Lillian A. Collins, Appellant,v.Craven H. Crowell, Jr. Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 30, 1998
01980885 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 30, 1998)

01980885

10-30-1998

Lillian A. Collins, Appellant, v. Craven H. Crowell, Jr. Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.


Lillian A. Collins v. Tennessee Valley Authority

01980885

October 30, 1998

Lillian A. Collins, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01980885

) Agency No. 0708-94090R

Craven H. Crowell, Jr. )

Chairman, )

Tennessee Valley Authority, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On November 10, 1997, Lillian A. Collins (appellant) timely appealed

the final decision of the Tennessee Valley Authority (agency), dated

October 10, 1997, concluding she had not been discriminated against in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. �2000e et seq. Appellant had alleged that she had been unlawfully

retaliated against for engaging in protected EEO activity when, in

February 1994, information regarding her former employment with the

agency was disclosed to her subsequent employer, which resulted in her

termination. This appeal is accepted in accordance with the provisions

of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

The record establishes that appellant was employed by the agency

from July 1976 until July 1992. Effective July 12, 1992, appellant's

employment with the agency was terminated when it was established that

she had intentionally provided false information on personal travel

vouchers submitted to the agency. Thereafter, appellant was hired by

Knoxville College in January 1994 as a business manager. By letter dated

February 8, 1994, officials at Knoxville College requested information

from the agency concerning appellant's employment. In response,

in a letter dated February 11, 1994, the agency's Human Resources

Manager provided appellant's dates of employment and the reason for her

termination--falsification of records. On March 21, 1994, appellant's

employment with Knoxville College was terminated because the information

provided by the agency would have precluded appellant from being selected

had it been known during the selection process.

Appellant asserted that the negative information provided by the agency

to Knoxville College was in retaliation for appellant's filing of an EEO

complaint concerning her termination from the agency. Appellant also

alleged that the agency provided Knoxville with information about this

prior EEO complaint. Officials at both the agency and Knoxville College

deny that any information about appellant's EEO activity was exchanged,

and there is no other information in the record to support appellant's

allegation. Agency officials also averred that it was standard practice,

when a request was received, to release information on former employees

concerning dates of employment and reason for termination.

On July 8, 1994, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging

retaliation as referenced above. The complaint was initially dismissed

by the agency for failure to state a claim. Appellant appealed the

dismissal to this Commission, and the agency's decision was reversed and

the complaint remanded for continued processing. Collins v. Tennessee

Valley Authority, EEOC Appeal No. 01950068 (May 2, 1995). On remand,

the agency investigated appellant's allegations. Upon receipt of the

investigative report, appellant requested a hearing before an EEOC

administrative judge (AJ). However, appellant subsequently requested

two postponements of the hearing and was unavailable for a third

prehearing conference. As a result, the AJ, citing appellant's failure

to cooperate, remanded the case back to the agency for a final decision

without a hearing. By final decision dated October 10, 1997, the agency

concluded no retaliation had occurred. It is from this decision that

appellant now appeals.

Appellant's allegation of unlawful reprisal constitutes a claim of

disparate treatment which is properly analyzed under the three-tiered

analytical framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). See also, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,

467 U.S. 867 (1984); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256 (1981).

Applying this legal standard, the Commission finds that any initial

inference of retaliation raised by appellant was successfully rebutted

by the agency with its articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for the actions taken. Specifically, the information concerning

appellant's dates of employment and reason for termination was provided

in response to a request for this specific information from appellant's

subsequent employer. The agency asserted that similar information was

provided for all former employees upon request. As noted above, there

was no evidence to support appellant's contention that information about

her prior EEO activity was also transmitted by the agency. After a

careful review of the record, the Commission discerns no basis upon

which to conclude that appellant established, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions in this

matter were unbelievable or that its actions were more likely motivated

by retaliatory animus.

Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

AFFIRM the agency's final decision which concluded no reprisal occurred

in this matter.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON

WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT

PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may

result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct 30, 1998

_________________ ____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations