Linda Adams, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 31, 2009
0120082735 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 31, 2009)

0120082735

03-31-2009

Linda Adams, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Linda Adams,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120082735

Hearing No. 471-2008-00005X

Agency No. 1J-489-0005-07

DECISION

On June 3, 2008, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's May 15,

2008 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

During the relevant time, complainant worked as a Supervisor, Distribution

Operations, Tour 3, EAS-17 at the Processing and Distribution Center

in Saginaw, Michigan. In February 2007, a vacancy for the position of

Manager, Distribution Operations EAS 19, was announced under No. 14102.

Complainant, and four other employees, applied for the position.

A review board that considered the applications recommended three

of the individuals, including complainant, to be interviewed by the

Selecting Official (hereinafter "SO").1 Complainant and the selectee

were interviewed by the SO and two others. The selectee was considered

the better candidate and chosen for the vacancy.

Believing that her non-selection was discriminatory, complainant contacted

the EEO office. Informal efforts to resolve complainant's concerns were

unsuccessful. On June 15, 2007, complainant filed a formal complaint

based on race, color, sex, and retaliation.

The agency framed the claims as follows:

(1) on February 26, 2007, complainant overheard the Plant Manger say

he had moved another employee to Tour III to prevent complainant from

getting the Tour III MDO position; and,

(2) complainant alleged discrimination based on retaliation when she

received a letter dated May 21, 2007 notifying her of non-selection

for the position of Manager, Distribution Operations, EAS 19, vacancy

announcement number 14102.

The agency accepted for investigation claim (2). However, the agency

dismissed claim (1). On the grounds of untimely EEO Counselor contact.

Specifically, the agency noted that the employee at issue was assigned to

Tour III in January 2006, and in April 2006 he was approved permanently

for the Tour III MDO position. The agency found that complainant

waited approximately a year after the alleged event before contacting

the EEO office. Further, the agency found that complainant did not

claim that he was unaware of the time limitation, nor had she provided

any other credible justification for her untimely contact.2

At the conclusion of the investigation of claim (2), complainant was

provided with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

(AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over the complainant's

objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the agency's Motion

for Summary Judgment. On May 5, 2008, the AJ issued a decision without

a hearing. The AJ concluded that complainant failed to prove that she

was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

The AJ found that the SO provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for complainant's non-selection. The SO considered the selectee to be the

better candidate for several reasons. First, while both the selectee and

the complainant held supervisory positions, the selectee had additional

years of service with the agency. Second, the selectee worked well with

his peers and the union leadership. Third, the SO determined that the

selectee accepted the opportunity to perform the MDO position on Tour

1 as a detail, after complainant rejected such an offer. During his

detail, the selectee created a new process to address performance, he

held his supervisors accountable by creating a daily log, and his sick

leave reduction plan was later adopted by all three tours.

On the other hand, complainant was not perceived as a team player.

Complainant declined an opportunity to do a detail in the MDO position in

2006, and when she later accepted such a detail, she did not implement

any new ideas or improvements. Consequently, the SO found the selectee

to be the better individual for the MDO vacancy.

When the burden of persuasion shifted to the complainant, the AJ found the

record contained no evidence of pretext. Specifically, the AJ noted that

in her affidavit complainant made many assertions that were unsupported

by evidence. For example, complainant claimed that the agency failed to

follow the appropriate promotion procedures, yet she did not specify which

procedures were not observed. According to the AJ, because there was no

direct or other circumstantial evidence of discrimination, complainant

was required to show that she is observably superior to the selectee.

The AJ concluded that the record did not support such a finding.

The agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding

of no discrimination. Complainant filed the instant appeal.3

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant through her representative, argues that she

established a prima facie case and that the agency failed to articulate a

non-discriminatory reason for their actions. Additionally, complainant

attacks the SO's reference to the selectee's ability to get along with

the union. She reiterates that her education and training is equal

to that of the selectee. Finally, complainant contends that the SO's

statements, that she is not a team player and does not get along with

co-workers, are unsupported by evidence.

In response, the agency reiterates its belief that the AJ properly granted

its motion for summary judgment and found no discrimination. With respect

to complainant's arguments on appeal, the agency contends that complainant

again fails to present any evidence to dispute the AJ's findings.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and

factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from

an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see

also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999)

(providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision

without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed

de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case

with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)

or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and

legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional

discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal

employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,

� VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that

the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and

legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC

"review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including

any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its

decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its

interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary

judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

The Commission finds that the AJ properly granted the agency's motion

and issued a decision without a hearing. We agree that there is no

genuine issue of material fact.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

As noted above, the SO presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for choosing the selectee for the vacancy. In his affidavit, the SO

explained that the selectee was experienced with Tour I, demonstrated

an ability to work well with others, interviewed well, accepted a detail

opportunity, and created new processes while on detail.

Complainant has not met her burden, of establishing that the

agency's reasons were pretext to mask unlawful discriminatory animus.

For example, when asked why she believes the non-selection was due to

her race, complainant simply stated that she was "fully qualified", had

performed the duties, had a "decent" attendance record, and that she was

"better qualified" than the selectee. The record does not establish that

complainant was observably superior. We find that complainant has merely

presented conclusory statements regarding her claim of discrimination.

These assertions are not supported by evidence. The Commission agrees

that complainant has failed to prove that her non-selection was unlawful

discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the agency's

finding of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 31, 2009

__________________

Date

1 One of three to be interviewed withdrew the application from

consideration.

2 Complainant was properly advised that she did not have a right to appeal

the dismissal at that time. If she disagreed with the agency's decision,

complainant could raise her objections with the EEOC Administrative Judge

(AJ) in the event that she requested a hearing.

3 Because complainant did not raise the dismissal of claim (1) on appeal,

we shall not address the matter in our decision.

??

??

??

??

2

0120082735

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

7

0120082735

8

0120082735