01994725
02-05-2002
Lavern Partridge, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Lavern Partridge v. United States Postal Service
01994725
February 5, 2002
.
Lavern Partridge,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01994725
Agency No. 1J-484-1014-96
Hearing No. 230-97-4172X
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 1999, Lavern Partridge (complainant) initiated an appeal to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from the
final decision of the United States Postal Service (agency), concerning
her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42
U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is
accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,
we REVERSE and REMAND the agency's final decision.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ),
in making the decision not to hold a hearing, erred in determining that
there were no genuine issues of material fact.
BACKGROUND
Complainant, a Casual employee at the agency's Detroit Bulk Mail Center
in Allen Park, Michigan, filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency,
alleging that the agency had discriminated against her on the bases of
race (Black), disability (Achilles tendinitis), and retaliation when she
was terminated on March 1, 1996. The record reflects that complainant was
on light duty due to an injury from August 25, 1995 to November 1, 1995.
On February 16, 1996, a 204B supervisor (S-1) directed complainant to
report to the east dock. Complainant averred that she requested that
she be replaced because she was sleepy and informed S-1 that she would
report to the east dock later. Complainant further averred that she
told S-1 to tell the acting manager (RMO) of her request. S-1, however,
averred that complainant refused her order and yelled, �I will not go.�
The record reflects that S-1 informed RMO of the incident. RMO went to
the area where complainant was working and said, �When you're told to
go to a job, you get your ass on the east dock and that's the bottom
line.� Complainant averred that she responded that this was not the
bottom line and asked RMO to show some compassion. RMO stated that he
would �dock her off the clock,� and then informed her not to return.
S-1 and complainant's co-workers testified that complainant yelled
and used profanity during the incident. Complainant did not return to
the facility thereafter, and on March 1, 1996, RMO issued a Letter of
Termination for failing to follow instructions.
Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO
counseling and filed a formal complaint on June 20, 1996. During the
investigation, complainant asserted that she believed that a letter she
had written to the former plant manger requesting that she be hired as
a part time flexible employee was the basis of management's retaliatory
termination. She further explained that she believed that RMO was angry
because of her past disability. She noted in an affidavit, dated October
28, 1996, that a white employee (comparator) refused a direct order,
but was not terminated as she was.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a
copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an AJ.
The AJ issued a decision, without a hearing, finding that complainant
had not been subjected to discrimination as alleged.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case
of race, disability, or retaliation discrimination. With respect to
race discrimination, the AJ found that complainant failed to identify a
similarly situated employee<1> because she did not offer any evidence
that the comparator refused a job assignment and was not terminated.
With respect to disability discrimination, the AJ determined that
complainant failed to show that her Achilles tendinitis rose to the level
of a substantially limiting disability because complainant's physician
released her to return to work with no restrictions. Finally, with
respect to retaliation discrimination, the AJ found that complainant
failed to show any prior EEO activity of which management was aware at
the time of the incident. On April 13, 1999, the agency's final decision
implemented the AJ's decision.
Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal. The agency requests
that we affirm its final decision.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where
a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary
standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not
sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must
be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to
affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by
weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.
In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ
may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that
the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when he
concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case.
Initially, complainant contends that the comparator refused a direct
order, but was not terminated as she was. The agency, however, did not
investigate whether the comparator in fact refused a direct order and
was not terminated. Since complainant's evidence must be believed at
the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn
in her favor, we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as
to whether the comparator was similarly situated to complainant.
The hearing process is intended to be an extension of the investigative
process, designed to �ensure that the parties have a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain and supplement the record and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive (MD) 110, as
revised, November 9, 1999, Chapter 6, page 6-1; see also 29 C.F.R. ��
1614.109(c) and (d). �Truncation of this process, while material
facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is still
ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full and fair
investigation of her claims.� Mi S. Bang v. United States Postal Service,
EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October 31, 1996);
Chronister v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940578
(April 23, 1995). In summary, there are unresolved issues which require
an assessment as to the credibility of the various witnesses. Therefore,
judgment as a matter of law for the agency should not have been granted.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, the Commission REVERSES
the agency's final action and REMANDS the matter to the agency in
accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.
ORDER
Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,
the agency is ordered to submit a request to the Hearings Unit of the
Cleveland District Office for scheduling of a hearing. The agency is
also directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings
Unit within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.
The agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at
the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted
to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue a
decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the
agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the
right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in
the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 5, 2002
__________________
Date
1 We note that comparative evidence is not an essential element of
a prima facie case of discrimination. The complainant may also come
forward with sufficient evidence to create an inference of discrimination.
See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterer's Group, 517 U.S. 308 (1996).