01980885
10-30-1998
Lillian A. Collins, Appellant, v. Craven H. Crowell, Jr. Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.
Lillian A. Collins v. Tennessee Valley Authority
01980885
October 30, 1998
Lillian A. Collins, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01980885
) Agency No. 0708-94090R
Craven H. Crowell, Jr. )
Chairman, )
Tennessee Valley Authority, )
Agency. )
______________________________)
DECISION
On November 10, 1997, Lillian A. Collins (appellant) timely appealed
the final decision of the Tennessee Valley Authority (agency), dated
October 10, 1997, concluding she had not been discriminated against in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. �2000e et seq. Appellant had alleged that she had been unlawfully
retaliated against for engaging in protected EEO activity when, in
February 1994, information regarding her former employment with the
agency was disclosed to her subsequent employer, which resulted in her
termination. This appeal is accepted in accordance with the provisions
of EEOC Order No. 960.001.
The record establishes that appellant was employed by the agency
from July 1976 until July 1992. Effective July 12, 1992, appellant's
employment with the agency was terminated when it was established that
she had intentionally provided false information on personal travel
vouchers submitted to the agency. Thereafter, appellant was hired by
Knoxville College in January 1994 as a business manager. By letter dated
February 8, 1994, officials at Knoxville College requested information
from the agency concerning appellant's employment. In response,
in a letter dated February 11, 1994, the agency's Human Resources
Manager provided appellant's dates of employment and the reason for her
termination--falsification of records. On March 21, 1994, appellant's
employment with Knoxville College was terminated because the information
provided by the agency would have precluded appellant from being selected
had it been known during the selection process.
Appellant asserted that the negative information provided by the agency
to Knoxville College was in retaliation for appellant's filing of an EEO
complaint concerning her termination from the agency. Appellant also
alleged that the agency provided Knoxville with information about this
prior EEO complaint. Officials at both the agency and Knoxville College
deny that any information about appellant's EEO activity was exchanged,
and there is no other information in the record to support appellant's
allegation. Agency officials also averred that it was standard practice,
when a request was received, to release information on former employees
concerning dates of employment and reason for termination.
On July 8, 1994, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging
retaliation as referenced above. The complaint was initially dismissed
by the agency for failure to state a claim. Appellant appealed the
dismissal to this Commission, and the agency's decision was reversed and
the complaint remanded for continued processing. Collins v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, EEOC Appeal No. 01950068 (May 2, 1995). On remand,
the agency investigated appellant's allegations. Upon receipt of the
investigative report, appellant requested a hearing before an EEOC
administrative judge (AJ). However, appellant subsequently requested
two postponements of the hearing and was unavailable for a third
prehearing conference. As a result, the AJ, citing appellant's failure
to cooperate, remanded the case back to the agency for a final decision
without a hearing. By final decision dated October 10, 1997, the agency
concluded no retaliation had occurred. It is from this decision that
appellant now appeals.
Appellant's allegation of unlawful reprisal constitutes a claim of
disparate treatment which is properly analyzed under the three-tiered
analytical framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). See also, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
467 U.S. 867 (1984); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256 (1981).
Applying this legal standard, the Commission finds that any initial
inference of retaliation raised by appellant was successfully rebutted
by the agency with its articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the actions taken. Specifically, the information concerning
appellant's dates of employment and reason for termination was provided
in response to a request for this specific information from appellant's
subsequent employer. The agency asserted that similar information was
provided for all former employees upon request. As noted above, there
was no evidence to support appellant's contention that information about
her prior EEO activity was also transmitted by the agency. After a
careful review of the record, the Commission discerns no basis upon
which to conclude that appellant established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions in this
matter were unbelievable or that its actions were more likely motivated
by retaliatory animus.
Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,
it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
AFFIRM the agency's final decision which concluded no reprisal occurred
in this matter.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from
the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil
action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY
(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or
to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the
jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil
action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON
WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT
PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Oct 30, 1998
_________________ ____________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations