Lifetime Door Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 15, 1966158 N.L.R.B. 13 (N.L.R.B. 1966) Copy Citation LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 13 the supplements, stacking those supplements, and delivering them to the adjoining mailroom of the Employer's plant located in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Lifetime Door Company and Local Union No. 3135, United Broth- erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 11-CA-2638 and 11-RC-2081. April 15, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On January 20,1966,-Trial Examiner William W. Kapell issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the coin- plaint and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to those allegations. In addition, the Trial Examiner found merit in certain objections to the election filed in Case No. 11-RC-2081 and recommended that the election be set aside. Thereafter, the Re- spondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this consolidated case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order and dismissed the petition for certification of representative in Case No. 11-RC-2081 and vacated all prior proceedings held thereunder.] TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION AND REPORT ON OBJECTIONS TO ELECTION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Case No. 11-CA-2638 , a proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , herein called the Act, was heard before Trial Examiner 158 NLRB No. 3. 14 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD William W. Kapell in Orangeburg, South Carolina, on August 10 and 11, 1965,' with all parties participating pursuant to due notice on a complaint 2 issued on April 29, by the Regional Director for Region 11 of the National Labor Relations Board, here- inafter called the Board, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by Lifetime Door Company, hereinafter called the Respondent. The complaint in substance alleges that Respondent had interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by various specified conduct; discriminatorily discharged employee Rosa Busby; and refused to bargain with the Union as the representative of a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit. In its, duly filed answer Respondent denied any violation of the Act. The Union's objections to conduct affecting the results of an election held on Jan- uary 22 in Case No. 11-RC-2081 were consolidated for hearing with Case No. 11-CA-2638 by an order of the Regional Director issued on April 30. All parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs. General Counsel and Re- spondent filed briefs which have been duly considered. Upon the entire record in the cases, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT At all times material herein Respondent, a corporation, has owned and operated a plant in Denmark, South Carolina, where it has been engaged in the manufacture of doors. During the year prior to the issuance of the complaint herein, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations at said plant, purchased and received materials valued in excess of $50,000 from points outside the State of South Carolina, and shipped from said plant finished products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of South Carolina. Respondent, admits, and I find, that at all times material herein it has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background and setting In November 1964 the Union began organizing Respondent's employees, and prior to December 1, 1964, claimed it had obtained authorization cards from a majority of the employees designating it as their exclusive representative in a unit of its em- ployees appropriate. for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.3 The parties also stipulated that by letter of December 1, 1964, sent to Respondent the Union claimed to represent a majority of its employees in the aforedescribed unit and requested recognition as their exclusive bargaining representative. By letter of the same date, the Union also filed a petition in Case No. 11-RC-2081 for an election seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining rep- resentative of the employees in the unit hereinabove described. Pursuant thereto a Decision and Direction of Election was issued by the Regional Director on Decem- ber 31, 1964, providing for a secret-ballot election on January 22. At the election 37 ballots were cast of which 6 were for and 31 against the Union. On January 27, the Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election, which are more particularly described and considered, infra, under the heading "Objections to Election." 'All dates hereinafter refer to the year 1965 unless otherwise noted. 2 Based on a charge filed on January 27 by Local Union No. 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union 3 The unit consisting of all production, maintenance, and yard employees of Respond- ent, employed at its Denmark, South Carolina, plant, exclusive of all office clerical em- ployees, professional and technical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, as amended, was found to be appropriate by the Regional Director in his Decision and Direction of Election and admitted by Respondent to be an appropriate unit for collective-bargaining purposes LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 15 B. The issues The issues raised herein are: (1 ) whether Respondent engaged in conduct which interfered with , restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of their statutory rights in violation of Section 8(a)( 1); (2) whether Respondent discriminatorily dis- charged Rosa Busby in violation of Section 8(a)(3); (3 ) whether Respondent en- gaged in conduct which warranted setting aside the election held herein ; (4) whether the Union commanded majority support at the time it requested recognition and bargaining , so that Respondent 's failure to bargain violated Section 8(a)(5); and (5) whether employees Clyde Frazier and Benjamin Hare were supervisors within the meaning of the Act at all times material herein. C. The contested supervisory status General Counsel claims , and Respondent denies, that employees Clyde Frazier and Benjamin Hare , who allegedly participated in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), were at all times material herein , supervisors within the meaning of the Act, whose conduct was binding on Respondent . The evidence pertaining to their status consists of the following: Craven L. Deese, International representative of the Union , and Billy Henderson, the Union's business agent, met with George E. Alexander , Respondent 's manager, just prior to the election on January 22 to determine what employees would be eligible to vote. Alexander handed Deese and Henderson each a list containing the names of employees and their job classifications (General Counsel 's Exhibit No. 3), whom he claimed were eligible to vote. The list contained the names of 39 employees, in- cluding Clyde Frazier's with the job classification of maintenance supervisor, and Benjamin Hare 's with the job classification of shipping supervisor . Alexander stated that their names somehow got on the list, and inasmuch as they were , in fact, super- visors, he asked whether their names could be stricken without preparing a new list. Deese agreed provided that the changes were initialed . A line was then drawn through those names , and Alexander, Deese, and Henderson each initialed the changes, as appear on the exhibit .4 Other relevant evidence pertaining to the status of Frazier and Hare consists of testimony by employee Rosa Busby to the effect that when she was hired in July 1964 , she worked for about 6 weeks under the supervision of Hare, testimony by employee Anderson Walker to the effect that on the day Rosa Busby was fired he had a conversation with Clyde Frazier whom he described as the supervisor of maintenance ; and the testimony of employee Richmond Tyler ,that Hare supervised three men and gave him orders concerning loading, and that Hare wore no uniform as the employees did, did not punch a time clock , and helped load trucks only in emergencies. Respondent produced no evidence relative to the status of Frazier and Hare. Nor was any claim made to the effect that they were unavailable to testify. In view of the foregoing , I find that the evidence of record is sufficient to sustain a finding that Frazier and Hare were supervisors within the meaning of the Act, whose conduct was binding on Respondent . See N.L.R B. v. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company and Grundy Mining Company, 307 F. 2d 374, 378 (C.A. 6); Wigmore, Evidence, § 285-286 (3d ed.). D. The alleged interference, restraint , and coercion The complaint alleges and General Counsel contends that during approximately the 2 weeks prior to the election, Respondent through its supervisors and agents (1) threatened employees that the plant would close down , other industry would not come in, and they would be unable to obtain other jobs in town or in South Carolina if they voted the Union in; (2) informed employees the Company had already dis- charged one employee for meddling with the Union and would discharge other union supporters ; ( 3) interrogated employees concerning their union activities and inten- tions and the intentions of other employees ; (4) gave employees the impression that their union meetings were kept under surveillance ; and (5 ) promised employees a raise and an insurance plan if they did not vote the Union in. In support thereof General Counsel adduced testimony from several employees that during the 2-week period prior to the election Respondent 's supervisory personnel discussed the election and its consequences with them as follows: 4 These findings are based on the uncontradieted testimony of Deese Respondent as- serted that Alexander was no longer employed , and his whereabouts were unknown 16 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD W. E. Martin, an assistant plant manager, called W. H. Galloway and several other employees together while they were working, and after telling them that they could vote as they wished, he advised them to vote "No" because .the plant would close if the Union was voted in, and another company planning to open a plant would change its mind if it learned that a union was already entrenched in town.5 On the Wednesday before the election, Martin spoke to Robert Holmes and an- other employee in his group and told them that if the Union was voted in, the plant would close down and the employees would be unable to obtain jobs in South Caro- lina because they voted the Union in.6 About 8 days before the election, Martin, in talking to employee Willie Rice, asked whether he knew anything about the Union. When Rice denied having any knowl- edge about the Union, Martin told him that if the Union was voted in, the plant would probably close down.? About 2 weeks prior to the election Cecil Bums, conceded by Respondent to be a supervisor, summoned employee Philip Rice from his work and told him that, while he was not going to advise him how to vote, the plant might be closed down if the Union won the election .8 About 2 weeks before the election, Hare asked employee Richmond Tyler whether he had heard about the Union. When Tyler replied he had not, Hare stated he was not,going to tell him how to vote but if he were to vote, he would vote "No" be- cause Alexander 9 had shut the plant down in Michigan. Hare then questioned him as to whether he had signed a union card and attended union meetings to which Tyler replied that he had not. About 2 weeks before the election Alexander asked Richmond Tyler whether he had received a slip 10 with his paycheck the previous day. Upon his affirmative reply, Alexander asked whether he knew what it was about. Tyler stated that he did not, and Alexander then asked whether he had heard a rumor about a union coming in. When Tyler replied that he had not, Alexander advised him to vote "No" on the Union, otherwise the plant would close down." These findings are based on the testimony of Galloway, which was not contradicted by Martin. However, prior to the hearing Respondent's attorney interviewed Galloway privately at the plant in preparation for the hearing, during the course of which he obtained an affidavit from Galloway stating, inter alia, that he had no conversations with supervisory personnel concerning the Union and had not been told that the plant would close if the Union won the election. On cross-examination Galloway affirmed that he told the truth on direct examination as related above. Based on the demeanor of Gal- loway, and also considering the environment and attendant circumstances in which his affidavit was obtained, I credit his testimony on direct examination. Although Respond- ent's counsel formally complied with the criteria set forth in Joy Silk Malla, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 1,85 F. 2d 732, 743 (C.AD.C), for conducting such interviews in preparation for the hearing, I, nevertheless, feel that the environment and attendant circumstances in which the interview was conducted were not conducive to a frank disclosure of the facts by Galloway. 6 The above findings are based on the testimony of Holmes, which was not contradicted by Martin . Holmes, who is illiterate , also was interviewed by Respondent 's attorney prior to the hearings, and signed an affidavit by affixing his mark. On cross-examination he admitted telling Respondent's attorney, as stated in his affidavit, that no supervisory personnel had spoken to him about the Union except Martin , who said something about voting which he had forgotten, and that neither Martin nor anyone else questioned him about his voting or union activities . Based on Holmes ' demeanor and the failure of Martin to contradict his testimony, I credit his direct testimony, his "affidavit" to the contrary notwithstanding. 7 These findings are based on the uncontradicted testimony of Rice. 8 The above findings are based upon the testimony of Rice. He also was interviewed by Respondent's counsel in preparation for the hearing and signed an affidavit in which he stated that no supervisor had ever told him the plant would be closed if the Union was voted in. Based on his demeanor and the considerations related above in connection with the affidavits of other employees, I credit his testimony. 6 George E. Alexander was admittedly the plant manager at the time. 10 Union's Exhibit No. 1, dated January 15, and signed by Alexander, was distributed to all employees with their paychecks, and urged them to husband their money because the plant was faced with an indefinite shutdown due to a union strike at east coast ports and the very low inventory of certain items. 