Linda M. Chapman, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 29, 2000
01986267 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 29, 2000)

01986267

03-29-2000

Linda M. Chapman, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Linda M. Chapman v. United States Postal Service

01986267

March 29, 2000

Linda M. Chapman, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01986267

v. ) Agency No. 1H351103096

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Linda M. Chapman (complainant) timely filed an appeal on August 11, 1998,

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission) from

a final agency decision (FAD), received by complainant on July 13, 1998,

concerning a claim of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq.<1> The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the agency correctly determined that complainant was not

discriminated against on the basis of sex (female) when she was charged

Absent Without Leave (AWOL).

BACKGROUND

Complainant was employed by the agency as a Distribution Window Clerk,

PS-05. She filed a formal complaint on August 20, 1996, claiming

discrimination on the basis of sex (female) when, from March 27, 1997

through March 29, 1997, she was charged AWOL. The agency's FAD found

no discrimination, reasoning that complainant had not established a

prima facie case of discrimination because she had not identified a

similarly situated male employee who was treated more favorably.<2>

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which

the first step normally consists of determining the existence of

a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the

agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to

the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In response to complainant's claim that she was charged AWOL, the agency

has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

According to the sworn statement of management official S-1, Supervisor,

Customer Services, complainant was charged AWOL pending medical

documentation because of her past attendance record. Complainant was,

however, paid for the hours after an agency nurse called complainant's

doctor's office to confirm that she had, in fact, been ill, and she was

charged with sick leave rather than AWOL.

Since the agency articulated such a reason, the burden returns to the

complainant to demonstrate that the agency's articulated reason was a

pretext for discrimination. We find that the complainant has failed

to show pretext. Complainant argued that a female coworker, C-1,

had repeated unexcused absences, but was not charged AWOL. The record

shows, however, that C-1 was charged AWOL for these absences, and we

note that she is in the same protected group as complainant. The record

also shows that a male coworker of complainant, C-2, was also charged

AWOL for unexcused absences. The record contains no other evidence

of pretext. Therefore, the agency's determination that complainant

failed to establish that she was discriminated against, with respect to

this claim, was supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the agency is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 29, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

________________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2 We find that the agency erred in concluding that complainant had not

established a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex merely

because she did not identify a similarly situated male coworker who

was treated in a more favorable manner. To establish a prima facie case,

complainant need only present evidence which, if unrebutted, would support

an inference that the agency's action resulted from discrimination based

on sex. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).

It is not necessary for her to show that a comparative individual,

from outside of her protected group, was treated differently. O'Connor

v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996); Enforcement

Guidance on O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caters Corp., EEOC Notice

No. 915.002, n.4 (September 18, 1996); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996). Since the agency's finding of no

discrimination with respect to the basis of sex was not based solely on

complainant's inability to establish a prima facie case, we find that

the agency's error was harmless.