Letty K.,1 Complainant,v.Emily W. Murphy, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Nov 14, 2018

0120170474 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 14, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Letty K.,1
Complainant,

v.

Emily W. Murphy,
Administrator,
General Services Administration,
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120170474

Hearing No. 550-2013-00234X

Agency No. GSA-12-R9-FAS-DL-13

DECISION

Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC
or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s final order concerning
her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final
order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are: (1) whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued
summary judgment; (2) whether Complainant established that the Agency’s proffered explanation
for its actions was pretext to mask unlawful discrimination based on reprisal; and (3) whether
Complainant established that she was subjected to hostile work environment harassment based on
reprisal, as alleged.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Telecommunications
Specialist, GS-12, at the Agency’s Federal Acquisition Service (FAS), Network Services Division
(NSD), Customer Care Branch, in San Francisco, California. The management officials who
supervised Complainant included the Branch Chief and the Director.

According to Complainant, she suffers from hypersensitivity to cigarette smoke, which causes her
burning eyes, nausea, and listlessness, among other symptoms. As a result, Complainant requested
that she not be near employees who smoke in the workplace, and informed management that she
is adversely affected by the smell of residual cigarette smoke. Although smoking was not allowed
in the Federal building where Complainant worked, Complainant could apparently smell the
residual smoke from employees who smoked. Complainant therefore requested that she be allowed
to telework as an accommodation, which would have allowed her to be at home and away from
the employees around her who smoked.

The Branch Chief instead instructed Complainant to move back to her old workspace on May 29,
2012, because there were no smokers in that area. The Branch Chief averred, however, that
Complainant did not want to return to her old work space and did not accept the offer. He stated
that telework or an Alternate Work Schedule (AWS) would not have been a good solution because
telework and AWS had been discontinued for the entire team. Thereafter, on April 20, 2012, the
Branch Chief denied Complainant’s request to use annual leave in lieu of sick leave. According to
Complainant, the Branch Chief never responded to her request to convert her sick leave hours to
annual leave hours. In response, the Director averred that during this time, management had no
policy in place of converting leave in this manner. Also, according to Complainant, on May 1,
2012, she made a request to the Branch Chief for seven hours of official time to prepare for EEO
Counseling. The Branch Chief only granted her two hours of official time on May 2, 2012, which
she felt was insufficient and unsatisfactory. The Branch Chief stated that Complainant had
requested 79.25 hours of official time and 47.50 hours of time had been granted between the period
of March 28, 2012, through October 29, 2012.

Complainant additionally averred that her workload increased after the office underwent a
reorganization. She attested that her workload increased from seven customer systems to twenty-
five assigned customer systems. Complainant also stated that she acquired old customer systems
from two GS-13 employees and became a back-up to another GS-13 employee. As a result,
Complainant felt that management had improperly assigned her with higher graded work. Both the
Brach Chief and the Director disagreed with Complainant’s assertion and maintained that
Complainant was not provided work at the GS-13 grade-level, as she alleged.

Complainant also contended that the Director improperly issued her a Level 3 rating on her Mid-
Year Annual Performance Appraisal review. Complainant felt that the Director did not comment
on her major accomplishments during this period, including her San Francisco Federal Building
Transition Project efforts, which she asserted consumed the majority of her time from October 1,
2011 through February 21, 2012.
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In response, the Director stated that he gave Complainant the rating of Level 3, Successful, on her
Mid-Year because the whole office was behind in its production. The Director also gave other
employees a rating of Level 3, at this time.

According to Complainant, in an email dated June 5, 2012, the Director announced that all GS-12
employees were required to turn in their Limited Contracting Officer Warrant certificates no later
than June 15, 2012. Complainant averred that only some GS-13 employees were allowed to
maintain their Limited Contracting Officer Warrants. The Branch Chief explained that warrants
were removed from all GS-12 employees in the Customer Care Branch in order to focus on meeting
the requirements of the customers in certain work areas.

Complainant further believed that she was improperly charged with 15 minutes of absence without
leave (AWOL) on October 17, 2012. Complainant explained that she was late because she had to
use the restroom several times and had to gather documentation from home to prepare for a
deadline. The Branch Chief attested that employees were noticing that Complainant would
routinely arrive to work late, and therefore Complainant was warned via e-mail on October 4,
2012, that she would be placed on AWOL the next time she arrived to work late.

On November 7, 2012, Complainant received a Level 3 rating for her final Fiscal Year 2012
Annual Performance appraisal. The Branch Chief stated that Complainant received the Successful
rating because Complainant did not have familiarity with the database used to maintain inventory
and billing, among other things.

On April 27, 2012, Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor and filed an EEO complaint on June
13, 2012, alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (German,
African), national origin (German, African), sex (female), religion (Agnostic/Protestant), color
(White), disability (hypersensitivity to cigarette smoke), age (59), and in reprisal for prior
protected EEO activity when:

1. From February 27, 2012, through March 27, 2012, her requests for an Alternative Work
Schedule (AWS) and telework were denied;

2. On April 20, 2012, her request to use annual leave in lieu of sick leave was denied;

3. On May 1, 2012, her request for official time was only partially granted;

4. On May 2, 2012, she was reassigned an increased workload;

5. On May 2, 2012, she was assigned duties for a high-grade position;

6. On May 7, 2012, she was denied her request for reasonable accommodation;

7. On May 30, 2012, she received a Level 3 rating for her Fiscal Year 2012 Mid-Year Annual
Performance Appraisal review;

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8. On June 5, 2012, her Limited Contracting Officer Warrant was removed;

9. On October 17, 2012, she was notified that she was charged with 15 minutes of Absence
Without Leave (AWOL);

10. On November 7, 2012, she received a Level 3 rating for her Fiscal Year 2012 Annual
Performance appraisal;

11. On May 7, 2012, when she indicated that she did not have access to a Telephone Order
Processing System (TOPS) account, the Branch Chief responded sarcastically, “Is that why
you haven’t completed TOPS orders for the past ten years?” in front of three other
colleagues;

12. On February 29, 2012, the Director ignored her and/or subjected her to the silent treatment
in response to her “cease and desist” email;

13. On February 21, 2012, the Director shouted at her and directed her to report to his office;
and

14. On February 21, 2012, the Director joked about “pushing female’s buttons” and on one
occasion in December 2011 or January 2012 he sarcastically addressed her as “Captain.”

After its investigation into the complaint, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ notified the parties sua sponte of an
intent to issue a summary judgment decision, to which both parties responded. The AJ
subsequently issued a decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency.

The AJ initially found that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
based on race, national origin, and religion, finding there was no evidence that any Agency official
was aware that she was German, African, or Protestant/Agnostic. The AJ further found that the
Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which Complainant did
not show were pretextual. With respect to claim 1, the AJ noted that the Agency denied
Complainant’s request for an AWS and Telework because such privileges had been suspended for
the entire department after an investigation showed that the division was behind in work. In
addressing claim 2, the AJ noted that there was no policy in place that allowed annual leave to be
used in place of sick leave. The AJ observed that Complainant was nevertheless ultimately granted
the annual leave in lieu of sick leave as she requested. The AJ additionally observed, with respect
to claim 3, that between March 18, 2012, and October 29, 2012, Complainant was granted 47.5
hours of official time out of the 79.25 hours she requested. Regarding claim 4, the AJ found that
the reassignment was due to a reorganization of the entire branch and each team member was
assigned more customer systems. In addressing claim 5, the AJ noted that a desk audit was
conducted, reflecting that her position was properly graded at the GS-12 grade-level. The AJ also
noted that three other employees were assigned to assist Complainant when she filled-in as a back-
up for the GS-13 employee.
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In addressing claim 7, the AJ found that Complainant did not establish that the rating she received
was due to her protected classes, as other employees received the same rating. As for claims 8 and
9, the AJ noted that Complainant herself acknowledged that the Agency removed the warrants
from other employees as well, and she admitted that she was late on the day in question. With
respect to claim 10, the AJ noted that the Branch Chief stated that Complainant was not a team
player, and found that Complainant did not point to any evidence to show that the Agency was
motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

The AJ additionally found that Complainant did not show that she was denied a reasonable
accommodation for her purported disability, as alleged (Claim 6). The AJ found that despite the
absence of requested medical documentation, the Agency conducted an air quality review, and
also offered Complainant the opportunity to move her workspace to a different area. The AJ
moreover found that Complainant did not show that her request for separation between herself and
any smokers was a reasonable request for an accommodation. The AJ found further that
Complainant did not establish that the Agency’s actions were severe or pervasive enough to rise
to the level of a hostile work environment. The AJ specifically found that Complainant did not
show that the Agency’s conduct was so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of her
employment. The AJ found that Complainant did not establish a discriminatory or retaliatory
motive, and therefore she could not establish a hostile work environment.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant, through her attorney, argues that the AJ erred in disregarding clear
evidence of retaliatory animus towards her. Complainant specifically cites to an email dated March
27, 2012, sent to her from the Branch Chief writing as follows:

As far as your EEO suits and repeatedly telling me, yes I know and am aware of
your history considering you tried to build a case against your previous
supervisors . . . .

Complainant maintains that this email from the Branch Chief shows a retaliatory motive against
her.2 Complainant states that she engaged in opposition activity which included telling her prior
supervisors in 2004 and 2007 that she believed she had been subjected to discrimination when less
qualified workers were promoted to the GS-13 grade-level. Complainant also states that her
request for accommodation for her hypersensitivity to cigarette smoke constituted protected EEO
activity as well. She further believes that she was subjected to reprisal for her making EEO
Counselor contact with respect to the instant complaint. Complainant contends that other
employees were not performing as well as she was in TOPS, yet they were allowed an AWS and
allowed to Telework.

2 The AJ found that this email only showed that the Branch Chief acknowledged that Complainant
told her about her EEO activity, and therefore found that this email did not support an inference
that the Branch Chief was motivated by retaliatory animus.
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Complainant states that the Branch Chief and the Director’s assertion that her work contained
deficiencies was simply not credible. Complainant asserts that the Branch Chief closely monitored
her attendance, while not doing the same for other employees.

Complainant further states that another coworker (C1) maintained that he was subjected to reprisal
in a similar manner by the Branch Chief and the Director as well. Complainant contends that both
she and C1 were assigned more work than other employees because of their protected EEO
activity. Complainant states that both she and C1 were assigned to 25 systems while three other
coworkers were assigned to 7, 9, and 14 systems, respectively. Complainant additionally states
that she got all new customers, which made her job more difficult. In addition, Complainant argues
that her Level 3 Fully Successful annual performance rating for 2012 was lower than her previous
two annual ratings. Complainant cites to a statement from a GS-13 employee who believed that
management’s concerns about her performance were not justified. She also maintains that she was
subjected to a hostile work environment at TOPS training in May 2012 when the Branch Chief
accused her of not doing her TOPS input for the last 10 years. Complainant maintains that the
Director frequently yelled at her and belittled her in a hostile manner, which was witnessed by her
coworkers.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Summary Judgment

We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a
hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary
judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary
standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's
function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for
trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment
stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An
issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of
the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the
outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding
a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly
consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record
has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal
No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
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Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she
ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a
decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material
facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery
before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes
summary judgment “where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity
to discover information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the
hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the
amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing.
Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if
necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

Upon review of the record, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact presented here.
The record has been adequately developed, Complainant was given ample notice of the AJ’s intent
to issue a decision without a hearing, she had the opportunity to respond, and she was given the
chance to engage in discovery before responding. We find that, even assuming all facts in favor of
Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor, as explained below. Therefore,
we find that the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.

Disparate Treatment (Reprisal Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10) 3

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference
of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co, v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry
may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov.
13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993);
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy,
EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).

3 We note that Complainant only raises the basis of reprisal on appeal, and does not specifically
challenge the Agency’s findings based on her race, national origin, sex, religion, color, disability,
and age. Complainant also does not address claims 3, 6, and 8 on appeal. We therefore decline to
address these bases and claims herein, as the Commission has the discretion to review only those
issues specifically raised in an appeal. EEOC Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614,
Chap. 9, at § IV.A (Aug. 5, 2015) (“Although the Commission has the right to review all of the
issues in a complaint on appeal, it also has the discretion not to do so and may focus only on the
issues specifically raised on appeal.”).
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Upon review, we find that assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination based on reprisal, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its actions. With regard to claim 1, the Branch Chief explained that telework and AWS had been
discontinued for the entire team based upon findings that the office was behind in work production.
In addressing claim 2, the Director averred that during this time, management had no policy in
place of converting sick leave to annual leave. With regard to claim 4, the Branch Chief explained
that the entire branch was reorganized, which resulted in an increased workload for everyone.
Regarding claims 7 and 10, the Branch Chief stated that Complainant did not have familiarity with
the TOPS database which is used to maintain inventory and billing. As for claim 9, the Branch
Chief attested that employees were noticing that Complainant would routinely arrive to work late,
and therefore Complainant was warned via email on October 4, 2012, that she would be placed on
AWOL the next time she arrived to work late.

The burden now shifts to Complainant to establish that the Agency’s nondiscriminatory reason
was a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, at 254. In an attempt to show pretext, Complainant cites
to the March 27, 2012, email sent to her from the Branch Chief mentioned above. Complainant
maintains that this email to her as well as other communications between the Branch Chief and the
Director clearly show that management was motivated by retaliatory animus. Complainant
contends that other employees were not performing as well as she was in TOPS, yet they were
allowed an AWS and allowed to Telework. Complainant states that the Branch Chief and the
Director’s assertion that her work contained deficiencies was simply not credible. Complainant
additionally asserts that the Branch Chief closely monitored her attendance while not doing the
same for other employees. Complainant states that C1 also maintained that he was subjected to
reprisal in a similar manner by the Branch Chief and the Director. In addition, Complainant argues
that her Level 3 Fully Successful annual performance rating for 2012 was lower than her previous
two annual ratings. Complainant cites to a statement from a GS-13 employee who believed that
management’s concerns about her performance were not justified.

Notwithstanding Complainant’s assertions, we find that she has not established that the Agency’s
reasons were a pretext for discrimination based on her protected EEO activity. In so finding, the
record reflects that telework and AWS was eventually suspended for all employees. In addition,
with respect to the Branch Chief’s March 27, 2012, email to Complainant about Complainant’s
prior EEO activity, like the AJ, we note the email only shows the Branch Chief acknowledging
that Complainant had mentioned her EEO activity to her. The email does not threaten or make
any negative light of Complainant’s EEO activity, but simply acknowledges that Complainant had
mentioned her prior EEO activity. We also note that there is no dispute that Complainant was
nevertheless allowed to take leave with regard to claim 2, and the Agency had just undergone a
reorganization regarding claim 4. In addressing claims 7 and 10, we note that the Director rated
five other employees at the same Level 3 Fully Successful rating during the Mid-Year Annual
Performance Appraisal review, and we find that Complainant has not established that her final
rating was motivated by her EEO activity. Moreover, with respect to claim 9, there is no dispute
that Complainant was late on the day in question and that she was provided with a warning
beforehand on October 4, 2012, that she would be placed on AWOL the next time she arrived to
work late.
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We note that another employee, who had never engaged in protected activity, averred that he was
also provided with a similar warning for being late. In sum, we find that Complainant did not
show that the Agency’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination or were motivated by retaliatory
animus.

Hostile Work Environment Harassment

Finally, to the extent that Complainant is alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment, the Commission finds that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems.
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), Complainant’s claim of hostile work environment must fail. See
Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 3,
1994). Complainant’s harassment claim is precluded based on the Commission’s finding that she
failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by retaliatory animus
with regard to claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01932923
(Sep. 21, 2000).

With respect to claims 11-14, assuming all of Complainant’s allegations occurred as alleged, we
note that not every unpleasant or undesirable act which occurs in the workplace constitutes a
discrimination violation. See Shealey v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC
Appeal No. 0120070356 (Apr. 18, 2011), request for recons. den'd, EEOC Request No.
0520110498 (Feb. 6, 2014); Epps v. Dep't of Trans., EEOC Appeal No. 0120093688 (Dec. 19,
2009). In this regard, we have held that the discrimination statutes are not civility codes. An
abusive or hostile working environment exists “when the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
condition of the victim’s employment.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. Even assuming that the conduct
alleged was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment, we find that
Complainant has not shown that any of the alleged incidents were motivated by retaliatory animus.
As such, we find that Complainant has not established that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment based on reprisal, as alleged.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order implementing the AJ’s
decision without a hearing finding that Complainant was not discriminated against as alleged.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be
submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131
M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted
in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

November 14, 2018
Date