LEGGETT & PLATT, INC.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 17, 2018

367 N.L.R.B. 51 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

367 NLRB No. 51
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Leggett & Platt, Inc. and International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM),
AFL–CIO. Cases 09–CA–194057, 09–CA–
196426, and 09–CA–196608
December 17, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS MCFERRAN
AND KAPLAN
On October 2, 2017, Administrative Law Judge An-
drew S. Gollin issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel and the Charging Party each filed cross-
exceptions and a supporting brief, and all parties filed an
answering brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.2
The Board has carefully considered the decision and
the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,3 findings,4 and

1 Proposed-Intervenors, 11 employees employed by the Respondent,
filed proposed exceptions and a supporting brief to the Administrative
Law Judge’s decision. On January 23, 2018, the Board granted the
General Counsel’s Motion to Strike the Proposed-Intervenors’ excep-
tions and brief.
2 Member Emanuel is recused and took no part in the consideration
of this case.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d. Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
4 Applying Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717
(2001), the judge found that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and
(1) by withdrawing recognition from the Union because the Respondent
failed to prove that the Union had actually lost majority support on
March 1, 2017, the date recognition was withdrawn, and by thereafter
unilaterally making changes to 12 of the employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment without giving the Union notice or an opportunity
to bargain. We affirm these findings. Chairman Ring and Member
Kaplan affirm these findings under extant law in the absence of a Board
majority to reconsider it in this case. Member McFerran believes that
the Board should not revisit Levitz in a future case without first provid-
ing public notice and an invitation to file briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the judge’s decision, the Board further
affirms the finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) when a
supervisor unlawfully provided aid to the decertification petition that
was filed after the withdrawal of recognition. In the absence of excep-
tions, we also adopt judge’s dismissal of the allegation that the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing the job-
bidding procedure.
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below.5
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act, we shall order the Respondent to
cease and desist from engaging in such conduct and, as
explained in the remedy section of the judge’s decision,
to take certain steps to effectuate the policies of the Act.
For the reasons set forth in Caterair International, 322
NLRB 64 (1996), we find that an affirmative bargaining
order is warranted in this case as the “traditional, appro-
priate” remedy for the Respondent’s unlawful withdraw-
al of recognition. Id. at 68.
In several cases, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has required that the
Board justify, on the facts of each case, the imposition of
such an order. See, e.g., Vincent Industrial Plastics v.
NLRB, 209 F.3d 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber &
Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1462
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d
1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Vincent, supra, the court
summarized its requirement that an affirmative bargain-
ing order “must be justified by a reasoned analysis that
includes an explicit balancing of three considerations: (1)
the employees’ [Section] 7 rights; (2) whether other pur-
poses of the Act override the rights of employees to
choose their bargaining representatives; and (3) whether
alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the viola-
tions of the Act.” Id. at 738.
Although we respectfully disagree with the court’s re-
quirement for the reasons set forth in Caterair, supra, we
have examined the particular facts of this case as the

5 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the
Board’s standard remedial language. In accordance with our decision
in AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 1
(2016), we shall modify the judge’s recommended tax compensation
and Social Security reporting remedy. Further, the Respondent, having
unilaterally changed employees’ terms and conditions of employment,
must make employees whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
they may have suffered as a result of the Respondent’s unlawful con-
duct. Accordingly, the Respondent shall reimburse the unit employees
for any expenses resulting from the Respondent’s failure to continue
the benefits provided for under the expired collective-bargaining
agreement, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891,
891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). The make-
whole remedy shall be computed in accordance with Ogle Protection
Service, Inc., 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1971), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB
1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medi-
cal Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). We shall substitute a new notice to
conform to the modified Order. Finally, because we otherwise find that
the Board’s standard remedies are sufficient to effectuate the policies of
the Act, we deny the General Counsel’s request for a notice-reading
remedy.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
court requires and find that a balancing of the three fac-
tors warrants an affirmative bargaining order.6
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 right of employees who have been
represented by the Union since 1965. At all relevant
times, the Union was actively engaged in representing
the unit employees and had requested bargaining with the
Respondent for a successor agreement in order to ad-
vance employees’ interests with respect to their terms
and conditions of employment.7 Following the expira-
tion of the parties’ agreement, the Respondent withdrew
recognition from the Union without showing that the
Union had actually lost majority support on the date
recognition was withdrawn, and the Respondent imple-
mented several material and substantial changes to em-
ployees’ terms and conditions of employment without
giving the Union notice or an opportunity to bargain.
The expiration of the parties’ agreement, however, did
not extinguish either the employees’ right to have the
Union represent them or the Respondent’s obligation to
recognize and bargain with its employees’ chosen repre-
sentative. The Respondent’s unlawful conduct demon-
strated disregard for the employees’ Section 7 right to
choose union representation and tended to undermine
unit employees’ continuing support for the Union.
At the same time, a bargaining order, with its attendant
bar to raising a question concerning the Union’s continu-
ing majority status for a reasonable period of time, will
not unduly prejudice the Section 7 rights of employees
who may oppose continued union representation. The
bar does not continue indefinitely, but rather only for a
reasonable period of time to allow the good-faith bar-
gaining that the Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of
recognition cut short. It is only by restoring the status
quo ante and requiring the Respondent to bargain with
the Union for a reasonable period of time that the em-
ployees’ Section 7 right to union representation is vindi-
cated. It will also give employees an opportunity to fair-
ly assess the Union’s effectiveness as a bargaining repre-
sentative and determine whether continued representation
by the Union is in their best interests.

6 Chairman Ring and Member Kaplan would adopt the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s view that the Board should determine, on the facts of each case,
whether an affirmative bargaining order and the attendant decertifica-
tion bar is appropriate by balancing the three considerations set forth in
Vincent Industrial Plastics, supra. They agree that the conditional
three-factor analysis set forth here in affirming the need for an affirma-
tive bargaining order is consistent with extant precedent, but in light of
adverse judicial rulings they believe this precedent warrants full Board
review in a future case.
7 The parties’ most recent collective-bargaining agreement was ef-
fective from February 28, 2014, through February 28, 2017.
In concluding that a bargaining order is appropriate,
we are mindful of the decertification petition pending in
this case. That petition, however, has remained blocked
by the Respondent’s unlawful conduct—the unlawful
withdrawal of recognition, unilateral changes to several
of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment,
and significantly, the Respondent’s unlawful aid in the
decertification effort. The Respondent argues that in-
stead of a bargaining order, the Board should proceed
with an election; however, doing so without first giving
the Union an opportunity to reestablish itself with the
bargaining unit employees would unjustly reward the
Respondent for its unlawful interference in the collec-
tive-bargaining process and its unlawful role in the de-
certification effort.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order serves the purpos-
es and policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collec-
tive bargaining and industrial peace, and by removing the
Respondent’s incentive to delay bargaining in the hope
of further discouraging support for the Union. Such an
order also ensures that the Union will be afforded a rea-
sonable time to bargain and not be pressured to achieve
immediate results at the bargaining table following the
Board’s resolution of its unfair labor practice charges and
issuance of a cease-and-desist order. A bargaining order
seems particularly conducive to the aim of industrial
peace given that the parties have enjoyed over a 50-year
collective bargaining relationship.
(3) A cease-and-desist order alone would be inade-
quate to remedy the Respondent’s withdrawal of recogni-
tion, refusal to bargain, and unilateral changes. Standing
alone, such an order would not provide the Union with a
reasonable period of time to bargain and would allow
another challenge to the Union’s majority status before
the taint of the Respondent’s unlawful conduct has dissi-
pated and before the unit employees have had a reasona-
ble time to regroup and bargain through their chosen
representative in an effort to reach a successor agree-
ment. Such a result would be particularly unjust here
because the Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recog-
nition, accompanied by its unlawful assistance to the
decertification petition filed only a month later, would
likely have a continuing effect, thereby tainting any em-
ployee disaffection from the Union arising during that
period or immediately thereafter. We find that these cir-
cumstances outweigh the temporary impact the affirma-
tive bargaining order will have on the rights of employ-
ees who oppose continued union representation.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that an af-
firmative bargaining order with its temporary decertifica-
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 3
tion bar is necessary to fully remedy the Respondent’s
unfair labor practices in this case.8
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Leggett & Platt, Inc., Winchester, Ken-
tucky, its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM) District Lodge No. 619, AFL–CIO (Union), and
failing and refusing to bargain with the Union as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of unit em-
ployees.
(b) Undermining the Union and interfering with em-
ployee free choice by directing an employee to meet with
another employee for the purpose of obtaining signatures
on a petition to decertify or repudiate the Union.
(c) Making the following changes to bargaining unit
employees’ terms and conditions on or about March 1,
2017: wages, paid personal time, health insurance, vaca-
tion, stock bonus plan, 401(k) plan, dental insurance,
vision insurance, flexible spending plan, life insurance,
short term disability insurance, and long term disability
insurance, without affording the Union notice and an
opportunity to bargain.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.

8 The Respondent relies on Scomas of Sausalito, LLC v. NLRB, 849
F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2017), in arguing that an affirmative bargaining
order is not justified in this case. Scomas is easily distinguishable,
however. In denying enforcement of the Board’s affirmative bargain-
ing order in that case, the court relied on the fact that the union had
neglected its representational duties and had not even requested bar-
gaining for a year after the contract expired, that the union said nothing
to the employer about its intention to persuade employees to revoke
their signatures from the decertification petition, and thereafter the
union withheld information about its restored majority status until after
the employer withdrew recognition. Further, the court noted that the
union did not “spring back into action” by filing unfair labor practice
charges until after the petitioners withdrew their decertification petition
from the Board, believing that they were free of the union based on the
respondent’s withdrawal of recognition. Thus, the union at every turn
seemed to “sit on its hands,” and the court did not believe that it would
be serving employee free choice, a core principle of the Act, by enforc-
ing an affirmative bargaining order in that case. Id. at 1156–1158. By
contrast, the Union in the present case was actively representing the
unit employees at all material times and had requested bargaining with
the Respondent for a successor agreement both before and after the
Respondent announced that it would be withdrawing recognition from
the Union upon the expiration of the parties’ agreement on February 28,
2017. Moreover, as noted above, the Union filed unfair labor practice
charges on the very day the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition
from the Union took effect.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the following appro-
priate unit concerning terms and conditions of employ-
ment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the
understanding in a signed agreement:
The Company’s production and maintenance employ-
ees at the Company’s New Street and Ecton Road,
Winchester, Kentucky plants, including inspectors and
shipping and receiving employees. Excluded from
recognition under this Agreement are the Company’s
over-the-road drivers, officer clerical employees, quali-
ty auditors, inventory control employees, parts room at-
tendants, guards, professional employees, and supervi-
sors as defined by in the Act.
(b) On request of the Union, rescind the unilateral
changes made to terms and conditions of employment
with respect to wages, paid personal time, health insur-
ance, vacation, stock bonus plan, 401(k) plan, dental in-
surance, vision insurance, flexible spending plan, life
insurance, short term disability insurance, and long term
disability insurance, made on or about March 1, 2017,
and continue in effect any or all of the terms and condi-
tions set out in the collective-bargaining agreement effec-
tive from February 28, 2014, to February 28, 2017, and
continue those terms and conditions in effect unless and
until changed through collective-bargaining with the Un-
ion.
(c) Make unit employees whole, with interest, for any
loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of
the Respondent’s repudiation of the collective-bargaining
relationship.
(d) Compensate affected employees for the adverse
tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay
awards, and file with the Regional Director for Region 9,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay awards to the appropriate calendar
years for each employee.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its New Street and Ecton Road, Winchester, Kentucky
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plants copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”9
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 9, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be dis-
tributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means,
if the Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facili-
ty involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since March 1,
2017.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 9 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 17, 2018
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM) District Lodge No. 619, AFL–CIO (Union), and
fail and refuse to bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of our employees in
the following appropriate bargaining unit:
The Company’s production and maintenance employ-
ees at the Company’s New Street and Ecton Road,
Winchester, Kentucky plants, including inspectors and
shipping and receiving employees. Excluded from
recognition under this Agreement are the Company’s
over-the-road drivers, officer clerical employees, quali-
ty auditors, inventory control employees, parts room at-
tendants, guards, professional employees, and supervi-
sors as defined by in the Act.
WE WILL NOT make changes in wages, hours, and oth-
er terms and conditions of employment, including, but
not limited to, employees’ wages, paid personal time,
health insurance, vacation, stock bonus plan, 401(k) plan,
dental insurance, vision insurance, flexible spending
plan, life insurance, short term disability insurance, or
long term disability insurance, without giving the Union
notice and an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT direct you to employees in an effort to
get you to sign a petition to decertify or repudiate the
Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our bargaining unit employees concerning terms
and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL, on request of the Union, adhere to any or all
of the terms and conditions set out in the February 27,
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 5
2014, through February 28, 2017 collective-bargaining
agreement, and continue those terms and conditions in
effect unless and until changed through collective bar-
gaining with the Union.
WE WILL, on request by the Union, rescind any or all
changes to your terms and conditions of employment that
we made on or about March 1, 2017, without bargaining
with the Union, including, but not limited to, employees’
wages, paid personal time, health insurance, vacation,
stock bonus plan, 401(k) plan, dental insurance, vision
insurance, flexible spending plan, life insurance, short
term disability insurance, and long term disability insur-
ance.
WE WILL pay you for the wages and other benefits lost
because of the unilateral changes to terms and conditions
of employment that we made without bargaining with the
Union.
WE WILL make you whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits you have suffered because of our repudia-
tion of the collective-bargaining relationship.
WE WILL compensate you for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay awards,
and WE WILL file with the Regional Director for Region
9, within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay awards to the appropriate calendar
years for each employee.
LEGGETT & PLATT, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CA-194057 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Zuzana Murarova, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Arthur T. Carter and A. John Harper III, Esqs. for the Re-
spondent.
William H. Haller, Esq. for the Charging Party.
DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION1
ANDREW S. GOLLIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. These
consolidated cases were tried on July 24–26, 2017,2 in Mt. Ster-
ling, Kentucky. The complaint alleges that Leggett & Platt,
Inc. (Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (Act) when on March 1 it withdrew
recognition from the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (IAM), AFL–CIO (Union) as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of a unit of production and
maintenance employees, and, thereafter, unilaterally changed
employees’ wages, paid personal time, health insurance, vaca-
tion, stock bonus plan, 401(k) plan, dental insurance, vision
insurance, flexible spending plan, life insurance, short and long
term disability insurance, and job bidding procedures, without
bargaining with the Union.
Under Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717
(2001), Respondent has the burden of proving, through objec-
tive evidence, that the Union lost the support of a majority of
the unit as of the March 1 withdrawal of recognition. To meet
its burden, Respondent relies upon a petition signed by 181 of
the then 299 unit employees stating they did not want to be
represented by the Union. The General Counsel argues 43 of
those signatures are invalid because, prior to March 1, 15 of the
signatories left the unit, and the other 28 signatories later
crossed over and signed a prounion petition, thereby reducing
the total number of signatures below the required majority.
Respondent argues at least 11 of the crossovers should be
counted as supporting the antiunion petition because: (1) the
Union never notified Respondent about the prounion petition
before March 1; (2) the Union confused, coerced, or made
misrepresentations to crossovers to sign the prounion peti-
tion; and (3) if the crossovers were allowed to testify about
their subjective views, 11 would state they did not support the
Union as of March 1. After considering the evidence and ap-
plicable law, I find Respondent failed to meet its burden of
proving, through objective evidence, an actual loss of majority
support as of March 1. Respondent, therefore, violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it withdrew recognition and
made the unilateral changes to these terms and conditions of
employment, except for job bidding for which I find insuffi-
cient evidence of an actual change.
After Respondent withdrew recognition, the Union filed un-
fair labor practice charges. While those charges were pending,
employees circulated another decertification petition. The com-
plaint alleges, and I find, that in early April, Respondent’s Hu-
man Resource Manager Stephen Day directed an employee to
meet with a fellow employee to sign the decertification petition,
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

1 Abbreviations in this decision are: “Tr.” for transcript; “Jt. Exh.”
for Joint Exhibits; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s Exhibit; “CP
Exh.” for Charging Party’s Exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhib-
it; “GC Br.” for General Counsel’s brief; “CP Br.” for Charging Party’s
brief; and “R. Br.” for Respondent’s brief.
2 All dates refer to 2017, unless otherwise stated.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 1, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge
against Respondent, which was docketed as Case 09–CA–
194057. On April 6, the Union filed another unfair labor prac-
tice charge against Respondent, docketed as Case 09–CA–
196426. Based on its investigation, the Regional Director for
Region 9 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
issued a complaint against Respondent alleging violations of
Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. On April 10, the Union
filed a third unfair labor practice charge against Respondent,
docketed as Case 09–CA–196608. On April 24, Respondent
filed its answer to the complaint. On April 27, the Regional
Director issued an amended complaint, which Respondent an-
swered on May 11. On May 22, the Regional Director issued
an order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint and notice
of hearing, which Respondent answered on May 25. On May
26, the Union filed a first-amended unfair labor practice charge
against Respondent in Case 09–CA–196426. On June 15, the
Regional Director issued an Order Further Consolidating Cases,
Second Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing (Com-
plaint) in the above-referenced cases.3 Respondent filed its
answer to the Complaint on June 29, and filed its amended
answer to the Complaint on July 14. Respondent denies com-
mitting any violations of the Act.
On July 19, Keith Purvis and 10 other employees filed a
written motion to intervene. On July 20, the Regional Director
issued an order denying the motion. At the commencement of
the hearing, Attorney Aaron B. Solem, from the National Right
to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., on behalf of Mr. Pur-
vis and the other employees, orally moved to intervene, assert-
ing the same arguments contained in his July 19 written motion.
Mr. Solem and the parties argued their positions. After careful-
ly considering their arguments and the applicable law, I orally
denied the motion to intervene for the reasons stated on the
record.4
At the hearing, all parties were afforded the right to call, ex-
amine, and cross-examine witnesses, present any relevant doc-
umentary evidence, and argue their respective legal positions
orally. Respondent, Charging Party, and General Counsel filed
posthearing briefs, which I have carefully considered. Accord-
ingly, based upon the entire record, including the posthearing
briefs and my observations of the credibility of the witnesses, I
make the following

3 The General Counsel moved, without objection, to withdraw par.
7(a) of the complaint, alleging Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) since March 1, by failing to remit union dues deducted pursuant to
valid, unexpired, and unrevoked employee checkoff authorizations.
The motion was granted.
4 There was no request made for special permission to appeal my
ruling, and the parties have not argued in their posthearing briefs for me
to reconsider my ruling regarding the motion to intervene. Attorney
Solem filed a posthearing brief on the merits. Although I maintain my
ruling denying intervention, including denying Attorney Solem’s re-
quest to submit a posthearing brief, I reviewed the brief and find that
the arguments and authority contained therein would not cause me to
alter my decision.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT5
A. Jurisdiction
Respondent is a corporation with offices and places of busi-
ness on New Street and on Ecton Road in Winchester, Ken-
tucky, where it has been engaged in the manufacture and the
nonretail sale of commercial and residential furnishings. In
conducting its operations during the preceding 12-month period
ending May 31, 2017, Respondent sold and shipped from its
Winchester facilities goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly
to points outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Respondent
admits, and I find, that it has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Based on the foregoing, I
find this dispute affects commerce and the Board has jurisdic-
tion, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
B. Collective-Bargaining Relationship
From September 1965 until March 1, 2017, Respondent rec-
ognized the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the following unit pursuant to
9(a) of the Act:
The production and maintenance employees at the [Respond-
ent’s] New Street and Ecton Road, Winchester, Kentucky
plants, including inspectors and shipping and receiving em-
ployees. Excluded from recognition under this Agreement are
the [Respondent’s] over-the-road drivers, office clerical em-
ployees, quality auditors, inventory control employees, parts
room attendants, guards, professional employees, and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
Respondent’s recognition of the Union has been embodied in
successive collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of
which was effective from February 28, 2014 to February 28,
2017. (Jt. Exh. 1.)
C. Background6
1. Respondent’s operations
Respondent manufactures innerspring mattresses at its New
Street facility, where it employs approximately 250 unit em-

5 Although I have included citations to the record to highlight par-
ticular testimony or exhibits, my findings and conclusions are not based
solely on those specific record citations, but rather on my review and
consideration of the entire record for this case.
6 The following factual summary is a compilation of the credible
and uncontroverted testimony. To the extent there is a critical dispute in
testimony, I have assessed the witnesses’ credibility considering a
variety of factors, including the context of the witness’ testimony,
demeanor, corroboration, the weight of the respective evidence, estab-
lished or admitted facts, inherent probabilities, and reasonable infer-
ences that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Double D Con-
struction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi, 335
NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321
NLRB 586, 589 (1996)), enfd. sub nom., 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir.
2003). Those assessments are discussed below. Credibility findings
need not be all-or-nothing propositions. Indeed, nothing is more com-
mon in judicial decisions than to believe some, but not all, of a witness’
testimony. Daikichi Sushi, supra.
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 7
ployees. Respondent handles shipping and receiving at its
warehouse facility on Ecton Road, where it employs approxi-
mately 50 unit employees.
2. Withdrawal of recognition
In December 2016, Keith Purvis began circulating an anti-
union petition. The top of each page of the petition contained
the following language:
EMPLOYEE PETITION
FOR THE UNION DECERTIFICATION
The undersigned employees of Leggett & Platt #002 do not
want to be represented by IAM 619 hereinafter
referred to as “union”.
(R. Exh.7, Tr. 318, 328, 379–380).7
On around December 19, 2016, Purvis provided Respond-
ent’s General Manager, Chuck Denisio, with the petition,
signed by a majority of the unit employees. Upon receiving the
petition, Denisio asked two managers (John Omohundro and
Kurt Bruckner) to review and verify the signatures by compar-
ing them against the signatures contained on documents in the
employees’ personnel files. There were two signatures that
Omohundro and Bruckner did not count: one was a duplicate
(Kelly Barnett), and one that was not verifiable based on per-
sonnel records (Fred Gross). (Tr. 238:10–17, 241:19–17.)
On or around December 22, 2016, the Union’s Directing
Business Representative, Billy E Stivers Sr., sent Denisio a
letter officially notifying Respondent of the Union’s desire to
terminate the parties’ expiring collective-bargaining agreement
and to begin negotiations over a successor agreement. (Jt. Exh.
2.)
Purvis and others continued to collect signatures on the anti-
union petition through December 2016 and into January. Pur-
vis provided Denisio with additional signatures for the petition
in January. Denisio also had a manager (Cathy Spencer) re-
view and verify those signatures against those in the employ-
ees’ personnel files. (Tr. 475–477.) The evidence establishes
that as of early January, the antiunion petition contained signa-
tures from a majority of the employees in the unit.
On January 11, General Manager Denisio sent Union Direct-
ing Business Representative Stivers a letter in response, stating:
We have received evidence from a majority of employees in
the bargaining unit that they no longer wish to be represented
by your union. Accordingly, we will not negotiate a successor
agreement to our current collective bargaining agreement, and
we will withdraw our recognition of your union as our em-
ployees’ representative effective when the current collective
bargaining agreement expires on February 28, 2017. We will
continue to honor the Company’s obligations under the col-
lective bargaining agreement and under the law through and
including that date.
(Jt. Exh. 4.)

7 Keith Purvis led the decertification effort, but Jacob Purvis, Jona-
than Bryant, George McIntosh, and Ricky Marshall also gathered sig-
natures for the antiunion petition.
On January 12, Denisio also sent the unit employees a letter,
informing them that the Company notified the Union that when
the current agreement expires, the Company will no longer
recognize the Union as the employees’ bargaining representa-
tive, and the Company informed the Union that it will not bar-
gain over a successor agreement. The letter then went on to
explain specific changes that would be made following the
expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement, including a
wage increase, personal paid time off, lower health insurance
deductibles, shorter periods of time to accrue vacation, the im-
plementation of stock bonus plan, offering eligibility to partici-
pate in a 401(k) plan, changes in dental and vision insurance
providers, changes to life and disability insurance benefits, etc.
(Jt. Exh. 5.)
At around the time Respondent sent these letters, the Union
posted flyers at Respondent’s facilities announcing an open
house at the Union Hall from Wednesday, January 18 from
5:30 a.m. to Thursday, January 19 at 7:30 a.m. for unit employ-
ees “to learn more about right to work state and decert of un-
ion.” (GC Exh. 7.)
The union hall is in a three-story building. On the third floor,
there are three adjoining rooms. One room contains the union
business office; another room has a refrigerator and tables; and
the third room is where the Union holds meetings. The Union
made no presentations or speeches during this open house.
Instead, it set out written information in the Union office for
members to review, and union officials were present to answer
questions.
During the open house, most union members entered the un-
ion office from the hallway. Upon entering the union office,
there was a desk to the right and a desk to the left. These desks
were approximately 15–20 feet apart. (Tr. 638.) On one of the
desks there were three stacks of paper with information regard-
ing the Union, health insurance, and the possible effects of no
longer having a union. (Tr. 653–654) (GC Exh. 6). Near these
stacks of information was a petition for employees to sign.
(GC Exh. 2.) The top of the petition stated, “We the under-
signed members of the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 619, support the Union at
Leggett & Platt, Inc.”8 Below that were lines for employees to

8 At the hearing, there was a dispute as to whether this “We the un-
dersigned members of the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 619, support the Union at Leggett &
Platt, Inc.” language was on the petition at the time employees signed
it. Union President Elmer Tolson and Union Chief Committeeman
Marvin Berry testified that this language was preprinted on the top of
every petition page presented to employees to sign. (Tr. 71–72; 112.)
Employees Cecil Gross and Paul Haddix confirmed that the language
was on the top of the petition when they signed it. (Tr. 633–634; 644.)
Employee Justin Gilvin testified that the petition “looked like this”
(referring to GC Exh. 2, which contained the above language) when he
signed it. (Tr. 618.)
Respondent asked several of its witnesses about whether the above
language was on the petition at the time they signed it, and almost all
either testified that they did not actually read the petition before signing
it (e.g., Brian Patrick (Tr. 595) and Jack Keith (Tr. 410), or that they
could not recall or were uncertain what the petition said when they
signed it (e.g., Glen Dixon (Tr. 429), Tim Keeton (Tr, 456), Marvin
Rogers (Tr. 470), James Green (Tr. 493–494), James Wells (Tr. 513),
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
print, sign, and date their names. (GC Exh. 2.)
At the other desk, there was a sign-in sheet for employees to
vote if they wanted to go out on strike.9 This sign-in sheet had
two preprinted columns of numbered lines for signatures, and
nothing else. There was no heading or written explanation for
the purpose of the sign-in sheet. (GC Exh. 3.) There was
someone from the Union who told the employees as they came
through the line that they should sign the sheet if they wanted
to vote on going out on strike and to receive strike benefits in
the event a strike was called. (Tr. 672–673.) Once the employ-
ees signed this sheet, they were given a ballot to vote whether
they wanted to go out on strike. There was a box for the em-
ployees to cast their ballot. (Tr. 673.) Several members who
signed the prounion petition also signed the sign-in sheet for
the strike sanction vote.
Although the Union made no formal presentations during the
open house, some members did ask questions or raised con-
cerns. There is no claim that a union official said anything
during this open house to threaten or pressure employees into
signing the petition.10
The Union continued to gather additional signatures on the
prounion petition after the January 18−19 open house. Union
President Elmer Tolson and Union Chief Committeeman
Marvin Berry gathered signatures at the Union hall and near
Respondent’s New Street facility. (Tr. 70; 107–113.)11 All of

and Tina Freeman (Tr. 560)). Ashley Rogers was the only witness who
testified that the language was not on the petition when she signed it.
(Tr. 605). However, her signature appears on the same page as Elmer
Tolson and Paul Haddix, who both testified that the language was on
the petition when they signed it. Rogers also testified that when she
signed the petition, she also signed the sign-in sheet for the strike vote,
discussed infra. There is no dispute that the sign-in sheet had no lan-
guage on the top. (GC Exh. 3, pg. 1.) Under these circumstances, I
believe that Rogers was mistaken or confusing the documents when she
testified that the prounion petition did not contain the above language
when she signed it. Therefore, I credit the corroborated testimony of
those 5 witnesses who specifically read and recalled the language on
the petition, and they confirmed that it contained the above language.
9 According to Tolson, under the Union’s constitution, the Union
must have a strike sanction vote before going out on strike; otherwise,
the members who strike will not be able to receive strike benefits.
10 Respondent contends that employees were confused when they
signed the prounion petition. (R. Br. 10.) I need not assess the credibil-
ity of these statements on this point because I find, as discussed more
fully below, under Board law, the prounion petition contained unam-
biguous language, and there has been no claim regarding literacy or
issues with understanding English.
11 A. Dwayne Hawkins, an employee, testified that on around Febru-
ary 27, Tolson approached him and two other employees (Rick Duna-
way and Buddy Helton) while they were standing in a parking lot
across from Respondent’s facility about the prounion petition. Accord-
ing to Hawkins, Tolson talked about the antiunion petition and said:
[B]oys, if you all let the Union go, then−if you let the Union go, then
your insurance is going to double, you’re going to lose your job. He
said you all’s job is the first one to go. He said if the Union goes, this
job is gone. That’s about–pretty much, that’s about it.
(Tr. 585–586.) The General Counsel recalled Tolson as a rebuttal
witness, and he denied making these statements. (Tr. 654–655.) Nei-
ther party called Dunaway or Helton.
I credit Tolson over Hawkins regarding this exchange. Overall, I
found Tolson to be an honest witness who provided logical, detailed
the signatures on the prounion petition were gathered before
expiration of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. (GC
Exh. 2.)
On February 21, Stivers sent Denisio a letter disputing Re-
spondent’s claim that a majority of IAM represented employees
no longer wished to be represented by the IAM, and that as the
certified bargaining representative of those employees, the
Union demanded to meet with the company to bargain and to
set dates and times to negotiate a successor agreement. (Jt.
Exh. 6.) The following day, Denisio sent Stivers a letter, which
states:
As the company explained in its January 11, 2017 letter to
you, it has received a signed petition from a majority of its
bargaining unit employees that they no longer desired to be
represented by the Union when the current collective bargain-
ing agreement expires on February 28, 2017. To date, the
Company has not received any evidence indicating that any
employees have changed their minds in this regard. Accord-
ingly, the Company intends to withdraw recognition upon ex-
piration of the agreement. Until that time, it will comply with
the agreement and its obligations under the law.
(Jt. Exh. 7.)
On March 1, Denisio sent Stivers a letter largely reiterating
the contents of its February 22 letter and informing the Union
that now that the agreement has expired, the company withdrew
recognition from the Union as the bargaining representative.
(Jt. Exh. 9.)
As of March 1, there were a total of 295 employees in the
bargaining unit. (Jt. Exh. 8.) There were 181 signatures on the
antiunion petition.12 As of March 1, 15 of those signatories had

testimony about events. Hawkins, in contrast, seemed to be paraphras-
ing the exchange based upon his impressions of what was discussed, as
opposed to what was actually said and the context in which it was said.
Finally, I find it telling that no other witness testified about Tolson, or
any other Union official, making similar statements.
12 There is a dispute whether the names/signatures of employees
Fred Gross, Donnie Butler, and William Woodruff on the antiunion
petition should be counted. Fred Gross’s printed name and signature
appear on the antiunion petition. (R. Exh. 7, pg. 2 (line 15).) “Fred
Gross”s is printed, but “Mr. Gross” is the signature. To the left of the
name/signature is the handwritten word “no.” Gross did not testify at
the hearing. Jacob Purvis testified that Gross signed the petition and
then asked to have his name removed, so Purvis wrote the word “no”
next to Gross’s name. (R. Exh. 7, pg. 2 (line 15).) John Omohundro,
one of the managers tasked with verifying the signatures, testified that
Respondent did not count Gross’s signature because he could not verify
it as being the same as the signatures in Gross’s personnel file. (Tr.
274–275, 285.) I credit Purvis’s testimony that Gross asked to have his
name removed from the antiunion petition prior to its submission to
Respondent, and that Purvis wrote “no” next to Gross’s name before it
was submitted to Respondent, largely because it is against Purvis’s self-
interest as one of the proponents of the decertification effort to not have
Gross’s signature on the petition be counted. Moreover, I note that
Gross’s name/signature also appears on the prounion petition. (GC
Exh. 2, pg. 4 (line 20).) In my review of both petitions, the handwriting
appears to closely match. Regardless, under these circumstances, I find
Gross’s signature on the antiunion petition will not be counted.
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 9
left the bargaining unit, and 28 of the remaining signatories
subsequently crossed over and signed the prounion petition.
The 28 crossover employees are: Michael Bowman, Shane
Caves, Terris Cesefske, Dustin Day, Glenn Dixon, Reuben
Elkins, Tina Freeman, Justin Gilven, James Green, Fred Gross,
Paul Haddix, Albert Hawkins, Timothy Keeton, Jack Keith,
Christian McIntosh, Brian Patrick, Christopher Payne, Jose
Pesina, Leopold Pesina, Charles Randall, Tommy Roberts,
Ashley Rogers, Marvin Rogers, Frederick Sandefur, Paul Troy,
Tyler Troy, James Wells, and James Wren. (Tr. 675–676, GC
Exh. 2, R. Exh. 7.)13 Respondent never provided the Union

Donnie Butler’s printed name and signature appear on the antiunion
petition. (R. Exh. 7, pg. 11 (line 6).) There is a dispute as to whether
Butler’s signature was on the petition when it was initially submitted to
Respondent in December 2016. George McIntosh, one of the employ-
ees who gathered signatures for the antiunion petition, testified that he
and Butler drive to work together each day. McIntosh spoke with But-
ler about supporting the antiunion petition. McIntosh testified that
when he gave Butler the petition to sign, Butler printed but did not sign
his name. Later, after McIntosh noticed this, he asked Butler if he
would sign his name. On the antiunion petition, there is a signature
next to Butler’s printed name, along with the date of December 5, 2016.
Butler did not testify at the hearing. None of the witnesses witnessed or
could verify Butler’s signature. (Tr. 278–279; 368; 375–376.) Accord-
ing to Denisio, Butler at some point came to the office to put his signa-
ture on the petition after it was submitted to Respondent (but before the
March 1 withdrawal of recognition). Denisio testified that for whatever
reason Butler’s signature could not be verified, so it was not counted as
supporting the antiunion petition. (Tr. 276–277.) Under these circum-
stances, I find that Butler’s unverified signature will not be counted as
supporting the antiunion petition. Latino Express, Inc., 360 NLRB 911,
923 (2014).
William Woodruff’s printed name and signature appear on the anti-
union petition. (R. Exh. 7, pg. 19 (line 1).) Woodruff’s is the only
name/signature on the page. There are three other pages from the peti-
tion that contain only one name/signature. (R. Exh. 7, pgs. 9–10, 20.)
At the hearing, Woodruff testified that this was not his handwriting,
and that he did not sign or authorize anyone to sign the petition on his
behalf. (Tr. 629–630.) Woodruff worked for Respondent for approxi-
mately 4 months before he was terminated for “alcoholism” and “being
drunk on the job.” (Tr. 631.) Woodruff testified he does not harbor
any animosity toward Respondent for his termination, and that he does
not believe that his alcoholism has any effect on his memory or recall.
At the hearing, Jacob Purvis testified that he personally obtained
Woodruff’s signature, confirming that he saw Woodruff “put pencil or
pen to paper to sign it.” (Tr. 323.) Human Resource Manager Cathy
Spencer testified that she was able to verify Woodruff’s signature on
the petition with those in his personnel file. (Tr. 477–478.) Signatures
can be properly authenticated by witnesses, the employees themselves,
or by handwriting comparison. See Action Auto Stores, 298 NLRB 875,
879 (1990) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(3)) (authenticating cards by
comparing the signature on the card with the employee’s employment
application); Parts Depot, Inc., 332 NLRB 670, 674 (2000); Thrift
Drug Co. of Pennsylvania, 167 NLRB 426, 430 (1967) (cards authenti-
cated by comparison with other samples by nonexperts); Traction
Wholesale Ctr. Co., 328 NLRB 1058, 1059 (1999) (cards authenticated
by judicial comparison of signatures to other records); Justak Bros. and
Co., 253 NLRB 1054, 1079 (1981) (same). Under these circumstances,
I find that Woodruff’s signature was authenticated and will be counted
as supporting the antiunion petition.
13 At the hearing, Respondent made offers of proof that 11 crossover
employees, including Jack Keith (Tr. 412:22−413:11), Glen Dixon (Tr.
435:7−436:25), Timothy Keeton (Tr. 458:4–459:12), Marvin Rogers
with a copy of, or the names of the signatories to, the antiunion
petition, and the Union never provided Respondent with a copy
of, or the names of the signatories to, the prounion petition.
3. Unilateral changes to wages, hours and other terms
and conditions
a. Undisputed changes
The parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts that after Re-
spondent’s March 1 withdrawal of recognition from the Union,
it unilaterally made material, substantial, and significant chang-
es to the unit employees’ wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, without bargaining with the Union.
(Jt. Exh. 10). Specifically, Respondent increased wages by
three percent; changed the days off benefit to provide three
paid days off rather than five unpaid days off; changed
health insurance provider and network from Baptist Health to
BlueCross BlueShield; and made the following changes to
health insurance:
Old Plan New Plan
Deductible SIF $2,500/$5,000 $1,000/$3,000
Medical Opp $3,900/$11,800 $3,900/$9,700
RX Opp $2,000/$4,000 $2,000/$4,000
Office Co-Pay $30 $30
Respondent also changed the vacation plan as follows:
Length of Amount Under Old Plan Amount Under New
90 days 1 week
1 year 1 week 2 weeks
3 years 2 weeks
7 years 3 weeks
10 years 3 weeks
15 years 4 weeks
20 years 4 weeks
Additionally, Respondent provided the employees with a
new stock bonus plan and a new 401(k) plan. It also changed
the dental insurance provider from Delta Dental to MetLife,
and changed the vision insurance provider from Avesis Vision
to VSP. It provided a new health flexible spending plan. It
changed basic life insurance coverage from a flat amount of
$28,500 to the employee’s annual earnings, up to $50,000;
changed the available supplemental life insurance from $10,000
to up to five times the basic life insurance benefit and changed
available dependent life insurance from $10,000 to $50,000 for
a spouse and from $5000 to $15,000 for children; changed short
term disability from a flat rate of $280 per week to 40 percent

(Tr. 472:1−24), James R. Green (Tr. 487:24−488:18), James Wells (Tr.
514:6−515:5), Tina Freeman (Tr. 562:3−15, 564:1−6), Albert Hawkins
(Tr. 587:10−17), Brian Patrick (Tr. 596:2−11), Ashley Rogers (Tr.
607:25−608:7), and Justin Gilvin (Tr. 621:22-622:3), opposed to the
Union on March 1, despite their signatures on the prounion petition.
The General Counsel and the Union objected to the introduction of
evidence of employees’ subjective views as being irrelevant. I sus-
tained those objections.
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of average weekly earnings; and provided long-term disability
of 60 percent of average weekly earnings for employees’ choice
of a 2 year or 5-year benefit period. Respondent announced it
would make no changes to the pension plan until December 31,
2017, at which point bargaining unit employees will become
limited participants. Respondent did not make any changes to
the discount stock plan or to paid holidays. Also, on March 1,
Respondent ceased checking off dues from unit employees’ pay
checks. (Jt. Exh. 10.)
b. Job bidding procedures
The General Counsel contends that Respondent also unilat-
erally changed the established job bidding procedure following
its withdrawal of recognition. Article 9 of the parties’ collec-
tive-bargaining agreement sets forth the job bidding procedure.
According to the procedure, in the event of a new or perma-
nently vacated job, the Company will post on all bulletin boards
notice of the opening and the person vacating that job. The
posting will remain up for 48 hours, starting at 12 noon. Quali-
fied employees who wish to be considered must file a written
bid for the position with the Plant Superintendent within the
notice period. Job bid cards must be stamped or signed and
dated by a Supervisor as to the time and date they were filed.
The Company shall furnish the Union in writing with the names
of all bidders for the job within 24 hours after the end of the
posting period. All jobs are to be posted within 15 days of the
date they become vacant. Jobs are to be awarded based on plant
seniority. In the event no qualified unit employee bids on the
job, the job may be filled with junior employees or new hires.
The names of employees awarded the jobs are to be posted. (Jt.
Exh. 1.)
Article 9 identifies there are certain jobs for which the origi-
nal job vacancy and 1 additional vacancy are subject to this
posting and bidding procedure. For all other vacancies the
original vacancy shall be subject to the above procedure, and
any further resulting vacancies will be filled by the Company
without regard to said procedure. Article 9 does not address
temporary transfers.14
Although the General Counsel acknowledges that Respond-
ent continued to post vacant positions in accordance with Arti-
cle 9 after March 1 withdrawal of recognition, he contends
Respondent did not do so in all instances. In its posthearing
brief, the General Counsel cites to specific instances Respond-
ent allegedly did not comply with the l job bidding procedure.
First, the General Counsel argues that, on about June 2017,
employee Ashley Rogers was transferred from her job as a
clipper in the AT department on third shift to an assembly op-
erator position in the AR department on third shift. (Tr. 79–
80.) As proof, the General Counsel relies upon the testimony
of Union President Elmer Tolson, who works in the AR de-
partment. He testified that Rogers moved over to that depart-
ment on third shift, and he does not believe that Respondent
posted and awarded the position in accordance with the con-

14 Arts. 9.12 and 9.13 address vacancies caused by FMLA leave or
military leave. In the FMLA context, Respondent can post the position
as a temporary bid while the incumbent employee is on leave, and then
he/she will be able to return to the position upon returning to work. (Jt.
Exh. 1..
tractual job bidding procedure. Tolson testified that he looks at
the job posting bulletin board every day and he did not see any
posting for the position at issue. (Tr. 80.) Respondent’s Gen-
eral Manager Charles Denisio testified that the position at issue
was posted, Rogers bid on that position, and she was awarded
the position. (Tr. 226–227.)
The General Counsel argues that sometime after March 1,
2017, George McIntosh was moved from his job as a coiler
specialist in the AR department on third shift to perform elec-
trical work, including diagnosing equipment and electrical is-
sues, after the prior maintenance engineer, Robert Ward, left to
work as a branch accountant. (Tr. 83, 119–120, 219–221, 269–
270.) Ward’s maintenance engineer position was not a unit
position. (Tr. 221.) The branch accountant position also is not
a unit position. The General Counsel contends that the mainte-
nance engineer job McIntosh got was not put up for bid. As
proof, the General Counsel relies upon the testimony of Tolson
and Union Chief Committeeman Marvin Berry who both testi-
fied that they regularly review the job bidding bulletin board
and did not see any posting for the position at issue. The Gen-
eral Counsel also relies upon the job bid postings Respondent
introduced into evidence, and the absence of any reference to
the maintenance engineer position on those postings. (Tr. 83–
84, 121; R. Exh. 4.)15
When McIntosh moved to cover Ward’s position, Jacob Pur-
vis was moved from his job as a preventative maintenance
technician in the AR department to a coiler specialist position
in the AR department on third shift, the job previously held by
McIntosh. The General Counsel contends that McIntosh’s
position was not posted for bidding. (Tr. 80–82, 86–87, 221,
329.) Again, the General Counsel’s evidence is that Tolson did
not see the job posted on the bulletin board, and the absence of
any reference to McIntosh’s position on any of the postings
Respondent introduced. (Tr. 82–83; R. Exh. 4.)
Charles Denisio testified about the situation involving Ward,
McIntosh, and Purvis. (Tr. 222–224.) According to Denisio,
Ward’s maintenance engineer position was a management job,
not a unit position. Ward informed Denisio that he had been
diagnosed with a health condition, and that the condition made
it painful for Ward to perform certain work out on the floor.
Ward recently completed his accounting degree, and Respond-
ent was in the process of implementing a new financial report-
ing system. So Denisio offered Ward an office accounting
position on a probationary basis. This accounting position was
a non-unit position. After Ward was moved to the office ac-
counting position, McIntosh was temporarily transferred to
cover the work that Ward had been performing. Although
McIntosh is a licensed electrician, he required additional train-
ing in order to perform certain of the maintenance engineering
tasks. As of the hearing, McIntosh was still considered a tem-
porary transfer while he continued to learn the job and com-
plete his probationary period (expected to last an additional 30
days or so). (Tr. 220–221.) After McIntosh was temporarily

15 Respondent introduced several job posting sheets, both before and
after March 1. Respondent utilized the same sheets, including the same
information, following the March 1 withdrawal of recognition. (R.
Exhs. 3 and 4.)
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 11
transferred, Denisio testified that Purvis was temporarily trans-
ferred to cover McIntosh’s now open position based on Purvis’s
skills and experience. (Tr. 222.) According to Denisio, if
Ward remains in the accountant position, McIntosh would
move into the maintenance engineer position, and Respondent
would then bid McIntosh’s former position. If Purvis is not
awarded that position, he would return to his former position.
(Tr. 222.)
The General Counsel also cites to new employees (Robert
Woodward and Kelly Withrow) who were hired into positions
that were not posted for bidding. (Tr. 87.) Once again, the
General Counsel primarily relies upon Tolson’s testimony that
he did not see these positions posted on the bulletin board.
Robert Woodward was hired in about May 2017 to work first
shift as a conveyor operator in the AR Department. (Tr. 88,
223.) Tolson did not see Woodward’s position posted. (Tr. 87;
R. Exh. 4.) Kelly Withrow was hired in about June 2017 as a
conveyor operator on first shift in the AR department. (Tr. 88,
223.) Tolson did not see Withrow’s position posted. (Tr. 88; R.
Exh. 4.) On cross-examination, Tolson testified about these
entry positions:
Q. I’m going to ask about before March 1st. In fact, the prac-
tice at Leggett & Platt was that they did not post entry-level
jobs for bid, correct?
A. Unless you had somebody on second or third that wanted
that job, then they would go to me or one of my stewards and
ask.
Q. And that rarely, if ever, happened, correct?
A. Usually them job entry levels, they don’t last long enough
to bid, I’m sorry. So, yeah, you’re correct in saying it rarely
happened.
Q. And just to finish the point, it rarely happened because the
entry-level jobs are the lowest paid, hardest jobs in the facto-
ry, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, after March 1, that practice continued. The entry-
level jobs were not posted for bid, correct?
A. Correct.
(Tr. 100–101.)16
Denisio confirmed that these entry level positions are not
normally posted because there is high turnover and they are
very basic jobs that most people will not bid on. Denisio testi-
fied that these positions have not been posted for “[m]aybe a
year and a half, maybe longer than that.” (Tr. 223–224.) This
testimony was not refuted.

16 On redirect examination, Tolson testified about the posting of
these entry-level positions.
Q. BY MS. MURAROVA: Mr. Tolson, you testified that the practice
was not to post entry-level jobs unless someone wanted that job. Is
that right?
A. That’s the way that we normally do business because, like I said,
clippers out there, they just don’t stay very long, you know.
Q. So have you ever filed a grievance about someone wanting an en-
try-level job?
A. No …
(Tr. 106.)
Next, the General Counsel cites to two unidentified individu-
als who were hired without Respondent complying with the
contractual job bidding procedure. The General Counsel alleg-
es that one was a female employee on third shift that was
moved from a clipper position to a third shift coiler operator in
the AR Department in about June/July 2017. The General
Counsel relies upon the testimony of Marvin Berry, who testi-
fied that he did not see the particular job posted on the bulletin
board. (Tr. 119, 121.) The General Counsel alleges that the
other unidentified employee transferred from second shift clip-
ping to day shift clipping in the AC department in about July
2017. (Tr. 119–120, 122.) Again, according to Berry’s review
of the bulletin boards, this job was not posted. (Tr. 120.)
Finally, the General Counsel cites to Kenny Grant. Accord-
ing to Berry, on around May 2017, Kenny Grant was re-hired
into a second shift operator position/innerspring operator posi-
tion in the AH department without having to bid on his job.
(Tr. 134–137, 223, R. Exh. 4.) Berry had a conversation with
Grant, who informed Berry that he had been rehired. On cross-
examination, Berry testified he was not aware of the circum-
stances surrounding Berry being placed in the position. Den-
isio testified Grant was temporarily transferred to this position:
Q. Were you present yesterday for testimony regarding Ken-
ny Grant?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you familiar with his current work situation?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. What is his current work situation?
A. He’s a VRC operator on second shift.
Q. Okay. And is there a situation with him with respect to
temporary transfers?
A. Yes, there is.
Q. What is that?
A. As we’re training – second shift is – Your Honor, that’s
one of the harder shifts to work. It’s, basically it’s hotter than
most. And we’re – we have openings in this innerspring line,
so Mr. Grant had previously been an operator. He came back.
We hired him back as a clipper, and now he’s training – help
– we’re training other people, and he’s filling in till we get
these other people filled. Then he’ll go back to clipping.
(Tr. 222–223.)
After Respondent withdrew recognition on March 1, the Un-
ion filed unfair labor practice charges. After the charges were
filed, employees began circulating a new decertification peti-
tion. Keith Purvis again took the lead in gathering signatures.
On around April 4, Cordell Roseberry began working for Re-
spondent at the New Street facility. He was hired by Respond-
ent’s Human Resource Manager Steven Day. Day met briefly
with Roseberry in the morning of Roseberry’s first day of work.
The following day, Roseberry was standing near the computers
and bulletin board on inside of the facility, near the conference
room. Day was in the conference room meeting with employ-
ees regarding healthcare insurance.
According to Roseberry, when Day saw him, Day pointed at
him and then pointed at Keith Purvis, who was standing nearby,
and motioned Roseberry over to Purvis. Roseberry then
walked over to Purvis. Up to that point, Roseberry had not met
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Purvis, but he had heard that Purvis was responsible for the
decertification petition. Purvis asked Roseberry if he had
signed anything, any kind of petition. Roseberry responded he
had not. Purvis told Roseberry to meet him at his truck after
work. That was the end of the interaction. Roseberry also
recalled hearing Purvis ask Day if there were any other new
employees. (Tr. 144–147.)
According to Day, he has a practice of introducing each new
employee to his/her supervisor on his/her first day of work.
However, on the day in question, Day was tied up dealing with
the changes Respondent had implemented regarding health
insurance. Day testified that he had a conversation with Keith
Purvis earlier that day and asked Purvis if he would take the
new employees over to meet their supervisors, because Day
would not have the time to do it. Purvis agreed. Later on,
when Day saw Roseberry standing outside the conference
room, Day asked him to go with Purvis, with the intent that
Purvis would take Roseberry to go and meet his supervisor.
Day testified that he did not hear any of the conversation be-
tween Roseberry and Purvis, and he did not know that Purvis
was going to talk to Roseberry about the decertification peti-
tion. (Tr. 162–166.)
In reviewing the evidence, I credit Roseberry and do not
credit Day. Roseberry was a neutral employee witness who had
a detailed recollection and testified clearly and credibly about
what occurred. Day, in contrast, simply was not credible re-
garding these events. For example, Day testified the sole rea-
son he directed Roseberry over to Purvis was for Purvis to take
Roseberry over to meet his supervisor because Day was tied up
with meetings and would not be able to take him. Day testified
that he had arranged with Purvis ahead of time to do this, and
that Purvis agreed. Yet, Roseberry testified that Purvis never
took him over to meet his supervisor. Instead, Purvis just asked
Roseberry if he had signed any petitions and, when Roseberry
said he had not, Purvis told him to meet at Purvis’s truck after
work. I find it highly improbable that if Day had asked Purvis
to take Roseberry over to meet his supervisor and Purvis agreed
to do so, that Purvis would not have taken Roseberry over, or,
at least, Purvis would have explained to Roseberry why he was
not taking him over to meet his new supervisor. Finally, and
probably most telling, Respondent called Keith Purvis to testify
during its case-in-chief, after Roseberry had testified, and it
never questioned Purvis about his exchange with Roseberry, or
Day’s alleged request for Purvis to take Roseberry over to meet
his new supervisor. In fact, Respondent asked Purvis nothing
about this. I find Respondent’s failure to question Purvis about
this matter—or do anything else to corroborate Day’s testimo-
ny—is a telling omission that undermines Day’s credibility
regarding his motive for directing Roseberry over to meet with
Purvis on the day in question.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Respondent Failed to Present Objective Evidence that the
Union Lost the Support of a Majority of Unit Employees as of
the Date Respondent Withdrew Recognition.
Subparagraphs 8(a) and (b) of the complaint allege that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it
withdrew recognition from the Union on March 1. It is well-
established that a union is entitled to an irrebuttable presump-
tion of majority status for one year following Board certifica-
tion and during the term of any collective-bargaining agree-
ment, up to three years. At other times, the presumption is
rebuttable. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781,
785–787 (1996). In Levitz Furniture, supra, the Board articu-
lated the current standard for how an employer could rebut this
presumption and withdraw recognition without a Board elec-
tion. Prior to Levitz, an employer could withdraw recognition
by showing “a good-faith doubt based on objective considera-
tions” that the union continued to enjoy majority support. Cela-
nese Corp., 95 NLRB 664 (1951). However, in Levitz, the
Board found this good-faith doubt standard to be inconsistent
with the purposes of the Act and held that “an employer may
rebut the continuing presumption of an incumbent union’s ma-
jority status, and unilaterally withdraw recognition, only on a
showing that the union has, in fact, lost the support of a majori-
ty of the employees in the bargaining unit.” Levitz, 333 NLRB
at 725.17 In so doing, the Board emphasized that an employer
with objective evidence that the union has lost majority sup-
port—for example, a petition signed by a majority of the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit—withdraws recognition at its
peril. Id. If the union contests the withdrawal of recognition in
an unfair labor practice proceeding, the employer bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
union had, in fact, lost majority support at the time of the with-
drawal of recognition. If the employer fails, it will not have
rebutted the presumption of majority status, and its withdrawal
of recognition will violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Id.18
On December 19, 2016, Respondent received a petition
signed by a majority of the employees stating that they did not
want to be represented by the Union, and, in January, Respond-
ent received additional signatures supporting this antiunion

17 In their briefs, Respondent and the General Counsel make diver-
gent arguments for why current Board law on the withdrawal of recog-
nition is flawed and should be changed. I, however, am bound by cur-
rent Board precedent and leave it to the Board, at its discretion, to con-
sider their arguments on this question.
18 In Levitz, the Board modified the evidentiary standard necessary
for an employer to file an RM petition, making it easier. The Board
reasoned:
The Board and the courts have consistently said that Board elections
are the preferred method of testing employees’ support for unions.
And we think that processing RM petitions on a lower showing of
good-faith uncertainty will provide a more attractive alternative to uni-
lateral action. By contrast, were we to require employers to demon-
strate a higher showing of good-faith belief of lost majority support in
order to obtain an RM election, as in United States Gypsum, we might
encourage some employers instead to withdraw recognition rather
than seeking an election. An employer who has enough evidence to
establish a good-faith belief, though not necessarily enough to show
loss of majority status, may be tempted to withdraw recognition in the
hope of being able to make that showing in an unfair labor practice
proceeding (and, in any event, ousting the union while the proceeding
is pending). Thus, by liberalizing the standard for holding RM elec-
tions, we are promoting both employee free choice (by making it easi-
er to ascertain employees’ support for unions via Board elections) and
stability in collective-bargaining relationships (which remain intact
during representation proceedings).
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 13
petition.19 On January 11, Respondent sent the Union a letter
about the petition and that it intended to withdraw recognition
from the Union once the parties’ collective-bargaining agree-
ment expired. Under Board law, the operative date for deter-
mining whether there is objective evidence of a lack of majority
support is not the date the employer announces its intent to
withdraw recognition based on such evidence, but rather the
date the employer’s withdrawal of recognition becomes effec-
tive. See Levitz, supra. See also HQM of Bayside, LLC, 348
NLRB 758 (2006), enfd, 518 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2008), and
Parkwood Developmental Center, 347 NLRB 974 (2006). In
this case, the operative date is March 1, after the parties’
agreement expired. Parkwood Developmental Center, supra
(discussing anticipatory withdrawal of recognition).
With additions and subtractions, there were 295 employees
in the unit as of March 1. (Tr. 15) (Jt. Exh. 10). Respondent,
therefore, needed to present objective evidence that as of that
date a majority (148) of the unit employees demonstrated that
they no longer wanted to be represented by the Union. Re-
spondent relies upon the antiunion petition, which contained
signatures from 181 unit employees. The General Counsel and
the Union contend that the antiunion petition fails to meet Re-
spondent’s burden, claiming that 43 of the 181 signatures were
invalid because, as of March 1, 15 of the employees who signed
the petition no longer worked in the unit, and 28 of the other
employees who signed the antiunion petition later signed the
prounion petition.20 The result is Respondent only had valid
signatures from 138 employees.
The Board has held that, in considering the evidence of a
loss of majority support, the employer cannot rely upon as of
the date recognition is withdrawn the signatures of employees
who are no longer part of the bargaining unit, or employees

19 There is no allegation these signatures were tainted or obtained as
result of unfair labor practices.
20 In Flying Foods, 345 NLRB 101, 103 fn. 9 (2005), the Board held,
consistent with Levitz, that, if the withdrawal is challenged, the ultimate
determination requires that the signatures be authenticated. Id. at
103−104. The reason being that a union seeking to obtain a bargaining
order after having its support undermined by unfair labor practices is
required to establish, generally by authorization cards, that a majority
of the employees in the unit signed the card without coercion or any
misrepresentation. Signatures may be authenticated by the testimony of
the signer, a witness to the signature, delivery to the solicitor of the
card, or by handwriting exemplars. The standard is no different when
an employer seeks to establish the loss of majority support for an in-
cumbent union. See generally Ambassador Servs., Inc., 358 NLRB
1172 (2012), adopted by Ambassador Servs., Inc., 361 NLRB 939
(2014).
At the hearing, the General Counsel seemed to challenge the method
Respondent used to authenticate the signatures on the antiunion peti-
tion. But, in its posthearing brief, the only issue the General Counsel
raised concerned the names/signatures of Fred Gross, Donnie Butler,
and William Woodruff. I have previously addressed those signatures,
finding that Gross and Butler should not be counted as supporting the
antiunion petition, but Woodruff should. Regardless, even if the Gen-
eral Counsel had contested the authenticity of the signatures, I find
Respondent’s verification process was reasonable. Moreover, at the
hearing, Respondent called the employees who gathered the signatures
to further verify their authenticity. Consequently, I find the signatures
were properly authenticated.
who subsequently demonstrated support for the union by sign-
ing a prounion petition prior to the date recognition is with-
drawn. See HQM of Bayside, LLC, supra; Parkwood Develop-
mental Center, supra; and Highlands Regional Medical Center,
347 NLRB 1404, 1407 (2006). As a result, under current Board
law, Respondent cannot rely upon the 15 signatures of employ-
ees who left the bargaining unit, or the 28 crossover employees
who signed the antiunion petition but later signed the prounion
petition prior to March 1. And with the elimination of these
signatures, I find that Respondent has failed to meet its burden
of proving, through objective evidence, an actual loss of ma-
jority support as of the date it withdrew recognition.
In its posthearing brief, Respondent does not dispute that the
15 employees who left the unit prior to March 1 should not be
counted. But it does argue that at least 11 of the 28 crossovers
should be counted as supporting the antiunion petition. First,
Respondent contends they should be counted because the Un-
ion failed to notify Respondent regarding the prounion petition,
despite Respondent’s implied inquiries about such evidence in
the correspondence it sent to the Union prior to withdrawing
recognition. This argument lacks merit. The Board has held
there is no duty under Levitz Furniture for a union to provide
such evidence to an employer. See Scomas of Sausalito, LLC,
362 NLRB 1462 (2015), enforcement denied and order vacated
by Scomas of Sausalito, LLC v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1147 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (holding that employer’s violation was not so severe
as to warrant affirmative bargaining order); Fremont Medical
Center, 354 NLRB 453, 459–460 (2009), adopted 359 NLRB
452 (2013) (withdrawal of recognition unlawful although union
did not inform employer of countervailing evidence of union
support); HQM of Bayside, LLC, 348 NLRB 758, 759 (2006),
enfd., 518 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2008) (union has no duty to
demonstrate majority support prior to withdrawal of recogni-
tion). In overruling Celanese Corp., supra, and holding that an
employer may withdraw recognition only on a showing that the
union has in fact lost majority support, the Board reaffirmed in
Levitz the presumption of continued majority support based on
important principles underlying the Act, such as safeguarding
industrial stability and fostering employee rights to designate
their collective-bargaining representative. Levitz Furniture,
supra, 333 NLRB at 725. Further, the Board noted that when
presented with a petition signed by a majority of employees
stating they no longer want the union, an employer need not
unilaterally withdraw recognition but may petition the Board
for an election based on a lower “uncertainty” standard. Id. at
727. With these safeguards in place, Levitz and its progeny do
not require a union notify an employer it has gathered evidence
to establish continued majority support.
Respondent attempts to distinguish this case from Levitz,
Parkwood Developmental Center, and Highlands Regional
Medical Center, by pointing out that in those cases the unions
offered to show the employers evidence that there was not a
loss of majority support, and the employer withdrew recogni-
tion without reviewing that evidence. In this case, Respondent
asserts that the Union never informed Respondent that it had
such evidence, and, instead, chose to play a game of “gotcha”
by keeping its prounion petition a secret. Respondent contends
that allowing such conduct is fundamentally unfair and contrary
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to the purposes of the Act. This argument lacks merit as well.
The Board has placed the burden of proof entirely on the em-
ployer when it decides to withdraw recognition to later prove in
the event of an unfair labor practice charge that it had objective
evidence of actual loss of majority support. HQM of Bayside,
LLC, supra at 759. In Levitz, the Board held that an employer
acts at its peril when it relies upon a petition signed by a ma-
jority of the unit as the basis for withdrawing recognition. That
is particularly true in this case when Respondent relied upon a
petition signed by employees up to three months prior to the
withdrawal of recognition. Although the signatures on the
antiunion petition are not stale, there is a risk of relying upon
such signatures because employees’ opinions may change in
the interim, and there may not be objective evidence of an actu-
al loss of majority of support when recognition as of the date
recognition is withdrawn. This uncertainty is why, in Levitz,
the Board held that “elections are the preferred method of test-
ing employees’ support for unions” and why the Board lowered
the standard for filing an RM petition. Levitz, 333 NLRB at
727. The same rationale holds true for RD petitions and em-
ployees who no longer want to be represented by their union.
Respondent also argues that certain of the crossover signa-
tures should still be counted as evidence of the Union’s loss of
majority support because there was confusion, coercion, and
misrepresentations made regarding the prounion petition. This
argument lacks merit. I find there is no showing that any of the
signatures were obtained by any misrepresentation or coercion.
In DTR Industries, 311 NLRB 833 (1993), the Board held:
[W]here as here, the purpose of the card is set forth on its face
in unambiguous language, the Board may not, in the absence
of misrepresentations, inquire into the subjective motives or
understanding of the card signer to determine what the signer
intended to do by signing the card.
I find the language on the top of the prounion petition stating
that “We the undersigned members of the International Associ-
ation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 619,
support the Union at Leggett & Platt, Inc.” was unambiguous.
Respondent’s claims certain employees signed the prounion
petition because they were confused or believed that they need-
ed to sign the petition to receive strike benefits or to maintain
insurance. (R. Br. 10.) These are largely the same employees
who did not read the petition, or do not recall what the petition
said, when they signed it. As previously stated, I find Elmer
Tolson to be a credible witness, and he denied making any
statements that employees needed to sign the prounion petition
in order to receive strike benefits or keep their insurance. Some
of the witnesses appear to have conflated the purposes of the
prounion petition and the sign-in sheet for the strike sanction
vote. I do not find that the confusion was the result of any ne-
farious intent or conduct on the part of the Union. The proun-
ion petition was at one desk, and the sign-in sheet for the strike
sanction vote was on a separate desk. There was a union offi-
cial at the strike sanction vote desk explaining what the sign-in
sheet was for and to answer any questions. I fail to see how,
under these circumstances, employees were confused or co-
erced so as to invalidate their signatures on the prounion peti-
tion. Respondent also contends that Tolson misrepresented to
A. Dwayne Hawkins what would happen if Hawkins did not
sign the petition. As previously stated, I do not credit Hawkins’
uncorroborated testimony that Tolson threatened that health
insurance would double and that Hawkins would lose his job if
the Union were gone. Therefore, I find no evidence of coercion
or misrepresentation.
Finally, at the hearing, Respondent presented 11 of the
crossover employees for the purpose of having them testify
that, as of March 1, they did not support the Union. I allowed
Respondent to make offers of proof—initially through ques-
tions and answers and then through narrative statements by
Respondent’s counsel—about those 11 employees’ subjective
views. I then sustained the objections to the introduction of
that evidence because, under current Board law, after-acquired
evidence about employees’ subjective views is irrelevant to
deciding whether there is an actual loss of majority support. I
reaffirm my rulings. The Board has held that such evidence is
irrelevant not only because the Levitz standard is objective and
Respondent’s proffered evidence was subjective, but also be-
cause Levitz requires that Respondent have that objective evi-
dence at the time it withdraws recognition, not at some later
date. See Highlands Regional Medical Center, supra at 1407
fn. 17 (2006). See also Pacific Coast Supply, LLC, 360 NLRB
538, 543–544 (2014); RTP Co., 334 NLRB 466, 469 (2001),
enfd. 315 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 811
(2003) (“In analyzing the adequacy of an employer’s defense to
a withdrawal of recognition allegation, the Board will only
examine factors ‘actually relied on’ by the employer. Conduct
of which the employer may have been aware, but on which the
employer ‘did not base’ its decision to withdraw recognition
from the Union, is of ‘no legal significance.”’). Based on the
record, the only evidence Respondent was aware of, as of
March 1, that these employees did not support the Union was
the antiunion petition. That petition was initially submitted to
Respondent on December 19, 2016, and later supplemented
with additional signatures in January. The signatures for the
prounion petition were gathered January18-February 28. Re-
spondent has presented no evidence that, prior to or as of
March 1, any of these crossover signatories objectively reas-
serted that they no longer wanted the Union after they signed
the prounion petition. Respondent, therefore, cannot rely upon
the after-acquired evidence of these employees’ subjective
views to establish an actual loss of majority support as of
March 1.
Based on the foregoing, I find that Respondent failed to pre-
sent objective evidence that, as of March 1, a majority (148 of
the 295 unit employees) no longer wanted to be represented by
the Union. Respondent, therefore, violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act when it withdrew recognition from the Union as
of that date, and when it failed to bargain with the Union.
B. Respondent Made Material, Substantial, and Significant
Changes to Unit Employees’ Wages, Hours, and Other Terms
and Conditions of Employment, Without Providing the Union
With Notice or an Opportunity to Bargain, in Violation of Sec-
tion 8(A)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Subparagraph 8(c) of the Complaint alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it unilaterally
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 15
changed the unit employees’ terms and conditions of employ-
ment, without bargaining with the Union. Section 8(d) of the
Act requires that an employer bargain with a union representing
its employees with respect to “wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment.” An employer has a duty to
bargain with the union over changes to these mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining and that its failure to do so violates Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679−682 (1981); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 743 (1962). The duty to bargain arises when the changes
are ““material, substantial and significant.” Flambeau Airmold
Corp., 334 NLRB 165, 171 (2001). The parties have stipulated
that following Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition from the
Union on March 1, it unilaterally changed employees’ wages,
paid personal time, health insurance, vacation, stock bonus
plan, 401(k) plan, dental insurance, vision insurance, flexible
spending plan, life insurance, short term disability insurance,
and long term disability insurance, as described more fully
above. The parties further stipulated that these changes were
material, substantial, and significant, and they were made with-
out bargaining with the Union. (Jt. Exh. 10). Respondent’s
sole defense is that it had no obligation to bargain with the
Union over any of these changes as of March 1, because it had
lawfully withdrawn recognition from the Union as of that date.
For the reasons already stated, I find that Respondent lacked the
requisite objective evidence of an actual loss of majority sup-
port sufficient to withdraw recognition from the Union. I,
therefore, find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act when it unilaterally implemented these changes without
bargaining with the Union.
The only dispute is whether Respondent unilaterally changed
the job bidding procedure, without bargaining with the Union,
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Board
has held that changes to how jobs are posted, bid, and awarded
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. See generally Beverly
Health & Rehabilitation Services, 335 NLRB 635, 656 (2001);
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 247 NLRB 171, 173 (1980).
The General Counsel has the burden of showing, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the unilateral change at issue con-
stitutes a “material, substantial, and significant” change.
Fremont Medical Center, 357 NLRB 1899, 1902 (2011).
Based upon my review of the evidence, I find that the General
Counsel has failed to meet its burden. The General Counsel
cites to a few instances in which Respondent allegedly awarded
jobs to individuals without complying with the contractual
bidding process. Those individuals are Ashley Rogers, Robert
Woodward, Kelly Withrow, Robert Ward, George McIntosh,
Jacob Purvis, Kenny Grant, and two unidentified individuals.
The General Counsel relies almost exclusively upon the testi-
mony of Tolson and Berry as to whether they saw a posting for
a particular job on the bulletin board before it was awarded.
Although Tolson and Berry testified that they regularly re-
viewed these bulletin boards, I find that their testimony alone is
insufficient evidence to meet the General Counsel’s burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the jobs were
not, in fact, properly posted or bid. Respondent introduced
several examples of jobs that were posted, both before and after
March 1. Respondent posted 30 vacancies for bid between
mid-March and late June. (R. Exh. 4.) I do not believe that
relying upon the recollection of Tolson or Berry as to whether
they saw that a job was posted is alone sufficient to prove the
alleged unilateral change. The General Counsel could have
subpoenaed all the job postings, bids, and notifications as to
who was awarded the job to prove (or disprove) whether Re-
spondent complied with the procedure after March 1.
As for Rogers, I credit Denisio’s testimony that her position
was posted and that she was the successful bidder. As the Gen-
eral Counsel points out, Respondent did not introduce Rogers’
bid or award notification. But the initial burden is not for Re-
spondent to prove that it complied with the contractual proce-
dure. It is the General Counsel’s burden to prove Respondent
did not. And as stated, I do not believe the General Counsel
met its burden.
Moreover, I find that in several of these instances the Gen-
eral Counsel did not establish that the alleged failure to post the
position at issue constituted a unilateral change. For example,
with regards to Ward, McIntosh, Purvis, and Grant, the evi-
dence establishes that these were all temporary transfers. Ac-
cording to Article 9.2 of the parties’ agreement, the job bidding
procedure applies to a “new or permanently vacated job.” (Jt.
Exh. 1, p. 14.) Based on Denisio’s testimony, these jobs were
not considered to be new or permanently vacated. They were
considered temporary transfers. Article 9 does not require that
temporary transfers be posted. The General Counsel argues
that Respondent agreed to move Ward because of his medical
condition, and Respondent has, in the past, posted positions
vacated because of the incumbent employee’s medical condi-
tion. However, as Denisio testified, Respondent has temporary
bids for positions that are temporarily open because the incum-
bent employee is out on FMLA leave. (Tr. 218–219.) That
was not the case in these situations.
Similarly, the General Counsel alleges that Respondent
failed to post entry level positions (Woodward, Withrow, and
the two unidentified individuals). However, Tolson and Den-
isio confirmed that these entry-level positions are not normally
posted for bidding because there is high turnover and low de-
mand for them. Tolson testified that there have been instances
in which Respondent hired or placed someone into one of these
entry-level positions, and a unit employee wanted the position
because it was on a different, preferable shift. Tolson testified
that when the unit employee(s) notified him about the opening,
he would go and talk to management and get the unit employ-
ee(s) assigned to the job. In other words, according to Tolson,
Respondent did not normally post these entry-level positions,
but if a unit employee wanted an entry-level position that was
not posted for bid, the Union would raise the issue with man-
agement, and management would award the job to the senior
unit employee. (Tr. 75–76.) The issue, however, is that there
is no evidence that the Union went to management after Re-
spondent awarded these entry-level positions after March 1,
seeking to have the position assigned to a unit employee. As
such, there is no evidence Respondent changed the practice.
Based on the foregoing, I find the General Counsel has not
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent
unilaterally changed the contractual procedure or established
practice for job bidding. I, therefore, dismiss this particular
16 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
allegation.
C. Respondent, Through Day, Directed Roseberry to Purvis to
Discuss the Decertification Petition, in Violation of Section
8(A)(1) of the Act.
Subparagraph 7(a) of the Complaint alleges Respondent,
through its Human Resource Manager Stephen Day, violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it directed an employee to meet
with a fellow employee to sign the decertification petition. An
employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting, en-
couraging, promoting, or providing assistance in the initiation,
signing, or filing of an employee petition seeking to decertify
the bargaining representative. Wire Products Mfg. Corp., 326
NLRB 625, 640 (1998), enfd. sub nom. mem. NLRB v R.T.
Blankenship & Associates, Inc., 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000).
In determining whether an employer’s assistance is unlawful,
the appropriate inquiry is “whether the Respondent’s conduct
constitutes more than ministerial aid.” Times Herald, 253
NLRB 524 (1980). In making that inquiry, the Board considers
the circumstances to determine whether “the preparation, circu-
lation, and signing of the petition constituted the free and unco-
erced act of the employees concerned.” See generally, Eastern
States Optical Co., 275 NLRB 371, 372 (1985); Dentech Corp.,
294 NLRB 924 (1989) (employer allowed the antiunion em-
ployee to solicit signatures for an antiunion petition on compa-
ny time and to answer employee questions at meetings); Com-
munity Cash Stores, 238 NLRB 265 (1978) (employer told an
employee to go up to the company meeting room where the
antiunion employee would give him a statement withdrawing
his union authorization card); and Scherer & Sons, Inc., 147
NLRB 1442, 1445–1449 (1964), enfd. per curiam 370 F.2d 12
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 88 S.Ct. 46 (1967) (employer gave
antiunion employee unrestricted access to the plant and offices
and directed employees to sign her legal complaint against the
union’s picketing).
I find that Day directed Cordell Roseberry to meet with
Keith Purvis for the purpose of having Roseberry sign the de-
certification petition, and that this amounted to more than min-
isterial aid. As previously stated, I do not credit Day’s testimo-
ny that he directed Roseberry over to Purvis so that Purvis
could take Roseberry over to meet his supervisor. I find that
Day, the human resource manager, directed a new employee—
an employee who he had just hired—to go and talk to the
known leader of the decertification effort, on company time and
on company property, for the purpose of having Purvis talk to
Roseberry about the decertification effort and to get him to sign
the decertification petition. In light of the foregoing, I find
Day’s conduct had a reasonable tendency to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce the employees in the exercise of their Section
7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Leggett & Platt, Inc., is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. The Union, the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (IAM), AFL–CIO is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Union has been the exclusive representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining of the employees in the fol-
lowing bargaining unit pursuant to 9(a) of the Act:
The production and maintenance employees at the [Respond-
ent’s] New Street and Ecton Road, Winchester, Kentucky
plants, including inspectors and shipping and receiving em-
ployees. Excluded from recognition under this Agreement are
the [Respondent’s] over-the-road drivers, office clerical em-
ployees, quality auditors, inventory control employees, parts
room attendants, guards, professional employees, and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain with the
Union on March 1, 2017, and continuing to date, as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the contractual
bargaining unit.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
making the following changes to bargaining unit employees’
terms and conditions of employment effective March 1, 2017,
without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain:
(1) wages
(2) paid personal time
(3) health insurance
(4) vacation
(5) stock bonus plan
(6) 401(k) plan
(7) dental insurance
(8) vision insurance
(9) flexible spending plan
(10) life insurance
(11) short term disability insurance
(12) long term disability insurance
6. The unfair labor practices described above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
7. The Respondent did not violate the Act in any other man-
ner alleged in the complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair la-
bor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act, the Respondent shall be ordered to cease and desist
from engaging in such conduct and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Most im-
portantly, in order to restore the status quo ante, in light of Re-
spondent’s withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain
with the Union, Respondent must recognize and bargain with
the Union for a reasonable period of time as the bargaining
representative of unit employees.
The Respondent must bargain on request with the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit and embody any understand-
ing reached in a signed agreement. The Respondent is required
to meet to negotiate with the Union at reasonable times and
reasonable places.
The restoration of the status quo ante requires that the Re-
spondent must, on request from the Union, continue the terms
LEGGETT AND PLATT, INC. 17
and conditions of employment until changed through collective
bargaining with the Union. In accord with Board practice and
equitable considerations, the recommended Order will not re-
quire the rescission of the unlawful wage increases, absent a
request from the Union. The Respondent shall post an appro-
priate informational notice, as described in the attached appen-
dix. The General Counsel requests that, in addition, the Re-
spondent be required to read the notices to employees at an all
employee meeting. This remedy is atypical and generally or-
dered in situations when there is a showing that the Board’s
traditional notice remedies are insufficient, such as when a
respondent is a recidivist violator of the Act, when unfair labor
practices are multiple and pervasive, or when circumstances
exist that suggest employees will not understand or will not be
appropriately informed by a notice posting. Here, the violations
are serious, but I do not find circumstances to warrant a notice
reading remedy.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended21
ORDER22
Respondent, Leggett & Platt, Inc., its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from the International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) District
Lodge No. 619, AFL–CIO (Union), and failing and refusing to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of unit employees.
(b) Undermining the Union and interfering with employee
free choice by directing employees to meet with another em-
ployee for the purpose of obtaining employees signatures on a
petition to decertify or repudiate the Union.
(c) Making changes to bargaining unit employees’ terms and
conditions of employment in effect March 1, 2017, without
affording the Union prior notice and a meaningful opportunity
to bargain.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of the following
appropriate unit employees concerning terms and conditions
of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
the understanding in a signed agreement:

21 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
22 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
The Company’s production and maintenance employees at
the Company’s New Street and Ecton Road, Winchester, Ken-
tucky plants, including inspectors and shipping and receiving
employees. Excluded from recognition under this Agreement
are the Company’s over-the-road drivers, office clerical em-
ployees, quality auditors, inventory control employees, parts
room attendants, guards, professional employees, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
(b) On request of the Union, adhere to the terms and condi-
tions set out in the expired collective-bargaining agreement
honored through February 28, 2017, giving effect to its terms
retroactive to March 1, 2017, and continuing those terms and
conditions in effect unless and until changed through collective
bargaining with the Union.
(c) Make unit employees whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the Respondent’s repudia-
tion of the collective-bargaining relationship.
(d) Compensate affected employees for the adverse tax con-
sequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay awards, and
file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating
the backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days of service by the Region, post at its Win-
chester, Kentucky facilities copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.” Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director of Region 9, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since March 1, 2017.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 9 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 2, 2017.
18 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the
above rights.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain in good faith with the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers (IAM), AFL–CIO as exclusive representative for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining of the employees in the follow-
ing bargaining unit pursuant to 9(a) of the Act
The production and maintenance employees at the [Respond-
ent’s] New Street and Ecton Road, Winchester, Kentucky
plants, including inspectors and shipping and receiving em-
ployees. Excluded from recognition under this Agreement are
the [Respondent’s] over-the-road drivers, office clerical em-
ployees, quality auditors, inventory control employees, parts
room attendants, guards, professional employees, and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Union or refuse
to recognize and bargain with the Union as your bargaining
representative in the absence of a Board election or absent
proof of an actual loss of majority support of the bargaining
unit employees at the time recognition is withdrawn.
WE WILL NOT make changes in wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, including, but not limited to,
employees’ wages, paid personal time, health insurance, vaca-
tion, stock bonus plan, 401(k) plan, dental insurance, vision
insurance, flexible spending plan, life insurance, short and long
term disability insurance, without reaching an overall good
faith impasse.
WE WILL NOT tell you to meet with other employees to sign a
petition to decertify the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain or coerce you in the exercise of your rights under Section
7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and bargain with the Union as your rep-
resentative concerning wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, and, If an agreement is reached with the
Union, we will sign a document containing that agreement.
WE WILL if requested by the Union, rescind any or all chang-
es to your terms and conditions of employment that we made
without bargaining with the Union.
WE WILL pay you for the wages and other benefits lost be-
cause of the unilateral changes to terms and conditions of em-
ployment that we made without bargaining with the Union.
LEGGETT & PLATT, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CA-194057 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.