Laura Martinez, Petitioner,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 24, 2009
0320090053 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 24, 2009)

0320090053

06-24-2009

Laura Martinez, Petitioner, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Laura Martinez,

Petitioner,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Petition No. 0320090053

MSPB No. SF0752080462I2

DECISION

On April 29, 2009, petitioner filed a timely petition with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission asking for review of a Final Order

issued by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) concerning her claim

of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

Petitioner worked as a Human Resources Assistant at the agency's Medical

Center facility in Las Vegas, Nevada. On May 21, 2007, petitioner

was issued a Notice of Proposed Removal (Notice) alleging deliberate

refusal to carry out a proper order and failure to follow instructions.

Specifically, the Notice alleged that petitioner deliberately failed to

register with the Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations (e-Qip)

program despite an order from her supervisor (RMO: no disability) to

do so. The Notice further alleged that petitioner failed to follow

instructions when she repeatedly allowed visitors past the front desk

and repeatedly failed to log in applications as required.

Petitioner alleged that she was discriminated against on the bases of

disability1 (central auditory processing disorder, depression, post

traumatic stress disorder) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity

under a statute that was unspecified in the record when she was removed

from the agency, effective July 27, 2007.

Petitioner filed a mixed case complaint and the agency issued a decision

finding that petitioner was not discriminated against as alleged.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an appeal with the MSPB and a MSPB

Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a decision finding no discrimination.

Petitioner next sought review by the full Board, but in a Final Order

dated March 26, 2009, the Board denied her request. Petitioner then

filed her petition with this Commission.

In its decision, the MSPB found that petitioner failed to establish

a prima facie case of disability discrimination because she failed to

establish that she was a qualified individual with a disability. The AJ

found that petitioner argued that her medical condition prevented her from

performing essential function of her position, and therefore, according

to the AJ, petitioner was not qualified for her position and hence was

not a qualified individual with a disability. The AJ further found that

petitioner failed to identify otherwise similarly situated individuals

who were treated differently. The AJ next found that petitioner failed to

establish a prima facie case of reprisal because she failed to establish

a nexus between her prior EEO activity and the agency's action.

In her request, petitioner argues that she sought a reasonable

accommodation and that the agency failed to engage in the interactive

process and denied the requested accommodation. Petitioner further

argues that the AJ erred in finding complainant was not a qualified

individual with a disability. Petitioner argues that since she was hired

under the State Vocational Rehabilitation Program, that is sufficient

to establish that she has a disability and further, that the agency

was aware of her disability. Petitioner next argues that the AJ erred

in finding that she was not qualified for her position. In addition,

petitioner argues, the AJ erred in finding that she was not denied a

reasonable accommodation. Petitioner maintains that the AJ found that

petitioner was not denied a reasonable accommodation when she was allowed

to fingerprint job applicants without having to touch them or use her

injured finger, but that the AJ failed to address whether petitioner

was denied a reasonable accommodation when she was not excused from the

requirement to register and use the agency's e-Qip system. As regards

reprisal, petitioner argues that the AJ erred in finding that she failed

to establish a prima facie case of reprisal.

EEOC regulations provide that the Commission has jurisdiction over

mixed case complaints on which the MSPB has issued a decision that

makes determinations on allegations of discrimination. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.303 et seq. The Commission must determine whether the decision of

the MSPB with respect to the allegation of discrimination constitutes a

correct interpretation of any applicable law, rule, regulation or policy

directive, and is supported by the evidence in the record as a whole.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.305(c).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, petitioner must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). The Notice said that petitioner was

removed because she deliberately failed to carry out a proper order when

she failed to register with the e-Qip program despite an order from RMO,

and that she failed to follow instructions when she repeatedly allowed

visitors past the front desk and repeatedly failed to log in applications

as required.

To ultimately prevail, petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097

(2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981);

Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842

(November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request

No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Petitioner has not presented any argument or evidence showing that the

agency's articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. For example

petitioner has not indicated that other employees who acted as she did

were treated more leniently. Indeed, petitioner testified before the

MSPB AJ that she was aware that she could lose her job if she did not

register for e-Qip.

Instead of showing that the agency's articulated reason was a pretext,

petitioner argues that she was denied a reasonable accommodation and

that this led to her being removed. Petitioner maintains that she

sought a reasonable accommodation regarding her e-Qip duties but that

her request was not granted. Petitioner further maintains that she did

not need to comply with the agency's request for additional medical

information because since she was hired as a Schedule A employee the

agency already had her medical information on file. Petitioner's Petition

For Review, p. 5. We note, however, that an employer is entitled to

request "reasonable documentation about [an employee's] disability and

its functional limitations that require reasonable accommodation."

EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical

Examinations of Employees Under the Americans With Disabilities Act

(Enforcement Guidance I) Example 7, p. 20.

Petitioner states in her Initial Appeal that she was hired in 1997,

while the record shows that her request for reasonable accommodation

was not made until April 16, 2007, approximately ten years later.

Since e-Qip duties were a new requirement, petitioner has not shown that

whatever medical information the agency may have had on file from when

she was hired ten years earlier would have shown that she required an

accommodation to perform the new e-Qip duties. In addition we note that

petitioner does not dispute that she did not comply with the agency's

request for additional information. We further note that generally were

an employee refuses to provide the reasonable documentation requested by

an employer, the employee is not entitled to reasonable accommodation See

EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, (Enforcement Guidance II),

Example 6, pp. 12, 13.

Petitioner argues on appeal that the MSPB AJ only addressed her claim that

she was denied a reasonable accommodation regarding her fingerprinting

duties but did not address her claim that she was denied a reasonable

accommodation regarding being excused from her e-Qip duties. We note

however that the AJ found that "other than suggesting the elimination of

[such duties] the appellant has not suggested any manner of modifying

this position that would allow her to perform the essential functions of

[her position]." MSPB Initial Decision, p. 20.

Based upon a thorough review of the record, it is the decision of

the Commission to concur with the final decision of the MSPB finding

no discrimination. The Commission finds that the MSPB's decision

constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules, regulations,

and policies governing this matter and is supported by the evidence in

the record as a whole.

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (W0408)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,

based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, within

thirty (30) calendar days of the date that you receive this decision.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 24, 2009

__________________

Date

1 For purposes of this decision the Commission assumes without finding

that petitioner is an individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(g)(1).

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0320090053

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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