Lauren Van Heerden et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 9, 2019

14502407 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/502,407 09/30/2014 Lauren VAN HEERDEN G4144-00052 1653
39290 7590 10/09/2019
DUANE MORRIS LLP - DC
505 9th Street
Suite 1000
WASHINGTON, DC 20004-2166
EXAMINER
CAO, VINCENT M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3688
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/09/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte LAUREN VAN HEERDEN, MICHAEL E. GLOBE,
MAZIN AL-SAMADI, GUNALAN NADARAJAH,
ORIN DEL VECHHIO, MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS,
PRABAHARN SIVASHANMUGAM, EDWARD LOUNDSBURY,
PAUL MON-WAH CHAN, JONATHAN K. BARNETT,
ASHRAF METWALI, and JAKUB DANIELAK
____________

Appeal 2018-002803
Application 14/502,4071
Technology Center 3600
_______________

Before HUNG H. BUI, JON M. JURGOVAN, and
JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–26 and 28–35, which are all the
claims pending in the application. Claims Appx. Claim 27 has been
cancelled. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. The real party in interest is Toronto-Dominion Bank. App.
Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed June
12, 2017; Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed December 26, 2017; Examiner’s
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention is directed to “computerized methods and
systems for administering, creating, or modifying actual and virtual
investment portfolios based on a user’s interaction with one or more social
networks and/or the user’s consumption of electronic content.” Spec. ¶ 5.
According to Appellant, the “system includ[es] a storage device and at least
one processor [] configured to [1] obtain an investment risk tolerance of a
user, [2] obtain digital activity data associated with the user [including at
least one of (i) first data indicative of an interaction between the user and a
social network or (ii) second data indicative of elements of electronic
content accessed by the user], [3] obtain program data identifying a []
loyalty program associated with the user . . . [4] identify a plurality of []
securities based on the digital activity data, the [] loyalty program, and the
investment risk tolerance, and [5] generate one or more electronic
commands to transmit information a first set of the [] securities to a device
of the first user.” Spec. ¶ 6; Abstract.
Claims 1, 28, and 32 are independent. Independent claim 1,
reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A system, comprising:
a storage device; and
at least one processor coupled to the storage device, the
storage device storing software instructions for controlling the
at least one processor when executed by the at least one
processor, and the at least one processor being operative with
the software instructions and configured to:

Answer (“Ans.”) mailed October 24, 2017; Final Office Action (“Final
Act.”) mailed December 29, 2017; and original Specification (“Spec.”) filed
September 30, 2014.
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[1] obtain program data identifying a first loyalty
program associated with a user, the user being a participant in
the first loyalty program;
[2] obtain, from a device, digital activity data indicative
of an interaction of a user with digital content presented by the
device within a corresponding graphical user interface, the
digital activity data including at least one of (i) first data
indicative of an activity within a social network or (ii) second
data indicative of a portion of the displayed digital content
visible within a first interface element of the graphical user
interface;
[3] identify a plurality of first securities based on the
digital activity data, the first securities having corresponding
issuers, the issuers being related to at least a portion of the
digital activity data, and the first securities being associated
with risk levels consistent with an investment risk tolerance of
the user;
[4] based on the program data, determine a relationship
between the first loyalty program and the issuers of a subset of
the first securities; and
[5] transmit data identifying the subset of the first
securities to the device, the transmitted data instructing the
device to generate a second interface element that includes
information representative of the subset of the first securities,
and to present the generated second interface element at a
corresponding position within the graphical user interface, the
second interface element obscuring at least a portion of the
digital content visible within the first interface element.

App. Br. 26–27 (Claims App.) (bracketing added).

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EXAMINER’S REJECTION
Claims 1–26 and 28–35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly
more. Final Act. 2–5.

ANALYSIS
In support of the § 101 rejection of claims 1–26 and 28–35, the
Examiner determines Appellant’s claims are directed to “recommending
securities to the user based on collected user information including a
tolerance of user investment risk, purchase activity, geographic area, and
loyalty program participation,” which is a fundamental economic practice.
Final Act. 3; Ans. 3–4. According to the Examiner, “collection of
information, [] analysis and selection of [] data, and [] presentation of []
data” is also analogous to the claims found by the Federal Circuit to be an
abstract idea in Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, 838 F.3d, 1266
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Final Act. 3.
The Examiner then determines the additional elements (i.e., storage
device, processor, and interface elements), when analyzed individually and
as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea because these additional elements (1) do not improve “the
functioning of a computer or improve[] any other technology; (2) “the
claimed invention is specifically directed towards an improvement in
business and finance by encouraging new investors”; and (3) the use of
“graphical user interfaces” are “routine and conventional” and are
considered to be “extra-solution activity.” Final Act. 4–5, 7–9 (citing July
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2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility, 80 Fed. Reg. 45,429 (July 30,
2015) (“the 2015 Update”)).
Legal Framework
To determine whether claims are patent eligible under § 101, we apply
the Supreme Court’s two-step framework articulated in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). First, we determine whether the claims are
directed to a patent-ineligible concept: laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas. Id. at 216. If so, we then proceed to the second step to
consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that
“‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at
217. In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 218 (alteration in original).
The Federal Circuit has described the Alice step-one inquiry as
looking at the “focus” of the claims, their “character as a whole,” and the
Alice step-two inquiry as looking more precisely at what the claim elements
add—whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of the
ineligible matter to which the claim is directed. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC
v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Internet Patents
Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (the “Office”) applies the Supreme Court’s two-step
framework, the Office recently published revised guidance interpreting
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governing case law and establishing a prosecution framework for all patent-
eligibility analysis under Alice and § 101 effective as of January 7, 2019.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–
57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).
2019 Revised Guidance
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look under Alice step 1 or
“Step 2A” to whether the claim recites:
(1) Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., [i] mathematical concepts,
[ii] mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion), or [iii] certain methods of organizing human activity
such as a fundamental economic practice or managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people); and

(2) Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).3
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55, Revised Step 2A,
Prong One (Abstract Idea) and Prong Two (Integration into A Practical
Application). Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does
not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 or
“Step 2B.” See 2019 Revised Guidance at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:

3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08.2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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1) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

2) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
In the briefing, Appellant and the Examiner refer to prior USPTO
guidance regarding § 101, including, for example: (1) 2014 Interim
Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618
(December 16, 2014); (2) July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility, 80
Fed. Reg. 45,429 (July 30, 2015) (“the 2015 Update”); (3) May 2016 Subject
Matter Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,381 (May 6, 2016); and (4)
Memorandum on Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions dated Nov. 2, 2016.
Final Act. 6; App. Br. 15. However, these prior guidance and update have
been superseded by the 2019 Revised Guidance. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. As such, our analysis will not address the
sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection against the cited prior guidance.
Rather, our analysis will comport with the 2019 Revised Guidance as
discussed below.
Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance
Step 2A—Prong 1
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s determination that claims
1–26 and 28–35 recite “a fundamental economic practice.” Final Act. 3.
Instead, Appellant argues the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because the Examiner’s characterization is an “oversimplification of
Appellant’s claims” that ignores “certain claim elements” such as the use of
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(1) “a first interface element of [a] graphical user interface” and (2) “a
second interface element at a corresponding portion within the graphical
user interface . . . obscuring at least a portion of the digital content visible
within the first interface element” as recited in claim 1 and similarly, claims
28 and 32. App. Br. 20–21; Reply Br. 2–4.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. At the outset, we note
Appellant’s Specification and claims describe “computerized systems and
methods for administering investment portfolios in a network environment,
such as the Internet” that “create or modify actual and virtual investment
portfolios based on a user’s consumption of information.” Spec. ¶ 2. For
example, Appellant’s claim 1 recites a “system” equipped with “at least one
processor . . . configured to:
[1] “obtain program data identifying a first loyalty program
associated with a user . . .;

[2] obtain . . . digital activity data indicative of an interaction
of a user with digital content presented by the device within a
corresponding graphical user interface . . . including at least one
of (i) first data indicative of an activity within a social network
or (ii) second data indicative of a portion of the displayed digital
content visible within a first interface element of the graphical
user interface;

[3] identify a plurality of first securities based on the digital
activity data, the first securities having corresponding issuers . .
. related to at least a portion of the digital activity data, and . . .
associated with risk levels consistent with an investment risk
tolerance of the user;

[4] based on the program data, determine a relationship
between the first loyalty program and the issuers of a subset of
the first securities; and
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[5] transmit data identifying the subset of the first securities
to the device, the transmitted data instructing the device to
generate a second interface element that includes information
representative of the subset of the first securities, and to present
the generated second interface element at a corresponding
position within the graphical user interface, the second interface
element obscuring at least a portion of the digital content visible
within the first interface element.

App. Br. 26–27 (Claims App.) (bracketing added).

As correctly recognized by the Examiner, these limitations of
Appellant’s claim 1, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite
nothing more than collecting “information regarding the user including both
activity data and loyalty program participation data” and “a plurality of
securities available for purchase,” analyzing such information for “a
relationship between subset of securities and the loyalty program data,” and
then presenting (displaying) the subset of securities (i.e., financial and other
forms of business data) to the user, which is a known business activity and a
fundamental economic practice in our system of commerce. Ans. 3–4; see
Spec. ¶¶ 2, 5–8. Such activities are squarely within the realm of abstract
ideas, like (1) the risk hedging in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010);
(2) the intermediated settlement in Alice, 573 U.S. at 220; (3) verifying
credit card transactions in CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370; (4) guaranteeing
transactions in buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); (5) distributing products over the Internet in Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (6) determining a price of a
product offered to a purchasing organization in Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v.
SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and (7) pricing a product
for sale in OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
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2015). Collecting, analyzing, and displaying selected securities or financial
data is also a building block of a market economy and, like risk hedging and
intermediated settlement, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 220.
Alternatively, collecting [user information, loyalty program, and
securities available for purchase], analyzing such information [a relationship
between subset of securities and the loyalty program data] and then
presenting (displaying) the subset of securities (i.e., financial and other
forms of business data) to the user are nothing more than a series of “mental
processes” that could also be performed in the human mind or by a human
using a pen and paper—a subject matter that falls within the three groupings
of abstract ideas identified in the Revised Guidance. See CyberSource Corp.
v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A]
method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract
idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”); see also In re Comiskey, 554
F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental processes—or processes of human
thinking—standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical
application.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena
of nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”
(Emphasis added)). Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable
even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could
have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That
purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a
computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson.”).
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As further recognized by the Examiner, collecting, analyzing, and
displaying selected securities is also analogous to the claims identified by
the Federal Circuit as directed to an abstract idea in Affinity Labs of Texas,
LLC v. Amazon.com, 838 F.3d, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “the
concept of delivering user-selected media content to portable device” is an
abstract idea under § 101). Final Act. 3; see also Electric Power Group,
LLC, v. Alstom, 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the concept of
“collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis” is an abstract idea under § 101).
We, therefore, conclude limitations (1)–(6) in Appellant’s claim 1
recite nothing more than collecting, analyzing, and displaying selected
securities, which is “a fundamental economic practice” and/or “mental
processes” as identified in the Revised Guidance, and thus, an abstract idea.
See 2019 Revised Guidance (Revised Step 2A, Prong One), 84 Fed. Reg. at
52, 54. According to the Federal Circuit, “collecting information, including
when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as
information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.” See, e.g., Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015;
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs.
for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); CyberSource Corp.
v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Likewise,
“analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more,” is “essentially mental processes
within the abstract-idea category. See, e.g., TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 613;
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Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351; SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs.,
SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2011); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 589–90 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). And the
Federal Circuit has recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract
processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as
identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part
of such collection and analysis. See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at
1347; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application)
Under Revised Step 2A, Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, we must
determine if the claims (i.e., additional limitations beyond the judicial
exception) integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
However, we discern no additional element (or combination of elements)
recited in Appellant’s claims 1–26 and 28–35 that integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55 (“Prong Two”). For example, Appellant’s additional elements (i.e.,
processor, user’s device, and graphical user interface including first and
second interface elements) recited in claims 1–26 and 28–35 do not (1)
improve the functioning of a computer or other technology, (2) are not
applied with any particular machine (except for generic computer
components), (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a
different state, and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond
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generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant argues “certain claim elements” recited in claim 1 and
similarly, claims 28 and 32 such as the use of (1) “a first interface element of
[a] graphical user interface” and (2) “a second interface element at a
corresponding portion within the graphical user interface . . . obscuring at
least a portion of the digital content visible within the first interface
element” “represent a specific technological improvement that enhances a
computer’s basic ability to display information and interact with a user.”
App. Br. 21. Appellant also argues the “specific technological improvement
[is] necessary rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem arising
in graphical user interfaces, and not an improvement in the ‘fields of
business, social science, and law.’” Reply Br. 8 (emphasis added).
We do not agree. There is no support from Appellant’s Specification
for any feature that would improve any existing graphical user interface
technology or would “overcome a problem arising in graphical user
interfaces” as Appellant argues. Reply Br. 8. Instead, Appellant’s claims
seek to utilize generic computer components (i.e., “storage device,”
“processor” and “user’s device”) as a tool, as shown in Appellant’s Figure 1,
to perform an abstract idea. Likewise, Appellant’s claims utilize generic
graphical user interfaces (i.e., “first interface element” and “second interface
element at a corresponding portion within the graphical user interface . . .
obscuring at least a portion of the digital content visible within the first
interface element”) as a tool, as shown in Appellant’s Figures 5B, 6B, and
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7B, to present selected securities to an end user. For example, Appellant’s
Figures 5B and 6B are reproduced below:

