Level 3 Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 4, 2020

14120283 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/120,283 05/14/2014 Paul Farnsworth 0460-US-U1 7620
83579 7590 05/04/2020
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
Attn: Patent Docketing
1025 Eldorado Blvd.
Broomfield, CO 80021
EXAMINER
LEVINE, ADAM L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent.docketing@centurylink.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PAUL FARNSWORTH, ERIC DAVID GUNDERSEN,
YUNAS NADIADI, and PETER CLARK SNEE
Appeal 2019-000932
Application 14/120,283
Technology Center 3600
Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.

REPKO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–24. Appeal. Br. 5.2 An oral
hearing was held on March 19, 2020. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method for ordering telecommunication
services. Spec. ¶ 2. The method collects provider data and designs a
telecommunication package by considering different services, locations,
infrastructure, pricing, among other things. Id.
Claims 1 and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A method for processing telecommunications orders
comprising:
receiving, using at least one processor, provider data from
a first provider member and a second provider member, the
provider data including a plurality of attributes associated with
one or more telecommunication packages, the plurality of
attributes including infrastructure information, location
information, and pricing information, wherein receiving the
provider data comprises:

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to applicant as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). According to Appellant, “The real party in interest is Level 3
Communications, LLC of Broomfield, Colorado,” which is “a subsidiary of
Century Link, Inc.” Appeal Br. 3.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Final Office Action (“Final”),
mailed November 15, 2017; the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”), filed May 15,
2018; the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”), mailed September 10, 2018; and the
Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed November 13, 2018.
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providing a user interface for the first provider member
and receiving a manual upload of provider data from the first
provider member through the user interface; and
automatically receiving provider data from the second
provider member;
aggregating the provider data by at least one of the
plurality of attributes using the at least one processor; and
storing the aggregated provider data in one or more
databases.
Appeal Br. 27 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the references found in the table below.
Name Reference Date
Carlin US 5,694,549 Dec. 2, 1997
Marsh US 6,574,465 B2 June 3, 2003
Caballero US 2007/0203799 A1 Aug. 30, 2007

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to ineligible subject matter. Final 7–12.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Caballero and Marsh. Final 13–21.3
The Examiner rejects claims 21 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Caballero, Marsh, and Carlin. Final 21–22.

3 In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew the § 103 rejection of claims 23 and
24. Ans. 3.
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OPINION
I. The Subject-Matter Eligibility Rejection
A. Principles of Law
Under § 101, patent-eligible subject matter is defined as “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. But courts have long
held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 70–71 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
These ineligible concepts are implicit exceptions to the statutory categories.
Id. at 70.
The Supreme Court articulated a two-step subject-matter eligibility
test in Mayo and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208
(2014). Alice/Mayo step one asks whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial
exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. In Alice/Mayo step two, we consider “the
elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to
determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79,
78). Step two is described as a search for an “inventive concept.” Id.
The USPTO has published revised guidance on patent subject matter
eligibility. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Step 1 of the USPTO’s eligibility
analysis asks whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four
statutory categories of invention. Id. at 53–54. Under Step 2A, Prong One of
the Guidance, we determine if the claim recites a judicial exception,
including particular groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
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certain methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes). Id. at
52–53. If so, we then analyze the claim to determine whether the recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application under Step 2A,
Prong Two of the Guidance. Id. at 53–55; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
Only if the claim fails to integrate the exception and, thus, is “directed
to” the judicial exception, do we then look to whether the claim adds a
specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or whether the claim
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

B. Overview of the Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments
In the Examiner’s view, representative4 claim 1 is directed to a
fundamental economic practice, which is an abstract idea. Final 9.
According to the Examiner, the claims do not represent an improvement to
technology because they recite no more than an abstract idea performed on a
computer. See id. at 10. Thus, the Examiner concludes that claim 1 is not
eligible for patent protection.
As for the abstract idea, Appellant argues that “the claims include
significant limitations that limit application of the claimed methods and
systems to the technical realm of processing telecommunications orders

4 Appellant argues claims 1–4, 6–9, and 16–22 as a group. See Appeal Br. 9–
17; see also Reply Br. 2. We select claim 1 as representative of claims 1–4,
6–9, and 16–22. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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using multiple input means from a plurality of provider members.”
Appeal Br. 12. In Appellant’s view, the claimed invention adds flexibility
and has technical advantages compared to other methods for ordering
services. Id. at 13. Regarding the inventive concept, Appellant argues that
the claimed method is rooted in networking technology and “results in
improvements to the functioning of the network.” Id. at 16. For these and
other reasons, Appellant argues that claim 1 is eligible for patent protection.
See id. at 9–17; Reply Br. 2–3.

C. Step 1: Does the claim fall within a statutory category of invention?
Under Step 1 of the USPTO’s eligibility analysis, we agree with the
Examiner’s determination that the claimed subject matter falls within one of
the four statutory categories of invention because claim 1 recites a process.
Final 8; Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54. Indeed, claim 1 recites a series of
steps. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s determination here. See
generally Appeal Br.; Reply Br.

D. Step 2A, Prong One of the Guidance
We next determine whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. “[A] claim recites a judicial exception when
the judicial exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in the claim.” October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 1 (USPTO Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October 2019 Update”).
The Guidance synthesizes the key concepts identified by the courts as
abstract ideas into three primary subject-matter groupings: mathematical
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concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental
processes. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For the reasons discussed below,
claim 1 recites an abstract idea that falls in the Guidance’s subject-matter
grouping of organizing human activity, which includes commercial
interactions, and also the grouping of mental processes. Id.
In particular, claim 1 recites, in part,
receiving, using at least one processor, provider data from
a first provider member and a second provider member, the
provider data including a plurality of attributes associated with
one or more telecommunication packages, the plurality of
attributes including infrastructure information, location
information, and pricing information.
Receiving a telecommunication package’s associated location,
infrastructure, and pricing information is part of a commercial interaction.
See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 3. The commercial interaction here is between a
telecommunication provider and an entity seeking to obtain its services. See
id. For example, the recited providers can be cable companies, which
provide cable-television packages along with internet access. Id. ¶ 18. As
part of this interaction, the customer in the recited commercial interaction
obtains information from two providers. See Appeal Br. 13 (describing
collecting information). In this way, the recited step of receiving the
provider data is part of a commercial interaction of obtaining services, which
falls within the Guidance’s subject matter grouping of certain methods of
organizing human activity.
Claim 1 further recites, in part, “aggregating the provider data by at
least one of the plurality of attributes using the at least one processor.” This
step is also part of the commercial interaction. For example, the recited
aggregating includes compiling information about location and pricing
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information. Spec. ¶¶ 30–31. Consumers typically collect information when
ordering telecommunication services, which is the commercial transaction
recited here. See id.
Also, the recited aggregating can practically be performed in the
human mind or with the assistance of pen and paper. For instance, a person
can mentally review prices and aggregate the data on paper. In this way,
claim 1 also recites a mental process. Thus, claim 1 recites a concept that
falls within the Guidance’s subject-matter grouping of mental processes in
addition to the group covering certain methods of organizing human activity.
For all the above reasons, claim 1 recites an abstract idea.

E. Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now proceed to determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. When a claim recites a judicial
exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, the
claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id.
We use the term additional elements for claim features, limitations, or
steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See id. at
55 n.24. In claim 1, the additional elements include (1) “providing a user
interface for the first provider member and receiving a manual upload of
provider data from the first provider member through the user interface;” (2)
“automatically receiving provider data from the second provider member;”
and (3) “storing the aggregated provider data in one or more databases.”

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1. The User Interface and the Receiving Steps
As for additional elements (1) and (2), the receiving function and the
corresponding user interface for receiving data add “insignificant extra-
solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Courts have found that such activity may not integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application. Id. For example, the Guidance explains that
insignificant extra-solution activity includes “mere data gathering such as a
step of obtaining information about credit card transactions so that the
information can be analyzed” to detect fraudulent transactions. Id. at 55
n.31; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (analyzing the step of obtaining transaction data and
determining that “such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(g) (instructing examiners that
“[a]n example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data for use in a
claimed process”).
In Appellant’s view,
rather than using conventional, single-style input methods to
receive provider input from multiple provider members, the
present application provides added flexibility and technical
advantages in that it is more easily adapted to the siloed
information of multiple provider members. A plurality of
attributes of the disparately collected provider information are
then used to aggregate the provider information. For at least these
reasons, claims 1 and 16 do not recite an abstract idea and recite
patent-eligible subject matter.
Appeal Br. 13. According to Appellant, the claims are like those to improved
user interfaces that were found patent eligible by the Federal Circuit.
Id. at 12–13 (discussing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
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We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive because “[t]he mere
combination of data sources . . . does not make the claims patent eligible.”
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1097 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Here, the recited user interface collects the data to be processed,
without more. The addition of multiple data sources—i.e., multiple
providers—does not change how the data is collected. Rather, the claim
merely calls for using multiple sources. See id. When considering the claim
as a whole, this does not impose any meaningful limitation on the claimed
system. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370; see also MPEP § 2016.05(g)
(collecting cases).
Thus, the limitations to the receiving steps and the corresponding
interface—considered individually and in combination with the other
limitations—do not indicate that the claim integrates the abstract idea into a
practical application.

2. The Storing Step
Claim 1 recites, in part, “storing the aggregated provider data in one
or more databases.”
The MPEP instructs examiners that courts have recognized that the
function of “[s]toring and retrieving information in memory” can be
“insignificant extra-solution activity.” MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(collecting
cases). Here, the recited storing step is not a technical improvement. For
instance, the Federal Circuit found that a server used in its ordinary capacity
to store images was not an improvement to computer functionality. In re TLI
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612–13 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cited
in MPEP § 2106.05(f). Similarly, claim 1’s method uses a database in its
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ordinary capacity to store the aggregated data. And the aggregation itself is
part of the abstract idea. So the storing step “adds insignificant extra-
solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Thus, the storing step—considered individually and in combination
with the other limitations—does not indicate that the claim integrates the
abstract idea into a practical application.

3. The Combination
Appellant argues that claim 1 falls in the technical realm of processing
orders. Appeal Br. 12. In Appellant’s view, the claims are also rooted in
networking technology. Id. at 16–17 (discussing Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v.
Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
It is true that an improvement to technology or a technical field, for
example, indicates that the claim may have integrated the judicial exception
into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. But that is not the
case here. Instead, the claim as a whole brings together information from
several providers. Accord Appeal Br. 12–13 (discussing using different
provider data). Collecting this information is part of the commercial
interaction and the abstract mental process that we identified above. See
supra § I.C. Thus, we are unpersuaded that, here, collecting information
about services is a technical solution in the context of this claim.

4. Conclusion to Step 2A, Prong Two
For the reasons above, we conclude that the recited judicial exception
has not been integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 51. Because claim 1 recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the
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exception into a practical application, it is “directed to” the judicial
exception. Id.

F. Step 2B of the Guidance
To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, the
additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to
determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field
or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Also, we reevaluate our
conclusions about the additional elements discussed in the previous step. Id.
As discussed in Step 2A, Prong Two, claim 1’s additional elements
include (1) “providing a user interface for the first provider member and
receiving a manual upload of provider data from the first provider member
through the user interface;” (2) “automatically receiving provider data from
the second provider member;” and (3) “storing the aggregated provider data
in one or more databases.”

1. The User Interface and the Receiving Steps
The Examiner finds that additional elements (1) and (2) are well-
understood, routine, and conventional. Final 10–11. We agree. For example,
the Federal Circuit determined that “sending a first set of electronic
messages over a network to devices” was well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity in the claims at issue in OIP Technologies, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which was cited
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by the Examiner. See Final 11. Also, the MPEP instructs examiners that
courts recognize that receiving data over a network may be well‐understood,
routine, and conventional when claimed generically. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)
(collecting cases).
Here, the receiving steps are claimed generically. And as discussed
above, the mere combination of data sources does not make claim 1 patent
eligible. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1097. Apart from receiving data from
a combination of sources, the recited user interface adds little to the abstract
idea itself. Rather, the user interface and receiving steps recite no more than
generic computer functions. Final 10.
The Specification supports this conclusion. According to the
Specification, “the computer system 1000 typically includes a modem, a
network adapter, or any other type of communications device for
establishing communications over the wide area network.” Spec. ¶ 52
(emphasis added). As for the user interface, the Specification discloses,
one or more functionalities disclosed herein may be generated
by the processor 1002 and a user may interact with a Graphical
User Interface (GUI) using one or more user-interface devices
(e.g., the keyboard 1016, the display unit 1018, and the user
devices 106) with some of the data in use directly coming from
on line sources and data stores.
Id. ¶ 54. A system capable of executing the recited method is shown in
Figure 10, which is reproduced below. Id.
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Figure 10, above, shows an example computing system 1000 configured to
implement the claimed method. Id. ¶ 16. System 1000 is little more than a
generic computer executing software. Id. ¶¶ 49, 54.
On this record, we agree with the Examiner that the recited user
interface and receiving steps simply append well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Final 10–11.

2. The Storing Step
The Examiner finds that “storing the aggregated provider data in one
or more databases” is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Id. We
agree. For instance, the Federal Circuit has recognized that a generic
database may not satisfy the inventive-concept requirement. Mortg. Grader,
Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Also, the MPEP instructs examiners that courts recognize that storing
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and retrieving information in memory may be well‐understood, routine, and
conventional when claimed generically. MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (citing
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2015); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363).
Here, the recited “one or more databases” are claimed generically. In
claim 1, the databases do no more than store the aggregated data. Indeed, the
Specification broadly describes these databases. According to the
Specification,
In an example implementation, provider data, customer
information, design data, consolidated quotes, a plurality of
internal and external databases, source databases, and/or cached
data on servers are stored as the memory 1008 or other storage
systems, such as the disk storage unit 1012 or the DVD/CD-
ROM medium 1010, and/or other external storage devices made
available and accessible via a network architecture.
Spec. ¶ 53. On this record, we agree with the Examiner that “storing the
aggregated provider data in one or more databases” simply appends well-
understood, routine, and conventional activity previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Final 10–11.

3. The Examiner’s Factual Determinations
“Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to
a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.”
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The USPTO
issued a memo on the Berkheimer decision. See Robert W. Bahr, Deputy
Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
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Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (USPTO April 19, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (“Berkheimer Memo”). Here, Appellant argues that the
Examiner does not address any of the findings required by the Berkheimer
Memo. Reply Br. 3.
We disagree. The Berkheimer Memo instructs examiners that the
factual findings can be supported by “[a] citation to one or more of the court
decisions discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood,
routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s).” Berkheimer
Memo 4. Here, the Examiner supports the findings by citing OIP
Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
among other decisions. Final 11.
The MPEP cites OIP in a discussion about how receiving data over a
network and storing information can be well-understood, routine,
conventional activity:
The courts have recognized the following computer functions as
well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions when they
are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of
generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity. . . .
Receiving or transmitting data over a network . . . Storing and
retrieving information in memory.
MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II). Although the Examiner also cites other cases, the
citation to OIP here adequately supports the Examiner’s factual
determinations about the recited functions. Final 11.
Thus, Appellant’s arguments about the Berkheimer Memo are
unpersuasive. See Reply Br. 3.
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4. Appellant’s Arguments about BASCOM and Amdocs
According to Appellant, “claims 1 and 16 recite ‘a specific, discrete
implementation’ of any potential abstract idea involved in such claims and
do not preempt all uses of such an idea.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant argues
that claim 1’s additional limitations are like those in BASCOM Global
Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Id. at 15–16. In Appellant’s view, “claim 1 requires a particular set of
ordered actions to improve the operations of an electronic
telecommunications order processing system.” Id. Appellant also makes
similar arguments with respect to Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See id. at 16–17.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Specifically, the claims in
BASCOM involved an inventive distribution of function between a local
computer and a server. See 827 F.3d at 1350–51. The Federal Circuit noted
that “[t]he inventive concept described and claimed in the ’606 patent is the
installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” Id. at
1350. “Because the filtering tool on the ISP server contains each user’s
customized filtering mechanism, the filtering tool working in combination
with the ISP server can apply a specific user’s filtering mechanism to the
websites requested by that user.” Id. at 1345.
Unlike BASCOM, claim 1 does not recite an inventive distribution of
function, for example. The computers in claim 1 simply execute the abstract
idea, and the recited database stores data. By contrast, BASCOM’s filtering
tool worked in combination with an ISP server. See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at
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1345. Here, claim 1 is simply an “abstract-idea-based solution implemented
with generic technical components in a conventional way.” Id. at 1351.
As for Amdocs, Appellant does not sufficiently explain why claim 1 is
“more rooted in networking technology.” Appeal Br. 16. Claim 1 from
Amdocs recites processing network accounting information. But claim 1 here
does not even recite a network. At best, claim 1 implicitly uses some generic
network to receive data about telecommunication packages. As discussed
above, courts recognize that receiving data over a network may be well‐
understood, routine, and conventional when claimed generically. See, e.g.,
MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (collecting cases).
Thus, Appellant’s arguments about BASCOM and Amdocs are
unpersuasive. See Appeal Br. 15–17

G. Conclusion to Step 2B
Considering all the additional elements discussed above, we
reevaluate our conclusions about whether the recited additional elements
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56. Because the additional elements add nothing more than well-
understood, routine, and conventional activity, those conclusions stand.
Considering both our previous conclusions and the findings about well‐
understood, routine, and conventional activity, we determine that the
claimed method does not use the additional elements in a way that indicates
that the claim provides an inventive concept.

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H. Summary
Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of
representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the rejection.
We also sustain the rejection of claims 2–4, 6–9, and 16–22, which are not
argued separately. See supra n.3.
I. Claims 23 and 24
Claim 23 recites,
The method of claim 9, further comprising: providing a
design user interface to facilitate the design of the consolidated
quote, wherein the design user interface:
displays a geographic map illustrating geographic
locations where the first provider and the second provider
provide the telecommunications packages; and
enables a user to select locations on the geographic map to
design the consolidated quote for the selected locations.
Claim 24 recites similar limitations as a system with a server configured to
perform these functions.
The Examiner explains that claims 23 and 24 are directed to ineligible
subject matter because (1) the claims are directed to a fundamental economic
practice, which is an abstract idea, and (2) do not represent an improvement
to technology because they recite no more than an abstract idea performed
on a computer. See Final 12.
Appellant argues,
claims 23 and 24 (and the other dependent claims that have not
been specifically addressed in the Office Action) add even more
reasons why the claims recite significantly more than any
abstract idea. As a nonexclusive example, as discussed further
below, the advancements in user interface technology set forth in
claims 23 and 24 are clearly not conventional, as the Office
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Action fails to provide any reasonable evidence of such
technology in the cited references.
Appeal Br. 17. We find Appellant’s argument here unpersuasive because the
Examiner explained on page 12 of the Final Rejection that the analysis
presented on the preceding pages applies to claims 23 and 24. Also, as for
Appellant’s argument about the cited references, we note that “[e]ligibility
and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[A] claim for a new
abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant argues that the Examiner has not provided adequate support
under the Berkheimer Memo. Reply Br. 3. For the reasons discussed above,
we disagree. See supra § I.F.3. And as discussed above, the Examiner’s
factual determinations are adequately supported by citations to the relevant
case law. See, e.g., Berkheimer Memo 4. Appellant has not addressed why
the Examiner’s citations (Final 11) are insufficient to support the factual
determinations.
Appellant argues that claims 23 and 24 are like those in Core Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
But we find this argument unpersuasive for the same reasons discussed
above. See supra § I.F.4. In particular, “[t]he mere combination of data
sources . . . does not make the claims patent eligible.” FairWarning, 839
F.3d at 1097.
Thus, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of
claims 23 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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II. The Obviousness Rejection over Caballero and Marsh
A. The Rejection
In the rejection of claim 1 over Caballero and Marsh, the Examiner
finds that Caballero receives provider data and aggregates by attribute.
Final 13. According to the Examiner, the recited attributes—i.e.,
infrastructure, location, or pricing information—are non-functional
descriptive material. Id. at 14. The Examiner finds that Caballero lacks the
receiving steps and cites Marsh for these features. Id. at 19.

B. Appellant’s Arguments
In Appellant’s view, neither reference aggregates the data by the
recited attributes. Appeal Br. 20–21. Appellant argues that the Examiner
admits that Caballero lacks the recited provider data, which is part of the
aggregation. Id. And Appellant argues that Marsh’s data collected through
the DL process is not aggregated as recited in the claim. Id. at 21.

C. Analysis
Appellant’s arguments are persuasive.
Claim 1 recites, in part, “aggregating the provider data by at least one
of the plurality of attributes using the at least one processor,” and “the
plurality of attributes including infrastructure information, location
information, and pricing information.” For example, aggregating by location
allows the interface to display telecommunication packages geographically.
Spec. ¶ 31.
For this limitation, the Examiner cites Caballero. Final 15. Caballero
relates to processing telecommunication orders. Caballero ¶ 15. According
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22
to the Examiner, Caballero aggregates information in an asset table.
Final 15. Caballero’s asset table includes information about products
installed at a customer’s premises. Caballero ¶ 15. Caballero defines
attributes for products and services. Id. ¶ 133. For example, a telephone
service’s attribute can be a telephone number. Id. ¶ 156. The Examiner also
points out that a Service ID is stored as an attribute. Final 15 (citing
Caballero ¶ 157).
But the Examiner has not shown how Caballero teaches or suggests
aggregating by infrastructure, location, or pricing information, as recited.
See Appeal Br. 21. Instead, the Examiner states that the infrastructure,
location, and pricing information have “no functional role” and “will not
distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.” Final 14. On this point,
we disagree. Infrastructure, location, or pricing information has a role in the
aggregation because the claim requires aggregating by that information. In
this way, the recited attributes are functionally related to how the
aggregation is performed. Thus, the Examiner erred by not giving these
attributes patentable weight.
The Examiner did not cite Marsh for aggregating by the attributes.
Id. at 19. So Marsh cannot cure Caballero’s deficiencies in this regard.
Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 and
independent claim 16, which also recites the aggregation function as part of
a system. We do not sustain the rejection of claims 2–4, 6–9, and 17–20,
because they incorporate these limitations by their dependency.

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23
III. The Obviousness Rejection over Caballero, Marsh, and Carlin
Claims 21 and 22 depend from claims 1 and 16. In the rejection of
claims 21 and 22, the Examiner adds Carlin to the combination of Caballero
and Marsh. But the Examiner does not rely on Carlin to teach or suggest the
limitations missing from the Caballero-Marsh combination. So, for the
reasons discussed above, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 21 and 22.
See supra § II.C.
CONCLUSION
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6–9,
and 16–24 is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6–9,
16–24
101 Eligibility 1–4, 6–9,
16–24

1–4, 6–9,
16–20
103 Caballero, Marsh 1–4, 6–9,
16–20
21, 22 103 Caballero, Marsh,
Carlin
21, 22
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–9,
16–24

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED