Lincoln Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 12, 1966

160 N.L.R.B. 1866 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

1866 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from
any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named Union as
the exclusive representative of our employees in the appropriate unit described
above, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached.
All of our employees are free to become or to remain or to refrain from becom-
ing or remaining members of the above-named Union or any other union except
to the extent that such rights may be affected by the provisos in Section 8(a)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act.
SOUTH BAY DAILY BREEZE, A DIVISION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 312
North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Telephone 688-5840.
Lincoln Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Local Union No. 503, Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association , AFL-CIO. Case 25-
C%1-13/5. October 12, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 1, 1966, Trial Examiner Gordon J. Myatt issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel
filed limited exceptions to the Trial Examiner' s Decision and a mem-
orandum in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Brown and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
160 NLRB No. 146.
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING CO. 1867
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.2
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.]
'For the reasons stated in Dan Howard Mfg. Co , and Dan Howard Sportswear Inc.,
158 NLRB 805 , footnote 5, Member Brown would rely upon the employees ' signatures to
cards designating the Union as their bargaining agent, to establish the majority status
of the Union at the time it requested recognition , as the best evidence of employees'
intent.
2 The Respondent ' s request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record , the excep-
tions , and the briefs , in our opinion, adequately present the issues and the positions of
the parties.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed October 15, 1965,1 and an amended charge filed November 9,
1965, by Local Union No. 503, Sheet Metal Worker's International Association,
AFL-CIO ( herein referred to as the Union), a complaint was issued against Lincoln
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Respondent), on Decem-
ber 17, 1965. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act2 Respondent's answer admits certain allegations of the complaint,
but denies the commission of any unfair labor practices . This case was heard by
Trial Examiner Gordon J. Myatt at Fort Wayne, Indiana, on February 14 and 15,
1966, and briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record 3 in this case, including my evaluation of the witnesses
based on my observation of their demeanor and on the evidence contained in the
rrecord, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent, an Indiana corporation , is engaged in the manufacture , sale, and dis-
tribution of stainless steel food serving equipment , and maintains its only office and
place of business in Fort Wayne, Indiana. During the past 12 months , a representa-
tive period , Respondent manufactured , sold, and shipped products valued in excess
of $50,000 from its Fort Wayne, Indiana, plant directly to points located outside the
State of Indiana.
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local Union No. 503, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, AFL-CIO,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
' Unless otherwise noted , all dates herein refer to 1965
2 During the course of the hearing the Respondent moved to strike an allegation of inter-
rogation occurring in November ( paragraph 5(b)) and allegations of threats and promises
of benefit occurring on June 29 (paragraph 5(c) and ( d)) from the complaint . The Gen-
eral Counsel did not oppose the motions, and they were granted
3 The transcript of the hearing is hereby corrected in the following respect:
1. Page 18 , lines 19 and 24 "Joyce Silk Mills " to "Joy Silk Mills."
2. Page 173 , line 3 "their" to "there."
3. Page 204 , line 2 "account" to "accountant."
4. Page 209 , line 4 "account" to "accountant."
5. Page 238 , line 6 "flw" to "flaw."
6. Page 248, line 7 "think" to "thing."
7. Page 262 , line 8 "bet" to "get."
1868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues involved
The primary issues in the case are- (1) whether the Union had been designated
as the collective-bargaining representative by a majority of Respondent's employees
at the time it required recognition and bargaining by the Respondent; and (2)
whether the Respondent engaged in various acts of interference, restraint, and coer-
cion after the Union's request in an effort to undermine the Union by dissipating its
majority status and to avoid the statutory requirement to bargain
B. Chronology of events
Sometime during the latter part of March, approximately 22 of Respondent's
employees met in a local motel with the Union's representatives Frank M. Elbrink
and Edwin C. Winter. Elbrink informed the employees that the Union represented
production workers in various areas throughout the country. He also discussed the
effect of collective representation on such matters as wages, job security, and other
benefits. During the course of the meeting Elbrink polled the employees to deter-
mine if they wished to be represented by the Union. The employees all responded
in the affirmative .4
On May 17, the Respondent received the following letter 5 on the Union's
stationery:
Request is hereby made that Lincoln Manufacturing Co., Inc., recognize
and bargain with Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local Union
#503 for a collective bargaining agreement, covering Production, Mainte-
nance, Shipping and Receiving, Truck Drivers and Janitorial employees of
your Company for wages, hours of work, and other working conditions of
the above-mentioned employees.
I should be most glad to meet with you to discuss this matter at your con-
venience. I can be reached at the above address.
Awaiting your reply, I remain,
Yours truly,
Frank Elbrink
International Organizer.
On the same day that Respondent received the letter, the Union filed a representa-
tion petition with the Regional Director in Indianapolis.
On May 20, D. Dean Rhoads, president of Respondent, was contacted by a
Board agent by telephone, and orally agreed to enter into a consent election with
the Union. As Rhoads had to go to Chicago on a business trip, the formal consent
agreement was forwarded to him there and returned by him through the mails to^
the Regional Office.
On July 8, an election was held, resulting in 11 ballots in favor of the Union
and 16 ballots against union representation. The Union filed timely objections with
the Regional Director, alleging that the Employer engaged in various acts of mis-
conduct which affected the results of the election. On December 16, the Regional
Director issued a report on objections wherein he found merit in several of the
Union's objections and ordered the election set aside and declared a nullity.
C. The various acts of interference, restraint, and coercion
1. The change in vacation policy
The evidence indicates that Respondent did not reply to the Union's letter
requesting recognition and bargaining, but that on May 20, Respondent did agree
to a consent election. That same day, Respondent mailed letters to all of its
employees advising them that the plant would be closed for a week beginning
June 28 through July 5, with the exception of a skeleton crew composed of employ-
ees not entitled to a full week's vacation. The fact is, however, that no employee
* The above is taken from the unrefuted testimony of Elbrink
5 The letter from the Union was dated May 13, however the parties stipulated that the
letter was not received by the Respondent until May 17. Accordingly, I find that the
critical date herein Is May 17, and not May 13, as alleged in the complaint Rea Construc-
tion Company, 137 NLRB 1769, 1772.
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING CO. 1869
was entitled to a full week's vacation as the Respondent was a new manufacturing
concern which did not become operational until after May 1, 1964. Consequently,
each letter contained a form on which the employee was to indicate the days
he would be on vacation and the days he would work during the allotted period.
The Respondent also offered the employees the option of working during their
vacation on a "permissive opportunity" basis. Thus, if the Respondent had need
for an employee to perform a particular job during the vacation period, that
employee was offered an opportunity to work and receive a pay allowance in lieu
of vacation. Some of the employees took advantage of this offer.
The Employer's announcement of the plant closing and the granting of vacations
on a prorated basis varied from the procedure set forth in the Respondent's Factory
Handbook containing the plant rules and policies . 6 According to the handbook the
vacation policy was as follows:
An employee shall receive vacation pay in accordance with the schedules
shown below as determined by his continuous service record as of May 1 of
each year:
Seniority as of May I Vacation
1 year but less than 5_____________________________ 1 week
5 years or more__________________________________ 2 weeks
The plant may be shut down for vacation time.
There shall be no right to accumulate the vacation from year to year; and
all vacations must be taken not later than the end of the vacation year (May 1
to December 31) in which they fall due. There will be no pay allowance in
lieu of vacation.
The Respondent asserts that the matter of vacations was under consideration by
management long before the advent of the Union. Rhoads testified that he fre-
quently walked through the production area of the plant engaging in conversations
-with the employees , and that on numerous occasions employees would mention the
fact that they were not entitled to a vacation during 1965 under the terms of the
handbook.? Rhoads stated that because of the unfairness of the situation, he
intormed Rex D. Scott, vice president in charge of accounting, that the employees
would be given a vacation on a prorated basis. According to the testimony of
Rhoads and Scott, this decision was made during the latter part of January or the
early part of February. After consulting with Respondent's accountants in March,
Scott set up the vacation costs as an accrued expense item on the Company 's finan-
cial records .8 Although the decision to grant vacations was made sometime during
the first 2 months of the year, Rhoads testified that he did not feel it was necessary
to make this known to the employees until the letters were sent on May 20 . Rhoads
stated that the Company was behind on customer orders and that he wanted to
grant the vacations before the summer rush started. For this reason, he decided
that all employees would take a vacation at the same time, thereby allowing the
plant to resume production on a systematic basis. Therefore, announcement of the
change in policy was delayed until a period of time was selected which would
accommodate Respondent's production requirements.
This explanation , while seemingly plausible, is not persuasive when all of the
factors surrounding the announcement are considered . Rhoads toured the factory
at least once every day, and he knew all of the employees by their first names.
Rhoads stated that when he walked through the plant the employees would freely
engage him in conversations about their families, and about anything in the plant
which they felt was not right. In view of this relationship, described by Rhoads as
"one big happy family ," I find it difficult to place credence in Respondent 's asserted
O The handbook was compiled during the last 3 months in 1964, and was distributed to
the employees in early January 1965
7 Rhoads Identified Devlin and Cooper as the employees expressing the greatest concern
over the lack of vacations , although he testified that he had similar conversations with
many other production employees
8 Copies of the journal sheets were introduced into evidence as Respondent's Exhibits
1 and 2 The initial entries thereon reflect the dates of January 31 and February 28, but
Scott testified that the actual posting did not occur until .March Experience indicates
that this is an accepted procedure wherein many businesses antedate entries on their
books to reflect the time when the expense is actually incurred or accrued
1870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reasons for withholding announcement of the change in policy for a period of 3
months. This is especially true, as the matter of vacations was a constant topic of
discussion between the employees and Rhoads after the distribution of the hand-
book in January. But assuming valid reasons for withholding announcement of the
decision from the production employees, I find it difficult to understand the need
to keep the decision from other members of top level management. On cross-
examination, Rhoads admitted that Herb Doehla, Respondent's personnel director,
was not aware of the change in vacation policy as late as May 14. Even though a
change in the vacation policy may have been decided by the Respondent before
the advent of the Union, I find, nonetheless, that the timing of the announcement,
occurring 3 days after the Union's request for recognition and bargaining and on
the same day that the Respondent orally consented to an election, was calculated
to influence the outcome of the pending election. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co.,
375 U.S. 405. Furthermore, I find that by allowing employees to work and receive
a pay allowance in lieu of vacation, contrary to the terms of the handbook, the
Respondent conferred an economic benefit upon the employees which was calcu-
lated to influence the outcome of the election.9 Accordingly, I find that the Respond-
ent interfered with the rights of the employees guaranteed them by Section 7 of
the Act, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1).
2. Respondent's letters and speech to the employees
After consenting to an election, the Respondent engaged in a vigorous campaign
to persuade the employees to reject the Union. Rhoads sent a series of letters to
to the employees and delivered a speech the day before the election. The letters and
the transcript of the speech were stipulated into evidence by the parties.ii
On July 4, Respondent sent the first letter to the employees expressing opposition
to the Union. This letter advised the employees of the pending election, cited the
struggle of Respondent as a fledgling manufacturing concern, and compared the
current wage rates of the employees with the wage rates of employees of another
concern represented by the Union. The letter then went on to state:
You know what I say is true for you have witnessed this "Miracle." (Respond-
ent's accomplishments in the past year .] Wouldn't it be a shame to have a
union come in and spoil all this? What would a union have done for you in
this period of time? [Emphasis supplied.]
WHAT ABOUT OUR CUSTOMERS?
It isn 't unusual for union organized companies to lose customers ... "After
all how can we assure delivery until this situation is settled . If we loose [sic]
one order BIG or SMALL, loose [sic ] ONE customer, you are the one it is
going to hurt most."
* * * * * * *
The Union is waging a typical union campaign in an effort to undermine your
confidence in us. These organizers know no end to their demands at the
expense of the employees and the company . The situation today is a living
reminder of the fable , "Don't Kill the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg."
"He who wants more, often looses [sic] ALL!!"
The second letter was dated July 5 . This letter was in the style of a company
newsletter entitled "Lincoln Lines," and the Respondent 's views were set forth in
e Browning Indatstraes, Inc., 142 NLRB 1397, 1401
11 The letters are in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Only
those portions considered material to the issues herein are quoted in the text of this
Decision, with the exception of the newsletter of July 6 (General Counsel's Exhibit 9),
attached hereto as Appendix B.
11I note that the complaint alleges a letter dated July 2, but that a letter of that date
is not contained in the exhibits. There is, however, a letter dated July 4, which is not
mentioned in the complaint. As all the letters were received in evidence through mutual
agreement of the parties, I shall consider the July 4 letter along with the others and make
my determination accordingly.
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING CO. 1871
the form of a series of "questions and answers." The newsletter began with the
statement by the Respondent that "we are definitely opposed to having a union at
Lincoln." Among the "questions and answers" were the following:
QUESTION: If the Company does not agree to the Union's demand,
would there be a strike?
ANSWER: That would be up to the Union, but if its demands weren't met,
a strike is the standard action the Union could take to attempt to get its
demands.
QUESTION: Will the Lincoln plant close down if the Union gets in?
ANSWER: I hope not. I guess the Union could cause enough trouble to
force the plant down, as union [sic ] have done at so many other places.
QUESTION: Will the Union give me security?
ANSWER: NO, and it is foolish for the Union to claim that it will. Your
security is in our being a good strong and secure Company . It is customers that
make us secure. In my opinion, the Union will only hurt this Company and
NOT make it secure.
* * * * * * *
You might want to ask the Union "Chiefs" the following questions and care-
fully evaluate their replies:
HOW CAN A UNION ATTEMPT TO MAKE THEIR PROMISES GOOD
WITHOUT A STRIKE
WHAT WOULD A STRIKE DO TO LINCOLN CUSTOMERS
On July 6, the Respondent issued two separate newsletters. The first contained
two poems, and is attached hereto as Appendix B. The second contained the
Respondent's views on the superiority of individual action as opposed to group
action. In essence, the Respondent stated that the employees' individual freedom,
dignity, and worth would have to be subverted to the rule of the majority if the
Union became the bargaining representative.
On July 7, the Respondent forwarded its last letter to the employees. This letter
contained wage rates for similar job classifications in another Indiana company
where the employees were organized and represented by a union. In addition to the
foregoing letters, the Respondent posted on its bulletin board a leaflet (General
Counsel's Exhibit 13) which purported to show the amount of money an employee
would lose each week by striking to secure an hourly wage increase.
On July 7, at 7 a.m., Rhoads made a speech to the employees in the plant.12
Rhoads touched upon a wide range of subjects in an effort to persuade the employ-
ees to reject the Union in the forthcoming election. He dealt with such items as
unionization of union organizers, comparison of the Respondent's wage rates with
the rates of unionized plants, inability to live within one's income, and the unlimited
opportunities available to the employees as Respondent's plant expanded. Included
in this speech were the following statements:
So this is the darker side of the story. I asked these companies [unionized
companies ], I said, "Now if your fellows who are making $2.87 per hour want
to work overtime, can they? CAN THEY? DO YOU PERMIT IT? DO YOU
PERMIT ONE HOUR OF IT? The answer was: Only in emergency. ONLY
IN EMERGENCY.
Another company was questioned : Do you ever have overtime ? Answer:
Generally, No. Only if we have a hot job and might run one department a
bit longer.
Ask the union man this: Has he ever seen a contract where the union
agreement calls for overtime?
Hell, no!
"The transcript of the speech is in evidence as General Counsel 's Exhibit 14 . Because
of a faulty recording machine, the transcriber was unable to set down certain parts of the
speech. Where this occurs, the transcript contains the word "garbled." In making my
determination concerning this speech , I do not rely upon those segments of the speech
where the plain meaning and sense of the statements contained therein are distorted or
destroyed by the garbled portion.
1872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Besides this is something you can't write into a union contract. Overtime is
a prerogative of the Management. Rightfully so!
Let's look at annual incomes-without overtime. Compare companies in Indi-
ana which are the highest paid. There is no overtime these. Ask the Union this
How can they get more money for a shear operator that already makes a thou-
sand a year more without overtime? How can he get more money for a break
operator that already makes a thousand a year more without overtime? Or a
welder that makes $600 more or a common assembly worker that is making
$900 more and a punch press operator making $400 more. I admit these are
top rates. By golly, whenever there's a top rate established you have a chance
to get there as well as anybody else.
* *
Let's look with [sic] overtime.
How can Mr. Elbrink [the union organizer] look you in the eye and tell you
that you are going to make more when you're possibly going to make $3,500
less? Because here you have overtime, OVERTIME-OVERTIME-
OVERTIME!
* * * *
Before we have a contract, I have to sign it. And if in that contract it calls
for a $60 a year extra per employees [sic], and I don't agree to that (and I'm
not saying I would or wouldn't) because if I said I wouldn't-that would be
a threat, I'm not allowed to make threats, but I can say this without any fear
of contradiction-no one can make me sign anything. I don't have to agree to
anything. Now, if I don't agree to it, there isn't any force in the whole wide
world that can get you more money.
* * * * * * *
You know I got a contract up there from the Federal Government for three
quarters of a million dollars and I have refused to sign it. There is no law in
the land that can make me sign that contract involuntarily. I'm not going to
put my boy back there, John-I've got two other boys at home-I've got my
neck out for one half million dollars in loans, and I'm not going to put my
neck out any further when there is a possibility you are going on strike
garbled-I want that contract-I want it more than anything in the whole
wide world garbled I've worked all my life for that and it hits
right now. And IT show it to you. Anybody who wants to see it, it's up on my
desk. To be exact, it is $649,000. It doesn't take a genius to figure out how
much that would mean to everybody.
Respondent contends that the letters to the employees do not violate Section
'8(a)(1) and that the General Counsel must perforce rely upon Rhoads' speech to
establish his case. Respondent further contends that the speech does not exceed the
limits permitted by Section 8(c) of the Act. If what is meant is that all of the com-
munications, written and verbal, must be viewed in their totality to determine
whether a violation has been committed, then the Respondent is correct While each
separate communication to the employee must be analyzed, it is the sum total of all
the statements expressed during an effort to defeat unionization of the employees
which must be considered. General Industries Electronics Company, 146 NLRB
1139, 1141. Contrary to the Respondent, however, I find that the letters and the
speech contain statements which violate Section 8(a)(1).
In the first communication to the employees on July 4, the Respondent raised
the specter of loss of customers if the employees selected the Union. This theme
was repeated in the letter of July 5, wherein Respondent emphasized strike action
as the only means by which the Union could enforce demands on behalf of the
employees. In this letter, Respondent posed the question of "What would a strike do
to Lincoln's customers?" The two poems in the newsletter of, July 6, purporting to
be the lament of a wife of a worker in a unionized plant, reiterate the inevitability
,of strikes, economic loss, and indebtedness should the employees select the Union as
their representative. These statements clearly 'indicate that the Respondent was
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING CO. 1873
attempting to instill in the minds of the employees that strikes and the resultant loss
of benefits and security were the inevitable consequences of union representation.
Furthermore, in his speech of July 7, Rhoads made it exceedingly clear to the
employees that selection of the Union would result in a drastic loss of opportunity
to work overtime. By informing the employees that overtime was nonexistent or
kept at a minimum in unionized plants, and by stating that the employees might
earn $3,500 less if they became unionized, the Respondent made it evident to the
employees that existing overtime benefits would be curtailed if the Union were to
become their representative. In the speech Rhoads also told the employees that he
was withholding his signature from a Government contract for $649,000. On this
point, Rhoads stated "1 as not going to put my neck out any further when there is a
possibility you are going on strike ...." The obvious implication of this statement
is that Rhoads withheld his signature because of possible unionization of the
employees and would continue to do so until the employees rejected the Union.
Accordingly, I find that the letters of July 4, 5, and 6,13 were intended to create
and instill in the minds of the employees the fear of economic suffering through
strikes and loss of benefits as a result of selecting the Union. I further find that
Rhoads' speech contained thinly veiled threats of reprisal in the form of curtailing
overtime and refusing to sign the Government contract in the event the employees
chose to be represented by the Union. Such conduct interferes with, coerces, and
restrains the employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed them under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act and therefore violates Section 8(a)(1). Louisiana Manufacturing
Company, 152 NLRB 1301; Brownwood Manufactuiing•Company, 149 NLRB 921,
924; Northwest Engineering Company, 148 NLRB 1136, 1144.
3. Other alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1)
After work on July 6, employees Frank Pion and Wayne Long were distributing
union handbills in front of the Respondent's plant. Rhoads approached the two
employees and asked them to pose for a picture. Pion and Long testified that after
Rhoads had taken their picture, he stated that he could have the employees fired.
Rhoads then left the employees and returned to the plant. Rhoads, on the other
hand, testified that he requested the permission of the employees to take their photo-
graphs while they were handbillmg and that as he turned to leave one of the
employees asked, "Are you going to fire us for this?" Rhoads stated that he did not
answer the question. In an affidavit (General Counsel's Exhibit 41) given a Board
agent on November 30, Rhoads gave a somewhat different version of this event.
There, Rhoads acknowledged photographing the employees distributing the union
literature, after first securing their permission, but did not recall having any further
conversation with the two employees and denied saying anything about firing tnem.
Because Rhoads' statement in the affidavit differed materially from his testimony at
the hearing concerning the incident, and because Rhoads admitted in the affidavit
that he may have been motivated to take the pictures of the employees because he
"may have thought at the time that the men were doing something wrong in distrib-
uting the leaflets, where they were," I credit the testimony of Pion and Long.' I
find, thererore, that Rhoads did make the statement attributed to him by the two
13 1 find nothing unlawful in the newsletter of July 6, setting forth Rhoads' philosophy
on the importance of the individual. The complaint, however, alleges that the newsletter
dated May 28, also violates Section 8(a) (1). This letter contained local plant news in-
cluding a short item reminding the employees of the pending shutdown for vacation. As
I have previously found the announcement of the vacation to be a violation, I deem it un-
necessary to make a similar finding concerning this letter, and I shall recommend dis-
missal of the allegation insofar as it relates to the letter of May 28.
14 In making this determination, I am not unmindful of the fact that Rhoads photo-
graphed the employees while they were distributing union handbills at the entrance to the
plant. Although the complaint does not allege, nor do I find, this to be an independent
violation of Section 8(a) (1), I deem it relevant in assessing Rhoads' conduct throughout
the entire incident.
257-551-67-vol. 160-119
1874 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees, and that the statement was made because the employees were engaged
in activities on behalf of the Union. It is fundamental that such conduct is in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1).15
D. The Union's majority and the request for recognition and bargaining
1. The appropriate unit
Paragraph 6(a) of the complaint sets forth the appropriate unit as:
All production and maintenance employees , janitors , truck drivers , and group
leaders employed at the Respondent 's Fort Wayne, Indiana, plant, exclusive
of all office clerical employees, professional employees , guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act ... .
Respondent 's answer admits, and I find , that the unit is appropriate for purposes
of collective bargaining.
2. The Union's majority
As previously noted, the Union 's request for recognition and bargaining was
not received by the Respondent until May 17, and it is this date which must be
considered in determining the Union 's majority status. The evidence discloses that
on May 13, there were 30 employees in the unit , and the parties stipulated that on
May 15, 1 employee (William D. McIntosh) quit. I find, therefore, that on May 17,
there were 29 employees in the bargaining unit.
In support of the claim of majority , the General Counsel introduced 21 signed
authorization cards.17 Each card was verified by the employee whose signature was
contained thereon . The Respondent raises two objections to the admissibility of the
cards. First, Respondent contends that 11 of the cards were not admissible because
of representations to the employees that the cards were solely for the purpose of
getting an election . 18 At the hearing , I overruled Respondent 's objection based on
the circumstances surrounding the signing of a card by employee Nern, and I
reserved my ruling until this Decision on the admissibility of the remaining 10
cards. Secondly, Respondent objects to the admissibility of all of the cards to estab-
lish the Union's majority status at the time of the request. This objection is
premised on the contention that the request itself is defective as a matter of law.
With respect to Respondent 's first objection , I make the following findings:
Louis Garcia: Garcia testified that he received a card from Long, who asked
if Garcia wanted to get a union in the shop . Garcia replied in the affirmative and
15 Pion and Long also testified that in his speech, Rhoads told the assembled employees
that he could have fired two employees the day before. He then asked Pion and Long bow
many children they had. The General Counsel alleges this to be an independent violation
of the Act. The transcript (General Counsel's Exhibit 14 at page 24) reveals that a
material part of this section of the speech was not transcribed as it was garbled on the
tape. I consider it unnecessary, however, to make a finding in this regard, as I have al-
ready determined that the speech violated Section 8(a) (1) and that on the preceding day,
Rhoads did tell Pion and Long that he could fire them for distributing handbills
The General Counsel also alleges that on July 6, Rhoads told employees Garcia and
Miebers that Respondent would never sign a contract with the Union, and if the Union
were selected, Respondent would be unable to do anything for the employees. Garcia testi-
fied with respect to the conversation. Rhoads admitted having a conversation with Garcia
and Miebers concerning wages, but denied making the statements attributed to him. As-
suming without deciding, that the conversation took place as described by Garcia, a fur-
ther finding of a separate violation of Section 8(a)(1) in these circumstances would be
cumulative. This is especially true as the remedy for such a violation would fall within the
scope of the Order which I shall recommend herein.
1e This is the unit description used by the parties in the election in Case 25-RC-2884.
See General Counsel's Exhibit 16, footnote 1.
17 Each card contained the following statement before the portion to be filled out by
the employee :
AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION
I, the undersigned, hereby authorize the SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNA-
TIONAL, ASSOCIATION, or any affiliated Local Union- thereof, to represent, me for
purposes of collective bargaining , and in my behalf , to negotiate and conclude all
agreements as to hours of labor, wages, and other, conditions of employment.
18 The employees whose cards were objected to on this ground were : Louis Garcia, Frank
Pion, Roy Fowler, Jr., Larry Cooper, Richard Nern, George Krumwiede, Clarence Hopkins,
William "Wiley" Peters, Ernest Peters, Charles Matelsky, and Roger Towler.
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING CO. 1875
stated, "We all wanted one in there." According to Garcia, Long gave him the
card and told him that if enough employees signed cards, "we would probably
have an election." Garcia further testified that he read the card prior to signing it.
He also testified that Long explained to him "about the Union coming in the shop
and the wages and all that and the benefits."
Long, however, testified that he did not give the card to Garcia, as he was not
the only employee distributing cards. Long did state that Garcia turned in a card
but failed to sign it, and that he (Long) took the card back to Garcia for signature.
I do not view these differences in the testimony as being material to the issue
of the representations made to Garcia when he received the card. Whether Garcia
got the card from Long or from another employee, in no way bears upon the
question as to what was said at the time. Garcia's testimony clearly demonstrates
that he was not told by anyone that the sole purpose of the card was to secure an
election. Moreover, he read the card prior to signing . For these reasons , I find that
Garcia's card is to be included as a valid authorization and counted toward the
Union's majority.la
Frank Pion: This employee also testified that he received his card from Long.
Long asked if he were interested in getting a union in the plant, and then gave
Pion a card to read and to fill out. Pion stated that he read the card and signed it.
He also stated that Long told him that "if we get enough cards and enough of the
people interested in it to have an election, that we can prove that there is enough
of them that is interested, then, we would have an election."
Considering Pion's testimony on this issue, I find that Long did not indicate that
the sole purpose of the card was to have an election. The card clearly designated
the Union as representative of the signer, and Pion stated that he read the card
before signing. I find that Long's statement to Pion did not conflict with the pur-
pose stated on the face of the card. I find, therefore, for the same reasons pertain-
ing to Garcia's card that Pion's card is a valid designation of the Union as his
bargaining representative.
Roy Fowler: Fowler testified that he attended the first meeting between the
employees and the union representatives at a local motel. It was at this meeting
that Elbrink explained what the Union hoped to accomplish for the employees
by way of collective bargaining. Fowler testified that the union representatives
said they had to have a percentage in order to get representation at the plant. Fow-
ler was uncertain as to, the exact percentage, but believed it was less than 50
percent. On the basis of Fowler's testimony I find that Fowler designated the
Union as his representative, and that the card was not represented to be solely for
the purpose of an election. I therefore find that Fowler's card should be included
in determining the Union's majority status.
Larry Cooper: Cooper received his card from- Long. Long asked him if he
wanted a union to represent him, and told him that a certain percentage was needed
to get the Union. According to Cooper, Long stated that "the Union would not take
for granted that employees wanted to be represented unless there were enough
signers to' get it."
I find that Cooper made a valid designation of the- Union as his representative.
Long's statements did not indicate that'the sole purpose of the authorization card
was to secure an election. Moreover, Long's statements did not detract from the
representative purpose contained on the face of the card. Accordingly, I find
that Cooper's card is a valid designation of the Union as his representative and is
to be counted toward the 'Union's majority.
'George Krumwiede: Krumwiede testified that he received a card from someone
at work, but he was unable to recall the name of the individual. He signed the
card and took it to the union meeting, that evening at the local motel, where he
turned the card in. According to Krumwiede, he was told at the meeting, that the
card was not a vote for the Union, but was a vote for an election. However,
Krumwiede stated that he had signed the card before he went to the meeting. It
is' reasonable to infer, therefore, that Krumwiede's signature was based on the
representations contained on the face of the card, as he testified that he did not
have any conversation concerning the Union at the time he received the card. I
find that Krumwiede's card' is to .be included in establishing the Union's majority
status.
19 Hamburg Shirt Corporation, 156 NLRB 511; Boot-Ster Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
149 NLRB 933; S N C. Manufacturing Co, Inc., 147 NLRB 809, enfd. sub. nom. Int'l
Union of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B, 352 F 2d 361 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 382 U.S.
902; Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268.
1876 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Clarence Hopkins: Hopkins also received his card from Long. Hopkins is unable
to read well, and Long volunteered to assist him in filling out the card. However,
Hopkins kept the card and took it home, in order to have a friend assist him.
Hopkins gave the card to his friend who told him it was for the Union. The
friend did not read the card to Hopkins. Hopkins then instructed his friend to sign
the card on his behalf.
I find, under these circumstances, that Hopkins clearly intended to designate
the Union as his representative when he instructed the friend to sign the card, and
I,shall count the card toward the Union's majority.
William "Wiley" Peters, Ernest Peters, and Roger Towler: "Wiley" Peters,
Ernest Peters, Roger Towler, and Cecil Lynch 20 met with Union Representative
Winter on April 28,,at the home of "Wiley" Peters. Towler and the Peters brothers
testified that Winter told them the Union needed a certain number of cards in order
to have an election and that more were needed to get the election. There three
employees all agree that Winter spoke to them for about 20 minutes, and they all
agree that wages were one of the subjects discussed. However, none of the employ-
ees could recall any other statements made by Winter during the discussion. Winter,
on the other hand, denied making any statements concerning an election. He testi-
fied that he informed the employees of the advantages of union representation and
said that the'card was for the purpose of authorizing the Union to represent them.
Lynch also testified that nothing was said at this meeting concerning an election,
but he was unable to recall the specific matters covered in the discussion.
I do not view the differences in the testimony as being deliberate attempts to
mislead, but, rather, as honest failure on the part of the witnesses to recall all
that occurred at the meeting. I am convinced, therefore, that the more accurate ver-
sion of what took place is embraced in the testimony of all of the participants.
Winter's account of his talk is consistent with the speech made to the other employ-
ees, by Elbrink at the previous meeting in the motel 2r I do not rule out however,
the ' possibility that a statement was made concerning an election. Nonetheless, I
find no need to credit one particular version over another , as none is a complete
recital of what occurred. The clear designation contained on the face of the cards,
the failure of the employees to recall the other matters included in Winter's 20-
minute talk, and Winter's testimony that he discussed the advantages of collective
representation and that he told the employees the cards authorized the Union to
represent them, lead me to conclude that Winter did not say that the cards were
solely for the purpose of securing an election. Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283,
1290; Cumberland Shoe Corporation, supra; C. J. Glasgow Company, 148 NLRB
98, enfd. in pertinent part 356 F.2d 476 (C.A. 7). See also the Board's discussion
on authorization cards in these circumstances in Dan Howard Mfg. Co., and Dan
Howard Sportswear, Inc., 158 NLRB 805, footnote 5. Accordingly, I find that the
cards signed by Towler and the Peters brothers conferred representative authority
on the Union, and I shall include the cards in determining the Union's majority
status.
Charles Matelsky: Matelsky testified that he had heard talk around the shop
that a certain percentage of cards were needed in order to have an election. He
received his card from employee Miebers and took it home to read. Matelsky
subsequently returned a signed card to Miebers. In these circumstances I find that
Matelsky fully intended to authorize the Union to bargain on his behalf, and I
shall include this card in determining the Union's majority status.
In view of the above analysis, I find and conclude that 21 out of 29 employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit validly granted the Union authority to act as
their collective-bargaining representative on May, 17. There remains for con-
sideration, however, Respondent's second objection.
The Respondent asserts that the Union's request is defective as the letter con-
tained no claim of majority or offer to prove majority. In support of this con-
tention Respondent relies upon'Sheboygan Sausage Company, Inc., 156 NLRB
1490. In that case, the union merely requested recognition and did not demand
bargaining. The request was in the form of a telegram which did not contain the
union's address and made no mention of majority status. Within a day or two
after sending the telegram, the union filed a petition with the Board. The Board
adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that the union did not make, or intend to
20 On the basis of his testimony, I received Lynch's card into evidence as a valid designa-
tion of the Union as his representative.
011 note at this point that Winter was also present at the meeting.
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING CO. 1877
make a genuine bargaining demand. In this case, however, the Union's letter
unequivocally calls for recognition and bargaining, and the bargaining unit is
clearly spelled out; nor is there any doubt about the address or identity of the
Union. As in the Sheboygan case, there was no mention here of majority status and
a representation petition was filed shortly after the request. While both cases have
these facts in common, I do not construe the Sheboygan case as controlling the
result to be reached here. The intent of the Union's letter is clear; it was requesting
recognition and bargaining on behalf of the Respondent's employees. The mere
fact that the letter did not state explicitly that the Union represented a majonty
of the employees does not, in my judgment, vitiate the request. It is well settled
that a request for recognition "need not follow a prescribed form so long as it is
clear from the entire situation that the essential elements of a valid demand are
present." Barney's Supercenter, Inc., 128 NLRB 1325, 1327, enfd. 296 F.2d 91.
No "special formula or form of words" is required by the Act. Joy Silk Mills, Inc.
v. I'T.f.R.B., 185 F 2d 732, 741 (C.A.D C.), enfg. 85 NLRB 12b3 lnheient in a
clear and unequivocal request for exclusive recognition and bargaining, which
identifies the union by name and address and clearly describes the unit, is a
claim that the union represents a majority of the employees in the unit sought.
That such a claim may or may not be accurate is irrelevant, for it is a claim
nevertheless, because the Act prescribes exclusive recognition for majority-status
unions only. Here the claim was accurate. Accordingly, I hereby overrule Respond-
ent's second objection to the admissibility of the authorization cards to establish
the Union's majority.
Respondent also urges that the Board's Decision in Flomatic Corporation, 147
NLRB 1304, imposes an additional requirement that an employer must be allowed
time to reply to a bargaining request. I find no such requirement in Flomatic.
True, one of the factors relied upon in that case was that the union filed a petition
before awaiting a reply. However, in arriving at its conclusion , the Board also
considered the further fact that the union representatives informed the employer
that the letter requesting recognition was necessary as "a prelude to an election."
Id. at page 1305. Thus, the Board 's ruling in Flomatic is based on the particular
circumstances of that case, and does not stand for the general proposition urged
by Respondent. The mere act of filing of a petition at the time of a demand, or
shortly thereafter, by a majority union does not indicate that the union has aban-
doned its claim in this regard. Indeed, the Board has held that in filing a rep-
resentation petition "[a] union has not altered its position that its represents the
employees and is entitled to recognition." Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc., 146
NLRB 1277, 1280.
At the time that the Respondent received the bargaining request in this case,
the Union commanded majority status. Thus, Respondent was under a duty to
bargain in the absence of a good-faith doubt. Happach v. N.L.R B., 353 F.2d 629
(C A 7), Mid-West Towel and Linen Service, Inc. 339 F.2d 958 (C.A. 7). enfe.
143 NLRB 744. The fact that the Union also filed a representation petition and
the Respondent consented to an election does not relieve the Respondent of his
duty. Master Transmission Rebuilding Corporation, 155 NLRB 364; Crown Tar
and Chemical Works, Inc., 154 NLRB 562; Permacold Industries, Inc., 147 NLRB
885. See also N.L.R.B. v. Frantz and Co., 361 F.2d 180 (C.A. 7), 62 LRRM
2229, decided May 24, 1966; N.L.R.B. v. Eliott-Williams, 345 F.2d 460, 464
(C.A. 7). The announcement of a change in vacation policy, the statement that
two employees could be discharged for passing out the union literature at the plant
entrance, the threat of loss of overtime, and the threat to reject the Government
contract clearly indicate that Respondent was not acting in good faith and was
unwilling to test the Union's majority in a fair election. Such conduct shows that
the Respondent was seeking to frustrate the employees' freedom of choice and was
motivated by the desire to undermine the Union's majority status in complete
rejection of the collective-bargaining principle. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. supra. Since
the Regional Director set aside the election as a nullity based on timely objections
filed by the Union, the requirements of Irving An Ciunie Comnany, I'i'.,1a9
NLRB 627, enfd. 350 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2), are satisfied. Therefore, under the
Board's decision in Bernel Foam Products Co, Inc, supra, I find that Recnondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and that a bargaining order should issue as a
proper remedy.
Even were Ito find no violation of Section 8(a) (5), I would, nonetheless, find that
a bargaining order is required in order to effectuate the statutory purpose in this
case. The Union did possess majority status at the time of the bargaining request
1878 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Respondent did engage in unlawful conduct which prevented a fair election.
Therefore , a bargaining order is necessary as the proper remedy to preserve the
status quo ante and to prevent Respondent from benefiting from its own unlawful
conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Dan Howard Mfg. Co., supra; Irving Air
Chute Company, Inc., supra. See also Northwest Engineering Company, 158 NLRB
624.
W. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend the issuance of an order that it cease and desist therefrom, and
that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
As I have found that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by refusing
to recognize the Union and bargain in good faith, I shall recommend that Respond-
ent cease and desist from refusing to bargain, and further, to bargain, upon request,
with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit found
appropriate herein, and , if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
The unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent strike at the very foun-
dation of employee rights protected by the Act, and suggest a predisposition to vio-
late these rights. I shall recommend, therefore, that the Respondent cease and desist
from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed its employees in Section
7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local Union No. 503, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, AFL-
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees, janitors, truckdrivers, and group
leaders employed at the Respondent's Fort Wayne, Indiana, plant, excluding all
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and all supervisiors as de-
fined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. On May 17, 1965, and -at all times thereafter, Local Union No. 503, Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association, AFL-CIO, has been the exclusive repre-
sentative of all the employees in the above-described unit for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining.
4. By refusing on May 17, 1965, and at all times thereafter, to bargain with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the above-
described unit, and by interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights under the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engag-
ing in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections
8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the record
as a whole, I recommend, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, that Respondent,
Lincoln Manufacturing Co., Inc., Fort Wayne, Indiana, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Warning and threatening employees that they can be discharged for distrib-
uting union literature on nonworking time at the plant entrance.
(b) Threatening employees by means of letters and speeches that the conse-
quences of unionization are economic loss and suffering and that unionization will
result in loss of overtime and threatening to refuse to sign a Government contract
unless the employees reject the Union.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local Union No. 503, Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association. AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the following appropriate unit.
All production and maintenance employees, janitors, truckdrivers, and group
leaders employed at Respondent's Fort Wayne, Indiana, plant, but excluding
all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and all supervisors
as defined in the Act.
(d) In any other manner interfering witth, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING CO. 1879
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with the above-named Union as the exclu-
sive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit described above, and, if
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its plant in Fort Wayne, Indiana, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix A." 22 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 25, after being signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent,
shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted and shall be main-
tained for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.23
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the allegations of the complaint alleging any
unlawful conduct other than found above be dismissed.
22 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
231n the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with strikes, economic loss, indebted-
ness, or loss of overtime benefits in order to cause them to reject Local No.
503, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, as their collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they can be discharged for distribution of
handbills for the Union at the plant entrance on nonworking time.
WE WILL NOT threaten to withhold approval of a Government contract for
work to induce our employees to reject the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist the above Union, or any other labor organiza-
tion, or to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
or to engage in any other concerted activities for their mutual aid or pro-
tection, or to refrain therefrom, as guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL bargain, upon request, with Local Union No. 503, Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative
of all the employees in the bargaining unit described below concerning rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment,
and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agreement. The
bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees, janitors, truck drivers and
group leaders employed at our Fort Wayne, Indiana, plant, excluding
all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and all super-
visors as defined in the Act.
LINCOLN MANUFACTURING Co., INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
1880 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614
ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, Telephone
633-8921.
APPENDIX B
A Report on Sales, Marketaag and Advertising. r
July 6, 1965 Z
To Our Employees and their Families:
I am enclosing copies of two poems. I thought you might like to read them.
It is a matter of record that in 1963 the Sheet Metal Workers Union was out
"On Strike" 19 days in Indiana
16 of these in Hammond
3 of these in Fort Wayne
D. Dean Rhoads
Lincoln Manufacturing Co., Inc. }
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE WIFE SPEAKS
Dear, Let's talk this thing thru,
The union will make a fool out of you.
They may call a "walk-out" and what'll we do?
The bills get bigger; the loans come due.
Food bill! car bill! furniture bill! behind in the rent!
See how much trouble the union has sent?
You mean you took a club to your best friend Bill
from the picket line?
What's happened to you, Jack, are you out of your mind?
Dear, look at the baby's little pinched face.
The milk man cut us off; I'm in a daze.
They came today, the furniture to take,
Because the payments we simply can't make.
I can't even get my hair washed and set!
You don't make the money you used to, you can bet!
All our savings have gone down the drain,
The family budget won't stand the strain.
Honey, the bank called; they want the car,
The bank also wants your four new tires.
The loan company wants our brand new home,
Junior wants money for his ice cream cones'
Time to get up? My! what a dream,
Banks and loans, even ice cream.
You go to work and vote a big "NO"
Do you hear me, honey? I told you so.
1. So there's talk about "join the union"?
Man' they've really got you steamed up and fumin!
Promising you things all out of reason.
Go ahead' Join 'em; this is "Sucker's Season."
(Ain't it?)
a
VALLEY DIE CAST CORPORATION
2. Have you talked it over with the "little wife"?
Can she face up to such a strife?
The family doing without; for maybe months,
Surely you aren't that big of a "chump!"
(or, are you?)
3. Look at the union rates, sent out in that letter
You guys top 'em; even go 'em better.
Compare your pay with factories around town;
Really, how can you do otherwise, but turn it "thumbs down"?
(Ever play Siemon says "Thumbs down?")
4. If the union calls a strike-a long drawn out affair
Man! you all gonna be kicked down stairs.
Gonna lose that new car and new home,
Everything you've worked for, simply blown!
5. So, July 8 when it comes to a vote,
Don't let the union make you the scape goat.
You're the ones that 'll have to pay
If you vote for them, Election Day.
1881
Valley Die Cast Corporation and International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America (UAW), AFL-CIO, Petitioner and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, Ind., Intervenor. Case 7-RC-7250. Octo-
ber 12, 1966
DECISION AND CERTIFICATION OF
RESULTS OF ELECTION
Pursuant to a stipulation for certification upon consent election
approved on March 24, 1966, an election by secret ballot was con-
ducted on April 21, 1966, under the direction and supervision of the
Regional Director for Region 7 among the employees in the stipu-
lated unit. At the conclusion of the election, the parties were fur-
nished with a tally of ballots which showed that of approximately
314 eligible voters, 298 cast ballots, of which 121 were for the Peti-
tioner, 1 was for the Intervenor, 170 were against the participating
labor organizations, 4 ballots were challenged, and 2 ballots were
void. The challenged ballots were insufficient in number to affect the
results of the election. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed timely objec-
tions to conduct affecting the results of the election.
In accordance with National Labor Relations Board Rules and
Regulations, the Regional Director conducted an investigation and,
on June 9, 1966, issued and duly served upon the parties his report
and recommendations on objections to election attached hereto, in
which he recommended that the objections be overruled in their
160 NLRB No. 142.