Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 29, 2021

2020000764 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/160,752 01/22/2014 XIN FENG RPS920130186-US-NP 8465
63203 7590 07/29/2021
ROGITZ & ASSOCIATES
4420 HOTEL CIRCLE COURT
SUITE 230
SAN DIEGO, CA 92108
EXAMINER
HASTY, NICHOLAS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2178
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
John@rogitz.com
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte XIN FENG, MEI-WEN SUN, and JAMES ANTHONY HUNT
____________________

Appeal 2020-000764
Application 14/160,752
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and
JAMES R. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15 through 18, 22 through 25,
and 27 through 30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). According to Appellant, Lenovo (Singapore) PTE. Ltd. is the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a multifunction apparatus with a touch-
enabled display. The apparatus includes instructions to execute a
handwriting recognition engine automatically without requiring user
selection of a handwriting recognition application to start the handwriting
recognition engine. See Spec. Abstract. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. An apparatus, comprising:
at least one processor;
a touch-enabled display operatively coupled to the
at least one processor;
storage accessible to the at least one processor and
bearing instructions executable by the at least one
processor to:
execute a handwriting recognition engine at least
in part by starting the handwriting recognition engine at
boot time of the apparatus automatically without
requiring user selection of a handwriting recognition
application to start the handwriting recognition engine;
receive input from the touch-enabled display;
determine whether the input indicates a character;
and
responsive to a determination that the input
indicates a character, automatically store the character;
wherein a file is automatically created responsive
to the detem1ination and the character is automatically
stored in the file.

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REJECTION2
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15 through 18,
22 through 25, and 27 through 30 based upon 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Raghupathy (US 7,123,770 B2; iss. Oct. 17, 2006), Yun
(US 2012/0302167 A1; pub. Nov. 29, 2012), and Kim (US 2014/0059493
A1; pub. Feb. 27, 2014). Final Act. 2–10.

Independent Claim 1
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant argues that the claim
recites “starting the handwriting recognition engine at boot time of the
apparatus” which is not taught by the combination of Raghupathy, Yun, and
Kim. Appeal Br. 4–7. Specifically, Appellant argues Kim does not teach
that the handwriting recognition program is loaded when the terminal is
turned on in paragraph 40 (the citation the Examiner relies upon to teach this
limitation). Appeal Br. 5. Appellant argues that at best this paragraph
indicates that the user interface and various applications are loaded into
memory. Appeal Br. 5. Further, Appellant argues that merely loading the
programs into memory for execution does not meet the claim as “it is
doubtful the skilled artisan would consider loading a host of applications in
memory as actually starting each application itself since they are different
concepts.” Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis omitted). Further, Appellant argues that
the Examiner’s proffered motivation to combine the references is deficient

2 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief filed June 10, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed November 7, 2019 (“Reply Br.”); Final
Office Action mailed December 13, 2018 (“Final Act.”); and the Examiner’s
Answer mailed September 20, 2019 (“Ans.”).
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as “motivation to combine Rag [Raghupathy] with Yun ‘in order to expand a
user ability to take notes’ per Rag, the alleged motivation is taken from
Rag’s own Background and Rag then attempts to itself resolve the problems
set forth in the Background.” Appeal Br. 9 (emphasis omitted).
Additionally, Appellant argues that “motivation to combine Rag with Kim
‘in order to allow the user to access functions at startup’ allegedly per Kim,
it too fails to rise to legal sufficiency since it fails to indicate why Kim
would have been sought in the first place when seeking to implement Rag.”
Appeal Br. 9–10 (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner finds that Raghupathy teaches a touch enabled device
which includes a processor and instructions to determine whether a touch
input is a character using handwriting recognition. Final Act. 3. The
Examiner finds that Raghupathy does not explicitly identify that the
character determination is automatically stored, or that the handwriting
recognition program is at least in part started at boot time. Final Act. 3. The
Examiner finds that Yun teaches a file is automatically created and stored
when a character is determined and that Kim teaches executing the
handwriting engine in part during boot time. Final Act. 3–4 (citing Yun ¶
160, Kim ¶ 40). In response to Appellant’s arguments the Examiner states:
Applicant uses the generic and commonly known term
“boot time”. While applicant defines “boot time” as starting
when the user presses the power button (Specification page 11
line 5), applicant does not clearly define when “boot time”
ends. Therefor “boot time” could be anytime after user initiates
booting.
Ans 3 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1. The disputed limitation in
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claim 1 states “execute a handwriting recognition engine at least in part by
starting the handwriting recognition engine at boot time of the apparatus
automatically without requiring user selection of a handwriting recognition
application to start the handwriting recognition engine.” Thus, claim 1
recites that for the handwriting execution engine, some part of execution
begins at boot time and that execution begins without user selection of the
handwriting engine. As the Examiner identifies, “boot time” is discussed on
page 11 of Appellant’s originally filed Specification which states “at boot
time of the smart phone 210 a handwriting recognition engine is
automatically started without user command to do so (e.g.[,] other than
selecting a power button on the device to initiate booting).” Appellant’s
Specification provides no other discussion of boot time and what event
marks the end of the “boot time.” We concur with the Examiner’s
interpretation of the claim term “boot time” as starting with the user pressing
the power button as this is consistent with the claim and the Specification.
We, note that Appellant has not proffered an interpretation of the term other
than to argue on pages 2 and 3 of the Reply Brief, that the Examiner’s
construction of “boot time” to be any time a computer is operating after
booting is unreasonably broad. In the absence of these definitions, we
construe “boot time” to be the time it takes for a device to be ready to
operate after the power has been turned on, i.e., boot time ends when the
device is operational. This is consistent with Appellant’s Specification
which at page 11 and Figure 3, depicts operation of the device after the steps
starting the handwriting recognition application. See Fig. 3 (Step 302,
receiving signals from touch screen occurs after step 300 starting
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handwriting recognition).
Applying this interpretation of the claim term “boot time,” we concur
with the Examiner’s finding that Kim teaches beginning execution of the
handwriting engine at boot time. We note that claim 1 recites “execut[ing] .
. . at least in part by starting the handwriting . . . engine at boot time” and as
such does not require the engine to be fully executing, just a part of it. Kim
teaches the operating system, a handwriting recognition engine, applications,
and a user interface are loaded into memory from a storage unit for
execution when the terminal is turned on. Kim ¶ 40. Further, Kim teaches
the operation of the terminal is shown in Figure 2, which involves sensing a
touch, identifying the movement of the touch, converting the movement
corresponding to the touch to text and based upon this executing a
corresponding function. See Fig. 2 and ¶ 49 (see also
¶¶ 7–12 which discusses a user interfacing with a base screen, through touch
inputs to directly access and execute applications). Thus, Kim teaches that
the handwriting recognition engine, which converts the touch to text is
executing (and operates in conjunction with the touch interface) prior to the
execution of any functions. As such, we find that Kim teaches the
handwriting recognition engine has begun execution at boot time (before
device to be ready to operate and after the power has been turned on) and are
not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding that Kim teaches the disputed
limitation.
We are similarly not persuaded the Examiner erred in combining the
teachings of Raghupathy, Yun, and Kim. Initially, we note that the
Appellant’s argument’s apply a strict application of the Teaching,
Suggestion, Motivation (“TSM”) test. In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected
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the rigid application of the TSM test in favor of a more expansive and
flexible approach to the determination of obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). The determination of obviousness
may be supported with an “articulated reasoning with [a] rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418
(citation omitted). Here as discussed above, the Examiner found that
Raghupathy does not explicitly identify that the character determination is
automatically stored, and that Yun teaches automatically created and stored
when a character is determined. Appellant has not contested these findings,
and we concur with these findings. We additionally note that Raghupathy
states “[t]he user 1300 enters ink strokes into the system 1310 . . . and the
ink strokes are stored by the application program 1320” and “the new
strokes or changes may be ignored, or they may be stored in a temporary
buffer memory.” See Raghupathy col. 10, ll. 29–33 and col. 11, ll. 61–63.
Thus, as Raghupathy suggests the very feature which the Examiner is
relying upon Yun to teach. As such, we consider the Examiner’s rationale to
combine the features to be sufficient to establish obviousness.
Further, as discussed above the Examiner found that Raghupathy does
not teach that the handwriting recognition program is at least in part started
at boot time and that Kim teaches executing the handwriting engine in part
during boot time. The Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to
include the beginning execution at boot time as taught by Kim into
Raghupathy as it would “allow the user to access functions at startup.” Final
Act. 4 (citing Kim ¶ 7). We concur with the Examiner’s conclusion. As
discussed above, we concur with the Examiner that Kim teaches that the
claimed step of executing the handwriting recognition engine at boot time,
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and that Kim teaches that this allows more direct access to the applications
of the device. Thus, we consider the Examiner to have shown that stating at
boot up to be known and to have known results. The Supreme Court has
said, that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results” (KSR 550 U.S. at 416), and the claimed invention recites merely
“the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” KSR 550 U.S. at 417. As such, we concur with the Examiner’s
rationale that the skilled artisan would consider using Kim’s teaching of
beginning execution at boot time with the teachings of Raghupathy and Kim.
Thus, the combination would allow the user to access the handwriting
engine from start up/boot time, and provide the user with the predictable
result of having more direct access to the functions of the device. We agree
with the Examiner that this is a reasoned rationale based upon factual
determinations. For the above reasons, Appellant’s argument has not
persuaded us of error and we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of claim 1.

Dependent Claim 6
With respect to dependent claim 6, Appellant argues that the claim
recites receiving an input on a home screen presenting icons associated with
applications which is not taught by the combination of Raghupathy, Yun,
and Kim. Appeal Br. 10–11. Specifically, Appellant argues that Yun, in
paragraph 280 (the citation the Examiner relies upon to teach this
limitation), does not mention a home screen nor has the Examiner performed
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a claim interpretation of the term “home screen.” Appeal Br. 11.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s argument finding that the
claimed home screen of claim 6 is taught in Yun and in Kim. Ans. 4 (citing
Yun Fig. 67, ¶¶ 278, 280, Kim Figs. 3A, 3B ¶ 49).
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 6. Initially, we note that Appellant’s
Specification does not define or discuss what constitutes a “home screen”
other than originally filed claim 6. Thus, we construe “home screen” as
being the name of a screen which presents icons associated with
applications. We concur with the Examiner that Kim teaches such a screen
in Figure 3A and paragraph 49, which describe icons, associated with
applications shown on the display screen.3 Accordingly, Appellant has not
persuaded us of error, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6.

Independent Claim 9
With respect to independent claim 9, Appellant argues that the claim
recites providing an alert that the drawing has been stored, which is not
taught by the combination of Raghupathy, Yun, and Kim. Appeal Br. 11–
12. Specifically, Appellant argues that Yun, which the Examiner relies upon
to teach this feature, does not. Appeal Br. 11–13 (citing Yun Figs. 89, 90,
¶¶ 347, 349, 350, 353). Further, Appellant repeats the arguments directed to
the motivation to combine the references, discussed above with respect to

3 We further note, that in as much as Appellant intended the limitation of a
home screen to be limited to a screen upon which an application always
starts, Yun also teaches this feature in paragraph 6.
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claim 1. Appeal Br. 13–15.
The Examiner finds that Yun teaches providing alerts when certain
actions take place including storing during handwriting analysis. Final Act.
5 (citing Yun ¶ 347), Ans. 4 (citing Yun ¶¶ 160, 347).
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection. We have reviewed the cited teachings of Yun and
concur with the Examiner’s finding that Yun teaches providing such alerts.
We note that Figures 95 and 99 of Yun further support the Examiner’s
finding as Figure 95, item 151-22 (described in ¶ 369), and Figure 99
(described in ¶¶ 377–378) depicts such an alert. Thus, Appellant’s
arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding that Yun
teaches providing an alert that the drawing has been stored as recited in
claim 9. Further, as discussed above with respect to claim 1, Appellant’s
arguments directed to the motivation to combine the teachings of
Raghupathy, Yun, and Kim are not persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 9.

Dependent Claim 10
With respect to dependent claim 10, Appellant argues that the claim
recites “starting the handwriting recognition engine at boot time of the
apparatus” and as such the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 is in error for
the same reasons as claim 1. Appeal Br. 15–16.
This argument has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 10. As discussed above, Appellant’s arguments with
respect to claim 1 have not persuaded us of error. Accordingly, we sustain
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the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 for the same reasons as claim 1.

Independent Claim 16
With respect to independent claim 16, Appellant argues that the claim
recites “execut[ing] a handwriting recognition engine responsive to a
command to initiate booting of the device, the command being received
based on selection of a power button on the device” which is not taught by
the combination of Raghupathy, Yun, and Kim. Appeal Br. 16–21.
Specifically, Appellant argues that Kim does not teach that the handwriting
recognition program is executed in response to a command to initiate
booting the device, asserting a rationale similar to that discussed with
respect to claim 1. Appeal Br. 16–19. Further, Appellant repeats the
arguments directed to the motivation to combine the references, discussed
above with respect to claim 1. Appeal Br. 19–21.
These arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 16. Claim 16 is different from the scope of claim 1 in that
it does not recite the execution of the handwriting recognition engine during
boot time but rather recites executing the handwriting recognition engine
command responsive to booting the device. As discussed above with respect
to claim 1, Kim the operating system, a handwriting recognition engine,
applications, and a user interface are loaded into memory from a storage unit
for execution when the terminal is turned on. Kim ¶ 40. Further, Kim
teaches the operation of the terminal is shown in Figure 2, which involves
sensing a touch, identifying the movement of the touch, converting it to text
and based upon this executing a function corresponding to the text. See Kim
Fig. 2 and ¶ 49 (see also ¶¶ 7–12 which discusses a user interfacing with a
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base screen, through touch inputs directly through the access and execute
applications). As such, we consider Kim to teach that the execution of the
handwriting recognition engine, which converts the touch to text, is executed
(and operates in conjunction with the touch interface) prior to the execution
of any functions and in response to the power being turned on. Thus, we
concur with the Examiner’s finding that Kim teaches the claimed feature of
executing the handwriting recognition engine command responsive to
booting the device and are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments.
Further, as discussed above with respect to claim 1, Appellant’s arguments
directed to the motivation to combine the teachings of Raghupathy, Yun, and
Kim are not persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 16.

Dependent Claim 22
With respect to independent claim 22, Appellant argues that the claim
recites presenting an alert that a file has been created, which is not taught by
the combination of Raghupathy, Yun, and Kim. Appeal Br. 21–23.
Specifically, Appellant argues that Yun, which the Examiner relies upon to
teach this feature, does not, and repeats the same arguments discussed above
with respect to claim 9. Appeal Br. 21–23 (citing Yun Figs. 89, 90, ¶¶ 347,
349, 350, 353).
This argument has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 22. Claim 22 recites presenting an alert that the file
(which per claim 1, stores the input character) has been created. As
discussed above with respect to claim 9, we concur with the Examiner’s
finding that Yun teaches presetting an alert that the handwriting has been
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saved (¶ 369 identifies the character is saved in a file) and that Figures 95
and 99 of Yun further support the Examiner’s finding. Accordingly,
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error and we sustain, the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 22.

Dependent Claim 25
With respect to independent claim 25, Appellant argues that the claim
recites “responsive to the determination that the input indicates a character,
launch an application different from the handwriting recognition engine,”
which is not taught by the combination of Raghupathy, Yun, and Kim.
Appeal Br. 23–24. Specifically, Appellant argues that Yun, paragraph 396
(the citation the Examiner relies upon to teach this limitation), discusses
using the handwriting function with the calendar application which is
already running, and thus does not teach launching an application different
from the calendar application. Appeal Br. 24.
Appellant’s arguments have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection. In rejecting claim 25, the Examiner cites to paragraph 396 of Yun
as teaching the disputed limitation. Final Act. 9, Ans. 5. We have reviewed
the cited teachings of Yun and agree with Appellant the cited teaching of
Yun involves the input handwriting and an already running calendar
program. As such, we disagree with the Examiner’s finding that Yun
teaches the claimed feature, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 25. We do however note that, should there be further prosecution
of this application the Examiner may want to consider whether there are
other teachings in the references which meet this claim (see, e.g., Kim Fig.
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6, step 650).

Dependent Claim 29
With respect to independent claim 29, Appellant argues that the claim
recites presenting an alert that a file has been created, which is not taught by
the combination of Raghupathy, Yun, and Kim. Appeal Br. 24–26.
Specifically, Appellant argues that Yun, which the Examiner relies upon to
teach this feature, does not, and repeats the same arguments discussed above
with respect to claims 9 and 22. Appeal Br. 24–26 (citing Yun Figs. 89, 90,
¶¶ 347, 349, 350, 353).
This argument has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 29. Claim 29 recites presenting an alert that the file
(which per claim 16, stores the input character) has been created. As
discussed above with respect to claim 9, we concur with the Examiner’s
finding that Yun teaches presetting an alert that the handwriting has been
saved (¶ 369 identifies the character is saved in a file) and that Figures 95
and 99 of Yun further support the Examiner’s finding. Accordingly,
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error, and we sustain, the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 29.

Remainder of the dependent claims
Appellant has not presented separate arguments with respect to
dependent claims 3, 4, 7, 13, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24, 27, 28, and 30.
Accordingly, we sustain this rejection for the same reasons as discussed with
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respect to independent claims 1, 9, and 16 from which they depend.

DECISION SUMMARY
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13,
15 through 18, 22 through 24, and 27 through 30.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 13,
15–18, 22–
25, 27–30
103 Raghupathy, Yun,
Kim
1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 13, 15–
18, 22–24,
27–30
25
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2018).

AFFIRMED IN PART