Laurae A. Olison, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 17, 2007
0120072707 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 17, 2007)

0120072707

09-17-2007

Laurae A. Olison, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Laurae A. Olison,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120072707

Hearing No. 320-A1-8129X

Agency No. 200M-0911

DECISION

On May 22, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's April 26,

2007, final decision on attorney's fees. The appeal is deemed timely

and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the agency's decision to award complainant attorney's fees and

costs in the amounts of $14,918.60 and $102.60 respectively was in error.

BACKGROUND

Following a hearing held on November 13 and 14, 2002 on complainant's

race, disability, sex and retaliation claims, an EEOC Administrative Judge

(AJ) determined that discrimination had occurred. See Olison v. Dep't

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Hearing No. 320-A1-8129X (Aug. 11, 2003).

The AJ concluded that as a result complainant was entitled to, among

other things, placement into a GS-6 position; restoration, credit or

reimbursement for 80% of all leave used from February 1999 to November

2001, $75,000.00 in compensatory damages, and $34,277.85 in attorney's

fees and costs. See id.

The agency disagreed in part with the AJ's findings and appealed to our

office the AJ's decision. Specifically, the agency rejected the AJ's

finding of harassment and disparate treatment discrimination on the

bases of race, sex, and disability. With regard to the remedies, the

agency rejected, among other things, the AJ's order to place complainant

in a position above a GS-5; to restore 80% of all the leave she used

from February 1999 to May 1999, and to pay complainant $75,000.00 in

compensatory damages. Complainant, for her part, responded to the

appeal and filed a cross-appeal, asserting that she was entitled to

$100,000.00 in compensatory damages and a promotion to GS-7. We note

that the agency accepted and paid complainant's attorney the $34,277.85

in attorney's fees that the AJ awarded.

In our April 28, 2005 appellate decision, we affirmed the AJ's decision

in its entirety, reversing the agency's final order to the extent that

it had rejected the AJ's decision. We also rejected complainant's

cross-appeal because it had been untimely filed. See Olison v. Dep't of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 07A40001 (Apr. 28, 2005). Complainant

subsequently filed a request for reconsideration on our denial of

her cross-appeal. Our office denied the request on January 30, 2007.

See Olison v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 0520050875

(Jan. 30, 2007). Before our decision on the request, complainant's

attorney submitted a fee request to the agency on August 28, 2005 for

the services he rendered on the appeal. Following our decision on the

request, on February 19, 2007, complainant's attorney submitted another

fee statement for services rendered between August 29, 2005 and February

19, 2007. In this petition, complainant's attorney requested a total

of $30,346.501 in fees. This total included services rendered by four

individuals at the law firm (a partner, a junior associate, and two

paralegals), each of whom claimed different billing rates.

As stated above, the agency issued its final decision on attorney's fees

on April 26, 2007. The agency points out that complainant's attorney

requests fees for three different actions: (1) the response to the

agency's appeal, (2) complainant's cross-appeal, and (3) complainant's

request for reconsideration. However, the agency notes that complainant

prevailed only as to the agency's appeal; she did not prevail as to her

cross-appeal or her request for reconsideration. The agency further

points out that complainant's attorney failed to indicate the hour totals

per employee who worked on complainant's case.

Taking these facts into account, the agency arrived at the following

conclusions. It determined that the 2.8 hours billed by the partner

for the period before the AJ's decision (pre-August 11, 2003)2 was

reasonable. The agency further found that the 127.83 hours that

complainant's attorney claimed for the period between August 11, 2003

and April 28, 2005, the date of our appellate decision, was excessive

because although the majority of this time was spent responding to

the appeal and preparing the unsuccessful cross-appeal, the firm had

already spent a considerable amount of time on the case, having argued

before the matter before the AJ. Therefore, the agency found that the

proper course of action was to disallow 50% of the hours requested for

this period and to accept as reasonable 17.5 hours billed by partner,

44.9 hours billed by the junior associate, and 0.5 hours billed by the

paralegal. With regard to the period after April 28, 2005, the agency

again accepted only 1.6 hours of the non-fee preparation time claimed

by the partner as the other claimed hours appear to have been spent on

the unsuccessful request for reconsideration.

With regard to compensation for the time spent of preparing the fee

petition, the agency determined that the 1.0 hour claimed by the partner

for the pre-August 11, 2003 period was reasonable. As for the period

between August 11, 2003 and April 28, 2005, complainant's attorney made

no fee request. For the period following our appellate decision of

April 28, 2005, the agency found the fee request to be excessive and

disproportionate, particularly given the poor quality of the request.

As such, the agency only approved 50% of the time requested - 2.4 hours

for the partner and 4.4 hours for the paralegal.

As for the hourly rates due to the law firm, the agency found the

attorney's rates reasonable. The partner claimed $250 per hour for

services rendered before April 28, 2005 and $300 per hour for services

rendered after April 28, 2005. The junior partner claimed a rate of

$175 per hour for all periods. The paralegal claimed a rate of $75 per

hour for services rendered before April 28, 2005 and $90 per hour for

the work performed after April 28, 2005.

In addition to attorney's fees, complainant's attorney also claimed costs.

The agency notes that although the fee petition contains little or no

explanation, justification or documentation as to the costs, it awarded

the $102.60 requested in light of the protracted processing of the case.

The agency's decision on attorney's fees and costs can be summarized in

the following tables:

Hours Expended Representing Complainant = $13,450.00

* Period before August 11, 2003:

Partner: 2.8 hours at $250/hour = $ 700.00 * Period between August 11,

2003 and April 28, 2005:

Partner: 17.5 hours at $250/hour = $4,375.00 Jr. Assoc 44.9 hours at

$175/hour = $7,857.50 Paralegal 0.5 hour at $75/hour = $ 37.50 *

Period after April 28, 2005:

Partner: 1.6 hours at $300/hour = $ 480.00

Hours Expended Preparing Fee Petition = $1,366

* Period before August 11, 2003:

Partner: 1.0 hour at $250/hour $ 250.00 * Period between August 11,

2003 and April 28, 2005: NONE

* Period after April 28, 2005:

Partner: 2.4 hours at $300/hour $ 720.00 Paralegal: 4.4 hours at

$90/hour $ 396.00

Allowable Costs = $102.60

Total Award = $14,918.60

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant filed no statement in support of appeal although her attorney

requested and was granted an extension of time to submit such a statement.

The agency, for its part, requests that we affirm its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act authorizes the award of reasonable

attorney's fees, including for an attorney's processing of a compensatory

damages claim. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). To establish entitlement

to attorney's fees, complainant must first show that she is a prevailing

party. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of

Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). A prevailing party

for this purpose is one who succeeds on any significant issue, and

achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the action. See Davis

v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05970101 (Feb. 4, 1999)

(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 427, 433 (1983)).

The fee award is ordinarily determined by multiplying a reasonable

number of hours expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate, also

known as a "lodestar." See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B); Bernard

v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998).

In determining the number of hours expended the Commission recognizes

that the attorney "is not required to record in great detail the manner in

which each minute of his time was expended." Id. However, the attorney

does have the burden of identifying the subject matters on which he spent

his time by submitting sufficiently detailed and contemporaneous time

records to ensure that the time spent was accurately recorded. See id.

Further, a reasonable fee award may be assessed in light of factors such

as: (1) the time required (versus time expended) to complete the legal

work; (2) novelty or difficulty of the issues; (3) the requisite skill to

properly handle the case; (4) the degree to which counsel is precluded

from taking other cases; (5) the relief sought and results obtained;

and (6) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship.

See Cerny v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05930899 (Oct. 19, 1994).

Complainant is only entitled to an award for time reasonably expended.

It does not always follow that the amount of time actually expended is

the amount of time reasonably expended. See Elvin v. Dep't of Labor,

EEOC Request No. 01943425 (Aug. 31, 1995). Rather, "billing judgment"

is an important component in fee setting, and hours that would not be

properly billed to a private client are also not properly billed to the

agency pursuant to a successful EEO claim. See id. Counsel for the

prevailing party should make a "good faith effort to exclude from a fee

request hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary." See

Bernard, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861.

The Commission has held that one method of addressing the appropriate

amount of attorney's fees when a complainant is not completely successful

is to take a percentage across-the-board reduction of compensable

time billed. See Blinick v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., EEOC Appeal

No. 07A20079 (Feb. 3, 2004) (citing McGinnis v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC

Request No. 05920150 (July 15, 1992)). Even if complainant did not

prevail on every aspect of her complaint, that does not, in itself,

justify a reduction in the hours expended where the successful and

unsuccessful claims are closely intertwined. See id. "Claims are

fractionable or unrelated when they involve distinctly different claims

for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories." Id.

Having reviewed the evidence, we find that the agency's decision was fair

and reasonable and as such we affirm the decision in its entirety. As the

agency pointed out, complainant only prevailed as to the agency's appeal.

Complainant did not prevail either on her cross-appeal or on her request

for reconsideration; therefore, she is not entitled under law to fees

or costs with regard to those actions. Moreover, given the initial

finding of discrimination, the agency acted appropriately in reducing

the time billed by 50%. We also note that complainant's attorney has

not presented any arguments in support of his claim for more attorney's

fees despite bearing the burden of proving his entitlement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission finds no reason to disturb

the agency's final decision and directs the agency to comply with the

Order below.

ORDER

Within thirty (30) days of this decision becoming final, the agency

shall:

1. Pay complainant's attorney $14,918.60 in attorney's fees, and

2. Pay complainant's attorney $102.60 in costs.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 17, 2007

__________________

Date

1 Specifically, complainant's attorney requested $30,449.10 in

attorney's fees and $102.60 in costs.

2 While the AJ's decision included an award of fees for this period

(taken from a fee statement dated June 23, 2003), complainant's attorney

explained that the 2.8 hours stem from hours worked on the case from

June 23 to August 11, 2003.

3 Complainant's attorney claimed 37.00 hours for work performed by the

law firm partner, 89.80 hours for work performed by the junior associate,

and 1.00 hour for paralegal services.

??

??

??

??

2

0120072707

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

7

0120072707