01972203
05-08-2000
Linda M. Luechtefeld Complainant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.
Linda M. Luechtefeld v. Department of Transportation
01972203
May 8, 2000
Linda M. Luechtefeld )
Complainant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01972203
)
Rodney E. Slater, ) Agency No. 5-95-5421
Secretary, )
Department of Transportation, )
Agency. )
_____________________________________)
DECISION
Linda M. Luechtefeld (complainant) filed an appeal with this Commission
from a final decision of the Department of Transportation (agency)
concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination, in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
791 et seq.<1> Complainant's claim of discrimination is based upon
her disability (drug addiction)<2>, when her supervisor frequently
made negative remarks to her regarding her disability.<3> The appeal
is accepted in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659, 37,660
(1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as EEOC Regulation 29
C.F.R. � 1614.402).
BACKGROUND
On June 5, 1995, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint claiming
discrimination as referenced
above. Complainant's complaint was accepted for processing and
investigated. Following the
completion of the investigation, complainant requested a final decision
by the agency. On January 2, 1997, the agency issued its final decision
finding no discrimination. It is this agency decision which complainant
now appeals.
The record reveals that complainant was employed by the agency as a
clerk in the Aviation Careers Division at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical
Center from 1991 until she resigned on April 20, 1995. At the time of her
resignation, complainant held the position of Staffing Clerk, GS-203-6.
The record further reveals that in 1990, prior to being hired by the
agency, complainant had become addicted to pain killers and was arrested
for obtaining Controlled Dangerous Substance narcotics. She stated
that she entered a drug rehabilitation program at that time. In May,
1993, complainant had a relapse and became active in her drug addiction
once again. Complainant was arrested when she attempted to illegally
obtain a Controlled Dangerous Substance narcotic. Complainant does not
believe that prior to this incident her supervisor (S2) or team leader
(S1) had any knowledge of her drug addiction. In May, 1993, complainant
advised S1 of her drug addiction.
After advising S1 of her drug addiction and arrest, she received a letter
of proposed removal which was held in abeyance so long as complainant
agreed to participate in an agency-approved Employee Assistance Program
(EAP), whereby she agreed to abide by the conditions of the 2-year
substance abuse treatment program and other conditions of rehabilitation.
Complainant alleged that following her return to work, her supervisor
made frequent negative remarks to her about her disability. She stated
that her supervisor told her that because of her past drug problem,
she should be grateful to her that she still had her job and that if
she were in private industry, they would have fired her on the spot.
Complainant also stated that she resigned in April, 1995 because she felt
that her supervisor would continue to hold her drug addition against her
and because she brought an issue of time card fraud in her department
to the attention of her supervisor's manager.
Complainant's supervisor denied ever saying anything negative about
complainant's disability. However, she did admit to telling complainant
at least once, but not frequently, that she was lucky to have a job.
Complainant's supervisor stated that this was stated in discussions
about complainant's attendance record and not with respect to her drug
addiction.
Shortly before complainant resigned she was issued a letter of warning
with respect to her excessive leave usage. In the eighteen months prior
to complainant's resignation, she used 90.50 hours of annual leave,
16.75 of compensatory time, 28.75 hours of leave without pay, 24 hours of
advanced sick leave, and 16 hours of time off awards. According to S1,
this leave record was having a negative impact on the office workload and
affected work operations. S1 stated and the record reflects that she had
issued similar letters of warning to employees outside complainant's
protected status.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The agency determined that while complainant was not substantially limited
in any major life function related to her drug addiction, she nevertheless
fell under the protection of the Rehabilitation Act since she had a
record of drug addiction and her supervisor was aware of this record.
The agency further found that complainant was qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job. We will assume, solely for the purpose
of our further analysis herein, that the agency's findings are correct.
The agency analyzed complainant's claims as a disparate treatment case
and found that assuming complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination, the agency articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory
basis for its employment action which the complainant failed to rebut or
show was based upon discriminatory animus. Specifically, the agency
noted that complainant's supervisor explained that her statements to
complainant that she was lucky to have a job were related to complainant's
leave usage and not her disability. The record further reveals that no
witness, through personal observation, could corroborate complainant's
claims. In addition, the record shows that complainant's leave record
was excessive. Accordingly, the agency found that complainant did not
meet her burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
discrimination occurred.
While the agency analyzed complainant's claims as a disparate treatment
case, we find that this case is better analyzed as a harassment complaint.
However, after a careful review of the entire record, including arguments
and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission
finds that complainant failed to meet her burden in proving that the
statements from her supervisor were sufficiently severe and pervasive so
as to unreasonable interfere with her work performance and/or create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.<4> See Lulverne
v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal No. 01966875
(October 1, 1998), citing Walker v. Ford Motor Company, 684 F.2d 1355
(11th Cir. 1982); See also McCleod v. SSA, EEOC Appeal No. 01963810
(August 5, 1999).
In addition, we find no evidence in the record which supports a finding
of constructive discharge. The Commission has adopted a three-pronged
test for establishing a constructive discharge. An complainant must
show that: (1) a reasonable person in her position would have found the
working conditions intolerable; (2) conduct which constituted prohibited
discriminatory treatment created the intolerable working conditions; and
(3) complainant's involuntary resignation resulted from the intolerable
working conditions. See Taylor v. AAFES, EEOC Request No. 05900630 (July
20, 1990); See Youngblood v. USPS, EEOC Request No. 05970830 (June 17,
1999). Since the evidence does not support a finding of intolerable
working conditions, constructive discharge cannot be supported.
Since complainant presents no arguments on appeal, we discern no basis
to reverse the agency's finding of no discrimination. Accordingly,
it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
AFFIRM the final agency decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
May 8, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to
all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the
administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the
revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999) where applicable,
in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be
found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2 The record indicates that complainant is missing fingers on her left
hand and has a port wine stain on her face. However, complainant does
not allege these conditions to be bases for her discrimination complaint.
3 Complainant also raised reprisal discrimination in her formal complaint
when she was issued a letter of warning with respect to leave usage.
However, the record indicates that the agency previously dismissed this
portion of complainant's complainant because it found that she did not
participate in EEO protected activity. There is no indication that
complainant appealed this agency decision.
4 Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to address whether complainant
falls within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act.