LeNoir Weibel, Appellant,v.Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 4, 1999
01983790 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 4, 1999)

01983790

06-04-1999

LeNoir Weibel, Appellant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


LeNoir Weibel v. Department of Agriculture

01983790

June 4, 1999

LeNoir Weibel, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01983790

v. ) Agency No. 940729

)

Daniel R. Glickman, )

Secretary, )

Department of Agriculture, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final agency

decision (FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq. The final agency decision was

dated January 30, 1998. The appeal was postmarked on April 17, 1998.

The timely<1> appeal, therefore, is accepted in accordance with EEOC

Order No. 960.001, as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed one of

appellant's allegations for failure to state a claim and the other for

untimely EEO Counselor contact.

BACKGROUND

Appellant began work on the National Appeals Staff in 1988. In 1991,

she applied for four GS-13 positions on the National Appeals Staff.

Appellant was not selected for any of these vacancies. The agency

advertised one GM-13 position (announcement #92-96JJ) on October 13, 1992.

Appellant did not apply for the vacancy. The position closed on November

13, 1992. A candidate was selected for the position. Appellant asserts

that she did not apply for the GM-13 position because of the previous

four rejections. Appellant initially contacted an EEO counselor on

February 8, 1994. Appellant filed a formal complaint on May 12, 1994,

alleging discrimination on the basis of age (57) when:

(1) she was not selected for any of the four GS-13 positions to which

she applied in 1991; and

(2) she did not apply for a single GM-13 position in October and November

of 1992 because she had been non-selected in the past.

In its final agency decision, dated January 30, 1998, the agency

dismissed both allegations in appellant's complaint. The agency

dismissed allegation (1) because the appellant did not timely raise the

four non-selections with an EEO Counselor. It dismissed allegation (2)

for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Allegation (1)

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) provides that an aggrieved

person must initiate contact with an EEO Counselor within 45 days of

the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or within 45 days of

the effective date of the personnel action. The Commission has adopted

a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts"

standard) for determining whether contact with an EEO Counselor is timely.

Ball v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880247 (July 6, 1988).

Under this standard, the regulatory limitations period "is not triggered

until complainant reasonably suspects discrimination, but before all the

facts that would support a charge of discrimination have become apparent."

Bracken v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05900065 (March 29,

1990).

The Commission finds that the agency properly dismissed allegation

(1) for untimely EEO counselor contact. The appellant contacted the

counselor more than 45 calendar days after the allegedly discriminatory

non-selections. Appellant applied for the four positions in 1991, but

did not contact a counselor until February 8, 1994. The denial of these

positions were discrete actions which should have alerted the appellant

to the need to assert her rights.

Allegation (2)

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides that an agency

shall dismiss a complaint which fails to state a claim, pursuant

to �1614.103. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

national origin, age or disabling condition. �1614.103; �1614.106(a).

The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long defined an

"aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss with

respect to a term, condition or privilege of employment for which there

is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049

(April 21, 1994).

The Commission has held that:

Normally, a candidate for a vacancy who does not follow the correct

application procedures may be eliminated from consideration for the

position without raising an inference of discrimination. However, under

unusual circumstances, a complainant may still maintain a discrimination

claim even if he or she failed to properly apply for a position, if it

can be proven that he or she was discouraged from applying by the agency

or that the application process was informal and secretive.

Ozinga v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05910416 (May

13, 1991)(citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987);

Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir. 1984);

Ferguson v. du Pont Co., 560 F.Supp 1172, 1192-1193 (D.Del. 1983).

In the instant case, appellant did not apply for the 1993 GM-13 vacancy

and therefore the fact that she was not hired for the position does not

raise an inference of discrimination. Appellant has not proven that

she was discouraged by the agency from applying. She notes only that

she did not apply because of the previous rejections. It was not the

agency, however, that actively discouraged her from applying for the

GM-13 positions. The Commission finds, therefore, that allegation (2)

fails to state a claim.

In her complaint, appellant stated that she had been denied a GS-13

position since 1991. A fair reading could suggest that she was alleging

a continuing violation of employment discrimination. When a continuing

violation is properly alleged, the normal time for filing a formal

EEO complaint is suspended. Rowan v. Department of Transportation,

EEOC Request No. 05940661 (February 24, 1995). If at least one of the

acts complained of falls within the limitations period, a complaint

filed at any time within this period is timely filed with respect to

all acts which are part of the continuing violation. Id. An essential

ingredient of a continuing violation is an analogous theme uniting the

timely and untimely acts of alleged discrimination by the employer into

a continuous pattern. Id.

In the present case, appellant suggests that, since 1991, the agency

engaged in a pattern of denying her GS-13 status. We find that appellant

has failed to establish that a continuing violation has occurred.

As previously noted, a continuing violation requires that at least one

of the alleged discriminatory acts must fall within the time limitation

period. Appellant sought EEO counseling on February 8, 1994; therefore,

the time limitation period began 45 days earlier on December 25, 1993.

Allegation (2) was the only matter that occurred during the period in

question. Since, however, we have affirmed the agency's dismissal of

allegation (2) on the grounds that it failed to state a claim, we find

that the appellant does not have a timely allegation remaining. She has

failed, therefore, to establish a continuing violation in this case.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 4, 1999

______________ ___________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 The agency did not supply a copy of a certified mail return receipt or

any other material capable of establishing the date appellant received the

FAD. Since the agency failed to submit evidence of the date of receipt,

the Commission presumes that appellant's appeal was filed within thirty

(30) days of receipt of the agency's final decision. See 29 C.F.R.

�1614.402(a).