01a03223
08-02-2000
Laura S. Meadows, Complainant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.
Laura S. Meadows v. Department of Agriculture
01A03223
August 2, 2000
.
Laura S. Meadows,
Complainant,
v.
Daniel R. Glickman,
Secretary,
Department of Agriculture,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A03223
Agency No. 980669
Hearing No. 170-99-8138X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final action
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination on the basis of reprisal<1> (prior EEO activity)
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<2> Complainant alleges that she was discriminated
against when she was separated from the agency in a Reduction-in-Force
(RIF) action on April 3, 1998. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).
For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final
action.
The record reveals that complainant was one of three Program Assistants
(PAs) at the agency's Cabell-Wayne County Farm Service Center (FSC), Field
Service Agency. She filed an informal EEO complaint in December 1997,
after a verbal altercation with one of the other PAs, naming the County
Executive Director (CED) and two other managers (Manager 1 and Manager
2) as responsible officials for allowing aggressive workplace behavior.
Prior to this, complainant complained to the District Director in May
1997, that she believed the CED treated her differently than the other
PAs. She averred that after that, the CED viewed her as a troublemaker.
She stated that in a September 1997, training session, the CED said that
his pet peeve was backstabbing troublemakers.
On January 5, 1998, the FSC in Washington, D.C. issued a RIF notice
(the Notice) affecting county offices. Complainant averred that
she attended a meeting in early January 1998, with Managers 1 and 2,
wherein it was determined which offices would be affected by the RIF.
She stated that Manager 1 said that this would be a good time to get
rid of the troublemakers.
The Notice included guidelines (the Guidelines) for determining which
employees would be affected by the RIF. The Guidelines provided that
CED's were to consider the employee's responsibilities, past experience,
current and projected workloads, which employee would enable the office
to best provide services, and performance if a documented performance
problem existed. Non-merit factors, including EEO activity, were not
to be considered.
On January 28, 1998, complainant received notice that she would be
separated by the RIF effective April 3, 1998. Complainant filed a formal
EEO complainant and at the conclusion of the investigation, requested
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Finding that no
material facts were in dispute, the AJ issued a decision without a
hearing, finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case
of discrimination based on reprisal because she engaged in protected
activity in December 1997, the responsible officials were aware of that
action when they selected her for separation, and the adverse action
occurred subsequent to her protected activity. Thus, she found a causal
connection between the actions based on closeness in time.
The AJ then concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that the CED testified
that he followed the Guidelines. He averred that he reviewed all three
PA's experience levels, and projected workloads and programs assigned to
each, and determined that one PA had a greater number of projected work
days than complainant and the other had more experience. The AJ further
found that complainant failed to show that the agency's articulated
reasons were pretextual. The AJ noted that the record revealed neither
that complainant was more qualified than the other two PAs nor that she
had more workload assignments, only that she had more years of experience
than one PA but that there was no evidence that length of service should
have been considered in determining which individual to separate.
The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal,
complainant argues that the AJ erred when she determined that no material
facts were in dispute, and that, even if material facts were not in
dispute, the evidence demonstrates that complainant was retaliated
against as claimed. Complainant criticized the fact that the CED used
one basis in the guidelines to retain one PA, and another basis to retain
the other PA, thus selecting her to be RIFed. Complainant claims that
the guidelines in the Notice were so subjective and flexible that the
CED could select any employee for separation.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure
set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment is appropriate
where the trier of fact determines that, given applicable substantive
law, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the
evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the
non-moving party. Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st
Cir. 1988). In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title
VII, summary judgment is appropriate if, after adequate investigation,
complainant has failed to establish the essential elements of his or
her case. Spangle v. Valley Forge Sewer Authority, 839 F.2d 171, 173
(3d Cir. 1988). In determining whether to grant summary judgment,
the trier of fact's function is not to weigh the evidence and render a
determination as to the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether
there exists a genuine factual dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the
investigative process, designed to �ensure that the parties have a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive
(MD) 110, as revised, November 9, 1999, Chapter 6, page 6-1; see also 64
Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,657 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.109(c) and (d)). �Truncation of this process,
while material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses
is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full
and fair investigation of her claims.� Mi S. Bang v. United States
Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also
Peavley v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950628
(October 31, 1996); Chronister v. United States Postal Service, EEOC
Request No. 05940578 (April 23, 1995).
We find that complainant set forth sufficient facts to show that there
was a genuine issue in dispute, namely, that the agency's articulated
reason for selecting her for RIF was a pretext for discrimination.
We are persuaded by complainant's argument that the CED used one basis,
projected workload, to retain one PA, and another, experience, to retain
the other PA. We also find suspect the statements made first by the
CED that he did not like troublemakers, and second by Manager 1, that
the RIF would be a good opportunity to get rid of the troublemakers.
In summary, there are too many unresolved issues which require an
assessment as to the credibility of the various management officials,
co-workers, and complainant, herself. Therefore, judgment as a matter
of law for the agency should not have been granted.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
arguments on appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed
in this decision, the Commission REVERSES the agency's final action and
REMANDS the matter to the agency in accordance with this decision and
the ORDER below.
ORDER
The complaint is remanded to the Hearings Unit of the appropriate EEOC
field office for scheduling of a hearing in an expeditious manner.
The agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the
EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this
decision becomes final. The agency shall provide written notification
to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the
complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter,
the Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on the complaint in
accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the agency shall issue a final
action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,
the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a
civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior
to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a
civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph
below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407
and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the
underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �
2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0400)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the
date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal
with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME
AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.
Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
August 2, 2000
__________________
Date
MEMORANDUM
TO: Hearings Unit, Philadelphia District /Field Office
FROM: Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
DATE:
RE: Laura S. Meadows v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal
No. 01A03223
Enclosed is a DECISION requiring the above referenced complaint be
assigned to an Administrative Judge. We request that the Administrative
Judge notify the Compliance Division at the Office of Federal Operations
after a decision has been issued. If there are any questions concerning
the further processing of this complaint, please contact Robert Barnhart,
Acting Director of Compliance and Control, at (202) 663-4525.
1 Complainant's formal complaint included sex (female) as a basis for
discrimination. The EEO Counselor's Report, Report of Investigation
and other documents in the record list only reprisal as the basis of
complainant's complaint. The agency's acceptance letter identified
reprisal as the sole basis of the complaint. There is no evidence or
argument from complainant indicating that this was in error. We also
note that complainant puts forth arguments going only to reprisal in
her appeal.
2 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.