Littler Diecasting Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 20, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 707 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

LITTLER DIECASTING CORP. 707
Littler Diecasting Corporation and International Un-
ion, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America, UAW.
Cases 25–CA–23466, 25–CA–24771, and 25–CA–
25243
July 20, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, TRUESDALE, AND
WALSH
On April 7, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Richard
A. Scully issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as
discussed below, and to adopt the recommended Order.
The principal issue in this case is whether the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by withdrawing
recognition from the Union in May 1996 and thereafter
making unilateral changes to employees’ terms and con-
ditions of employment. As a preliminary matter, we
must consider whether the Respondent failed to comply
with the terms of a September 5, 1995 settlement agree-
ment. For the reasons set forth below, we find, in
agreement with the judge, that the Respondent did not
fail to comply with the settlement agreement and that the
Respondent did not commit any postsettlement unfair
labor practices. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the com-
plaint in its entirety.1
Factual Background
The facts are as follows. On September 19, 1994, the
Union was certified as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the Respondent’s production
and maintenance employees. On that same day, the Un-
ion filed a charge in Case 25–CA–23466, alleging viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5). Thereafter, on De-
cember 30, 1994, the Regional Director issued a com-
plaint in Case 25–CA–23466.2

1 In addition, we shall reinstate the settlement agreement, which the
Regional Director set aside. See Shell Ray Mining, 286 NLRB 466 fn.
2 (1987).
2 The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by
threatening employees with discharge, physical harm, disciplinary
warnings, more stringent enforcement of work rules, and unspecified
reprisals for supporting the Union and by making statements of futility
concerning union representation. It also alleged that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(3) by changing and more strictly enforcing work
rules and procedures, restricting employee access to the Respondent’s
facility during nonwork hours and for nonwork purposes, removing a
break area table, issuing warnings and written reprimands to employ-
ees, changing an employee’s work duties, and suspending an employee.
Further, the complaint alleged that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5)
by unilaterally changing employees’ terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
On September 5, 1995, the Regional Director approved
an informal settlement of Case 25–CA–23466.3 The set-
tlement agreement required the Respondent to pay back-
pay, expunge employee personnel files, restore work
rules and policies, bargain with the Union concerning
employees’ terms and conditions of employment, and
post a notice to employees. The notice advised employ-
ees that the Respondent would undertake and forego cer-
tain actions, consistent with the employees’ Section 7
rights. The Respondent posted the notice for 60 days
beginning September 18, 1995. For the first week (Sep-
tember 18–25, 1995), the Respondent posted a letter next
to the notice stating that the Company believed it had not
violated the Act and that it had settled the case to avoid
litigation costs.
On September 20, 1995, a petition was filed in Case
25–RD–1241, seeking to decertify the Union. The Re-
gional Director dismissed that petition on May 17, 1996,
because of the affirmative bargaining provision in the
settlement agreement.
On May 31, 1996, the Respondent notified the Union
by letter that it was withdrawing recognition. The Re-
spondent, claiming that the Union no longer enjoyed
majority support among the bargaining unit employees,
based its belief on the Union’s failure to request bargain-
ing since August 23, 1995, and receipt of a decertifica-
tion petition signed by a majority of the unit employees.4
The petition stated, “we believe that a majority of em-
ployees in our unit no longer want to be represented by
the . . . [U]nion.” On March 5, 1997, the Respondent
unilaterally granted employees a wage increase.
On May 19, 1997, the Regional Director issued an or-
der consolidating cases, consolidated complaint, and no-
tice of hearing in Cases 25–CA–23466, 25–CA–24771,
and 25–CA–25243, in which he set aside the September
5, 1995 settlement agreement because the Respondent’s
letter posted next to the notice violated the terms of the
settlement agreement. The consolidated complaint al-
leges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by
withdrawing recognition and by unilaterally increasing
wages, in addition to the presettlement 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) allegations discussed above.

3 The settlement agreement included a nonadmission clause.
4 On July 5, 1996, a decertification petition was filed with the Board
in Case 25–RD–1264.
334 NLRB No. 93
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 708
The Judge’s Decision
The judge found that the Respondent had complied
with the terms of the settlement agreement in Case 25–
CA–23466 and that the Respondent’s letter, posted for
only 1 week of the 60-day notice-posting period, did not
undermine the settlement agreement so as to amount to
noncompliance. He found that the Respondent took all
actions specified in the settlement agreement, such as
paying backpay, expunging personnel files, and restoring
work rules and policies. The acts the Respondent per-
formed constituted significant remedial action that mean-
ingfully illustrated to employees that the Company was
abiding by the settlement agreement. Nothing in the Re-
spondent’s letter contradicted the impression that the
Respondent was abiding by the settlement agreement and
respecting employees’ rights under the Act. The judge
specified that the letter contained no misstatements, did
not preempt the Board’s notice, glossed over none of the
required remedial actions, and neither disparaged nor
blamed the Union.
Having found that the Respondent complied with the
settlement agreement, the judge concluded that there
were no unremedied unfair labor practices outstanding
when the Respondent withdrew recognition. He found
that the employees’ petition, containing the signatures of
more than a majority of unit employees, gave the Re-
spondent “an objectively based reasonable and good-
faith doubt that a majority of the unit employees still
wanted representation by the Union when it withdrew
recognition.” Accordingly, the judge concluded that the
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by withdraw-
ing recognition or by its subsequent unilateral wage in-
crease, and he dismissed the complaint.
The General Counsel’s Exceptions
The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s dismissal
of the complaint. The General Counsel argues, inter alia,
that the Respondent failed to comply with the settlement
agreement by posting the letter next to the notice and
committing subsequent unfair labor practices, i.e., with-
drawing recognition. The General Counsel argues that
the settlement agreement must be set aside and that all
the allegations it encompassed must be adjudicated.
The General Counsel asserts that those numerous and
substantial unfair labor practices tainted the employee
petition and that the Respondent did not have a good-
faith doubt about the Union’s majority status when it
withdrew recognition.5 The General Counsel further
contends that the language of the employee petition was

5 There is no contention that the Respondent’s withdrawal of recog-
nition was unlawful on the ground that a reasonable time for bargaining
had not elapsed since the execution of the settlement agreement.
not a clear statement that the signers no longer desired
union representation.
Discussion
1. For the reasons stated by the judge, we find that the
Respondent’s letter posted alongside the notice to em-
ployees did not so undermine the settlement agreement
as to amount to noncompliance. Accordingly, we also
agree with the judge that there were no unremedied un-
fair labor practices at the time the Respondent withdrew
recognition.
2. We now turn to the principal issue before us of
whether the Respondent lawfully withdrew recognition
from the Union. While this case was pending, the Board
issued Levitz, 333 NLRB 717 (2001), in which the Board
“reconsider[ed] whether, and under what circumstances,
an employer may lawfully withdraw recognition unilat-
erally from an incumbent union.”6 In Levitz,7 the Board
overruled Celanese Corp., 95 NLRB 664 (1951), and its
progeny insofar as they permitted an employer to with-
draw recognition from an incumbent union on the basis
of a good-faith doubt of the union’s continued majority
status. The Levitz Board held that “an employer may
unilaterally withdraw recognition from an incumbent
union only where the union has actually lost the support
of the majority of the bargaining unit employees.” Id. at
717. However, the Board also held that its analysis and
conclusions in that case would only be applied prospec-
tively. “[A]ll pending cases involving withdrawals of
recognition [will be decided] under existing law: the
‘good-faith uncertainty’ standard as explicated by the
Supreme Court” in Allentown Mack Sales & Service v.
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). Id. at 729.
Applying the Allentown Mack standard here, we find
that the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition was
lawful. The facts show that the Respondent’s plant man-
ager received a petition signed by 56 of the 81 unit em-
ployees stating that “[w]e believe that a majority of em-
ployees in our unit no longer want to be represented by
the . . . [U]nion.” As set forth in Levitz, “employees’
unverified statements regarding other employees’ anti-
union sentiments” constitute the kind of evidence that
employers may present to establish reasonable uncer-
tainty. Id. at 728. Here, where a majority of the unit
employees have stated that a majority of their coworkers
are against union representation, we find that the Re-
spondent would reasonably have been uncertain about
the Union’s majority status. Therefore, we conclude that
the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
withdrawing recognition from the Union or by subse-
6 Id.
7 Id. at 725.
LITTLER DIECASTING CORP. 709
quently changing employee terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted, the complaint is dismissed, and the
settlement agreement in Case 25–CA–23466 is rein-
stated.

Michael T. Beck, Esq. and Norton B. Roberts, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
Michael A. Moffatt, Esq. and Jack H. Rogers, Esq., of Indian-
apolis, Indiana, for the Respondent.
Joseph E. Allman, Esq., of Indianapolis, Indiana, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD A. SCULLY, Administrative Law Judge. Upon
charges1 filed by International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW (the Union) the Regional Director for Region 25, Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a complaint on
December 30, 1994, and consolidated complaints on September
26, 1996, and May 19, 1997, alleging that Littler Diecasting
Corporation (the Respondent) had committed certain violations
of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act). The Respondent filed timely answers denying
that it had committed any violation of the Act.
A hearing was held in Muncie, Indiana, on July 14 and 15,
1997, at which all parties were given a full opportunity to ex-
amine and cross-examine witnesses and to present other evi-
dence and argument. Briefs submitted on behalf of the General
Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent have been
given due consideration. On the entire record, and from my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
At all times material, the Respondent was a corporation en-
gaged in the production of die castings with an office and place
of business in Albany, Indiana. During the 12-month period
preceding May 1997, the Respondent in the conduct of its busi-
ness operations purchased and received at its Albany, Indiana
facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside the State of Indiana. The Respondent admits, and I find,
that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

1 The charge and an amended charge in Case 25–CA–23466 were
filed on September 19 and 27, 1994, respectively. The charge in Case
25–CA–24771 was filed on June 26, 1996, and that in Case 25–CA–
25243 on March 13, 1997.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material
the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Settlement Agreement Issues
On September 19, 1994, following an election conducted by
the Board on September 9, the Union was certified as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of certain of the Respondent’s
employees in a unit consisting of

[a]ll full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees including all quality control employees, all
set-up employees and all toolroom employees employed by
the Employer at its Albany, Indiana facility, but excluding all
office clerical employees, all professional employees, all
draftsmen, all engineers, all employees of temporary service
and all guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

On December 30, 1994, the Regional Director for Region 25
issued a complaint in Case 25–CA–23466 amended, alleging
that the Respondent had committed certain violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. On September 5, 1995, the
Regional Director approved an informal settlement agreement
entered into by the parties disposing of all issues raised by the
complaint. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, nu-
merous allegations were remedied, including, 8(a)(1) allega-
tions concerning threats of unspecified reprisals, more stringent
enforcement of work rules, discharge and physical harm, and
statements concerning the futility of selecting the Union as their
bargaining representative; 8(a)(3) allegations concerning
changes in work rules, break and cleanup times, and the proce-
dure for giving notice of absences, the removal of a picnic table
where employees took breaks, the issuance of warnings and
written reprimands to several employees, and the suspension of
employee Mark Beaty; and 8(a)(5) allegations concerning uni-
lateral changes in terms and conditions of employment. The
agreement called for the payment of backpay to Beaty, the
revocation and removal of disciplinary notices from the files of
seven employees, the reinstatement of preexisting work rules
and policies, and the posting of an appropriate remedial notice
for the usual 60-day period. It also contained a nonadmissions
clause.
The Respondent posted the Board’s remedial notice on its
bulletin board. It also posted a letter, dated September 18, 1995,
on the same bulletin board next to the Board notice for ap-
proximately 1 week. That letter, on the Employer’s letterhead
and signed by Company President John Littler, stated:

To All Employees:

Next to this letter is a notice which we agreed to post
as a part of a settlement with the National Labor Relations
Board in order to avoid incurring the costs of litigation
concerning the unfair labor practice charges from last year.
We have consistently maintained that we did not violate
the National Labor Relations Act and the settlement
agreement says this.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 710
In fact, we have always respected employee Section 7
rights and will continue to do so. Virtually all we would
gain from continuing an expensive legal battle would be to
avoid posting the adjacent notice. Consequently, we have
decided to settle this matter and to focus on making this
company an industry leader in quality, service, delivery
and costs.

On May 31, 1996, the Respondent’s counsel sent a letter in-
forming the Union that it was withdrawing recognition because
of its belief that the Union no longer had the support of a ma-
jority of its employees. This belief was allegedly based on the
fact that the Union had requested no bargaining sessions since
August 23, 1995, and receipt of a decertification petition signed
by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. On
March 5, 1997, the Respondent granted a 4-percent wage in-
crease to certain of its employees without first giving the Union
notice and the opportunity to bargain about the increase.
In the present action, the Regional Director has ordered the
September 1995 settlement agreement vacated, reinstated the
presettlement allegations, and consolidated them with postset-
tlement allegations concerning the Respondent’s refusal to
recognize and bargain with the Union on and after May 31,
1996.
Analysis and Conclusions
It is well established that a settlement agreement entered into
by all parties will not be set aside and the underlying matters
litigated unless the Respondent has failed to comply with its
provisions or has committed postsettlement unfair labor prac-
tices. E.g., Oster Specialty Products, 315 NLRB 67, 70 (1994);
R. T. Jones Lumber Co., 303 NLRB 841, 843 (1991); and U.S.
Gypsum, 284 NLRB 4, 11–13 (1987).
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent has
failed to comply with the settlement agreement by virtue of its
posting of the above-quoted letter to employees next to the
Board’s remedial notice which served to completely undermine
that notice and that by withdrawing recognition from the Union
and making unilateral changes it has committed additional un-
fair labor practices which warrant vacating the settlement
agreement.
1. The letter posted next to the Board’s notice
Charged parties “risk having a settlement agreement set
aside if they post their own comments alongside an official
Board notice.” Diester Concentrator Co., 253 NLRB 358, 359
fn. 5 (1980). In the present case, the letter that the Respondent
posted next to the official remedial notice implies that it has
done nothing wrong and that it settled the subject unfair labor
practice charges only to avoid the costs of litigation. Similar
comments have been found to be sufficiently offensive to war-
rant setting aside settlement agreements because they tend to
minimize the effect of the Board’s notice, thereby defeating its
purpose, i.e., to assure employees that their rights will be re-
spected, and to suggest that the employer’s true sentiments are
contained in its notice. E.g., Bingham-Williamette Co., 199
NLRB 1280, 1281–1282 (1972); Bangor Plastics, Inc., 156
NLRB 1165, 1166–1167 (1966). However, in determining
whether a settlement agreement should be set aside, the Board
has consistently rejected the application of mechanical or rigid
a priori rules and directed that the determination be made
through the exercise of sound judgment based upon all the cir-
cumstances of each case. E.g., Oster Specialty Products, supra
at 70; Steelworkers Local 3489 (Stran Steel), 263 NLRB 934
fn. 1 (1982); and Ohio Calcium Co., 34 NLRB 917, 935 (1941).
After considering all of the surrounding circumstances, I find
that the Respondent’s letter, which was posted for only 1 week
during the 60-day period that the Board’s notice was posted,
did not vitiate the effects of the notice. Unlike Bingham-
Williamette Co. and Bangor Plastics, supra, and similar deci-
sions where the notice-posting was the only affirmative action
the employer was required to take under the terms of the set-
tlement agreement, here, the Respondent agreed to and did take
significant remedial action in addition to the notice-posting. In
so doing, it illustrated “in a manner meaningful to employees
that it is abiding by the settlement agreement.” Diester Con-
centrator Co., supra at 359 fn. 5.
The General Counsel seeks to distinguish Diester, involving
a notice which the employer posted next to the Board’s notice
that contained language very similar to that used here, on the
grounds that the remedial actions taken in the cases were not
comparable. In Diester, in addition to the notice-posting, the
remedial actions included paying more than $25,000 in backpay
to alleged discriminatees, making whole employees for holiday
pay, offering reinstatement to five strikers and four other em-
ployees and placing other employees on a preferential hiring
list. Here, the Respondent was required to pay one employee
three days of backpay, to revoke and remove disciplinary no-
tices from the files of seven employees, to reinstate policies
governing cleanup and breaktimes, restroom use and call-in
procedure in effect before the Union’s election victory, to rein-
state afterhours access to and use of company facilities for per-
sonal work, and to permit employees to assist each other as
they had previously. It serves no purpose to try to compare
cases in quantitative terms such as backpay amounts or the
number of employees affected by the terms of the settlement.
What is important is whether, in the context of a particular case,
the remedial action apart from the notice posting was “signifi-
cant.” The decision in Diester appears to be based on the theory
that “actions speak louder than words.” Here, the bulk of the
affirmative remedial action the Respondent was required to
take pursuant to the settlement agreement, i.e., reinstatement of
preexisting work rules and policies, directly touched all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit on a daily basis. I find it much
more likely that the reinstatement of these rules and policies
and the expunging and removal of disciplinary warnings from
employees’ personnel files would have more of an impact on
the employees, indicate to them that the Respondent was abid-
ing by the terms of the settlement agreement, and impress on
them that their rights under the Act were being respected, than
language in a posted notice. Nothing in the letter the Respon-
dent posted alongside the notice was likely to overcome or
minimize that impact or that impression. Unlike the situation in
Gould, Inc.,2 cited by the General Counsel as allegedly more
comparable to the present case, the Respondent’s letter did not

2 260 NLRB 54 (1982).
LITTLER DIECASTING CORP. 711
contain any misstatements, it did not attempt to preempt the
Board’s notice or to ignore or gloss over the remedial action it
had agreed to take, and it did not disparage or blame the Union.
I find that the Respondent’s posting of the letter did not so con-
tradict or serve to undermine the Board’s notice as to amount to
noncompliance with the terms of the settlement agreement.
2. Withdrawal of recognition from the Union
The Respondent does not deny withdrawing recognition
from the Union on May 31, 1996, or refusing to bargain since
that date, but contends when it withdrew recognition it had a
good-faith doubt based on objective evidence that the Union
still represented a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit. Plant Manager David Littler testified that in late May 1996
he became aware that a decertification petition was being
passed around. He met employee Karen Lehman in the plant
and she asked if he would like to see the petition. Littler said
that he would and Lehman put it on his desk. The top of each
page of the document contains the following statement:

The undersigned employees of Littler Diecast Corp.
Albany, IN 47320, presently represented by the UAW lo-
cal 321, wish to have the National Labor Relations Board
conduct an election. We believe that a majority of em-
ployees in our unit no longer want to be represented by the
above union.

The copy of the petition in evidence, dated June 19, 1996, has
four pages and contains the name, department, and clock num-
ber of 67 people. Littler credibly testified that when he saw the
petition in May, it had the signatures of 56 employees on it.
Company attendance records he relied on established that there
were 81 employees in the bargaining unit at that time. After he
had checked that the signatures on the petition were those of
employees in the unit, he returned the petition to Lehman. Hav-
ing concluded that more than a majority of unit employees had
signed the petition, Littler contacted the Company’s attorney
who drafted and sent the May 31 letter informing the Union
that recognition was being withdrawn.
Analysis and Conclusions
The law is clear that a certified union enjoys a rebuttable
presumption that its majority status continues after the expira-
tion of the first year following certification. The employer re-
mains obligated to bargain with that union unless it can rebut
that presumption by establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that on the date recognition was withdrawn the
union did not in fact enjoy majority status, or (2) that its with-
drawal was predicated on an objectively based reasonable and
good-faith doubt as to the union’s majority status. E.g., Laidlaw
Waste Systems, 307 NLRB 1211 (1992); Hollaender Mfg. Co.,
299 NLRB 466, 468 (1990); and Terrell Machine Co., 173
NLRB 1480 (1969). The assertion of a good-faith doubt must
be raised in a context free of unfair labor practices. Lee Lum-
ber & Building Material Corp., 322 NLRB 175, 177 (1996);
Guerdon Industries, 218 NLRB 658, 661 (1975). Having con-
cluded that the Respondent did not fail to comply with the Sep-
tember 1995 settlement agreement, I find that there were no
unremedied unfair labor practices outstanding at the time the
Respondent withdrew recognition.3 The General Counsel and
the Union contend that the petition Littler was shown cannot
support a good-faith doubt as to the Union’s continuing major-
ity status because it did not unequivocally demonstrate the em-
ployees’ intention not to be represented by the Union.
Petitions which state, without more, that the signers would
like the opportunity to vote on whether to continue to have a
labor organization represent them have been found to be insuf-
ficient to establish a good-faith doubt on the part of the em-
ployer. See Pic Way Shoe Mart, 308 NLRB 84 (1992); Laidlaw
Waste Systems, supra; and Phoenix Pipe & Tube Co., 302
NLRB 122 (1991). Likewise, statements by less than a majority
of unit employees that they believe a majority no longer sup-
port the union have been found to not constitute objective con-
siderations justifying a good-faith doubt on the part of the em-
ployer. See Alexander Linn Hospital Assn., 288 NLRB 103,
109–110 (1988); Bryan Memorial Hospital, 279 NLRB 222,
225 (1986) and Atlanta Hilton & Towers, 278 NLRB 474, 481
(1986). However, in Bil-Mar Foods, 286 NLRB 786 (1987),
the Board agreed with the administrative law judge’s conclu-
sions that petitions bearing the following language:

The undersigned employees of Bil-Mar Foods, Inc.,
presently represented by the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 406, wish to have the National Labor
Relations Board conduct an election since we believe a
majority of employees in our unit no longer want to be
represented by the above union.

conveyed “the distinct impression that the signers no longer
wanted to be represented by the Union” and were “sufficient to
support Respondent’s reasonable belief that the Union no
longer represented a majority of its employees.” Id. at 796. In
Phoenix Pipe & Tube Co., supra, the Board specifically distin-
guished that case and Bryan Memorial Hospital from Bil-Mar
Foods by again noting that the petition in Bil-Mar conveyed the
clear impression that the employees no longer wanted union
representation. 302 NLRB at 123 fn. 3.
The petition in the present case contains language practically
identical to that used in Bil-Mar Foods and I find no basis for
distinguishing the two cases. Accordingly, I find that based on
the decertification petition reviewed by Plant Manager Littler in
May 1996 which was signed by 56 of the 81 unit employees,
the Respondent has established that it had an objectively based
reasonable and good-faith doubt that a majority of the unit em-
ployees still wanted representation by the Union when it with-
drew recognition.
The General Counsel also argues that the Board should re-
consider the above-mentioned rules concerning on what basis
an employer can withdraw recognition from a collective-
bargaining representative and replace them with one prohibiting
withdrawal of recognition unless the employees reject union

3 The are no allegations nor any evidence that the decertification pe-
tition was tainted by supervisory instigation, encouragement, or assis-
tance.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 712
representation in a secret ballot election. This argument must
be taken up with the Board.4
Having found that the Respondent did not unlawfully with-
draw recognition from the Union, I also find that it was not
required to give it notice and the opportunity to bargain over
the wage increases it granted in March 1997 and that its failure
to do so did not violate the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Littler Diecasting Corporation, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

4 An administrative law judge must apply established Board prece-
dent which it or the Supreme Court has not reversed. E.g., Herbert
Industrial Insulation Corp., 312 NLRB 602, 608 (1993); Los Angeles
New Hospital, 244 NLRB 960, 962 fn. 4 (1979); and Iowa Beef Pack-
ers, Inc., 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1965).
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent did not fail to comply with the settlement
agreement approved on September 5, 1995.
4. The Respondent did not commit the postsettlement unfair
labor practices alleged in the consolidated complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.