As shown in Figures 5B and 6B, graphical user interface 510 may
include region 514 that, upon selection by user 110, enables user 110 to
access a digital portal associated with a financial institution and suggested
securities (e.g., MonsantoTM and BayerTM) and interact with the digital portal
to generate or modify an actual or “virtual” investment portfolios and, in
some aspects, may click or select region to gain access to the digital portion,
which client device 194 may present within a separate window (pop-up) or
another interface 610 that obscures a portion of the web page 600. Spec. ¶¶
142–151.
However, the use of these generic computer components (i.e.,
graphical user interfaces) to display different types of digital content to a
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user is insufficient to show “integration into a practical application.” See
MPEP § 2106.05(f). Instead, these generic computer components are simply
the “automation of the fundamental economic concept,” OIP Techs., 788
F.3d at 1362–63. “[M]erely requiring generic computer implementation,”
“do[] not move into [§] 101 eligibility territory.” buySAFE, 765 F.3d at
1354.
For business-centric inventions such as Appellant’s invention
involving collecting, analyzing, and displaying selected securities and other
forms of business data, the “integration into a practical application” prong
requires consideration of whether the claims purport to provide “a technical
solution to a technical problem” as required by the Federal Circuit’s
precedential decisions in (1) DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773
F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and (2) Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet
Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
For example, the Federal Circuit found DDR’s claims are patent-
eligible under § 101 because DDR’s claims: (1) do not merely recite “the
performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world”
previously disclosed in Bilski and Alice; but instead (2) provide a technical
solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a “solution . . .
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR, 773 F.3d at
1257. Likewise, the Federal Circuit also found Amdocs’ claims patent-
eligible under § 101 because like DDR, Amdocs’ claims “entail[] an
unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed
fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously
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required massive databases)” and “improve the performance of the system
itself.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302.
Contrary to Appellant’s arguments (see Reply Br. 8), collecting,
analyzing, and displaying selected securities and other forms of business
data does not provide any “technical solution to a technical problem” as
contemplated by the Federal Circuit in DDR and Amdocs. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a). For example, Appellant’s claimed collecting, analyzing, and
displaying selected securities and other forms of business data does not
provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet,
i.e., a “solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Nor does Appellant’s invention entail, like Amdocs,
any “unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed
fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously
required massive databases)” and “improve the performance of the system
itself.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302. The focus of Appellant’s
invention is not to improve the performance of computers or any underlying
technology; instead, the focus is to use generic computer components as a
tool to gather and analyze business data to administer, create, or modify
actual and virtual investment portfolios based on a user’s interaction with
one or more social networks and/or the user’s consumption of electronic
content (see Spec. ¶ 5; Abstract).
A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “No
matter how much of an advance in the finance field the claims recite, the
advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged
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innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” See SAP America, Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Appellant’s “additional
elements” recited in claims 1–26 and 28–35 integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. However, we find no
element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s claims 1–26 and
28–35 that contain any “inventive concept” or add anything “significantly
more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application.
Alice, 573 U.S. 208 at 221.
Appellant does not identify any “specific limitation [of claims 1, 28,
and 32] beyond the judicial exception that is not ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional’ in the field” as per MPEP § 2106.05(d). Instead, Appellant
argues the graphical user interfaces recited (i.e., “first interface element” and
“second interface element at a corresponding portion within the graphical
user interface . . . obscuring at least a portion of the digital content visible
within the first interface element”) is significantly more than an abstract idea
because “Appellant’s claims recite a specific, discrete implementation of the
Appeal 2018-002803
Application 14/502,407

18
allegedly abstract idea within a computer-networked environment that
enhances a computer’s ability to display information to and interact with a
user.” App. Br. 24.
We do not agree. Utilizing generic computer components in a
network does not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter. As our reviewing court has observed, “after Alice,
there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does
not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR, 773 F.3d at
1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 222).
Lastly, Appellant argues the claims “do not attempt to preempt every
practical application of the ‘collection of information, the analysis and
selection of [data], and the presentation of data.’” App. Br. 21. We
disagree. The lack of preemption is a necessary clue for patent eligibility,
but it is not sufficient for patent eligibility. As the McRO court explicitly
recognized, “the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility.” See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
Furthermore, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter” under the Alice/Mayo framework, “preemption
concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
Because Appellant’s independent claims 1, 28, and 32 are directed to
a patent-ineligible abstract concept and do not recite an “inventive concept”
or provide a solution to a technical problem under the second step of the
Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claims 1, 28, and 32, and their dependent claims 2–26, 29–31, and 33–35 not
separately argued.
Appeal 2018-002803
Application 14/502,407

19

CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–26 and 28–35 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–26 and
28–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.§  Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–26 and 28–35 101  non-statutory 1–26 and
28–35

Overall Outcome 1–26 and
28–35

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED