Lievens, Daniel et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 9, 2019

14200328 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/200,328 03/07/2014 Daniel Lievens IPP201327906/258455 4109
143177 7590 10/09/2019
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
(United Parcel Service, Inc.)
2555 Grand Blvd.
Kansas City, MO 64108-2613
EXAMINER
ZEROUAL, OMAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDOCKET@SHB.COM
IPRCDKT@SHB.COM
docketing.shb@clarivate.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte DANIEL LIEVENS, VINCENT DETHIER, LUC PIRENNE, and
PETER HENDERICKX
________________

Appeal 2018-007766
Application 14/200,328
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before HUNG H. BUI, SHARON FENICK, and RUSSELL E. CASS,
Administrative Patent Judges.

CASS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s non-final rejection of claims 1–22 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
and 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal Br. 7.2 Claims 1–22 and 24 constitute all the

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as United
Parcel Service of America, Inc. Appeal Brief filed Feb. 20, 2018 (“Appeal
Br.”) 3.
2 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s arguments in
their entirety, we refer to the above mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the
following documents for their respective details: the Non-Final Action
mailed September 18, 2017 (“Non-Final Act.”) and the Examiner’s Answer
mailed May 24, 2018 (“Ans.”).
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claims pending in this Application. Claim 23 has been cancelled. Id. at 49.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The present invention relates to a system and method for activating
temporary delivery and pickup locations for parcels and other items for
delivery to individuals. Abstract. Appellant’s Specification explains that an
increase in Internet commerce has led to an increase in the number of parcels
delivered to alternate delivery/pickup locations other than homes and
workplaces. Spec. ¶ 2. According to the Specification, Appellant’s
invention allows existing retail businesses to be used as a delivery/pickup
location, such as a gas station, a convenience store, a retail location
associated with a common carrier, or a retail department store. Id. ¶ 13. The
delivery/pickup location may be manned for at least some time during the
week and equipped with a computer system that can communicate with
computing devices associated with a common carrier, the sender of a parcel,
and the recipient of a parcel. Id. ¶ 14.
Applicant’s Specification explains that the system may activate such
temporary attended delivery/pickup locations by: (1) receiving information
associated with an area where a temporary attended delivery-pickup location
is desired; (2) receiving information associated with inactive temporary
attended delivery/pickup locations; (3) from this information, determining
that a particular inactive temporary attended delivery/pickup location is in
the desired area; (4) transmitting a notification indicating that the particular
inactive temporary attended delivery-pickup location is in the area; (5)
receiving a request to activate the particular inactive temporary attended
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delivery/pickup location; and (6) activating the particular inactive temporary
attended delivery/pickup location. Id. ¶ 20.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter at issue:
1. A computer system comprising:
a logistics server having at least one processor, wherein the
computer system is configured for:
(A) receiving, at the logistics server, desired area
information, wherein the desired area information
comprises information associated with a particular area
where at least one attended delivery/pickup location is
desired, wherein the at least one attended delivery/pickup
location has a representative that takes an action associated
with delivery/pickup of a parcel;
(B) receiving information associated with an inactive
temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location that
is a brick-and-mortar store associated with the logistics
network wherein, the inactive temporary particular attended
delivery/pickup location comprises a delivery/pickup
location computer system adapted to communicate with the
logistics server and the information associated with the
inactive temporary particular attended delivery/pickup
location comprises:
i) a geographic location associated with the inactive
temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location;
and
ii) an indication that the inactive temporary particular
attended delivery/pickup location is inactive;
(C) determining that the inactive temporary particular
attended delivery/pickup location is located near the
particular area based at least in part on the geographic
location associated with the inactive temporary particular
attended delivery/pickup location;
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(D) transmitting a notification to a client device,
wherein the notification comprises:
i) an indication that the inactive temporary particular
attended delivery/pickup location is located near the
desired area; and
ii) an indication that the inactive temporary particular
attended delivery/pickup location is inactive within the
logistics network;
(E) at least partially in response to transmitting the
notification to the client device, receiving a request at the
logistics server, from the client device, to activate the
inactive temporary particular attended delivery/pickup
location;
(F) at least partially in response to receiving the request
to activate the inactive temporary particular attended
delivery/pickup location, activating of the inactive
temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location
within the logistics network, wherein activating the inactive
temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location
comprises transmitting one or more messages to the
delivery location computer system and authorizing delivery
of at least one the parcel to the active temporary particular
attended delivery/pickup.
Appeal Br. 42–43 (Claims Appendix).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
I. SECTION 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and
Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
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mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept” sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
II. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) recently
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO,
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
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(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”). Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (referred to as Step 2A, prong 1 in the Guidance); and

(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (referred to
as Step 2A, prong 2 in the Guidance).

See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then move to Step
2B of the Guidance and look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or

(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.

See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

ANALYSIS
I. THE SECTION 101 REJECTION
A. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Contentions
In the Non-Final Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 1–22
and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Examiner determines that the claims are
“directed to the abstract idea of determining a suitable attended delivery
location and sending a message to activate the location in order to deliver a
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package to the location.” Non-Final Act. 7. According to the Examiner, this
abstract idea “is described by the ‘receiving, determining, transmitting, and
activating’ steps/functions of independent claim 1.” Id. The Examiner
additionally determines that the claims do not “improve computer
performance similar to Enfish, include rules that allow a computer to
perform new functions similar to McRO, or include[] [a] non-generic
arrangement of conventional and routine computer components similar to
Bascom, and/or solve a computer or computer network problem with a
computer solution similar to DDR.” Id. Finally, the Examiner determines
that:
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because logistics server, processor[,] computer system and
client device (claim 1 and 12)[, and] computer processor (claim
19) as recited are a generic computer that performs functions
(i.e. collect receive, process and transmit data) that are generic
computer functions (i.e. receiving, processing and storing data,
and receiving data over a network) that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities previously known to the
industry.
Id. at 8.
Appellant makes a number of arguments in response to the
Examiner’s rejection. First, Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to
sufficiently establish that the claims recite an abstract idea, and, therefore,
fails to make out a prima facie rejection under Section 101. Appeal Br. 7– 9.
Appellant next argues that claim 1 is patent-eligible because it “describe a
specific method . . . for activating an inactive temporary attended
pickup/delivery location.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant further argues that the
claims are patent eligible because they “allow a computer to perform new
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and improved functions.” Appeal Br. 17–18. Finally, Appellant argues that
the claims contain an “inventive concept” and, thus, meet Alice Step 2B
because it “present[s] a non-generic, ordered combination of components
that allows the logistics server to activate an inactive attended
delivery/pickup location” including a “logistics server,” “delivery/pickup
location computer system” and a “client device.” Appeal Br. 19–21.
B. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance
Under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first must
determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the
claim. The 2019 Guidance identifies three judicially excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices, and (3) mental processes. 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53. Based on existing Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit precedent, the 2019 Guidance has identified “methods of
organizing human activity” that may constitute a judicially excepted
grouping, including “fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions).” See 2019 Guidance, 84 F3d. Reg. at 52.
Here, claim 1 falls into the category of managing interactions between
people, which is one of the categories of “organizing human activity”
recognized by the 2019 Guidance. See id. at 52 n.13. In particular, claim 1
recites interactions between a logistics location (such as a parcel delivery
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service), a client (user), and an attended delivery/pickup location, that can
traditionally be performed manually between people without the use of a
computer. These specific interactions recited in the claim will be detailed
below.
First, the claim recites “receiving,” at a logistics location, “desired
area information . . . associated with a particular area where at least one
attended delivery/pickup location is desired.” Appeal Br. 42 (Claims
Appendix). This action can be performed by having the individual client
communicate desired area information to a person at the logistics location
via telephone, by mail, or by having the client visit the logistics location in
person.
Next, the claim recites “receiving,” at the logistics location,
“information associated with an inactive temporary particular attended
delivery/pickup location” including “a geographic location associated with
the inactive temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location” and “an
indication that the inactive temporary particular attended delivery/pickup
location is inactive.” Appeal Br. 42 (Claims Appendix). This action can be
performed by having a person at an inactive attended delivery/pickup
location telephone a person at the logistics location to provide the
geographic location of the inactive delivery/pickup location, or by having a
person at the logistics location receive a list of such locations.
The claim next recites “determining,” at the logistics location, “that
the inactive temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location is located
near the particular area” desired. Appeal Br. 42 (Claims Appendix). This
step can be performed by having a person at the logistics location compare
the desired area received from the client with a list of available locations,
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which can be performed in the human mind or by a person using a pen and
pencil.
Next, the claim recites “transmitting a notification” to the client
including “an indication that the inactive temporary particular attended
delivery/pickup location is located near the desired area” and “an indication
that the inactive temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location is
inactive within the logistics network.” Appeal Br. 43 (Claims Appendix).
This transmission can be carried out by having a person at the logistics
location provide the specified information to the client via telephone, in
person, or by sending the information to the client in the mail.
Claim 1 next recites “receiving a request” at the logistics location
from the client “to activate the inactive temporary particular attended
delivery/pickup location.” Appeal Br. 43 (Claims Appendix). This step can
be carried out via a communication from the client to the logistics location
by telephone, in person, or in writing using the mail.
Finally, claim 1 recites “activating of the inactive temporary particular
attended delivery/pickup location within the logistics network.” Appeal Br.
43 (Claims Appendix). This action can be performed by having a person at
the logistics location update their records in writing on paper and
communicate (by phone or written communication) to a person at the
particular attended delivery/pickup location that the location is now active.
Because the claim limitations above all involve managing interactions
that can traditionally be performed manually by humans without a computer,
they qualify as methods of organizing human activity under the 2019
Guidance. See 2019 Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Mortg. Grader, Inc. v.
First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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(holding that a computer-implemented method for “anonymous loan
shopping” was a judicial exception because it could be “performed by
humans without a computer”). For this reason, we are persuaded that claim
1 recites a judicial exception to patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
C. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, we next
determine whether it recites “additional elements that integrate the [judicial]
exception into a practical application.” See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We agree with the Examiner that
claim 1 does not recite sufficient additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See Non-Final Act. 7–8.
Specifically, the structural computer elements in claim 1, including a
“logistics server,” a “client device,” and a “delivery location computer
system” are all generic components that are used to automate a process for
managing pickup/delivery locations that can be performed manually by
communications between individuals using traditional methods, such as the
telephone, the mail, or face-to-face communication. It is well settled that
“the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice 573 U.S. at
223. And, unlike Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2016), claim 1 is not directed to the improvement in the functioning of a
computer but instead, as in Alice, “can readily be understood as simply
adding conventional computer components to well-known business
practices.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1338. Additionally, claim 1 is not directed to
a solution that “is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,”
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as in DDR Holdings, LLC. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
Appellant argues that: (1) the Examiner “erred by not providing any
reasoned rationale as to why the Examiner-identified concept is abstract
based on a court-identified abstract idea” and (2) “the rejection is so
uninformative that it prevents Appellant from recognizing and seeking to
counter the grounds for rejection.” Appeal Br. 7–9 (emphasis omitted).
We do not find these arguments persuasive. In particular, the
Examiner identified the claim limitations that made up the judicial
exception, including the relevant portions of the “receiving,” “determining,”
“transmitting,” and “activating” steps in claim 1, and analogized those
limitations to claims at issue in previous cases. See Non-Final Act. 7; Ans.
3–5. The Examiner also explained why the claim did not include additional
elements that integrated the judicial exception into a practical application.
See Non-Final Act. 8; Ans. Therefore, we find that the Examiner made out a
prima facie case of unpatentability under § 101.
Appellant next argues that claim 1 is patent-eligible because it
“describe[s] a specific method . . . for activating an inactive temporary
attended pickup/delivery location.” Appeal Br. 12. As discussed above,
however, claim 1 recites the activation of an inactive temporary attended
pickup location using steps that can traditionally be performed manually by
interactions between people. These steps, therefore, amount to a judicial
exception, and Appellant has not identified additional limitations in the
claim that integrate this judicial exception into a practical application.
Next, Appellant argues that, like the claims found patent-eligible in
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
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2016), claim 1 “allow[s] a computer to perform new and improved
functions,” such as providing a “logistics server” that “is improved by the
present claims because” it is “configured to ‘activate[] the inactive
temporary particular attended delivery/pickup location within [a] logistics
network.” Appeal Br. 17–18. We do not find this argument persuasive.
Activating an inactive attended delivery/pickup location is not an
improvement to computer technology like the improved computer animation
system in McRO, which involved “a patentable, technological improvement
over the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” that used “limited rules
in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological
result in conventional industry practice.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316. Rather,
the activation of an inactive attended delivery/pickup location in claim 1
merely uses generic computers to automate interactions that can be
performed by individual persons, without any particular technological
improvement. Appellant has not demonstrated that the invention improves
the functioning of the computer itself, as opposed to simply using a
computer as a tool to increase the speed of communications that would
traditionally be carried out by humans.
D. Analysis under Step 2B
Under Step 2B, we determine whether claim 1 includes additional
elements individually or in combination that provide an “inventive concept”
and, therefore, amount to significantly more than the exception itself. Here,
Appellant has not demonstrated that claim 1 contains any such “inventive
concept,” or that claim 1 adds any limitations beyond the judicial exception
that are not “well-understood, routine, or conventional” in the field. See
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
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Appellant argues that claim 1 meets Alice Step 2B because it
“present[s] a non-generic, ordered combination of components that allows
the logistics server to activate an inactive attended delivery/pickup location”
including a “logistics server,” “delivery/pickup location computer system”
and a “client device.” Appeal Br. 19–21. Appellant, however, has failed to
establish that the “logistics server,” “delivery/pickup location computer
system” and “client device” are anything other than generic computer
equipment. Indeed, the Specification explains that “logistics server,”
“delivery/pickup location computer system,” and “client device” may be
implemented as “a desktop personal computer (PC), a tablet PC, a set-top
box (STB), a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a cellular telephone, a web
appliance, a server, a network router, a switch or bridge, or any other
computer capable of executing a set of instructions (sequential or otherwise)
that specify actions to be taken by that computer.” Spec. ¶¶ 31–32. Thus,
claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
components previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception, which is insufficient to confer patent-
eligibility. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Appellant attempts to analogize claim 1 to BASCOM Glob. Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), but this
argument is also unpersuasive. In BASCOM the claims at issue involved a
“technology-based solution” that made a prior art filtering system more
dynamic and efficient and, therefore, “improve[d] the performance of the
computer system itself.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Claim 1, on the other
hand, merely uses generic computers to automate interactions that can
traditionally be performed between humans using standard forms of
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communication, such as the telephone, mail, and face-to-face
communication. Appellant has not shown an improvement of the
performance of the computer system itself.
Consequently, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. We,
therefore, sustain this rejection, as well as the rejection of claims 2–8, 10,
11, 19–22, and 24 as patent-ineligible, which Appellant does not argue
separately.
E. Claims 9 and 12.
Appellant argues that claims 9 and 12 satisfy Alice Step 2B because
they include a delivery/pickup location that is “a brick-and-mortar store that
is not used as an attended delivery/pickup location unless activated.”
Appeal Br. 20–21. According to Appellant, the use of “a brick-and-mortar
store” makes the claim “entirely non-generic and non-conventional” because
it “allows attended locations, such as gas stations, grocery stores,
pharmacies, etc.[] that are not normally in the business of sending and
receiving parcels, to temporarily function as an attended pickup/delivery
location for the carrier.” Id. at 21.
We do not find this argument persuasive. Locating multiple business
services at a single location for the convenience of customers is a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce,
and, therefore, is a judicial exception to patent-eligibility under § 101. See
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that concept
of ‘‘local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods’’ is a
‘‘fundamental economic practice, which Alice made clear is, without more,
outside the patent system.”). Moreover, Appellant fails to demonstrate that
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this limitation is an “inventive concept” in light of existing business
practices that would confer patent-eligibility on the judicial exception. We,
therefore, sustain the rejection of claims 9 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We also sustain the rejection of claims 13–18, which are dependent on claim
12 and which Appellant does not argue separately.

II. THE SECTION 103 REJECTION
A. Claim 1
In the Non-Final Office Action, the Examiner rejected claim 1 as
unpatentable over Inomata (US 2002/0080030 A1; published June 27, 2002)
in view of Rudduck (US 2012/0235786 A1; published Sept. 20, 2012), and
Craig (US 2014/0081677 A1; published Mar. 20, 2014). The Examiner
relies on Inomata as disclosing most of the limitations of the claim
including, for example, a logistics server, receiving at the logistics server
information associated with a particular area where at least one
delivery/pickup area is desired, receiving information associated with an
inactive temporary particular delivery/pickup location, determining that the
inactive temporary particular delivery/pickup location is located near the
particular area, transmitting a notification to a client device indicating that
the inactive temporary particular delivery/pickup location is inactive and is
located near the desired area, and activating the inactive temporary particular
delivery/pickup location in response to a request to do so from the client
device. Non-Final Act. 10–12 (citing Inomata ¶¶ 30–34, 58–60, 159–168).
The Examiner relies on: (1) Rudduck to teach an attended delivery/pickup
location with a representative that takes an action associated with the
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delivery/pickup of a parcel, and (2) Craig to teach that the brick-and-mortar
building is also a brick-and-mortar store. Id. at 12–14.
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding
Inomata. Instead, Appellant disputes the rationale to combine Inomata,
Rudduck, and Craig, i.e., that one of ordinary skill would not have been
motivated to combine Inomata and Craig in order to make the
delivery/pickup location of Inomata a brick-and-mortar store. Appeal Br.
25–28. In this regard, Appellant argues that Inomata describes a locker
system in which customers may electronically reserve an available locker
box at a location with multiple individual lockers, while Craig teaches a self-
service system for lodging establishment convenience stores to allow guests
to pay for convenient shop items at a self-service terminal to avoid waiting
in line at a front desk. Id. at 26. Appellant argues that combining Craig with
Inomata would “render[] [Inomata] unsatisfactory for its intended purpose
because multiple people would no longer be able to individually . . . secure
[a] locker within the locker system.” Id. at 27. Appellant also argues that
the combination would also “change the principle of operation of Inomata”
because Inomata would no longer provide a person with secure storage of an
item at a locker in a locker system. Id. at 27–28. Appellant further argues
that Craig is non-analogous art, and that the Examiner has provided no
factual motivation for combining Craig with Inomata. Id. at 33–35.
The Examiner responds that the Appellant has misunderstood the way
in which the references were combined. Ans. 12. In particular, the
Examiner explains that Inomata did not disclose that the locker system is an
attended locker system with a representative that takes actions associated
with the delivery/pickup of parcels, so the Examiner combined Inomata with
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Rudduck, which disclosed a locker system that is located within a residential
building that is attended by a front desk attendant who signs for and delivers
packages to the locker system. Id. at 13 (citing Rudduck ¶¶ 106–08). The
Examiner goes on to explain that while the combination of Inomata and
Rudduck disclosed locker systems within brick-and-mortar buildings, it did
not disclose that those brick-and-mortar buildings are stores. Thus, the
Examiner relies on Craig to teach that the front desk attendant at a building
can also be in charge of a convenience store within the building, and in such
a case the brick-and-mortar location of the locker system (the lodging
establishment) would also be a store. Id. at 13–14. Thus, the Examiner
explains, Craig was used in the combination to show that the lodging
establishment can also be a store by showing that the front desk attendant
can also manage the store located within the building. Id. at 14. As a result,
according to the Examiner, the references teach all of the elements of the
claim, and that there is a motivation to combine those elements to achieve
the claimed invention under KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007). Non-Final Act. 13–14.
We find that the Examiner has established that the references teach all
limitations of claim 1, and that a sufficient motivation exists to combine the
references in order to arrive at the claimed invention. For example, we find
that Inomata teaches the use of a locker system for delivery and pickup of
parcels, and that this system allows the locker to be located at the user’s
desired place, such as a place near the user’s office. Inomata ¶ 10. We also
find that Rudduck teaches that lockers can be located at a lodging
establishment with an attendant and that Craig teaches that a lodging
establishment can also include a convenience store with an attendant.
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Rudduck ¶¶ 106–108. We further find that one of ordinary skill who was
interested in setting up a business of making lockers available at locations
convenient to individuals would have been motivated to combine the
references at the time of the claimed invention. Such a person would have
understood that the lockers of Inomata could be located in many different
types of locations, and, thus, would have been motivated to consider other
locations where lockers have been located, such as the lodging
establishments of Rudduck. One of ordinary skill would also have been
interested in the types of businesses and services that could be offered at a
lodging establishment along with the lockers, and thus would have been
motivated to include a convenience store at the lodging establishment, as
taught by Craig.
We also find unpersuasive Appellant’s arguments that: (1) combining
Craig with Inomata would “render[] [Inomata] unsatisfactory for its intended
purpose because multiple people would no longer be able to individually . . .
secure [a] locker within the locker system” and (2) the combination would
“change the principle of operation of Inomata” because Inomata would no
longer provide a person with secure storage of an item at a locker in a locker
system. Id. at 27–28. Appellant has not pointed to any disclosure in Craig
that would prevent multiple people from being able to individually secure a
locker within the locker system of Inomata, or that would interfere with
secure storage of an item in a locker in Inomata.
Finally, we disagree with Appellant’s contention that Craig is non-
analogous art. A prior art reference is considered analogous if the reference
is “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved.” In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Appellant’s
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Specification discloses that the inventors were seeking to solve problems
caused by an increasing number of parcels being delivered to alternate
delivery/pickup locations, some of which may not be convenient or suitable.
Spec. ¶ 2. Craig, especially when considered in light of Inomata and
Rudduck, is reasonably pertinent to this problem because a lodging
establishment with a convenience store may be a suitable and efficient
location for lockers due to the fact that an attendant at the lodging
establishment can also oversee both the delivery and pickup of packages to
and from the lockers and the operations associated with the convenience
store. Therefore, we believe the Examiner’s use of Craig in the rejection at
issue was appropriate.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
§ 103, and also sustain the rejection of claims 2–11 and 24, which are
dependent on claim 1 and are not argued separately.
B. Claims 12 and 19
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 12 and
19 because the prior art does not teach or suggest “a brick-and-mortar store
that is not used as an attended delivery/pickup location unless activated for
delivery of a parcel.” Appeal Br. 30–33. Appellant argues that Inomata
does not teach this limitation because it “describes a group of locker boxes at
a locker box system that would have some lockers reserved, while others are
not reserved.” Id. at 31.
We do not find this argument persuasive. When the locker system of
Inomata is first installed in a brick-and-mortar location that also has other
uses (or when none of the lockers are in use), the brick-and-mortar location
is not being used as an attended delivery/pickup location. We, therefore,
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sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12 and 19 under § 103, and also
sustain the rejection of claims 13–15 and 20–22, which are dependent on
claim 12 or 19 and are not argued separately.
C. Claim 16
Claim 16 recites that “the request to activate the particular inactive
attended delivery/pickup location comprises an indication that the particular
inactive attended delivery/pickup location will be staffed by at least one staff
member associated with the particular event during at least a portion of the
event.” Appeal Br. 47 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner relies on Shakes
(US 2014/0052661 A1; published Feb. 20, 2014) for this limitation. The
Examiner determines that Shakes discloses a delivery system in which the
user sends a request to activate a temporary delivery location where a user
can pick up an item, which is then staffed for the necessary time requested
by the user to allow the user to pick up the item. Ans. 16. The Examiner
also interprets the request to activate the temporary pickup location by the
user as an indication that the temporary pickup location needs to be staffed.
Id.
Appellant argues that Shakes “provides no teaching or suggestion that
the agent may be associated with the temporary pickup location,” but instead
“only describes that the agent may be at the location at the specified time to
allow customers to retrieve items” and “provides no suggestion that there
may be any crossover of resources between the temporary location and the
carrier—only that the carrier may utilize the location.” Appeal Br. 39–40.
We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive. Appellant has not
pointed to anything in the claim language that requires a “crossover of
resources” between the temporary location and a carrier. Moreover, we
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agree with the Examiner that Shakes fairly discloses this limitation. Shakes
discloses that “a temporary pickup location is a physical location at which an
agent, carrier or other individual is located for a predefined timeframe . . . to
allow for customers to retrieve ordered items” and that the “agent will be
available at the temporary pickup location to allow the customer to retrieve
the item, sign and/or pay for the item.” Shakes ¶ 13. The fact that the agent
is available to allow a customer to retrieve, sign, and pay for the item
indicates that the agent has some association with the carrier because the
agent is taking responsibility for ensuring that the item is being picked up by
the correct customer.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16.
D. Claim 17
Claim 17 recites that “the particular inactive attended delivery/pickup
location comprises a business, wherein the business is not primarily for
receiving one or more parcels.” Appeal Br. 47 (Claims Appendix). The
Examiner relies on Lee (US 2005/0068178 A1; published Mar. 31, 2005) for
this limitation, finding that Lee discloses lockers located in lodging
establishments or community centers. Non-Final Act. 20. Appellant argues
that Lee fails to teach this limitation because “[p]lacing the locker box
within a building does not teach that the building becomes an active/inactive
attended delivery/pickup location because, as the Examiner interprets the
references, it is still Lee’s locker system that is active or inactive—not the
building.” Appeal Br. 36.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Claim 17 does not
require that the building itself be active or inactive, but merely that the
attended delivery/pickup location comprises a business that “is not primarily
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for receiving one or more parcels.” Lee teaches locating a temporary
delivery/pickup system in a “transfer facility” including a “locker system”
that can be at the same location as a business that is not primarily for
receiving one or more parcels, such as an apartment complex or a
“merchant’s premises.” Lee ¶ 21.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17, and of
claim 18, which is dependent on claim 17 and not separately argued.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–22 and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 and under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

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In summary:
Claims
Rejected
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–22, 24 § 101 1–22, 24
1–3, 12, 13, 24 § 103 Inomata,
Rudduck, Craig
1–3, 12, 13,
24

14, 17–19, 22 § 103 Inomata,
Rudduck, Craig, Lee
14, 17–19, 22
4–8 § 103 Inomata,
Rudduck, Craig,
Shakes
4–8
10, 11 § 103 Inomata,
Rudduck, Craig,
Shakes, Klingenberg
10, 11
15, 16 § 103 Inomata,
Rudduck, Craig,
Lee, Shakes
15, 16, 20, 21
9 § 103 Inomata,
Rudduck, Craig,
Shakes, Terada
9
Overall Outcome 1–22, 24

AFFIRMED