11 Tyler also testified that Alexander told him that every one would get a raise and an insurance policy if the Union did not come in. However, as appears infra, his testimony to that effect is not credited. LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 17 About a week before the election Frazier asked Richmond Tyler whether he had heard about the Union coming in. Tyler replied that he-had, and Frazier then stated that he was going to vote "No " because he had a family. The day before the election, Hare approached Richmond Tyler and Willie Maye while they were' working on the dock and informed them that Doctor Thomas 12 wanted them "to knock off" ( to see him). Tyler and Maye then went to see Doctor Thomas, who interviewed them separately. Doctor Thomas told Tyler that a union was trying to get into the plant and that he had put up money for the plant con- struction , and then asked how he was going to vote. When Tyler replied that he did not know, Doctor Thomas advised him to vote against the Union because they were trying to get more industry in the area, and if the Union was voted in, the plant would close down and he did not believe any more industry would come in.i3 Conclusions as to 8 (a)(1) violations The credited testimony of the employees hereinabove related amply demonstrates that Respondent's supervisory personnel embarked on a campaign to defeat the Union . In pursuing that end they interrogated employees concerning their union activities and voting intentions , and advised them that if the Union prevailed, the plant would close down ' and other jobs would be unavailable in the area because companies contemplating opening new plants would refuse to do so, and existing plants would decline to'hire employees -who had voted for a union. These statements constituted' threats of ^ economic 'reprisal contingent solely. upon the advent of the Union, and could' have no other effect than to'inipede and coerce the employees in their statutory rights of self-organization. The law' is well settled that such activity on the part of management is violative of Section 8(a)(1).' Daniel Construction Co., Inc. (United Association of Journeymen, etc.) v. N.L.R.B., 341' F. 2d 805, 813 (C.A. 4); N.L.R.B. v. Stanton Enterprises, Inc., d/b%a Holiday'Inn' of'Charleston, 351 F. 2d 261 (C.A. 4); N.L.R.B. v. Nabors, d/b/a W. C. Nabors Company, 196 F. 2d 272, 276 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 344 U.S. 865; Sehon Stevenson & Co. Inc., 150 NLRB 675. Furthermore , even if the threats to close the plant were - construed only as a pos- sibility, they, nevertheless, would be, coercive. ". . . statements on the part of man- agement to employees that it might be necessary to close the plant, made during a period when unionization of it its employees were sought to be effected , must be regarded as coercive, notwithstanding sincere belief that such result would follow." United Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 252 F. 2d 428, 430 (C.A. 6). See also N.L R.B. v. W. C. Nabors Company, supra. Nor is there any question but that in- terrogation of employees in a background of union hostility falls within the proscrip- tion of Section 8(a)(1). N.L.R.B. v. Griggs Equipment, Inc., 307 F. 2d' 275, 278 (C.A. 5). I find it unnecessary to determine whether Respondent can be held responsible for Dr. Thomas' statements to Richmond Tyler. At best, they would constitute addi- sa Tyler's family doctor for about 6 years. 13 The conversations with Tyler are based upon his testimony on direct examination. Respondent did not call upon Hare, Frazier, Doctor Thomas, or Alexander to testify, or explain its failure to do so, except for Alexander whom it claimed had left its employ 4 months before and could not be located However, it produced no evidence to show what efforts if any, were made to locate Alexander . Respondent attempted to impeach Tyler's testimony with his affidavit obtained by its attorney during an interview similar to those described , supra. On cross -examination Tyler denied reading the affidavit at the time he signed it or stating to Respondent ' s attorney at the time, as appears in his affidavit, that no supervisor had ever told him that the plant would close if the Union was voted in. He also denied making any statements to Respondent 's attorney to the effect that no supervisor interrogated him about his union activities or those of other employees . However, he admitted stating to Respondent 's attorney that no supervisor had promised him a raise or an insurance policy or other benefits if the Union were not voted in, or asked him how he or anyone else expected to vote, except on one occasion when Frazier asked him but never said anything else to him one way or the other. Based on my observation of Tyler's demeanor and the failure of Respondent to call witnesses to contradict his testimony , I credit his testimony as related above on direct examination with the exception of his reference to Alexander ' s promise of a wage increase and an in- surance policy if the Union was not voted in because his admission on cross -examination regarding that statement and his failure to disavow his affidavit in that respect. 221-731-67-vol. 158-3 18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tional evidence of coercion , which would not affect the scope or nature of the remedy provided in the order recommended infra, which is based on findings of similar violations by Respondent's supervisory personnel. I find further that General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the credited evidence that Respondent made promises of economic benefits to its employees to influence them to vote against the Union or gave them the impression that their union activities were kept under surveillance . I, accordingly, shall recom- mend that such allegations in the complaint be dismissed. E. The discharge of Rosa Busby Rosa Busby was hired in July 1964 . She sanded doors under the supervision of Hare for about 6 weeks , and thereafter stamped doors under the supervision of Cecil Burns until January 13 when she was discharged . In November 1964 she had a conversation with Union Representative Glenn Titus , as a result of which she signed an authorization card designating the Union as her bargaining representative, and thereafter held three union meetings of employees at the home of her parents with whom she and her husband lived . Her parents ' home was located about 5 miles from Denmark , South Carolina . - Her husband Mose, an ex-employee of Respondent, was very active during the union campaign in obtaining union authorization cards. On January 13 she arrived for work and punched in at 7 : 01 a.m . Her schedule of work for that day called for a 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. workday. At about 5 p.m. she was called off the job by Alexander , who in the presence of Bums, handed her a check in payment of her day 's work. When she inquired why she was being paid so early, Alexander replied , "I understand you have been coming in late and being absent ." She remonstrated that she was not the only one that was late or absent, and that he would have to given her a better answer, and added , "It wasn 't because I was late or absent, it was because of the meetings they had at my house the night before, I got fired." She admitted being late on two occasions in January , including the day on which she was fired , and being absent about twice during that month , once because of ill- ness and the other because of her pregnancy . On each occasion she called Respond- ent's office and spoke either with the secretary , Peggy Rhinehart , or with Burns, and was told it was all right . She also admitted absences of 1 day in each of the months of August, September , and October 1964 , but denied ever having received any warn- ings about lateness or absences prior to her discharge . She also claimed that Hen- rietta Walker had been absent for a whole week in December 1964 , and Ertha Cecil had also been absent for a similar period at a time she was unable to recall but that neither one had been laid off. W. E. Martin , who was assistant plant manager at the time of Busby 's discharge, testified that he overheard the conversation between Alexander and Busby on Jan- uary 13, in which Alexander told her that she had been warned before about being late, that Busby denied being late and claimed she was being discharged because of a meeting the night before, and that Alexander insisted that it was because of her tardiness and absences . 14 Martin also testified that the employee timecards kept by Respondent had been shipped to Michigan (where the company offices were located ) and were not available. Employee Anderson Walker testified that on the day Rosa Busby was discharged and while he was working on the job, Frazier told him, "You had better be careful around here because Mrs. Busby has just been fired on account of working for the Union." 15 Conclusions Viewing Busby's discharge in the light of Respondent 's union hostility and its vio- lative conduct during the Union's organizational campaign, I find that Respondent 14 Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses and viewed in the light of all the evidence, the testimony of Busby is credited. '" On cross-examination, Walker admitted that in June while being interviewed by Respondent's attorney, he denied ever having been told that an employee has been fired or that employees would be fired if they voted for the Union, but declined to sign an affidavit including that admission and other statements relating to the Union made by him He claimed that he made the foregoing admission and other statements in order to protect his job. In view of the fact that Frazier was not called to refute the remarks attributed to him , and based on my observation of Walker 's demeanor while testifying, I credit his testimony concerning Rosa Busby as related above. His statements during his interview with Respondent 's attorney were made under circumstances which I feel greatly detract from their probative value. LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 19 was motivated to discharge her because of her union support and activity, in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(3), and not because of her tardiness or absenteeism . Frazier's statement to Walker confirms that Respondent knew 'of her union activity, and also reveals the reason for her discharge. Furthermore, although Respondent claims that Busby was discharged because of her absenteeism and lateness, it, nevertheless, did not produce her timecards which would accurately reflect both the extent and frequency of her alleged lateness and absenteeism. Its failure to produce those records sug- gests an inference to the effect that its records would not support its assertions of significant absenteeism or lateness.16 Viewing the entire record and, in particular, the timing of Busby's discharge, Re- spondent's threats to close the plant if the Union prevailed, and Respondent's failure to adequately demonstrate by documentary proof, the extent and frequency of her tardiness and her absenteeism, I conclude that she was discriminatorily discharged in order to discourage unionization of the plant in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Austin Powder Company, 141 NLRB 183, 187, enfd. 350 F. 2d 973 (C.A. 6). Furthermore, even conceding the existence of some grounds warranting her dis- charge, Respondent, nevertheless, was motivated to discourage union participation in discharging her. "The mere existence of valid grounds for a discharge is no defense to a charge that the discharge was unlawful, unless the discharge was predicted solely on those grounds, and not by a desire to discourage union activity." N.L.R.B. v. Symons Manufacturing Co., 328 F. 2d 835, 837 (C.A. 7). See also N.L.R.B. v. Solo Cup Company, 237 F. 2d 521, 524-525 (C.A. 8); N.L.R.B. v. Barberton Plastic Products, Inc., 354 F. 2d 66 (C.A. 6). F. The alleged violations of Section 8(a) (5) 1. The request for recognition and bargaining The parties stipulated that Respondent received the following letter from the Union on or about the date indicated thereon: Mr. GEORGE ALEXANDER, Plant Manager LIFE TIME DOOR COMPANY W. Mayfield Street Denmark, S.C. 805 Hudson Ave., Durham, N.C. December 1, 1964. Dear Sir: This is to respectfully advise you that our organization, Local Union #3134, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, represents a majority of your employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The unit considered appropriate for purpose of collective bargaining includes all production, maintenance and yard employees; excludes all supervisory, office clerical, professional and technical employees, and guards as defined in the Act. It is hereby requested that you meet with the undersigned representative of Local Union #3135 on December 8, 1964, at 2:30 P.M. in the Company office in Denmark, South Carolina, to discuss the wages, hours and other working conditions of your employees in the above unit, in order that we may conclude a collective bargaining covering them. If it is or is not convenient for you to meet at the above time and place please let me know in order that we may select a time and place mutually convenient. Yours truly cc: Mr. J. A. Parker, Director Southern States Organizing Office 913-101 Marietta Street Bldg., Atlanta 3, Ga. Via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested (S) Glenn C. Titus GLENN C. TITUS, Representative. 18 See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 285 (3d ed.) ; see also Missouri Transit Company, et at., 116 NLRB 587, 588, enfd. 250 F. 2d 26'1 (C.A. 8), with particular reference to inferences to be drawn from a litigant's failure to produce pertinent records. 20 DECISIONS OF-NATIONAL LABOR . RELATIONS BOARD 'The letter clearly requests recognition and bargaining and I accordingly find that on or , about December 1, 1964 , Respondent received an unequivocal request for recognition and bargaining for an appropriate unit.'' 2. The alleged majority status of the Union The parties stipulated that the 45 employees whose names appear on Joint Exhibit No. ,1 were on Respondent 's payroll for the period ending December 4, 1964, and constituted the membership of the unit found appropriate herein for collective- bargaining purposes with the possible exception of Frazier and Hare, whose super- visory status was asserted by General Counsel and denied by Respondent . In view of my findings , supra, that Frazier and Hare are supervisors , they are excluded from the appropriate unit , leaving 43 employees in the unit. General Counsel claims that prior to its request for recognition the Union obtained union authorization cards from 27 of these employees , thereby attaining a majority status . The evidence per- taining to the solicitation ahd signing of these cards consists solely of the testimony of Mose L. Busby ,19 who actively participated in the union organizational campaign during November 1964 , when either , alone or accompanied by Glenn Titus, a repre- seiitatNe of the Union , he contacted a number of employees at their respective homes or elsewhere for the purpose of soliciting them to sign cards authorizing the Union to represent them for collective -bargaining purposes . 19 At the contacts where both of them were present , Titus, in the , presence of Busby, discussed the Union with the employees and asked whethef they wished to sign union authorization cards 20 When Busby contacted employees by himself he personally solicited the employees to sign the cards . Thus, Busby testified . that he asked Ernest Davis to sign a card on No- vember 23, 1964 , which Davis did after reading it; that Solomon Watson signed a card on November 19, 1964, in his presence after reading it and being requested to do so by Titus; that Malcolm Odom signed a card on November 19 in his presence after reading it and being solicited by Titus; and that Leola Williams signed a card on November 18 in his presence at the solicitation of Titus after reading it and being assured that it would not become known to Respondent. It was stipulated that if called upon to testify further, Busby would state that 19 other employees 21 signed cards on the dates appearing thereon in his presence and under circumstances similar to those under which Davis , Watson , Malcolm Odom, and Leola Williams signed their cards. The cards of the 'above-named employees were admitted in evidence over the following objections by Respondent : ( 1) The best evidence rule required the signatories to testify in connection with the signing of their cards , ( 2) no union representative was present , therefore the cards are not 11 Respondent 's answer admitted the appropriateness of the unit claimed herein. is The husband of Rosa Busby , who previously worked for Respondent from July until September 1964, when he left to continue his schooling. is Respondent declined to cross-examine Busby or to produce evidence contradicting his testimony , and relied wholly on legal objections to the competency of his testimony as discussed hereafter. w The cards contained the following: IN UNION, THERE IS STRENGTH ! ! ! AUTHORIZATION CARD I hereby authorize the UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA to act as my collective bargaining agent in dealing with my employer in regard to wages, hours and other conditions of employment, and in proceedings before the NLRB and other governmental agencies . All previous authori- zations made by me are revoked. Name (Print)-------------------------------------------------------------- Address-------------------------------------------------------------------- Home Telephone Number----------------------------------------------------- Employer------------------------------------------------------------------- Hourly Classification------------ Dept--------------------- Rate-------------------- Signature--------------------------------------------------- Date---------- YOUR SIGNATURE WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL! Go-32 BE UNION ! SIGNATURE ! TALK UNION! THINK UNION 21 These employees were Ruthie Lee Robinson, Philip Rice , Willie Mae Wade, Kennon Kinard, Lennon Kinard, Henertta Walker, McKinley Calhoun, Betty Milhouse, James Washington , Anderson Walker, Ethelean Jones, Sam Johnson , Rosa M. Busby, Blondell Bradham, Alma Odom, Elijuh Odom, Elonza Stokes, Willie Rice, and Rufus Washington. LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 21 authorizations to the Union, (3) Respondent was denied an opportunity to cross- examine the signatories , and (4) the cards were obtained solely for the purpose of obtaining an election . I find no merit in Respondent 's objections . The Board with court approval has held that witnesses to the signing of authorization cards are com- petent to testify as to the attending circumstances -,and manner in which the cards are signed. N.L.R.B. v. Economy Food Center, Inc., 333 F. 2d 468, 471 (C.A. 7); The Colson Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F. 2d 128 (C.A. 8), cert. denied 382 U.S. 904; Freeport Marble & Tile Co., Inc., 153 NLRB 810. Busby clearly was soliciting cards with the approval of the Union, and at times in conjunction with a union rep- resentative (deceased at the time of the hearing). Nor was any evidence presented to establish that the cards were signed solely for the purpose of obtaining an election. The cards clearly and unambiguously authorize the Union to represent the signa- tories, no reference is made ,therein to an election, and no evidence was presented to overcome the effect of the overt action of the employees in signing the cards. Cum- berland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268, enfd. 351 F. 2d 917 (C.A. 6). Respondent also attacked the authenticity of the card signatures but made no effort to support that contention either on voir dire examination or cross-examination, and simply claimed that the purported card signatures did not match the signatures of those employees who signed attendance lists when they appeared at prior union meetings (General Counsel's Exhibits Nos. 6 and 7). A comparison of the card signatories and the signatures appearing on the attendance lists reveals that the names of the following employees do not even appear on the attendance lists: Blon- dell Bradham, Ruthie Lee Robinson, Willie Mae Wade, McKinley Calhoun, Anderson Walker, Alma Odom, Elijuh Odom, Kennon Kinard, Lennon Kinard, Henertta Walker, and Ethelean Jones. The names of Willie Rice and Leola Williams are printed on the authorization cards and written out on the attendance lists making it extremely difficult or impossible to compare their signatures . The other signatures appearing on the authorization cards appear to match the corresponding signatures appearing on the attendance lists. Under these circumstances and the fact that there is testimony to the effect that Busby saw the above-named employees sign their cards, I find no merit in Respondent's attack on the authenticity of the cards. I, accord- ingly, find that the above-described cards were validly executed and may be counted in determining the Union 's majority status. Busby testified further that he and Titus visited the home of Robert Lee Holmes on November 19, 1964, at which time Titus, in the presence of Busby, asked Holmes whether he wanted the Union to represent him. Upon being advised that he did, Titus told him he would have to sign an authorization card. Holmes took the card, which was not filled out, and left the porch where they were talking and went into the house to get a pencil. He returned shortly, and without saying anything handed Titus the card with the blanks filled in, including what purported to be his signature. Respondent objected to its admission in evidence and attacked its validity for the reasons heretofore stated in connection with the other cards, and especially on the ground that no one saw Holmes sign the card and it did not match his signatures appearing on the attendance lists (General Counsel's Exhibits Nos. 6 and 7), where his signature is printed). Ruling was reserved on its admissibility. I now rule that Holmes' card is admissible and is hereby admitted, and may be counted in determin- ing the Union's majority status. Regardless of whether Holmes signed the card, his return of the card to Titus under the circumstances clearly signified that he approved the signing of the card for the purpose indicated thereon. Titus and Busby also visited Richmond Tyler in the yard of his home on Novem- ber 23, 1964, where Titus asked him to sign a card authorizing the Union to represent him. Tyler assented to signing the card and, after reading it, went into his house and returned shortly with the card signed and he handed it to Titus. Respondent inter- posed objections to its admission in evidence similar to those described above, and ruling was reserved. I now find for the reasons stated in connection with the admis- sion of Holmes' card, and also on the ground that his purported signature matches his signature appearing on the union meeting attendance lists, that his card is admis- sible, and is hereby admitted in evidence as a valid card which may be counted in determining the Union's majority status. Titus and Busby also called at the home of Will James Odom on November 19, 1964, where Titus asked him whether he wanted'to have the Union to represent him. When Odom indicated that he did, Titus told him he would have to sign an authori- zation card. Upon learning that Odom was unable to read, Titus read the card to him. Odom then requested his wife :to sign the card for him stating that he was unable to write. She thereupon signed the card at his request while he and Busby watched . The card was admitted in evidence ' over Respondent 's objections . ' It is 22 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD evident that Odom approved and ratified the signing of his card by his wife. Under these circumstances I find that his card was validly executed and may be counted in determining the Union's majority status. General Counsel also produced and offered in evidence an authorization card pur- portedly signed by Benjamin Odom on November 19, 1964, under the following cir- cumstances: Titus in the presence of Busby asked Odom in his home whether he wanted the Union to represent him. When Odom replied that he did, Titus advised him that he had to sign an authorization card. Odom then stated that he wished to discuss the matter with his wife and they withdrew to another room. A few minutes later Odom returned with the card, handed it to Titus and said he was glad to sign the card because there was something that had to be done at the plant. Respondent also objected to the card's admission in evidence on grounds similar to those stated with respect to the other cards, and decision was reserved. I now find that the card was validly executed and it is hereby admitted in evidence. Regardless of who ac- tually signed the card, it obviously was done with Odom's approval for the purpose in- dicated thereon, and his comment on returning the card to Titus clearly so indicated. Accordingly his card may be counted in determining the Union's majority status. I, therefore, conclude that at the time .the Union requested recognition it had ob- tained 27 valid authorization cards in a unit containing 43 employees, and hereby established that it represented a majority of those employees. Conclusions as to the alleged violation of Section 8(a)(5) At no time after the demand for bargaining was made did Respondent convey to the Union that it doubted its majority status. Apparently the demand was simply ignored, and it was only at the hearing about 8 months later that Respondent at- tacked the validity of the authorization cards to justify its unwarranted failure or refusal to recognize the employees' chosen bargaining representative. When an em- ployer fails without good cause, as here, to respond to the bargaining request of the union, and instead embarks on a course of conduct which is either calculated to, or tends to, destroy that majority, he does not demonstrate the good-faith bargaining required to warrant his refusal to bargain. Cactus Petroleum Inc., 134 NLRB 1254, 1258. If Respondent entertained a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status, it should have immediately responded to the Union's demand and stated its position.22 The law applicable to the instant case was clearly stated in N.L.R.B. v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 298 F. 2d 176-179 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 370 U.S. 919, as follows: The act imposes a duty to bargain in good faith upon request whenever a labor organization has been designated by a majority of employees in an appro- priate bargaining unit. The employer must recognize and bargain with such an organization whether or not it has been certified by the Labor Board. Respondent's refusal to bargain was not motivated by any good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status but "by a rejection of the principle of collective bargaining, and by a desire to gain time in which to undermine the union." N.L.R.B. v. Austin Powder Company, 350 F. 2d 973 (C.A. 6), enfg. 141 NLRB 183. Or, as the Board stated in Joy Silk Mills: 23 We have previously held that an employer may in good faith insist on a Board election as proof of the Union's majority but that it "unlawfully refuses to bar- gain if its insistence on such an election is motivated, not by any bona fide doubt as to the union's majority, but rather by a rejection of the collective bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which to undermine the union." In cases of this type the question of whether an employer is acting in good faith or bad faith at the time of the refusal is, of course, one which of necessity must be determined in the light of all relevant facts in the case, including any unlaw- ful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful conduct. It is well established that one of the essential prerequisites for a good-faith doubt defense is that it must not have been raised in a context of illegal union activ- ity.24 The evidence shows that Respondent engaged in the unfair labor practices detailed hereinabove after the Union's request to bargain, whose foreseeable conse- 23 N.L.R.B. v. Howe Scale Company, 311 F. 2d 502 , 505 (C.A. 7). 29 85 NLRB 1263, 1264, enfd. 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C ), cert. denied 341 U.S. 914. 4 Permacold Industries , Inc., 147 NLRB 885; Master Transmission Rebuilding Corpo- ration & Master Parts, Inc., 155 NLRB 364. LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 23 quence was the destruction of the Union's majority status. I, accordingly, find that the evidence in its, totality establishes that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) by its failure to honor the Union's request for recognition. IV. THE OBJECTIONS TO ELECTIONS Case No. 11-RC-2081 As related hereinabove , an election was held on January 22, pursuant to an order of the Regional Director , at which 6 ballots were cast for and 31 against the Union. On January 27 the Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of an election. The Regional Director in ruling on these objections found that they pre- sented substantial and material issues of fact and issued a Decision directing, in substance , that a hearing be held therein on the following objections , and that said hearing be consolidated with the hearing on the complaint in Case No. 1l -CA-2638: (1) Respondent's conduct (objections 1 and 2 ) alleged in the complaint as violative of Section 8(a)(1) and ( 3), including specifically the receipt by the em- ployees of a slip 25 with their paychecks on January 15 and the conversation relating thereto on the following day between Plant Manager Alexander and an employee in which the employee was threatened with economic reprisal if the Union was voted in and promised economic benefits if the Union was defeated (objection 3); (2) the receipt by each employee of a letter from Respondent on or about January 13, in which the Union 's campaign promises were evaluated in the light of Respondent's rights therein (objection No. 4); and ( 3) the antiunion conduct of various members of the local community concerning the adverse consequences of voting for the Union (objection 5). In view of my findings, supra , that Respondent 's interrogation of employees con- cerning their union activities and its threats to close the plant if the Union was voted in violated Section 8 (a) (1) and ( 3 ), I conclude , as the Board has consistently held, that such conduct, a fortiori , interfered with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in the election held herein.26 I, accordingly , find merit in and sustain objections 1, 2, and 3. The letter referred to in objection 4 contains , inter alia, the following admoni- tions to the employees : ". . . Your vote could very well determine the future growth of Bamberg County. It could determine the economic security of your sisters, your brothers and your wives , your children and your friends . This Company under the law has no obligation to grant a single concession to this Union . The only way that this Union can force concessions from this Company is by a strike . Should this Union strike this Company because of wages, hours , or working conditions, this Company has a right under the law to replace permanently each and every worker who goes out on strike , with no obligation to take any of them back . In that event not only do you fail to get what the Union promised you, but you have lost your job as well. I am sure that the Union has not told you this 1127 I find that this letter, sent to the employees about a week before the election, on the day when one employee was discriminatorily discharged and during a period when several employees were interrogated about their union activities and warned by Respondent about the dire consequences of voting for the Union ,28 conveyed, or tended to convey , the impression to the employees that unionization of the plant would jeopardize their jobs. The receipt of the letter under these circumstances imparted to it a tendency to interfere with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in the election . I accordingly find merit in and sustain objection 4.29 In support of objection 5, several employee witnesses testified on behalf of the Union with respect to conversations between them and various members 30 of the local community , and the conduct of certain police officers as follows: 11 Union's Exhibit No. 1, see supra, footnote 10. 20 Playskool Manufacturing Company, 140 NLRB 1417, 1419 ; Leas & McVitty, incorpo- rated, 155 NLRB 389; Ideal Baking Company of Tennessee, Inc., 143 NLRB 546, 552-553. 77 Respondent stipulated that this letter was sent to the employees on the date in- dicated thereon, and was received by them in due course. 28 As appears infra, various members of the local community also warned the employees about the adverse consequences to them and the community if the Union prevailed at the election 'e Cf. Utica-Herbrand Tool Division of Kelsey-Hayes Company, 145 NLRB 1717. 80 None of these individuals were called to testify to refute the Union 's testimony, nor was any explanation advanced for their failure to do so. 24 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Two days after Rosa Busby was discharged, the Reverend James Wright, pastor of a local church in Denmark, in discussing her discharge in a conversation with her, stated that she was not discharged because, of,her lateness or absenteeism, but on account of the Union, and he advised her to vote against the Union because they were not ready for it, and to tell other employees to vote against the Union. He also advised her that he would see to it that she got her job back if she voted against the Union. During their conversation he showed her a list containing the names of all the employees at the plant and their wage rates, on which she also noticed the names of Helen Hayes, C W. Moore, and Lucas Wright, who were not employees, but whom she had given as references when she applied for her job at Lifetime. Cain, an insurance agent in Denmark, visited the home of Galatia Tyler, the mother of Rosa Busby, on the day before the election and asked whether her daugh- ter worked at Lifetime Door Company. Upon being advised that she no longer worked there, he replied that it was on account of the Brotherhood Union, and told her to tell her daughter to vote "No" at the election, and that there would be other plants coming into town and jobs would be "booming." Harvesta Tyler, father of Rosa Busby, in a conversation with Sinclair Guest, presi- dent of the Farm Bureau of Bamberg, South Carolina, was questioned about union meetings being held at his home. When Tyler replied that such meetings had been held, he was told by Guest, "Well, we don't want no union in this town. If the union comes in here, it will hurt the town." Carroll, the undertaker in Bamberg, in a conversation with F. M. Milhouse was instructed to tell his wife, one of Respondent's employees, to vote "No" at the elec- tion because they were not ready for a union and the Union would hurt the town, and that they were looking for more jobs and if the Union came in the jobs would go elsewhere, and the plant would close down. Denmark's Chief of Police Whetstone visited Robert Holmes at his home and told him not to vote for the Union because he had put up $600 to get the plant in, and if the Union was voted in the plant would close and the employees would be unable to get jobs. Sam Neeley, who operates a store selling appliances in Denmark , called upon Holmes and told him that he heard they were going to vote the Union in, that the Union was not worth "a damn," and that he would lose his job if the Union came in. About 3 or 4 days before the election Brooker, the mayor of Denmark, who also operates a hardware store, sent word to employee Willie Rice to come and see him at the store to pay a bill. While at the store Brooker informed Rice that they had caused the Respondent to come to Denmark and if a Union came in other plants would decline to come. On the same day while in the Ramsey Grocery where Rice traded he was told by Ramsey that if he voted for the Union, the plant would prob- ably close down. It also appears that when Rice applied for his job at Lifetime he gave Ramsey as a reference. About 2 weeks before the election Anderson Walker, an employee, in a conver- sation with Plant Manager Alexander, asked whether his wife who was then pregnant and also worked for Respondent, would have her job back after her pregnancy. Alexander replied that she would if the Union were kept out. About a week before the election Carter Rhodes, a furniture dealer in Denmark with whom Walker trades, called at his home and in the conversation with him stated that if the Union was voted in, it would keep other jobs from coming into Denmark, that those voting for the Union would be fired, and that it would be hard for them to get a job anywhere in South Carolina. As related supra, the Union held its organizing meetings at the home of the Tylers, the parents of Rosa Busby, which was located about 5 miles from Denmark on a dirt road leading off from Highway 321. W. H. Galloway, who attended two meet- ings, testified that upon leaving one meeting he saw a Denmark police car at the intersection of Highway 321 and the dirt road leading to Tyler's house, moving in the direction of Denmark about three car lengths ahead of his 'car. Richmond Tyler testified to the same effect, and that on the'following day he saw the same police car on Respondent's parking lot observing the parked cars of employees. Solomon Wat- son also testified about seeing a police car under similar circumstances. Union Representative Billy G. Henderson, who attended several of the union meetings, testi- fied that his car was followed and later stopped for identification by a police car after leaving a union meeting scheduled for January 21 at which none of the employees appeared. However, there was no evidence indicating whether this incident came to the attention of any employees. Although there are suspicious circumstances indi- cating that the police kept the union meetings under surveillance , I find that the evidence is too vague and indefinite to support such a conclusion: However, I find that the uncontradicted antiunion activities of the various members of the com- LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 25 munity, as related above, tended to create a fear of economic reprisal in the employ- ees, which interfered with the exercise of a free choice in the election. The effect on the employees was the same whether the townspeople were motivated to act out of personal or community interest. Nor does it matter whether their conduct can be attributed to Respondent. The Board has held that in similar circumstances, there is no need to make a determination "whether the Employer and the business- men acted in concert to defeat the Petitioner. . . Such determination is not material. The important fact is that conditions existed which prevented a free election " The Falmouth Company, 114 NLRB 896, 901. See also Utica-Herbrand Tool Division, 145 NLRB 1717, 1719. Considering the evidence in its totality, it is recommended that the representation election be set aside. However, in view of my findings that Respondent's refusal to bargain violated Section 8(a)(5), and my Recommended Order in that connection, I do not recommend that a new election be held.31 V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. REMEDY Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, including the posting of appropriate notices, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. 'It having been found that Rosa Busby was discriminatorily laid off, I shall recom- mend that she be offered full and immediate reinstatement to her former or sub- stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and privileges. I shall also recommend that Respondent make her whole for any loss she may have suffered by reason of discrimination in accordance with the formulas set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It having been found that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union, which represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, I shall recommend that, upon request, Respondent be ordered to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices engaged in by Respondent, I shall also recommend that it cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act. In view of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. At all times material herein, the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning'of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. At all times material herein, the Respondent has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. By discriminatorily discharging Rosa Busby, thereby discouraging membership in the above Union, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. 5. All production, maintenance, and yard employees of Respondent employed at its Denmark, South Carolina, plant, exclusive of all office clerical employees, profes- sional and technical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, as amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 6. At all times material herein since December 1, 1964, the Union has been the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of "In view of these findings and recommendations, it would follow that the petition for certification of representatives filed in Case No 11-RC-2081 should be dismissed, and that all proceedings held in connection therewith will be vacated. 26 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment. 7. By refusing since December 1, 1964, to bargain collectively with the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 9. All allegations of the compliant as to which specific findings of violations have not been made, have not been sustained by the preponderance of the evidence. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, I recommend that the Respondent, Lifetime Door Company, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their statutory rights by coercively interrogating them about union matters, and threatening economic reprisals in the event the Union won the election. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to join, form, or assist Local Union No. 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any and all such activities. (c) Discouraging membership in Local Union No. 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by discharging or refusing to reinstate employees because of their union activities, or in any other manner discriminating against them with respect to their hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment. (d) Refusing, upon request, to bargain collectively with Local Union No. 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclu- sive representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of employment: All production, maintenance, and yard employees of Respondent, employed at its Denmark, South Carolina, plant, exclusive of all office clerical employees, profes- sional and technical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local Union No. 3135, United Broth- erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the collective-bargaining representative of all its employees in the above-described appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ- ment , and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Offer Rosa Busby immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substan- tially equivalent job, without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay in the manner described in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (c) Notify Rosa Busby if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the provisions of the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under ,the terms of this Recommended Order. (e) Post at its plant in Denmark, South Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 32 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Direc- tor for Region 11, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be 82 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words , "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY 27 posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.33 31 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX A NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate ,the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by coercively interrogating our employees concerning their union activities, or threatening economic reprisals in the event the plant becomes unionized. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist Local Union No. 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro- tection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Local Union No. 3135, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging or refusing to reinstate employees because of their union activities or in any other manner discriminating against them in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL offer Rosa Busby immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and privileges previously enjoyed. WE WILL make whole Rosa Busby for any wages lost as a result of the dis- criminatory termination of her employment on January 13, 1965. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the aforedescribed Union as the exclu- sive bargaining representative of our employees in the appropriate unit noted below with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. WE WILL bargain, upon request, with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production, maintenance, and yard employees of Respondent, em- ployed at its Denmark, South Carolina, plant, exclusive of all office clerical employees, professional and technical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, as amended. All our employees are free to become, or refrain from becoming, members of the above-named labor organization, or any other labor organization. LIFETIME DOOR COMPANY, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) NoTE.-We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full reinstatement upon appli- cation in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. 28 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. If employees have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its pro- visions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 1831 Nissen Building, 310 West Fourth Street, Winston-Salem , North Carolina , Telephone No. 723-2911 , Extension 302. Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co., Inc. and American Federation of Ho- siery Workers, AFL-CIO.' Case No. 11-CA-2674. April 18, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On September 27, 1965, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that Respond- ent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged and rec- ommended dismissal of those allegations. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision, and the General Counsel filed cross- exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Jenkins and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,2 con- clusions, and recommendations 3 of the Trial Examiner. i Between the filing of the charge and the hearing in this case , the Charging Union merged with another union , and is now known as Textile Workers Union of America, Hosiery Division , APT.--CIO. Although the complaint was not formally amended at the hearing, the record reveals that all parties were aware of the merger and the name change, and that no confusion as to identity has resulted therefrom. 2 We find it unnecessary in this case to consider whether the first -numbered paragraph of the notice posted on the bulletin board by the Respondent on or about April 8, 1965, would, standing alone, constitute a violation of Section 8(a) (1). In the light of the other unfair labor practices in which Respondent engaged , particularly Plant Superintend- ent Wagoner 's statement to employees while referring to the notice that employees could be definitely hurt by signing a union card , we believe it clear , and we find , that the notice was calculated to and had the effect of restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. We adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's finding, to which no exceptions were taken, that Pinyatello was discharged for reasons unconnected with his union activities. 3 We agree with the General Counsel that the notice should be more directly related to the specific violations found than was done in the Trial Examiner ' s notice. However, to obviate possible compliance questions that might arise if the Order and notice were not fully congruent , we are also reformulating the Recommended Order. 158 NLRB No. 10. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation