Latonya J. Hudson, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 17, 2009
0120073279 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 17, 2009)

0120073279

06-17-2009

Latonya J. Hudson, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Latonya J. Hudson,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120073279

Agency No. 200L06142007100322

DECISION

On July 16, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's June 14,

2007 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as an Outpatient Pharmacy Technician, GS-5, at the Memphis, Tennessee

Veterans Affairs Medical Center. On December 16, 2006, complainant

filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on

the basis of race (Black) when: (1) on October 19, 2006, while preparing

the overtime roster for the following Saturday, her supervisor (S1)

referred to her and her two Black co-workers (C1 and C2) as the "Three

Stooges" and the "Three Musketeers" and (2) on or about October 24,

2006, S1 informed her that she could not work overtime every Saturday.

Prior to the conclusion of the EEO investigation, the agency dismissed

Claim 1 for failure to state a claim. The agency concluded that the

"Three Stooges" and "Three Musketeers" incident described by complainant

as harassment did not cause a harm or loss to a term, condition or

privilege of her employment. Specifically, complainant alleged that

that on October 19, 2006, S1 asked C1 (out loud across the pharmacy) if

she wanted to work on October 21 and October 28, which C1 agreed to do.

Complainant was then asked to work on the same dates which she agreed

to do. S1 then yelled across the pharmacy and asked C2 if he wanted to

work on those same dates as well. C2 also agreed to work on those dates.

S1 then allegedly1 stated, "It looks like The Three Stooges will be

working on Saturday, better yet The Three Musketeers." S1 testified

that she did not remember making this statement but if she did it was

not intended to be offensive or directed toward the complainant's race.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that complainant failed to

prove that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged with regard

to Claim 2. Specifically, the agency noted that management presented

evidence showing that the Controlled Substance Pharmacy Technician (White)

(C3) is the only pharmacy technician allowed to fill controlled medication

prescriptions in accordance with her Functional Statement, and therefore,

C3 assists the Pharmacists/Residents working on Saturdays, as needed.

The agency noted that it is undisputed that C3's Functional Statement

includes controlled substance duties, but complainant's Functional

Statement does not allow her to fill prescribed controlled medications.

Consequently, C3 receives more opportunities to work overtime on

Saturdays.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) provides, in

relevant part, that an agency shall dismiss a complaint that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R �� 1614.103,

106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long defined

an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss with

respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

We find that Claim 1 involves two unwelcome comments in one sentence on

one day unaccompanied by concrete agency action and does not alleged

a personal loss or harm regarding a term, condition, or privilege of

complainant's employment. To the extent that complainant claims that

the matters identified in Claim 1 constitute harassment, we find that

complainant's claim still fails. Unless the conduct alleged is severe,

a single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded

as a claim of discriminatory harassment. See Harris Forklift Systems,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Here, assuming the remarks were made,

they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or

abusive working environment. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). We note that the Commission

has held that the use of racial epithets or slurs in the workplace may

constitute harassment, and that a limited number of offensive slurs about

an employee's race or national origin may state a claim. See Yakubi

v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05920778 (June 4, 1993).

However, contrary to complainant's assertions the "Three Stooges" and

"Three Musketeers" comment is not objectively viewed as a racial epithet

or slurs. Therefore, the agency properly dismissed Claim 1 for failure

to state a claim.2

Regarding Claim 2, to prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this,

complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned

by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating

that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

We find that that the agency presented legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for its employment action which complainant did not show to

be pretext for discriminatory animus. Specifically, the agency noted

that management presented evidence showing that the Controlled Substance

Pharmacy Technician (White) (C3) is the only pharmacy technician allowed

to fill controlled medication prescriptions in accordance with her

Functional Statement, and therefore, C3 assists the Pharmacists/Residents

working on Saturdays, as needed. The agency noted that it is undisputed

that C3's Functional Statement includes controlled substance duties,

but complainant's Functional Statement does not allow her to fill

prescribed controlled medications. Complainant has adduced no evidence

to support her assertion that this explanation is merely a pretext for

discrimination. Accordingly, she has not established that discrimination

occurred as alleged.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tends to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court

that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court

also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs,

or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request

is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 17, 2009

Date

1 S1 testified that she did not remember making this statement but

if she did it was not intended to be offensive or directed toward the

complainant's race.

2 We note that the Commission previously vacated and remanded the

agency's dismissal of C2's claim of harassment holding that the agency

improperly fragmented a complaint which included three claims in addition

to the "Three Stooges/Three Musketeers" remark cited by complainant.

The Commission held that when considered together and assumed to be

true, the four claims raised by C2 were sufficient to state a viable

claim of harassment. See Jones v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Appeal No. 0120073336 (April 18, 2008). We distinguish Jones from

the present case in that the complainant in Jones alleged numerous

detailed incidents of harassment sufficient to create a pattern of

conduct, whereas complainant herein alleged only one specific incident

of harassing behavior.

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0120073279

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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