Linda R. O'Neal, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 22, 2005
05a60128 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 22, 2005)

05a60128

11-22-2005

Linda R. O'Neal, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.


Linda R. O'Neal v. United States Postal Service

05A60128

11-22-05

.

Linda R. O'Neal,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Request No. 05A60128

Appeal No. 01A53989

Agency No. 4H-300-0087-05

DENIAL

Linda R. O'Neal (complainant) timely requested reconsideration of

the decision in Linda R. O'Neal v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01A53989 (September 8, 2005). EEOC Regulations provide that

the Commission may, in its discretion, grant a request to reconsider any

previous Commission decision where the requesting party demonstrates that:

(1) the appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or (2) the appellate decision will have a

substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the

agency. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b).

Complainant alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment

on the bases of race (African-American) and in retaliation for prior EEO

activity when, on January 27, 2005, she was struck on the right arm by

the Postmaster, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Complainant alleged

that on the date at issue, the Postmaster walked past her on the workroom

floor and his right forearm hit her upper arm. The Postmaster denied

hitting complainant, but later apologized for brushing against her.

Pursuant to complainant's complaint of discrimination, the agency issued a

final decision dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. The

Commission then issued a decision finding that complainant's complaint was

properly dismissed under 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state

a claim. The Commission found that to the extent complainant alleged

that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, she failed to

state a claim. Further, the Commission found that assuming the incident

actually took place, it was not sufficiently severe or pervasive enough

to state a claim of discriminatory harassment. As such, the Commission

affirmed the agency's final decision dismissing complainant's complaint.

In complainant's request for reconsideration, she alleges that the

Commission's decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of

material fact or law, as it failed to address her claims of race and

retaliation discrimination. Further, complainant alleges that several of

the Commission's decisions state that allegations of physical assault or

physical injury as a result of the actions of another person constitute

allegations that state a claim.

Addressing complainant's allegations, we note that in determining whether

a harassment complaint states a claim in cases where a complainant has

not alleged disparate treatment regarding a specific term, condition,

or privilege of employment, the Commission has repeatedly examined

whether a complainant's harassment claims, when considered together and

assumed to be true, were sufficient to state a hostile or abusive work

environment claim. See Estate of Routson v. National Aeronautics and

Space Administration, EEOC Request No. 05970388 (February 26, 1999).

Consistent with the Commission's policy and practice of determining

whether a complainant's harassment claims are sufficient to state a

hostile or abusive work environment claim, the Commission has repeatedly

found that claims of a few isolated incidents of alleged harassment

usually are not sufficient to state a harassment claim. See Phillips

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960030 (July 12,

1996); Banks v. Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05940481

(February 16, 1995). In determining whether an objectively hostile

or abusive work environment existed, the trier of fact should consider

whether a reasonable person in the complainant's circumstances would have

found the alleged behavior to be hostile or abusive. Even if harassing

conduct produces no tangible effects, such as psychological injury, a

complainant may assert a Title VII cause of action if the discriminatory

conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment

abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national

origin. Rideout v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01933866

(November 22, 1995)(citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,

22 (1993)), req. for recons. den., EEOC Request No. 05970995 (May 20,

1999). Also, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances,

including the following: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;

its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee's work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission again finds that the

Postmaster did not subject complainant to a hostile work environment.

In reaching this conclusion, the Commission restates our prior finding

that even assuming the incident took place as complainant alleged,

there is no evidence by which we can conclude that the contact between

complainant and the Postmaster was intentional, especially in light of the

Postmaster's apology that same day, nor is there evidence that the contact

was so severe as to create a hostile work environment in and of itself.

While we agree that the Commission has previously found that a physical

assault can create a hostile work environment by itself, there is nothing

in the facts of appellant's allegation that this was anything more than

inadvertent contact. Thus, in this case, we find that complainant has

failed to explain how the incident at issue rendered her aggrieved.

As such, after reconsidering the previous decision and the entire record,

the Commission finds that the request fails to meet the criteria of

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(b), and it is the decision of the Commission to

deny the request. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01A53989 remains the

Commission's final decision. There is no further right of administrative

appeal on the decision of the Commission on this request.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this

decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____11-22-05______________

Date