Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 26, 2020

14633927 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/633,927 02/27/2015 Grigori Zaitsev RPS920140118USNP(710.383) 6722
58127 7590 05/26/2020
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
EXAMINER
AZARI, SEPEHR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2621
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/26/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GRIGORI ZAITSEV, RUSSELL SPEIGHT VANBLON,
JOSHUA NEIL NOVAK, and JIANBANG ZHANG
____________

Appeal 2019-002206
Application 14/633,927
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Lenovo
(Singapore) PTE LTD. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-002206
Application 14/633,927

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The present invention relates generally to accepting a pen input,
determining a modifier key characteristic of the pen input, and executing a
modifier key function associated with the pen input. See Spec. ¶ 3.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method, comprising:
accepting, at an input surface, a single pen input at an on-
screen keyboard location, wherein the single pen input comprises
input at a single non-modifier soft key of the on-screen keyboard and
wherein the single non-modifier soft key corresponds to a non-
modifier key default function;
determining, using a processor of an electronic device, a
control key characteristic of the single pen input, wherein the control
key characteristic does not comprise input at a modifier key and
wherein the control key characteristic identifies a modification to the
non-modifier key default function associated with the soft key of the
on-screen keyboard;
and
executing, using the processor, a modified key function
for the soft key that is different from the non-modifier key default
function associated with the soft key based on the single pen input and
the control key characteristic.

Appellant appeals the following rejections:
R1. Claims 1–6, 11–16, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Gough (US 5,603,053, Feb. 11, 1997),
Akkarakaran (US 2014/0329593 A1, Nov. 6, 2014), and Nurmi (US
2009/0167702 A1, July 2, 2009);
R2. Claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Gough, Akkarakaran, and Nurmi, and Park (US
2013/0050141 A1, Feb. 28, 2013); and
R3. Claims 9, 10, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Gough, Akkarakaran, and Nurmi, Park, and Cox, Jr.
Appeal 2019-002206
Application 14/633,927

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(US 6,462,760 B1, Oct. 8, 2002).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Did the Examiner provide an articulated reasoning with the
requisite rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness?
The Examiner concludes that combining the teachings of Gough and
Akkarakaran “would provide a user with simple means of producing text
output using an on-screen keyboard that functions indistinguishably from a
physical keyboard.” Final Act. 5–6 (citing Gough 7:5–10).
Appellant contends that “neither Gough nor Akkarakaran supports the
conclusion that the combination of the teachings would ‘provide a user with
simple means of producing text output using an on-screen keyboard that
functions indistinguishably from a physical keyboard.’ . . . such a motivation
is completely irrelevant.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant also contends that “one
skilled in the art would not combine the teachings of Akkarakaran with
Gough because those combined teachings would not result in the claimed
limitations” (id. at 16), and “even if the references could be combined, there
must be a reasonable expectation that the combination would be successful.”
Id. at 18. We disagree with Appellant.
As an initial point, we note that although “[t]he motivation need not
be found in the references sought to be combined, but may be found in any
number of sources, including common knowledge, the prior art as a whole,
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Application 14/633,927

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or the nature of the problem itself” (KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 421 (2007), the Examiner found the rationale for combining in Gough.
See Final Act. 6 (citing Gough 7:5–10) ( “Selection of the keys of the
keyboard image 60 by stylus 38 produces text output directly to a chosen
location of an active application program, i.e., the keyboard image 60 is
indistinguishable from a physical keyboard as far as the application program
is concerned.”). As such, we find unavailing Appellant’s contention that
Gough does not support the Examiner’s motivation, given that such a
motivation stems directly from Gough’s disclosure.
Secondly, Appellant fails to explain why the combined teachings
“would not result in the claimed limitations” (Appeal Br. 16). For instance,
the Examiner relies upon Gough to teach a single pen input, for a single non-
modifier soft key) at an on-screen keyboard location (Final Act. 4–5, citing
Gough 5:24–40, 7:5–14) (“Selection of the keys of the keyboard image 60
by stylus 38 produces text output directly to a chosen location of an active
application program, i.e., the keyboard image 60 is indistinguishable from a
physical keyboard.”); the Examiner relies on Akkarakaran to teach a virtual
keyboard providing lower case alphabet characters as a default (Final Act. 5,
citing Akkarakaran ¶ 42) (“Fig. 3A illustrates an on-screen GUI 300
comprising a default virtual keyboard 310 including lower case alphabet
characters.”); and the Examiner relies on Nurmi to teach control key
characteristics that do not comprise input at a modifier key (Final Act. 6,
citing Nurmi ¶ 58) (“the software could be programmed to input text, such
as pressing a virtual keyboard on a touch screen, wherein a first sensed angle
of the stylus could give a normal lower case letter, a second sensed angle of
the stylus at the same location could give a capital letter”).
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Appellant’s arguments not only fail to rebut these specific teachings,
but Appellant’s arguments also do not take into account what the collective
teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the
art and are therefore ineffective to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of
obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test
for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that
the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references
would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”) (citations
omitted). This reasoning is applicable here.
Finally, Appellant’s aforementioned contention that “there must be a
reasonable expectation that the combination would be successful” (Appeal
Br. 18) is conclusory and fails to rebut the Examiner’s findings, which
persuasively demonstrate that there would have been a reasonable
expectation of success (Final Act. 4–6). Mere attorney arguments and
conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled
to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
Because the Examiner has found actual teachings in the prior art and
has provided an appropriate rationale for the combination, we find that the
Examiner has provided sufficient motivation for modifying Gough with the
teachings of Akkarakaran and Nurmi.

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Application 14/633,927

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Issue 2: Did the Examiner err in finding that Nurmi cures the
deficiencies of Gough and Akkarakaran by teaching a control key
characteristic of the single pen input, as set forth in claim 1?
Appellant contends that “Nurmi fails to overcome the deficiencies of
Gough and Akkarakaran at least because Nurmi merely teaches a system that
changes the way that information is shown on the screen based upon the way
that a stylus is used with respect to the screen. . . . depending on the angle of
the stylus with respect to the screen.” Appeal Br. 21. Appellant further
contends that “Nurmi has no teachings related to an on-screen keyboard
containing soft keys and modification of soft key functions based upon
control key characteristics.” Id. We disagree with Appellant.
As noted supra, Nurmi teaches “a virtual keyboard on a touch screen,
wherein a first sensed angle of the stylus could give a normal lower case
letter, [and] a second sensed angle of the stylus at the same location could
give a capital letter.” Nurmi ¶ 58. Here, the Examiner concludes, and we
agree, that “Nurmi teaches in ¶ 58 that such a modified function may be
provided simply by changing an angle of the stylus while providing a single
input on a non-modifier key (alphabet key) without the need for a modifier
key such as Shift or Control . . . thereby making it faster and easier for the
user to input such modified inputs.” Ans. 11–12.
As a result, we find unavailing Appellant’s contention that “Nurmi
has no teachings related to . . . soft keys and modification of soft key
functions based upon control key characteristics,” given the aforementioned
disclosure in Nurmi.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Appellant’s arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of independent
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Application 14/633,927

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claim 11 and 20 rely on the same arguments as for claim 1, and Appellant
does not argue separate patentability for the dependent claims. We,
therefore, also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–20.

CONCLUSION
Appellant fails to demonstrated that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1–20 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over at least
Gough, Akkarakaran, and Nurmi.
As a result, the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 is affirmed.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 11–16, 20 103 Gough,
Akkarakaran,
Nurmi
1–6,
11–16, 20

7, 8, 17, 18 103 Gough,
Akkarakaran,
Nurmi, Park
7, 8, 17,
18

9, 10, 19 103 Gough,
Akkarakaran,
Nurmi, Park, Cox
9, 10, 19
Overall
Outcome
1–20

No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED