Langdale Forest Products Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 602 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 602
Langdale Forest Products Company and United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, Local 1996,
AFL–CIO. Cases 12–CA–18427 and 12–CA–
18505
August 27, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND TRUESDALE
On January 15, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Kelt-
ner W. Locke issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Charging Party each filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an an-
swering brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs2 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions4
and to adopt the recommended Order.
We adopt the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent
did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by impliedly promising
employees that they would receive better wages and
benefits if they abandoned their support for the Union.
The Respondent’s statements challenged by the General
Counsel and our dissenting colleague were, individually
and collectively, lawful expressions of opinion during a
decertification election campaign.

1 In light of our decision to adopt the administrative law judge’s rec-
ommended Order dismissing the complaint, we deny as moot the Re-
spondent’s Motion to Dismiss General Counsel’s Complaint and Ex-
ceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision.
2 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties.
3 The General Counsel and the Charging Party have excepted to
some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established pol-
icy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolu-
tions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have care-
fully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
4 In Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717 (2001),
which issued subsequent to the judge’s decision, the Board overruled
Celanese Corp. of America, 95 NLRB 664 (1951), and its progeny
insofar as they permitted an employer to withdraw recognition from an
incumbent union on the basis of a good-faith doubt of the union’s con-
tinued majority status. The Levitz Board held that “an employer may
unilaterally withdraw recognition from an incumbent union only where
the union has actually lost the support of the majority of the bargaining
unit employees.” Id. at 717. However, the Board also held that its
analysis and conclusions in that case would only be applied prospec-
tively; “all pending cases involving withdrawals of recognition [will be
decided] under existing law: the ‘good-faith uncertainty’ standard as
explicated by the Supreme Court” in Allentown Mack Sales & Service
v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). Levitz, supra at 728. Here, we affirm
the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent lawfully refused to bargain
with and prospectively withdrew recognition from the Union. We find
that the Respondent withdrew recognition in reliance on a good-faith
uncertainty, based on objective evidence, that the Union continued to
have majority support in the bargaining unit.

An employer has a right to compare wages and bene-
fits at its nonunion facilities with those received at its
unionized locations. The Board has repeatedly held that
providing such information is not unlawful. E.g., TCI
Cablevision of Washington, 329 NLRB 700 (1999); Via-
com Cablevision, 267 NLRB 1141 (1983). Furthermore,
it is lawful for an employer to state its opinion, based on
such comparison, that employees would be better off
without a union. Absent accompanying promises or
threats, the Board normally treats such comments as
statements of opinion protected by 8(c)’s free speech
proviso. Thomas Industries, 255 NLRB 646 (1981), enf.
denied on other grounds 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982); S.
S. Kresge Co., 197 NLRB 1011, 1012 (1972). Finally, it
is well settled that, absent threats or promise of benefit,
an employer is entitled to explain the advantages and
disadvantages of collective bargaining to its employees,
in an effort to convince them that they would be better
off without a union. Custom Window Extrusions, 314
NLRB 850 (1994); Fern Terrace Lodge, 297 NLRB 8
(1989).
Consistent with the foregoing precedent, we agree with
the judge that the Respondent’s August 30 newsletter and
its antecedent speeches on August 28–30 to employees
were lawful. While castigating the newsletter and
speeches as an artful conveyance of an implicit unlawful
promise of benefits in order to secure the Union’s ouster,
the dissent itself engages in an artful, but ultimately un-
persuasive, paragraph-by-paragraph parsing of the Re-
spondent’s language. For example, the dissent finds an
implied promise in the Respondent’s express disclaimer
of the intent to make any promises. It infers a promise to
pay employees more, in the absence of a collective-
bargaining representative, from an accurate description
of the statutory obligation to bargain instead of taking
immediate unilateral action. It suggests illegality in an
accurate comparison of the wage rate history of the Re-
spondent’s unionized plant with its nonunion plant and in
an apparently accurate description of the Union’s will-
ingness in past negotiations to accept below-average
wages. Finally, while not directly challenging the
judge’s view that there were no unlawful statements in
the Respondent’s speeches, the dissent nevertheless finds
that these speeches provide further context for under-
standing the unlawful promises allegedly implied in the
newsletter.
335 NLRB No. 51
LANGDALE FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 603
In sum, the dissent’s approach signals a fundamental
unwillingness to accept the principle that an employer
has a right to make comparisons or descriptions that are
unfavorable to an incumbent union during a decertifica-
tion election campaign. The cases cited by the dissent
are readily distinguishable. In Westminster Community
Hospital, 221 NLRB 185 (1975), as in this case, the re-
spondent displayed comparative wage charts demonstrat-
ing that the union had been unable to negotiate wages
and benefits equal to those enjoyed by employees at the
respondent’s nonunion facilities. Unlike in the present
case, however, the respondent in Westminster explicitly
threatened to limit any wage increases and threatened
further to negotiate a “lousy contract [and] shove it down
your throat” if the employees failed to reject the union.
Other cases cited by the dissent include explicit promises
of wage increases or enhancement of specific benefits if
employees rejected the union. Marvyn’s, 240 NLRB 54,
56–58 (1979) (employer assured part-time pregnant em-
ployees concerned about eligibility for health insurance,
“your baby will be taken care of” if the union is re-
jected); Michigan Products, 236 NLRB 1143, 1146
(1978) (respondent promised to contribute to profit-
sharing plan for employees if they were no longer cov-
ered by a collective-bargaining agreement and to increase
wages by 50 cents); Lutheran Retirement Village, 315
NLRB 103 (1994) (employer told assembled employees
that pension benefits, which union had been unable to
negotiate, were under active consideration); Bakersfield
Memorial Hospital, 315 NLRB 596, 600 (1994) (respon-
dent solicited employee grievances and made express and
implied promises to remedy them if union voted out).
The Respondent here did not threaten to bargain in bad
faith or to retaliate against employees if they failed to re-
ject the Union. It expressly disclaimed the ability to prom-
ise improvements in wages and benefits. It accurately
recited historical facts and expressed its opinion that em-
ployees would be better off without the Union. Accord-
ingly, we agree with the judge that under the circum-
stances of this case neither the newsletter nor the Respon-
dent’s speeches violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.

MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting in part.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would reverse the judge
and find that the “Notice to Employees” appearing in the
company newsletter, The Whispering Pines, and signed
by the Respondent’s general manager, James Langdale,
implicitly promised employees that they would receive
better wages and benefits if they voted to decertify the
Union. While artfully attempting to skirt the proscrip-
tions of the law, the article nonetheless clearly conveyed
its illegal message to employees: abandon the Union and
the company will make it worth your while. I therefore
dissent and would find that the “Notice to Employees”
unlawfully interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights,
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I would also
find that this violation was sufficient to taint the anti-
union employee petitions on which the Respondent later
relied in withdrawing recognition from the Union.
The Union (or its predecessor) had represented the Re-
spondent’s production and maintenance employees since
1964. On August 26, 1996,1 an employee filed a decerti-
fication petition. On August 28, 29, and 30, General
Manager Langdale held a number of meetings with em-
ployees. On each occasion, Langdale read from the same
prepared speech in which he addressed various work-
place concerns and set forth his views on the upcoming
decertification election.2 At the same time, Langdale
signed a “No Cut Guarantee” which assured employees
that they would not lose wages, benefits, or pensions if
they voted out the Union.3
On August 30, the Respondent mailed employees a
copy of its newsletter, the Whispering Pines. In addition
to reiterating the “No Cut Guarantee,” the newsletter
contained the following item:
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
I have been asked whether we will make im-
provements if the union is voted out. I can’t make
any promises about that during this election process
because that would be illegal. Even though I have
strong feelings about this, because of the law I have
to be very careful about what to say.
If there is no union, the law would allow us to
make improvements without first having to bargain
with the union about those improvements. There
have been several times during this contract where
we wanted to give wage increases immediately. In-
stead, we had to go through the negotiation process
with the union before we could put those increases
into effect. Keep in mind that it was the Company
that told the union we wanted to make increases.

1 Dates hereafter refer to 1996.
2 The speech is set forth in its entirety in the judge’s decision.
3 The judge rejected the General Counsel’s contention that the
speech and guarantee violated Sec. 8(a)(1). He determined that the
speech’s content was protected by Sec. 8(c) of the Act and that its
message was too vague to constitute a promise of benefit for rejecting
the Union. He further determined that the guarantee was merely re-
sponsive to union claims rather than assertions of the Respondent’s
future plans. Accordingly, he dismissed these complaint allegations.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 604
Without a union, there is no requirement to bar-
gain before we give an increase. Again, I can’t
promise you that we will grant benefit and wage in-
creases if the union is voted out. However, based on
the small increases negotiated by UFCW here, com-
pared with the larger increases given in our other
non-union facilities, you certainly would have been
better off here without the union[.]
I can tell you that no reductions will be made if
you get rid of the union. Also, since the union has
no power to deliver wage and benefit increases, the
UFCW can make you all sorts of promises. If you
have any questions, please let me know. Thank you.
[GC Exh. 22(b). Emphasis in original.]

The judge states that the “Notice” contains no promise
of benefit or threat of reprisal or force, and is therefore
“neither an unfair labor practice nor evidence of an unfair
labor practice.” Emphasizing the Respondent’s dis-
claimer of any promises, “because that would be illegal,”
the judge concludes, without citation to any supporting
precedent, that the complaint allegations are not justified.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would reverse the judge,
who failed to appreciate how the “Notice” implicitly—
indeed, artfully—conveys a clear message to its intended
audience that continued union representation was not to
their advantage. Even if its explicit language seems in-
nocent at first glance, the “Notice” let employees know
that the Respondent would not only maintain the status
quo if they abandon union representation, but would also
make improvements in wages and benefits.
The subject of the “Notice” is improvements in wages
and benefits. The overt message is that were it not for
outside constraints, things would be better. The underly-
ing message is that if, and when, the Respondent is freed
of these hindrances, it will make improvements.
In the first paragraph, the Respondent cites legal con-
straints for its inability to respond to questions about
possible improvements. At the same time, the text high-
lights that if the Respondent could promise improve-
ments, it would do so. Thus, Langdale states, “Even
though I have strong feelings about this, because of the
law I have to be very careful about what to say.” The
Respondent’s desire to make a promise (“strong feel-
ings”) is plain, but the law prevents an explicit promise
(“I have to be very careful”). The result—as the readers
of the “Notice” surely understood—is an implicit prom-
ise.
In the second paragraph, the Respondent blames the
Union for stifling wage rates and delaying the implemen-
tation of raises: “[W]e wanted to give wage increases
immediately. Instead, we had to go through the negotia-
tion process.” Here, in less subtle language than the first
paragraph, the Respondent implies that it stands willing
to pay employees more, once the obstacles of collective
bargaining are removed.
Disparagement of the Union and the collective-
bargaining process continues in the third paragraph.
Comparing the compensation rates of this plant with its
nonunion facilities (but again noting the prohibition
against promises), the Respondent states, “[Y]ou cer-
tainly would have been better off here without the un-
ion.” Thus, the Respondent suggests again that once the
Union is gone, the Respondent will provide the “larger
increases” enjoyed at the nonunion plants.4
In the final paragraph, the Respondent adds a twist to
its message. In the course of promising not to reduce
benefits, the Respondent points out that precisely be-
cause the Union cannot deliver improvements, it can
make promises. The clear implication is that the Re-
spondent can and will deliver improvements, even
though it cannot promise them. In context, of course, the
words do convey a promise of improvements.
The rhetoric of the “Notice” is artful, to be sure. But
its message remains unlawful. Carefully disclaiming a
promise to make improvements, while indicating a desire
to make a promise and act on it; holding the Union re-
sponsible for employees not getting raises, while
suggesting that raises will be forthcoming once the
Union is gone; noting the ability of the Union to make
promises but not to make improvements, while
promising that the Company will make no reductions if
the Union is voted out—taken together, these rhetorical
devices undeniably amount to the promise of benefit
designed to encourage disaffection from the Union. See,
e.g., Mervyn’s, 240 NLRB 54, 56–58 (1979); West-
minster Community Hospital, 221 NLRB 185 (1975).

The nature of the “Notice” is even clearer when Lang-
dale’s speeches are considered. Whether or not they vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) in and of themselves, the speeches
certainly helped create the context in which the “Notice”
would be understood. There, Langdale said that the Re-
spondent would “probably save more money by keeping
the union in here and continuing to drive a hard bargain.”
The clear implication would be repeated in the “Notice”:
wages and benefits will go up, if and when the Union is
gone. At that point, as the speeches observed, there
would be “a team with a real family atmosphere.” The
Board has not hesitated to find an implied promise in
such a message. See, e.g., Grede Plastics, 219 NLRB
592, 593 (1975).
4 While giving lip service once again in this paragraph to the prohi-
bition against making promises, the Respondent nevertheless manages
to hold out the enticement of better days to come.
LANGDALE FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 605
This is not a case where an employer simply compared
benefits at its organized and unorganized facilities, while
emphasizing that it could make no promises. Compare,
TCI Cablevision, 329 NLRB 700 (1999). The respon-
dent clearly communicated its desire to make an explicit
promise and to act on it, identifying the law and the un-
ion as obstacles to this desire, and pointedly distinguish-
ing its own capacities from those of the union. Of
course, “[i]t is immaterial that an employer professes that
he cannot make any promises, if in fact he expressly or
impliedly indicates that specific benefits will be
granted.” Michigan Products, 236 NLRB 1143, 1146
(1978). See, e.g., Lutheran Retirement Village, 315
NLRB 103 (1994). Here, indeed, the disclaimer of any
promises was a means to convey a promise. Finally, the
fact that the Respondent’s promises were implied rather
than express makes them no less pernicious. See Bakers-
field Memorial Hospital, 315 NLRB 596, 600 (1994).
Despite the majority’s contention, I do agree that an
employer is entitled: to compare the wages and benefits
at its nonunion facilities with those at its unionized loca-
tions; to state an opinion, based on that comparison, that
employees are better off without a union; and to explain
the advantages and disadvantages of collective bargain-
ing to its employees, so long as these statements are not
accompanied by threats or promises. The majority and I
differ over whether the Respondent here made a promise.
I believe it did—carefully, indeed cleverly, but still
unlawfully—by presenting the Union as the only obsta-
cle between employees and higher wages. For purposes
of the Act, of course, an implicit promise is no different
than an explicit one, though it certainly represents the
shrewder legal choice. It is a tribute to the Respondent’s
skill that it managed to convey its message to unit em-
ployees even while convincing my colleagues that it did
not.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent’s “Notice to
Employees” unlawfully interfered with employees’ Sec-
tion 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Given its timing, nature, tendency to cause employee
disaffection, and effect on employee morale, this viola-
tion, in turn, tainted the employee petitions that led the
Respondent to withdraw recognition from the Union.
See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 332 NLRB 575,
576 (2000). See generally Master Slack Corp., 271
NLRB 78, 84 (1984) (identifying factors to be weighed
in determining causal relationship between unfair labor
practices and decertification petition). Thus, I would
find that the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act when it withdrew recognition from the Union.

David S. Cohen, Esq., for the General Counsel.
W. Melvin Haas III, Esq. and Jeffery L. Thompson, Esq.
(Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Harper), of Macon,
Georgia, for the Respondent.
James D. Fagan, Esq. (Stanford, Fagan & Giolito), of Atlanta,
Georgia, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KELTNER W. LOCKE, Administrative Law Judge. In this
case, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board (the General Counsel or the Government and the Board)
alleges that Langdale Forest Products Company (the Respon-
dent or the Company) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act) by encouraging employees to
give up their representation by United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 1996, AFL–CIO (the Union or the
Charging Party). The General Counsel also alleges that the
Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and further contends that
even if the Company’s actions did not violate existing law, the
Board should overrule certain precedents and make the conduct
illegal. I find the government has not proven its case, and rec-
ommend that the complaint be dismissed entirely.
I heard this case in Valdosta, Georgia, on February 18 and
19, 1997, and have considered the parties’ posthearing briefs.1
The Facts
Respondent is a Georgia corporation engaged in the manu-
facture of utility poles and other lumber products. It admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act).
The Respondent also admits, and I find, that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act. In June 1964, the Board certified the Union’s predecessor
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a unit
consisting of production and maintenance employees, including
truckdrivers, employed at the Respondent’s facility in Valdosta,
Georgia.
The Respondent entered into successive collective-bargain-
ing agreements with the Union or its predecessor, which cov-
ered the bargaining unit employees. The last of these agree-
ments expired on November 21, 1996, at the end of its 3-year
term.
Beginning in early July 1996, certain of Respondent’s em-
ployees signed and got other employees to sign petition forms
headed “WE, THE UNDERSIGNED EMPLOYEES OF
LANGDALE FOREST PRODUCTS CO., NO LONGER
WISH TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE UNION.” Addition-
ally, some employees signed individual cards or slips bearing

1 Respondent has moved to correct the transcript of the hearing. Ad-
ditionally, I have found certain other typographical errors in the tran-
script. I order the transcript corrected in accordance with the changes
set forth in app. B to this decision [omitted from publication]. Other-
wise, I deny Respondent’s motion. Respondent also moved to strike
portions of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Charging
Party. I deny this motion.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 606
this language, rather than a petition form. On August 26, 1996,
employee Jerome Smith filed a decertification petition based
upon this showing of interest.
The record does not establish that the Respondent initiated or
sponsored such petitions, and the complaint does not allege that
Respondent did. Similarly, there is no allegation that the Com-
pany granted paid time off to any employees so that they could
circulate the petitions, or paid the expenses of such employees
to do so. However, the complaint does allege that the Respon-
dent solicited and encouraged its employees to sign such peti-
tions. Those allegations will be discussed individually in
chronological order.
A. The August 28–30, 1996 Speeches
Complaint2 paragraphs 6(a), (b), and (c), respectively, allege
that in meetings with employees during the period August 28,
1996, through August 30, 1996, Respondent’s general manager,
James Langdale, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Specifi-
cally, the complaint alleges Langdale impliedly promised to
increase wages and improve benefits if employees ceased sup-
porting the Union, solicited and encourage employees to sign a
“disaffection petition” renouncing their support for the Union,
and solicited and encouraged employees to resign from the
Union and revoke their dues-checkoff authorizations.
During this 3-day time period, there were a number of meet-
ings. At each, Langdale read the same prepared speech, which
stated, in its entirety, as follows:

Good to see everyone. I hope everyone knows me.
I’m Jim Langdale. I’ve been your general manager for the
past 8 months. Let me get right to the point. We received
word yesterday that employees here have filed a petition to
get rid of the UFCW union. Quite frankly, I’m real proud
of you for doing this. I’m glad that many of you feel like
me that we’re better off without a union here now.
Of course, most of you all know this union’s been
around here for a long time—as I understand it, for over
thirty years. Heck, this union’s been around here longer
than I have been alive. I appreciate the fact, that over the
years, several of our older employees have told me why
this union came in here to begin with. We did some things
in this company and around this part of the country to
blacks I’m not proud of. It was wrong. I can understand
why you all went after this union. Obviously at 24 years
of age I wasn’t around then—but my family was. We all
take responsibility for the discrimination and the unfair
treatment that took place. That certainly doesn’t change
anything—but I want you to know exactly how I feel.
Secondly, I want you to know that I will not tolerate
any discrimination now or in the future. All our older em-
ployees have made enormous contributions to our com-
pany over the years. You have worked long and hard in
very difficult circumstances to make us successful. I
pledge to you that I will never forget that. I consider this
decertification petition as giving us a second chance. We
can’t change the past but we can do something about the

2 The General Counsel amended the complaint orally at hearing. By
“Complaint,” I refer to the complaint as amended.
future. It’s a second chance for all of us as managers. As
for me, I do not want to blow this chance.
Let me talk about this decertification petition and what
it means. You may know that our contract expires at the
close of business on November 21, 1996. We have noti-
fied the union that even though we have a bargaining ses-
sion scheduled for October the 9th, that it is our intent to
terminate the agreement on the 22nd of November. Nor-
mally the NLRB will conduct an election within 45 days
after the decertification petition is filed. That would mean
we would have an election around the first or second week
in October. About 6 or 7 weeks from today. We’ll have
plenty of time between now and then to give you the exact
time and place of the election.
In the meantime, we still have an obligation to bargain
with the union over the contract that’s in place. With a
decertification petition filed there’s a quirk in the law, that
even though a decertification petition is filed, we still have
to bargain with the union unless the company has been no-
tified that more than 50% of the employees have signed
the petition. If that occurs, then the company can with-
draw from bargaining and withdraw recognition from the
union. In other words, if you all give us more signatures
so that you exceed the 50% mark the union will be gone.
If this doesn’t occur, any contract that would be reached in
bargaining before the current contract expires on Novem-
ber the 21st would be null and void if you all voted the un-
ion out.
When we got notice of this petition we really had sev-
eral options. Actually three choices. Our first choice was
to use this decertification petition to cut a deal with the un-
ion. Last time the union was so afraid of not reaching a
contract that they jumped on our first offer. At your ex-
pense, they saved us a lot of money in our last contract.
So from a pure business standpoint—it’s clear that the
company could save money with the union. But there’s
more to this business than just money. Certainly we’ve
got to make a profit. We feel you deserve a company that
really cares about you and shows it. Our second choice
was to be neutral and not do anything and let you make up
your mind without any input from us. But our final
choice—our third choice was to work as hard as we could
at communicating our views and letting you know how we
feel about this decision.
In any event, we expect the union to campaign hard
and if we didn’t do anything, then the union would be out
there campaigning against our employees who worked so
hard on this petition.
Speaking of union campaigning—I have received in-
formation that the union has been telling you that if you
vote them out, the company is going to reduce your
wages/benefits and pensions. That is an absolute lie. Let
me state this as clearly as I can. If you vote the union out,
we will not cut your wages and we will not take away any
of your fringe benefits. The union is only trying to use
scare tactics to frighten you into voting for them. Don’t
let them do that to you. Ignore their scare tactics. I feel so
LANGDALE FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 607
strongly about this—I’m going to put a guarantee in writ-
ing that we will not cut your wages or benefits.
In making this decision, we analyzed the pros and
cons. Here’s what we thought about. First, we know that
a campaign will cost us money. Unfortunately, we’ll have
to pay those damn lawyers to make sure we do things
right. Quite frankly, if I never have to deal with another
lawyer or union representative I’ll be happy—real happy.
They drive me crazy. But we know, the union will try to
file unfair labor practice charges and all that stuff, so we
have to have an attorney. And of course it will take time
and effort to work on this and take time away from our
normal duties so it will be expensive to wage a campaign.
Second, there’s no guarantee that the union will be
voted out. That decision is y’alls. We certainly don’t
know for sure how it will turn out, so we could spend all
this effort and money and y’all could still be stuck with
this union here.
Third, as I said with the union in here we’ve been able
to save a lot of money in negotiating our contract. As you
know, wages and benefits have not increased much at all
in the past several years. Certainly—significantly under
the national average. Apparently the union has agreed to
all of this because they’ve had no strength or don’t care
anymore. So getting the union out of here would not save
us money. That’s for sure, in fact we would probably save
more money by keeping the union in here and continuing
to drive a hard bargain. Now fourth, we know that the un-
ion is going to scream and raise all kind of hell if we fight
them. So those are all the negatives.
On the other hand, we have a large number of employ-
ees who don’t want this union in here. I know from talk-
ing with your managers and supervisors that they don’t
want the union in here. I sure know that I don’t want the
union in here. I’d like to see a new era begin where we are
truly a family. Where we worked together as a team with
a real family atmosphere of mutual respect and trust. I
know as managers we have to earn your trust everyday. I
understand that many of you would like to see what would
happen here if there weren’t a union. I think you deserve
that chance and the chance to have a real family atmos-
phere.
I’m real excited about this myself and I’m committed
to spending a lot of time over the next several weeks be-
fore this election to be able to talk with you in detail about
what all of this means. As I told you earlier, we have told
the union of our intention to terminate this agreement
when it expires on November the 22nd. That means eve-
rything will go back on the table. Everything would be
bargained for. Everything would be up for grabs. You all
know in bargaining there is nothing certain.
With regard to the union I know many of you are pay-
ing dues to the union—spending money paying for them to
represent you. That is your choice. It’s your money.
You’ve worked hard for it. I’m not going to tell you how
to spend your money. If you want to pay it to the union—
that’s your business. On the other hand, many people
have asked how they can get out of the union. Well if you
have any questions about how to do that it’s covered by
the checkoff authorization on the last page of your con-
tract—page 55, which requires you to give the company
written notice of stopping your dues. Or you can just see
personnel.
Other people have indicated that while they haven’t
paid union dues they may still vote for the union because
they feel they need it as a security blanket. Perhaps they
can’t in their minds erase the memories of the past.
Maybe they’re concerned about whether they’ll be treated
fairly and maybe they’re concerned that if the union’s
gone—they’re not sure that the company will do right by
them. Well, first of all you’ve got my word, for whatever
it’s worth to you, that we are going to do what’s right. But
more importantly, it would make no sense for us to make
the decision to communicate to you our views against this
union—if we were not prepared to do what was right. We
know it’ll probably cost us more money this way but we
feel you deserve it and we want to take responsibility for
your future and be held accountable. We know that if we
don’t do what’s right, then you can go get this union back
here in a heartbeat. I think that’s the best insurance
you’ve got.
I don’t think this union has represented you very well
for at least the past 10 years. I think you know that. Their
approach has been to sell you all out for some dues
money.
Since I’ve been your general manager I see a change.
I see us communicating and being honest with each other.
That’s the approach I want to have—that’s the way I want
to manage this plant. I want us working together without
the interference of lawyers and union reps—just us—
working together as a team. I don’t like the approach
we’ve taken with this union where we were out to just get
the best deal we could for the company and basically the
hell with our employees. I don’t want to have that ap-
proach. I would like for us to say our employees have
voted the union out—they fought for us and we need to
fight for them. I’ll commit to you that I’ll do just that.
Let’s get rid of this union and let’s get back to working to-
gether as a family. Thanks. [GC Exh. 21.]3

Based upon my observations of the witnesses at hearing, I
credit the of testimony James Hickman and James Langdale.
That testimony establishes, and I find, that the speech was read
verbatim.
Langdale also signed a “No Cut Guarantee,” which stated,
“I, Jim Langdale, Guarantee You, The Employees of Langdale
Forest Products, That If You Vote The Union Out, Langdale
Will Not Cut Your Wages And Will Not Take Away Any Of
Your Benefits Or Pensions.” (GC Exh. 22(a).)
As stated above, the complaint alleges that Langdale’s
statements interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees
in the exercise of employees Section 7 rights, in violation of

3 The original text was all in capital letters. I have rendered it in
capitals and lower case for ease of reading.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 608
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.4 In determining whether these
statements are unlawful, I must also follow Section 8(c) of the
Act, which states, “The expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefits.” 29 U.S.C. §158(c).
By its terms, Section 8(c) does not protect speech which con-
tains a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefits.” The
statements at issue here do not contain any threat of reprisal or
force, and the complaint does not allege any threat. However,
the complaint does allege an implied promise of benefits.
The complaint does not state what specific words constituted
the alleged unlawful implied promise of benefits. However, the
speech includes the following candidates:

1. Langdale pledged he would never forget that em-
ployees had worked “long and hard and in very difficult
circumstances to make us successful.”
2. If employees voted the Union out, the Company
would not cut wages or take away any fringe benefits.
3. Langdale pledged, “We are going to do what’s
right.”

The first statement, Langdale’s pledge never to forget the
employees’ hard work, does not mention employee wages or
benefits. I find it too vague to constitute a promise of benefit
within the meaning of Section 8(c). Moreover, this statement
occurs in the context of an apology for racial discrimination of
the past. It does not, on its face, promise any reward if em-
ployees rejected the Union.
The second statement, that the Company would not cut
wages or take away fringe benefits if the employees voted out
the Union, reinforced by Langdale’s “No Cut Guarantee,” cer-
tainly does say something about benefits. However, a state-
ment that existing benefits will not be cut is different from a
promise of new benefits.
Moreover, I find that Langdale gave this assurance because
he had received reports that those favoring the Union were
claiming that if the employees voted the Union out, the Com-
pany would cut wages and benefits. His speech itself places the
“no cut” pledge in the context of such reports, which Langdale
called “an absolute lie.” I find that Langdale did not make an
unlawful promise by assuring employees that existing benefits
would not be cut.
Finally, there is Langdale’s promise to “do what’s right.”
The General Counsel contends that this statement constitutes a
veiled promise to pay more wages or benefits if the Union is

