Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 31, 2022

2021001409 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/944,454 07/17/2013 Scott Edwards Kelso RPS920130047USNP(710.238) 5004 58127 7590 03/31/2022 FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC 409 BROAD STREET PITTSBURGH, PA 15143 EXAMINER RICKS, DONNA J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2612 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2022 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SCOTT EDWARDS KELSO, TOBY JOHN BOWEN, ROBERT A. BOWSER, and MATTHEW LLOYD HAGENBUCH ____________ Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before MASHID D. SAADAT, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-20, which constitute all3 pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the (1) Final Office Action dated February 13, 2020 (“Final Act.”); (2) Appeal Brief dated June 29, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) Examiner’s Answer dated Oct. 26, 2020 (“Ans.”); and (4) Reply Brief dated December 21, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Lenovo (Singapore) PTE. LTD as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. 3 App identifies a claim 21 in the Appeal Brief at page 22. In the Answer, the Examiner notes there is no claim 21. Ans. 5. Appellant does not refer to Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 2 We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s disclosure is directed to synchronizing display screen refresh with input data. Abstract, Spec., ¶¶ 2-4, 10, and Figs. 1-6. Claim 1 is representative4 of the invention and reads as follows (emphases added): 1. A method, comprising: identifying, using a processor, a refresh interval of a display screen, wherein the refresh interval corresponds to a time period between display refreshes; synchronizing a buffering interval with the refresh interval, wherein the buffering interval corresponds to a time period between releases of data collected within a buffer, wherein the synchronizing comprises adjusting the buffering interval to match the refresh interval and storing data in a single buffer to correspond to a single display frame, wherein the synchronizing is completed by: beginning buffering, in a data buffer associated with an input surface, a set of input data derived from the input surface at substantially the beginning of the refresh interval of the display screen, wherein the beginning of the refresh interval corresponds to a top of a first display frame presentation on the display screen, wherein the top of the first display frame is detected based upon an interrupt signal provided to an operating system associated with the display screen; detecting a top of a second display frame presentation on the display screen and identifying the detected top of the second display frame presentation as a beginning of a refresh of the display screen; claim 21 in the Reply Brief and no claim 21 is set forth in the Appeal Brief, Claims Appendix. 30-36. 4 Based on Appellant’s arguments and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness rejection of claims 1, and 2-20 on the basis of representative claim 1. See Appeal Br. 4-23. Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 3 stopping buffering, responsive to the detecting a top of a second display frame presentation, of the set of input data in the data buffer; associating the set of input data with a display frame corresponding to the first display frame presentation; sequestering the set of input data in the data buffer per display frame based on the refresh interval; and providing a new data buffer for a new set of input data, the new data buffer being associated with the second display frame presentation, wherein the new data buffer is utilized until a new display frame is detected, each new display frame having a new associated data buffer; and in response to a request from an operating system, communicating the set of input data for a corresponding display frame to the operating system. Appeal Br. 30-31 (Claims Appendix). REFERENCE AND REJECTIONS The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Henry et al. US 2014/0232664 A1 Aug. 21, 2014 Motta et al. US 2014/0184517 Al July 3, 2014 Matsui et al. US 8,963,852 B2 Feb. 24, 2015 Kim et al. US 2007/0159467 Al July 12, 2007 Hendry et al. US 2010/0079445 Al Apr. 1, 2010 Shahparnia et al. US 2014/0354555 Al Dec. 4, 2014 Schillings et al US 2014/0204036 Al July. 24, 2014 Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 4 Claims 1-5, 8-15, and 18-205 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Henry, Motta, Matsui, Kim, and Hendry. Final Act. 3- 22. Claims 6 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Henry, Motta, Matsui, Kim, Hendry, and Shahparnia. Final Act. 22- 23. Claims 7 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Henry, Motta, Matsui, Kim, Hendry, Shahparnia, and Schillings. Final Act. 23-24. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief. Arguments which Appellant could have made, but did not make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). As discussed below, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions of Examiner error. We adopt as our own the findings, conclusions, and reasons set forth in the rejections from which the appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer, and provide the following for highlighting and emphasis. 5 The heading in the Final Action recites the rejected claims over these references as claims “1, 11, 20, 2, 3, 10, 12, 13 and 19.” Final Act. 3. The Final Action then identifies additional rejected claims 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 18, and 20 over the same references. Final Act. 16-22; Appeal Br. 21, footnote 1. Therefore, the rejection over these references applies to claims 1-5, 8-15, and 18-20. Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 5 In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Henry, Motta, Matsui, Kim, and Hendry teaches the limitations of representative claim 1 and provides reasoning to combine the teachings. Final Act. 3-22. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in combining the cited references and in finding the cited references teach the refresh interval and synchronizing features recited in representative claim 1 set forth below: identifying, using a processor, a refresh interval of a display screen, wherein the refresh interval corresponds to a time period between display refreshes; synchronizing a buffering interval with the refresh interval, wherein the buffering interval corresponds to a time period between releases of data collected within a buffer, wherein the synchronizing comprises adjusting the buffering interval to match the refresh interval and storing data in a single buffer to correspond to a single display frame. Appeal Br. 22-26 (also referred to as “disputed limitations”). The Examiner relies on the teachings of Henry and Matsui for the disputed limitations. Final Act. at 3-5 (citing Henry ¶¶ 21, 24; Matsui, 4:33-38, 4:63-5:2, 5:7-27; Fig. 2). The Examiner finds Henry teaches “identifying, using a processor, a refresh interval of a display screen.” Id. at 3 (citing Henry ¶¶ 21, 24). The Examiner finds Matsui teaches “wherein the refresh interval corresponds to a time period between display refreshes.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Matsui 4:33-38). The Examiner finds Matsui teaches “synchronizing a buffering interval with the refresh interval, wherein the buffering interval corresponds to a time period between releases of data collected within a buffer.” Id. at 4 (citing Matsui 4:63-5:2, 5:7-13; Fig. 2). For this limitation, the Examiner finds, during the Matsui reading period (buffering interval), touch information is read out and stored (buffered) to Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 6 the memory part. Id. The Examiner finds the reading part has a predetermined reading period (time period between releases of data collected within the buffer). Id. The Examiner finds Matsui teaches “wherein the synchronizing comprises adjusting the buffering interval to match the refresh interval and storing data in a single buffer to correspond to a single display frame.” Id. at 4-5 (citing Matsui 5:14-27). For this limitation, the Examiner finds the reading operation synchronizes with the frame period of the LCD and the memory can be a buffer. Id. The Examiner finds the Matsui reading operation (buffering interval) is adjusted to synchronize (match) with the frame period (refresh interval). Id. Appellant argues Henry is directed to mitigating the amount of information per frame and does not teach “synchronizing the buffering interval with the refresh interval” as recited in the disputed limitations. Appeal Br. 23-24 (citing Henry ¶¶ 7, 19). According to Appellant: Since Henry is directed to mitigating the amount of information per frame, Henry does not synchronize the buffering interval with the refresh interval. Rather, Henry synchronizes “the display and touch recognition systems.” Henry at [0007]. Henry states the “terms ‘synchronized’ and the like are not intended to denote any synchronization between signals (e.g., clock signals) of the display controller and the touch controller. Instead, this terminology denotes a cooperation (e.g., via direct sharing of information) of the display controller and the touch controller such that operation of the touch controller at least partially depends on a state of the display controller and, potentially, vice versa.” Henry at [0022]. Thus, Henry explicitly states that the synchronization taught in Henry is not the same synchronization as found in the claimed imitations. As stated in the claims, the synchronization is used in the traditional sense which is distinguished from in Henry. Specifically, the claims state “wherein the synchronizing comprises adjusting the buffering interval to match the refresh interval and storing data in a single Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 7 buffer to correspond to a single display frame.” Claim 1. Henry explicitly states that the synchronization as taught in Henry is not this type of synchronization. Thus, even if any of the remaining references teach such a synchronization, these teachings cannot be combined with Henry because Henry specifically distinguishes from such a synchronization. Id. at 24−25. Appellant argues “at best, Matsui teaches that ‘reading operation for touch information of the touch sensor 10 synchronizes with the frame period of the LCD device 70.’” Appeal Br. 25-26 (citing Matsui 4:67-5:2). According to Appellant, a reading operation synchronizing with a frame period is not the same as synchronizing by “adjusting the buffering interval to match the refresh interval and storing data in a single buffer to correspond to a single display frame” as recited in the disputed limitation. Id. In the Answer, the Examiner finds that Henry teaches that synchronization denotes cooperation between the display controller and the touch controller such that the touch controller depends at least partially on the state of the display controller. Ans. 6-7 (citing Henry ¶¶ 7, 22). The Examiner finds the state of the display controller indicates, for example, whether the LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) is in a vertical blanking period. Id. at 7. The Examiner finds touch recognition (or the reading of touch input) is modified based on the state of the display controller. Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates Henry is directed to mitigating the amount of information per frame, and Henry does not synchronize the buffering interval with the refresh interval as recited in the disputed limitations. Reply Br. 25-26 (citing Henry ¶¶ 7, 22). Rather, according to Appellant, Henry synchronizes “the display and touch recognition systems.” Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 8 Id. at 26. Appellant reiterates that Matsui teaching a reading operation synchronizing with a frame period is not the same as synchronizing by “adjusting the buffering interval to match the refresh interval and storing data in a single buffer to correspond to a single display frame.” Id. at 27. Regarding the combination of Matsui and Henry, the Examiner finds it would improve the detection of the coordinates of the user’s touch input thereby improving the reliability of the touch screen display. Final Act. 12- 13. Appellant argues the Examiner presents an unsupported conclusory statement. Appeal Br. 22-26. Appellant argues, as discussed supra, Henry’s synchronization is a cooperation and not the synchronization in the claims. Id. at 24 (citing Henry ¶¶ 7, 19, 22). According to Appellant, “even if any of the remaining references teach such a synchronization, these teachings cannot be combined with Henry because Henry distinguishes from such a synchronization.” Id. at 24-25. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree, instead, with the findings and conclusion of the Examiner. The combination of Henry and Matsui teaches the synchronizing and refreshing as set forth in the disputed limitations. Henry teaches many forms of synchronization and refreshing. For example, Henry, Abstr., ¶¶ 7, 21, 22, 24. Henry notes in paragraph 22 that the term “synchronized” is not intended to denote any synchronization between signals (e.g. clock signal) of the display controller and the touch controller. Henry adds this technology denotes a cooperation (e.g., via direct sharing of information) of the display controller such that operation of the touch controller at least partially depends on a state of the display controller and potentially, vice versa. However, synchronizing in the disputed Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 9 limitations do not recite clock signals nor exclude the cooperation synchronization of Henry. Matsui also teaches synchronizing and refreshing, and teaches a memory part 24 that serves as a buffer for the reading operation. Matsui, 4:61-5:35, 7:11-18. Regarding the combination of the Henry and Matsui, both are directed to synchronizing and refreshing touch input and the state of a display, and the Examiner provides sufficient evidence to establish why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the teachings. Appellant argues an unreasonably narrow teaching of the cited references to attempt to limit the teaching to the express disclosures, and asserts an overly demanding standard of obviousness. However, we note: [t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection must be based on: [S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness[]. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 10 On the record before us, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the Examiner provides sufficient evidence to support the findings and conclusions. Therefore, based on the record, we sustain the rejection of representative claim 1, and claims 2-20. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we sustain the obviousness rejection of representative claim 1, and claims 2-20. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-5, 8-15, 18-20 103 Henry, Motta, Matsui, Kim, Hendry 1-5, 8- 15, 18- 20 6, 16 103 Henry, Motta, Matsui, Kim, Hendry, Shahparnia 6, 16 7, 17 103 Henry, Motta, Matsui, Kim, Hendry, Shahparnia, Schillings 7, 17 Overall Outcome 1-20 Appeal 2021-001409 Application 13/944,454 11 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED