LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 4, 2020

14450495 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/450,495 08/04/2014 Derek S. Anderson 0423-US-U1 5204
83579 7590 02/04/2020
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
Attn: Patent Docketing
1025 Eldorado Blvd.
Broomfield, CO 80021
EXAMINER
CHAU, PETER P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2476
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent.docketing@level3.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DEREK S. ANDERSON and RYAN T. KORTE
Appeal 2018-001750
Application 14/450,495
Technology Center 2400
Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing was held on January 28,

1 We refer to the Specification, filed August 4, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action, mailed July 21, 2016 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed December
21, 2016 (“Appeal Br.”); and Examiner’s Answer, mailed October 2, 2017
(“Ans.”).

2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Level 3
Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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2020. A transcript of the oral hearing is being prepared and will be entered
into the record in due course.
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to implementing a high-quality Video over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) network accessible through a public network, such
as the Internet. Spec. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed
limitations emphasized in italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for providing services over a
telecommunications network, the method comprising:
receiving a request for telecommunication services from a
requesting device, the telecommunications services comprising
transmission of one or more high-definition multimedia signals
through the telecommunications network;
accessing an equipment database associated with the
telecommunications network to determine a customer
identification associated with the requesting device;
registering an encoding device with the telecommuni-
cations network based at least on the customer identification, the
encoding device configured to encode the one or more high-
definition multimedia signals;
scheduling one or more components in response to the
request from the requesting device; and
commissioning the one or more components for
transmission of the one or more high-definition multimedia
signals through the telecommunications network.
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Lupulescu US 2003/0030751 A1 Feb. 13, 2003
Stirbu US 2006/0168656 A1 July 27, 2006
O’Neil US 2007/0067807 Al Mar. 22, 2007
Eng US 2010/0208634 Al Aug. 19, 2010
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–4 and 9–11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over O’Neil and Eng. Final Act. 3–8.
Claims 6–8 and 13–15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over O’Neil, Eng, and Stirbu. Final Act. 8–11.
Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over O’Neil, Stirbu, and Eng. Final Act. 11–16.
Claims 5 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over O’Neil, Eng, and Lupulescu. Final Act. 16–17.
Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
O’Neil, Stirbu, Eng, and Lupulescu. Final Act. 17–18.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments
Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
To the extent consistent with our analysis herein, we adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in (1) the action from
which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3–18) and (2) the Answer in response
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to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 5–13) and concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for emphasis.
With respect to the obviousness rejection of independent claim 1,
Appellant contends that the combination of O’Neil and Eng does not teach
or suggest “registering an encoding device with the telecommunications
network based at least on the customer identification.” Appeal Br. 10; see
also id. at 9–11. Appellant further contends that the combination of O’Neil
and Eng does not teach or suggest “scheduling one or more components in
response to the request from the requesting device,” as recited in claim 1.
Id. at 12–14.
Regarding “registering an encoding device with the
telecommunications network based at least on the customer identification,”
the Examiner finds this limitation corresponds to O’Neil’s “process of
determining subscriber content encoding and format configuration . . . based
on device type and capabilities . . . during network registration request
and/or information service request operation . . . by the system/ broadcast
application server.” Ans. 8. (citing O’Neil ¶¶ 46, 47, 54, 60–64, and 67–69);
see also Final Act. 3–5.
Appellant contends that the argued limitation should be construed
such that “a customer’s encoding device is registered with the
telecommunications network ‘based on a customer identification’ for the
purpose of determining the characteristics of the encoding device that the
customer will use to encode the high-definition video signal for transmission
over the local loop.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant argues that “O’Neil has no
disclosure of registering an encoding device because O’Neil does not
disclose an encoding device at all” and that “[w]hat the Office relies on in
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O’Neil is, at most, the transmission of encoded ‘subscriber content’ to
subscribing devices. As such[,] O’Neil does not disclose an encoding device
at all.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments for the reasons stated
by the Examiner (Ans. 5–8), which Appellant does not persuasively rebut.
In particular, we find persuasive the Examiner’s construction of (and
findings regarding) the argued limitation as follows:
the examiner interprets this limitation as based on the customer
identification to register an encoding device with the
telecommunications network and the encoding device will
perform encoding for one or more multimedia signals. In []other
words, customer/user/subscriber can login a telecommunications
network for requesting a multimedia /content service, then the
telecommunication network needs to assign/register a
multimedia/content encoding device/element/ process to perform
encoding function for the specific customer/user/subscriber and
the encoding operation can be performed separated from the
requesting device of the customer/user/subscriber.
Ans. 5.
A claim under examination is given its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the underlying specification. See In re
American Acad. of Science Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In the absence of an express definition of a claim term in the specification or
a clear disclaimer of scope, the claim term is interpreted as broadly as the
ordinary usage of the term by one of ordinary skill in the art would permit.
See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2007); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appellant does not direct our attention to––and we do not ascertain––any
construction of “registering an encoding device” that precludes O’Neil’s
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process, as broadly but reasonably construed by the Examiner. Ans. 8.
We also disagree that O’Neil does not disclose an encoding device.
Appeal Br. 11. O’Neil discloses a “content application server” that is
“configured to format [i.e., encode] the content associated with the
information service to provide subscriber content that is encoded and/or
otherwise configured to prevent at least some use by devices that are not
associated with a subscription to the information service.” O’Neil ¶ 47.
Accordingly, we find Appellant’s arguments are unsupported by sufficient
evidence or explanation to be persuasive.
We also are unpersuaded of error by Appellant’s argument that O’Neil
does not disclose “scheduling one or more components in response to the
request from the requesting device.” Appeal Br. 12–14. The Examiner
interprets the limitation as “after receiving the service request from the
requesting device, [the] service provider scheduling one or more
components for the service provision. In []other words, after receiving
customer/user/ subscriber multimedia/content service request, the service
provider needs to provision /schedule network resources /elements for the
requested multimedia /content service.” Ans. 9. The Examiner finds the
limitation reads on O’Neil’s subscriber content being “broadcast using a
particular frequency, time slot, and/or spreading code associated with the
communication session.” Id. at 10 (citing O’Neil Figs. 1, 4, and ¶¶ 16, 52,
81–83). The Examiner finds that “[b]oth particular frequency and time slot
are bandwidth related resource allocation /scheduling for a specific request;
and selected spreading code is also for a specific user’s communication
session.” Id. at 10–11.
Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings.
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Appellant argues that the “portion of O’Neil purportedly disclosing a
‘specified frequency, time slot, and/or spreading code’ is actually directed to
altering a broadcast to cause ‘the exclusion of non-subscribers’ from
receiving the transmission” and that “[n]either this portion, nor any other
part of O’Neil, discloses ‘scheduling one or more components in response to
the request from the requesting device.’” Appeal Br. 13 (quoting O’Neil
¶ 83). We find Appellant’s argument is unsupported by sufficient evidence
or explanation to be persuasive.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons we are unpersuaded of error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We also are unpersuaded or error in the
rejection of claim 9, which Appellant argues on the same basis. See Appeal
Br. 12, 14. Because Appellant argues the rejections of the remaining claims
based either directly or indirectly on claims 1 and 9 (id. at 14–16), we are
unpersuaded of error in the rejections of claims 2–8 and 10–20 for the same
reasons.
Appellant argues claims 7 and 14 for the additional reason that the
portions of O’Neil relied upon by the Examiner “nowhere disclose an
‘encoding device,’ let alone ‘detecting an encoding device’ and ‘analyzing
the encoding device to obtain one or more identifiers of the encoding
device.’” Id. at 14–15. Appellant contends that “[t]he relied-upon portions
of O’Neil disclose only steps ‘when content is available’ without reference
to a decoding device or analyzing the decoding device.” Id. at 15.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error for the reasons
stated by the Examiner (Ans. 11–12), which Appellant does not persuasively
rebut. We adopt the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the
Examiner’s rejections of claim 1–20.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 9–11 103 O’Neil, Eng 1–4, 9–11
6–8, 13–15 103 O’Neil, Eng, Stirbu 6–8, 13–15
16, 17, 19,
20
103 O’Neil, Stirbu, and Eng 16, 17, 19,
20

5, 12 103 O’Neil, Eng, Lupulescu 5, 12
18 103 O’Neil, Stirbu, Eng,
Lupulescu
18
Overall
Outcome:
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED