him within his work area because after he'd leave Baer would
be kidded by other employees in the area . Then, after he had
testified that Baer volunteered the information he was a un-
ionman, Verdier testified, "He didn't say if he was supporting
the union or not. He just asked me not to talk to him any-
more." This contradictory testimony, as well as the revelation
that Verdier talked to Baer frequently enough about the Un-
ion to be asked by Baer not to do so, leads me to believe that
Baer, who appeared to be a truthful witness, should be cred-
ited.
Contrary to Respondent's contention, I find that Verdier's
statements to Baer were violative of the Act. They were
clearly interrogatory, served no lawful purpose, were part of
a pattern of interrogation, and occurred in the context of
other unfair labor practices. The effects of the interrogation
are seen in Baer's remark during the second interrogation
that he might not vote at all. Baer had quickly perceived that
Verdier's questioning was not a mere casual interest about the
forthcoming election. In like manner, the remark that he had
heard Baer was a pretty strong unionman cannot help but
have caused Baer to believe that his union activities were
being surveyed by Verdier. In my judgment, Verdier's con-
duct was clearly coercive and tended to restrain Baer from
the exercise of his Section 7 rights. I find, therefore, that
Respondent, by Verdier's conduct, violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act as alleged in paragraph 6(b) and (c) of the complaint,
as amended.
7 The conduct of Eugene George
Alleged discriminatee Lee Miller testified that he had
heard that Foreman Ed Washabaugh was telling employees
that Miller was a union instigator and he asked Foreman
Eugene George if Washabaugh had said anything to him and
George told him that Washabaugh had told him the same
thing.
General Counsel contends that by so reporting to Miller,
George created the impression that Respondent was engaged
in surveillance of employees ' union activities.
Apart from other considerations,' I do not believe that
under the circumstances depicted by Miller a violation of the
Act can be predicated on George's response to Miller's ques-
tion. It is the General Counsel's position that Miller was an
outstanding supporter of the Union and Miller admitted to
having engaged in union activities on company time and
property. On his own testimony, he had heard that Wa-
shabaugh was referring to him with other employees as a
union instigator. If anything created the impression of sur-
veillance, it was Washabaugh's remarks (a matter independ-
ently alleged to be violative of the Act), not George's reply
to Miller's question. The the extent paragraph 1(b) of the
complaint, as amended, relies on this incident I shall recom-
mend that it be dismissed.
8. The conduct of Edward Washabaugh
Foreman Washabaugh is alleged to have created the im-
pression of surveillance of employees' union activities and to
have threatened employees with layoff and cessation of Re-
spondent's operations if they selected the Union as their bar-
gaining representative.
Alleged discriminatee Robert Ray testified that either in
January or February 1970, Foreman Ed Washabaugh told
him and fellow employee Jim Fann that he knew they had
signed union cards. He said he was opposed to the Union and
that "before the Landis Tool Company would let the union
come in, they'd close the doors."
Either on this or some other occasion Washabaugh told
Ray and Fann that, if the Union got in, there wouldn't be
enough work back there for the two of them (Ray and Fann
did grind and dress work in the welding department) and one
of them would have to go. He made a similar remark about
the two inspectors in the department.
On one occasion, Washabaugh remarked to Ray and Fann
that Lee Miller, an alleged discriminatee, was the union in-
stigator.
Fann substantially corroborated Ray's testimony.
Employee David Fair testified that on March 24 Wa-
shabaugh asked him why he wanted the Union and Fair told
him it was for better benefits.
On one occasion, Washabaugh told Fair and Miller that
Price would close the doors to the plant before he'd let the
Union in. Miller confirmed that Washabaugh made such a
statement, although he described it as a statement to Fair
which he overheard.
Washabaugh denied the allegations made by Ray, Fann,
Fair, and Miller. He admitted talking to some employees
about the Union, including Fann, Miller, and Fair, but not
Ray.
Where allegations of independent 8(a)(1) statements are
concerned, deciding on the credibility of witnesses is a par-
ticularly vexing problem, generally because there are no ex-
trinsic factors to rely on, but only the impression one forms
from his observation of the witnesses. On this basis, I credit
Fair's testimony that he was interrogated by Washabaugh,
and his and Miller's testimony that Washabaugh threatened
plant closure before Respondent would let the Union come
in. I also credit Fann's and Ray's testimony that Washabaugh
told them he knew they had signed cards, that Miller was the
union instigator, and that Respondent would close its doors
before letting the Union come in. The impression I formed of
Washabaugh leads me to believe he would make such state-
ments, not because he was told this by Price, but because he
believed this himself and felt that he could tell the employees
' Foreman Washabaugh denied telling George that Miller was a union
instigator, and George did not testify
LANDIS TOOL COMPANY
this without violating Respondent's instructions. However, I
cannot see any basis for the statements attributed to him by
Ray and Fann about the need for only one inspector and one
grind and dress man if the Union came in, and I do not credit
Ray and Fann with regard to such testimony. Ray did not
attribute such a statement to Washabaugh in his prehearing
affidavit and I suspect a belated recollection of a statement
which conveniently supports the allegations of the dis-
criminatory layoff of Ray and Miller.
By telling Ray and Fann he knew they had signed union
cards and that Miller was the union instigator, Washabaugh
created the impression that Respondent was keeping the em-
ployees' union activities under surveillance. Such conduct
tends to restrain employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act and is violative of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Similarly, the threats of plant closure and the
interrogation of Fair about his reasons for wanting the Union
(interrogation which is found to be clearly coercive in the
context of the case and Washabaugh's other conduct) con-
stituted conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. Respondent's Campaign Literature
General Counsel contends that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by its preelection campaign literature.
He contends that in an April 30 letter to all employees Re-
spondent threatened them with the loss of existing benefits
unless they refrained from supporting the Union. This con-
tention is based on the following excerpts from that letter:
Bargaining could begin from "zero" and during the
course of good faith negotiations, existing wage rates and
benefits could be retained, improved or eliminated."
[Emphasis supplied.]
* * * *
I believe it is good sense not to risk trading away the
things you have and the things that can be achieved by
cooperative discussion between you and the company,
for all the uncertainties this union stands for.
In my judgment, it may not be fairly held that the quoted
passages constituted threats (thinly veiled or explicit) of loss
of existing benefits. In Bray Oil Company, 169 NLRB No.
150, in a letter developing the same theme as here developed,
the employer stated "The Company could and would start
bargaining from scratch." The letter was found not to contain
any threat of reprisal. In Wagner Industrial Products Com-
pany, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 157, the Board stated the follow-
ing about a more explicitly worded letter: "Further, a reading
of the letter as a whole shows that the main thrust of Re-
spondent's argument is that the mere designation of a union
will not automatically secure to employees a large increase in
wages and benefits. There is no specific implication that Re-
spondent intended to adopt a bargaining posture offering the
employees less than they were then receiving." I conclude
that the same statement can be made about Respondent's
April 30 letter, and I shall recommend that the allegation of
paragraph 6(h) of the complaint, as amended, be dismissed.
Between January 22 and May 7, Respondent distributed at
least 13 pieces of literature to its employees, and General
Counsel contends that by the repeated references therein to
strikes Respondent conveyed to employees the impression
that strikes were inevitable, and Respondent thereby threat-
ened employees with loss of employment if they selected the
Union as their bargaining representative.
As an example of the tenor and tone of Respondent's re-
marks concerning the possibility of strikes and violence, Gen-
eral Counsel adverts to the following from a May 1 letter:
761
But there is no way of getting around the fact that to
have a union strike you first get a union-and that a
union strike is one of the hazards you undertake by
bringing in a union. It is also no coincidence that many
of the strikes you read about are called by the Teamsters.
After all, a strike is the union's ultimate weapon-the
only way it can hope to force your company to give all
of the things promised by the union organizers when
they were trying to win your support. When these de-
mands are unreasonable, the likelihood the union will
have to use that weapon increases.
During such a strike, you cannot collect unemployment
insurance benefits. You simply are ineligible for them as
long as you voluntarily refuse to work over contract
demands. Unfortunately, as day after day passes, and the
weeks and perhaps months drag on, your weekly and
monthly bills just keep coming in. Grocery and clothing
bills, telephone and utility bills, house and car payments,
and all the rest, still have to be paid-and few creditors
will stand idly by and let payments be missed, especially
during a long strike.
That's not even the worst of it. First you have to survive
two trips a day through a Teamster picket line-and
even Teamster members from other plants can be re-
cruited to picket. Hundreds of pickets, milling around
your car, blocking it as you try to drive in and out of
work, kicking it or hitting it with picket signs, and shout-
ing obscene and offensive names at you, would make it
pretty difficuly [sic] to try to come to work. And then
they start the anonymous, threatening telephone calls to
you and your family in the middle of the night.
In support of his position, General Counsel cites three
cases: Brandenburg Telephone Company, 164 NLRB 825;
Kawneer Co., 164 NLRB 983; and Boaz Spinning Company,
177 NLRB No. 103. Respondent contends that its literature
was protected by Section 8(c) of the Act and counters Gen-
eral Counsel's citations by citations of its own; e.g., Ripley
Shoe Products Company, 171 NLRB No. 153; Texaco, Inc.,
178 NLRB No. 72; Howmet Corporation, 171 NLRB No. 18;
Bray Oil Company, 169 NLRB No. 150; Allied/Egry Business
Systems, Inc., 169 NLRB No. 60.
The Union, relying not only on campaign literature intro-
duced into evidence by General Counsel, but also on litera-
ture it introduced into evidence in support of its Objection 7,
asserts that the election should be set aside and it submits its
own list of citations; e.g., Marsh Super-Markets, 140 NLRB
No. 83; Aeronca Manufacturing Company, 160 NLRB No.
35; Lincoln Manufacturing Company, 160 NLRB No. 146;
General Industries Electronics Company, 146 NLRB 1139;
Kawneer Company, 169 NLRB No. 138.
I have carefully considered all the cases cited by the parties,
as well as others disclosed by my own research, and I con-
clude that Respondent's campaign literature did not exceed
the boundaries of permissible propaganda. The Board deci-
sions in this area offer very little guidance. Compare Boaz
Spinning Company, Inc., supra, with Ripley Shoe Products
Company, supra. The reason for this absence of meaningful
guidlines can be found in Allied/Egry Business Systems, Inc.,
supra, where the Board stated, "Realizing full well that in all
cases such as this one, where one must attempt to fathom the
meaning of another's words and assess the impress of such
words on employees, reasonable men may differ, we differ
with out colleague."
762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In that case, as in this, the employer did not say that the
union must strike to gain reasonable demands, but only that
it had no intention of yielding to pressure by the union, such
as strikes, where the object of such pressure was unreasona-
ble. That employer did not state it would not bargain; nor did
Respondent. In my judgment, a close examination of Re-
spondent's literature discloses no express or implied promise
of benefit or threat of reprisal. I consider aptly descriptive of
the Respondent's literature in this case the following state-
ment of the Board in Howmet Corporation, supra,:
Essentially the Employer's propaganda was a re-
minder that there can be disadvantages to union repre-
sentation and that it would be wise for the employees to
give heed to the disadvantages as well as the advantages
in making their choice. And while the Employer did
advert to strikes in this connection, we do not think that
the content of the campaign material and the manner of
its presentation was such as to indicate to employees that
the Employer would not honor its statutory obligation
to meet and bargain with the Union in good faith should
the Union win the election. In the circumstances of this
case, we are unable to say that the Employer so tainted
the election atmosphere as to preclude the employees
from exercising a free choice on the question presented
to them at the election.
In line with the foregoing, I conclude that Respondent's
literature neither violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, nor did
it taint the election atmosphere as to preclude employees
from exercising a free choice in the election. Accordingly, I
shall recommend that paragraph 6(i) of the complaint, as
amended, be dismissed.
C. The Layoff of Robert Ray and Lee Miller
Respondent manufactures and sells machine tools. In early
1970, it employed about 800 production and maintenance
employees . On March 20 , it laid off 26 employees, including
Robert Ray and Lee Miller , both of whom were union sup-
porters. ' General Counsel contends that the layoff of Ray and
Miller was discriminatorily motivated and Respondent con-
tends that it was motivated by economic necessity.
General Counsel's position respecting Respondent 's asser-
tion of economic necessity is somewhat equivocal . At times,
it appeared that he was disputing the existence of any eco-
nomic necessity for a layoff , and at other times he appeared
to be conceding its existence . In any event , whatever the
General Counsel 's position, it is clear that in the period of the
layoff Respondent was suffering an economic decline. Thus,
whereas new orders had averaged approximately $2,620,000
per month during the fiscal year ending July 31 , 1969, for the
7-month period from August 1969 through February 1970,
the average monthly new orders placed had dropped to ap-
proximately $1,506,777, or a drop of over $ 1 million per
month from the previous 12-month average . At the beginning
Contrary to Respondent 's contention , I conclude that the record sup-
ports a finding of company knowledge of Ray's and Miller's umon activities
In my opinion , the record supports a finding that Foremen Washabaugh and
George knew of their union activities , and such knowledge is imputable to
Respondent It is true that Washabaugh and George testified that they did
not convey their knowledge to Plant Manager Kissinger and that Kissinger
testified that he and President Price made the decision to lay off employees
and how many to lay off without consulting foremen Be that as it may, it
is not essential to General Counsel 's proof that he establish by direct evi-
dence that Kissinger knew of Ray's and Miller 's union activities It is suffi-
cient that he show knowledge on part of a supervisor Moreover, it is
undisputed that Kissinger knew that the union organizational campaign was
in progress , and he did not deny knowledge of Ray 's and Miller's union
activities Cf. Texas Aluminum Company, Inc v. N.L.R.B., 435 F.2D 917
(CA 5)
of its fiscal year in August 1969, Respondent had a backlog
of orders in the amount of $23 million. This backlog de-
creased steadily to the point that it amounted to $18 million
in March 1970.
On the basis of the foregoing, one must conclude that there
was economic justification for a layoff. However, in a case
where an employee is allegedly discharged for cause, it is a
truism that proof of the existence of a cause for discharge not
preclude a finding that the discharge was motivated by union
considerations Similarly here, the fact of an economic de-
cline does not preclude a finding that the layoff of March 26
was motivated by union considerations. Certain factors cer-
tainly suggest the possibility that the economic decline was
seized upon as a pretext to coerce employees (as a group and
irrespective of the union sympathies of the individuals se-
lected for layoff) to refrain from supporting the Union. To
begin with, there is evidence of a strong union animus, includ-
ing threats of plant closure. During the 7-month period which
is relied on by Respondent to show an economic decline,
Respondent had hired approximately 50 employees, includ-
ing 7 in January, 1970, 4 of whom were production and
maintenance employees. In addition, Respondent had not
laid off employees since 1957 or 1958, and at that time it had
laid off 500 to 600 employees. In this instance, in laying off
26 employees, Respondent was reducing its work force by
approximately 3-1/4 percent. The record does not indicate
precisely how the figure of 26 was arrived at (except that the
plant manager and president concluded after consultations
with supervisors that that number could be spared without
hurting production) and one cannot help but marvel at the
skill of a management that can determine its personnel needs
with such precision. In light of such a stable employment
history as Respondent has shown, one cannot help but ask
why Respondent did not meet the economic decline by attri-
tion, rather than a layoff, or a further reduction in hours
(during this period, Respondent had reduced the hours of
work from 50 hours per week to 45). In the circumstances,
one must be forgiven the suspicion that in this instance Re-
spondent used the economic decline as a pretext to coerce
employees to refrain from supporting the Union.
Since General Counsel has not alleged that the layoff was
motivated by union considerations, there is no need to dwell
on this possibility. As the case stands, General Counsel must
be taken as conceding that the layoff of March 26 was not
only supported by economic necessity, but also was moti-
vated by that necessity. What General Counsel contends,
however, is that whatever economic necessity existed in the
case of 24 of the 26 laid-off employees it did not exist as to
Ray and Miller. While the matter is one not free from doubt,
I conclude that the evidence does not rise above the level of
suspicion and that a finding of a violation would require the
substitution of the Board's judgment for Respondent's busi-
ness judgment.
General Counsel enumerates the following factors in sup-
port of a finding of a violation: (1) the "layoffs" occurred at
the height of the Union's organizational activities; (2) at the
time the "layoffs" were made, there was a substantial amount
of work that had to be done; (3) employees were permanently
transferred into Ray's department to perform his work; (4) a
supervisor in addition to other employees was called upon to
work overtime to perform Miller's work; (5) a substantial
number of employees, including all apprentices, some of
whom had less seniority and experience than Ray and Miller,
were retained; and (6) Respondent subsequently hired the
same number of new apprentices as it had in the past, even
though this was contrary to its admitted policy of employing
LANDIS TOOL COMPANY 763
apprentices on the basis of current and projected business
conditions.'
As to (1), the timing of the layoffs has no significance other
than the fact that it occurred during an organizational cam-
paign, and it is explained by the evidence of an economic
decline.
As to (2), (3), and (4), it is necessary to detail certain facts.
The layoff was made in accordance with seniority, the man
with the least plant seniority being selected in those depart-
ments in which layoffs occurred. As a result, employees were
retained in some departments who had less plant seniority
than Ray and Miller. It is undisputed that Ray and Miller
were the least senior employees in their departments." Ray
was one of two grind and dress men in the welding depart-
ment, and Miller was one of two inspectors in the welding
department.
The record indicates that at the time of Ray's layoff, there
were 16 bucks (skids or pallets) of work to be ground and
dressed, and employee David Fair testified it took about 2
months to complete this work. At the time of the layoff, Ray
was the only regular grind and dress man working, the other
(Jim Fann) being absent from March 1 to April 6 due to
illness. During this period, Ray was assisted by welders who
were rotated to perform that work on a weekly basis. When
Fann returned to work (making up for Ray's absence since
his March 26 layoff) this practice of assigning welders con-
tinued, supplemented by an occasional apprentice, until
James Weideman transferred to grind and dress on June 15.
Thereafter, Fann and Weideman did the work, still with
occasional assistance from welders and apprenctices, until
Fann quit in August. About a week later, Wayne Weaver was
permanently transferred into grind and dress to replace Fann.
Weideman and Weaver have been the two grind and dress
men since that time.
It is seen from the foregoing that, whatever Respondent's
production and personnel needs may have been in other de-
partments, there was need for the services of more than one
grind and dress man. However, this does not mean that the
layoff of Ray was discriminatorily motivated. Until Weide-
man transferred into the department on June 15, the work
was performed within the department by employees with
more seniority than Ray, and the very fact that welders could
be taken from their regular jobs to do grind and dress work
indicates a reduced need for employees in the welding depart-
ment. As far as apprentices are concerned, it is customary for
apprentices to be assigned to production work as part of their
training, and the record does not support a finding that there
was any significant increase in such assignments. As to
Weideman's transfer, it occurred several weeks after the
layoff when it developed that work was slack in Weideman's
department. Weideman had more seniority than Ray. Fi-
nally, whatever Respondent's needs it has not hired any new
employees (excepting apprentices) since the layoff, and it can
be assumed that the reduction in the work force has been
further aggravated by attrition.
