Larry L. Griffis, Complainant,v.Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 8, 2000
01986914 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 8, 2000)

01986914

03-08-2000

Larry L. Griffis, Complainant, v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Larry L. Griffis v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01986914

March 8, 2000

Larry L. Griffis, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01986914

) Agency No. 96-0643

Togo D. West, Jr., )

Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 1998, complainant filed a timely appeal with the

Commission from a final agency decision (FAD) pertaining to his complaint

of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The

Commission accepts the appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein whether complainant has established, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the agency discriminated against him

on the basis of sex (male) when on September 18, 1995 he was not promoted

to the position of Medical Technologist/Ancillary Test Coordinator

(GS-11).

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant

was employed as a Supervisory Medical Technologist (GS-10) in the

Chemical/Urinanalysis Department, at the VA Medical Center (VAMC) in

Lake City, Florida. Complainant alleged that he was passed over for

a promotion. The promotion was given to a "lower grade female with no

supervisory experience and with less years of service." Believing he

was a victim of sex discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling

on September 29, 1995. Subsequently, on November 7, 1995, he filed

a formal complaint. Following an investigation of the complaint,

complainant requested a hearing, but later withdrew it. Thereafter,

the file was forwarded to the agency for the issuance of a FAD.

On August 20, 1998, the agency issued a FAD finding that complainant

had failed to prove discrimination. Specifically, the agency concluded

that complainant did establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination

when he demonstrated that he was qualified and applied for a vacancy,

was not selected, and an employee not in his protected class was chosen

instead. The FAD indicated that the agency presented a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its selection. The agency determined

that the newly created position would rely heavily on teaching and

communication skills, and less on traditional laboratory skills.

The agency further determined that the selectee was chosen because of

her extensive teaching experience that included thirty years as a medical

technologist, and her ability to work well with the night shift nurses.

It was noted, however, that complainant had had problems interacting

with the female laboratory employees. Moreover, the agency determined

that complainant failed to show that the agency's articulated reason

were pretext. Accordingly, the FAD found no discrimination based on sex.

On appeal, complainant argues that the selectee did not have "more years

of service". He notes his teaching experience with the U.S. Army and

with Lake City Community College, which he contends was "common knowledge"

to the Selecting Official (SO).<2>

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Dep't of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor

Cen. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 9, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Here, in response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency

argued that the selectee was the best candidate for the position.

According to the SO, the most important skills for the position

included: the ability to work well with the nursing staff, oversee

quality assurance, and work with patients in teaching them how to

do testing at home; that although complainant was qualified for the

vacancy and was one of three names given to the selecting official,

out of ten applicants, the selectee was viewed as the better candidate;

and that the selectee was chosen based on her ten years of teaching

experience, thirty plus years of experience as a medical technologist,

advanced degree, and experience working with the evening shift nurses.

The Commission finds that the record supports the agency's argument.

Therefore, we find that the agency has articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate

that the agency's reason was pretext for discrimination. We find that

complainant has failed to do so. Therefore, the agency's determination

that complainant failed to establish that he was discriminated against

was correct.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, including arguments

and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the

agency's decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 8, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________ _________________________________

DATE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANT

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2The Commission notes that on appeal, complainant also alleges that

after filing his complaint one of the agency officials who participated

in the selection process, JH, began to harass him. For example, she

circumvented his authority and reassigned him to another position.

Complainant is advised that if he wishes to pursue, through the EEO

process, the additional claims he raised for the first time on appeal,

he must initiate contact with an EEO counselor within fifteen days after

he receives this decision. The Commission advises the agency that if

complainant seeks EEO counseling regarding the new allegation within the

above fifteen-day period, the date complainant filed the appeal statement

in which he raised this claim with the agency shall be deemed to be

the date of the initial EEO contact, unless he previously contacted a

counselor regarding these matters, in which case the earlier date would

serve as the EEO counselor contact date. Cf. Qatsha v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970201 (January 16, 1998).