' I am not setting forth separately the Union's arguments in support of
a finding of a violation . Those arguments are not essentially different from
those of General Counsel and while they are well presented they do not
require separate discussion
' Technically, one employee in the inspection department, F A Shank,
was junior to Miller But Miller worked as an inspector in the welding
department and Shank worked in another department and performed in-
spection work entirely different from that performed by Miller In the cir-
cumstances, I can draw no inference of discriminatory motive from the fact
Respondent laid off Miller, instead of Shank
In Miller's case, after his layoff the only remaining inspec-
tor in the welding department was Bloom who had more
seniority than Miller. After Miller's layoff, Bloom continued
as the only inspector in the welding department for about 6
weeks when he was transferred to other work. During that
6-week period, Bloom did both his own inspection work, plus
that formerly performed by Miller, with the assistance, how-
ever, of other inspectors and assistance from his foreman. As
to the foreman's assistance, it is clear that it was rendered
because Bloom was unfamiliar with the inspection required
on certain pieces. To the extent the foreman did production
work, he did not do so regularly or continually. As to the
assistance from other inspectors, the record indicates that
about the time of Miller's layoff, Bloom was absent from
work for 3 days because of illness, and inspection work was
performed by first-shift inspector Brake who worked 4 hours
overtime (6 to 10 p.m.) and by second-shift inspector Hat
who would transfer from his regular job in the boring depart-
ment from 10:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. After Bloom returned, he
continued to receive assistance from both Brake and Hat, but
not on any set routine, nor both on the same day.
As in Ray's case, the foregoing indicates some need for
more than one inspector in the welding department, a need
that could have been fulfilled by Miller's retention. It is clear,
however, that there was insufficient work to occupy two in-
spectors on a full-time basis and no new employees have been
hired. A finding that Respondent should have retained
Miller, who was the most senior of the 26 employees laid off,
could only be supported by a substitution of the Board's
judgment for that of Respondent as to its method of running
its business. Respondent's decision to reach as deep as it did
in laying off Miller strongly suggests an unlawful motive, but
considering the record as a whole I cannot say that General
Counsel has established a case by a preponderance of evi-
dence.
I have not yet disposed of General Counsel's points (5) and
(6) relative to apprentices. Little need be said in this regard
other than that Respondent has an apprenticeship program
of many years standing which is highly structured and for-
mal. In my judgment, Respondent was fully justified in ex-
empting the apprentices from the layoff, and no inference of
unlawful motive may be drawn either from its failure to do
so, or the fact that it began a new apprenticeship class after
the layoff.
In accordance with the foregoing, I shall recommend that
the allegations of the complaint respecting the layoff of Ray
and Miller be dismissed.
IV THE OBJECTIONS
As noted earlier, the Union filed objections to conduct
affecting the results of the election. These were seven in num-
ber, but Objections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 have been withdrawn. The
remaining objections are as follows:
5. The employer held periodical meetings during the
time of employment and did not deduct any wages for
these meetings, which constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice in that they granted remuneration to the employees
in order to influence their voting.
7. The employer distributed literature which was mis-
leading, slanderous and beyond the right of free speech
and free press, which was in violation of the law, and
which constituted an unfair labor practice.
As to Objection 5, it is undisputed that the meetings at
which President Price spoke to the employees, as described
earlier, were held on company time and that the employees
were paid their regularwages for the time spent at the meet-
ings. The Union contends that the payment of employees for
attendance at these meetings, where there had never previ-
764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ously been any similar in-plant meetings, coupled with Re-
spondent's expressed antiunion posture and unlawful con-
duct, constituted an economic inducement to the employees
affecting the results of the election. In support of this conten-
tion, the Union relies on U-Tell Corporation, 150 NLRB
1534.
Whatever Price may have said in the employee meetings
and whatever other unfair labor practices Respondent com-
mitted are issues totally separate from Respondent's payment
of wages to employees for time spent in attendance at meet-
ings held to oppose the Union's attempt to obtain certifica-
tion. In this objection, the Union in effect is seeking a finding
that the holding of employee meetings on company time is
grounds for setting aside an election. Peerless Plywood Com-
pany, 107 NLRB 427, clearly indicates otherwise unless the
meetings are held within 24 hours of the election, which was
not the case here. Accordingly, I find no merit in Objection
5.
Objection 7 presents the same issue already considered as
an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The
considerations that moved me to conclude that the literature
did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act persuade me that the
literature constituted permissible campaign propaganda
which did not interfere with the exercise of a free and unco-
erced choice by the employees in the election of May 7.
Although I find no merit in Objections 5 and 7, the only
specified objections remaining of the seven originally filed, I
shall nevertheless recommend that the election be set aside
because of the acts of interference, restraint, and coercion
which I have found earlier in the discussion of Respondent's
8(a)(1) conduct. That the 8(a)(1) conduct was to be consid-
ered as grounds for setting aside the election was set forth in
the Regional Direcor's Supplemental Decision and Order
Directing Hearing on Objections, in which the Regional Di-
rector noted that his investigation had disclosed testimony
that supervisors had threatened employees with loss of em-
ployment if they supported the Union, created the impression
of surveillance of union activities, interrogated employees,
and threatened employees with loss of benefits. These matters
had not been specifically alleged in the objections, but the
Regional Director correctly noted that his jurisdiction was
not limited to the specific objections (citing Carter-Lee Lum-
ber Company, 119 NLRB 1374) and the alleged 8(a)(1) con-
duct was included among the issues to be considered in deter-
mining whether or not the election should be set aside. On the
basis of the findings of 8(a)(1) conduct set forth earlier, I shall
recommend that the election of May 7 be set aside and that
a second election be directed.
V THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations described
in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the sev-
eral States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
VI THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act , I shall
recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
In accordance with the Regional Director 's Supplemental
Decision and Order Directing Hearing on Objections, I
recommend that the Union 's Objections 5 and 7 be overruled,
but by reason of the independent 8(a)(1) conduct found
herein I recommend that the election be set aside and that a
new election be held at such time as the Regional Director
deems appropriate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Landis Tool Company, Division of Litton Industries, is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Local Union No.
110, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees about their union sympa-
thies or desires and creating the impression of surveillance of
their union activities, by threatening employees with plant
closure, and by soliciting employee complaints and griev-
ances , Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
4. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in
paragraphs 6(g), (f), (h), and (i) of the complaint, as amended.
5. General Counsel has not established by a preponderance
of evidence that the layoff of Robert Ray and Lee Miller was
violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act,
I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER"
Respondent, Landis Tool Company, Division of Litton
Industries, its officers agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Soliciting employee complaints and grievances and im-
pliedly promising them improvements in working conditions
to induce them to withhold assistance and support to Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters and Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 110, or
any other labor organization.
(b) Threatening employees with plant closure if they select
the above-named labor organization, or any other labor or-
ganization, as their exclusive representative for purposes of
bargaining with regard to wages, hours, or other terms or
conditions of employment.
(c) Creating the impression of surveillance of the union
activities of employees by telling employees it knew they had
signed union cards or referring to employees as union instiga-
tors.
(d) Interrogating employees about their union sympathies
or desires in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or
coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named
labor organization, or any other labor organization, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or
all activities.
" In the event no exceptions are filed to this recommended Order as
provided in Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor
Relations Board, the findings , conclusions and recommended Order herein
shall, as provided by Sec 10(c) of the Act and in Sec 102 48 of the Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclu-
sions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all
purposes
LANDIS TOOL COMPANY 765
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, plant, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith."
As to the allegations of the complaint found not to have
been supported by the evidence, it is recommended that they
be dismissed
" In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
" In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of
this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through a representative
of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with those
rights. More specifically,
WE WILL NOT question you about your union senti-
ments or desires.
WE WILL NOT create the impression we are watching
you in your union activites by referring to employees as
union instigators or telling employees we know about
their union sympathies
WE WILL NOT solicit your gripes and grievances and
impliedly promise to improve working conditions to dis-
courage you from selecting a union to represent you.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close the plant if you select
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union
No. 110, or any other union, to represent you.
You are free to become and remain members of Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 110, or any
other labor organization.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post
this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights-
To engage in self-organization
Dated By
LANDIS TOOL COMPANY
DIVISION OF
LITTON INDUSTRIES
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1536
Federal Building, 1000 Liberty, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
15222, Telephone 412-644-2977.