4 Sec. 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7” of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1). Sec. 7 of
the Act grants employees the “right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion,” and also “the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.”
29 U.S.C. §157.
voted out. However, when the “do what’s right” language is
read in context, it conveys a wholly different message.
Langdale began his speech with an apology for racial dis-
crimination of the past. He expressed the opinion that 30 years
earlier, employees had selected the Union as protection against
such invidious discrimination. He also suggested that some
employees might still have lingering fears about how they
would be treated if the Union were not there. Responding to
those concerns, Langdale gave his word “that we are going to
do what’s right.”
In this context, Langdale’s “do what’s right statement” sim-
ply promised that the Company would obey the law, which
prohibits racial discrimination. Moreover, this statement did
not suggest that the Company presently was discriminating and
would stop if the Union were voted out. Rather, Langdale
made it clear that he did not approve of what had happened in
the past, and would not return to those practices. The “do
what’s right” statement, in this context, is a promise to obey the
law, not an unlawful promise of benefits.
In another context, Langdale referred to the Company taking
responsibility and being held accountable for the employees’
future, and added, “We know that if we don’t do what’s right,
then you can go get this union back here in a heartbeat. I think
that’s the best insurance you’ve got.” This statement also did
not constitute a promise of benefits. Rather, it simply pointed
out that if the Company didn’t act in a manner satisfactory to
the employees, they could select a union to represent them.
In sum, I find that neither Langdale’s speech nor the “No Cut
Guarantee” contained any threat or force or promise of benefit.
Therefore, they do not constitute an unfair labor practice or
evidence of an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. §158(c).
B. Statement in Company Newsletter
Complaint paragraph 7 alleges that on August 30, 1996, in
the Whispering Pine newsletter mailed to employees, the Re-
spondent promised to increase wages and improve benefits if
employees ceased supporting the Union. That newsletter in-
cluded the following notice, which was signed by Langdale:
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
I have been asked whether we will make improve-
ments if the union is voted out. I can’t make any promises
about that during this election process because that would
be illegal. Even though I have strong feelings about this,
because of the law I have to be very careful about what to
say.
If there is no union, the law would allow us to make
improvements without first having to bargain with the un-
ion about those improvements. There have been several
times during this contract where we wanted to give wage
increases immediately. Instead, we had to go through the
negotiation process with the union before we could put
those increases into effect. Keep in mind that it was the
Company that told the union we wanted to make increases.
Without a union, there is no requirement to bargain be-
fore we give an increase. Again, I can’t promise you that
we will grant benefit and wage increases if the union is
voted out. However, based on the small increases negoti-
LANGDALE FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 609
ated by UFCW here, compared with the larger increases
given in our other non-union facilities, you certainly
would have been better off here without the union[.]
I can tell you that no reductions will be made if you
get rid of the union. Also, since the union has no power to
deliver wage and benefit increases, the UFCW can make
you all sorts of promises. If you have any questions,
please let me know. Thank you.

(GC Exh. 22(b) (emphasis in original).)
This statement does not contain any promise of benefit. To
the contrary, it expressly states “I can’t make any prom-
ises. . .because that would be illegal.” Additionally, it does not
contain or constitute a threat or force, and therefore is neither
an unfair labor practice nor evidence of an unfair labor practice.
29 U.S.C. §158(c). The allegations in complaint paragraph 7
are not justified, and I recommend they be dismissed.
C. The September 4–6, 1996 meetings
Complaint paragraphs 6(d) and (e) allege, respectively, that
during meetings with employees conducted September 4, 1996,
through September 6, 1996, Respondent, through General
Manager Langdale, solicited and encouraged employees to
resign from the Union and revoke their dues-checkoff authori-
zations, and impliedly promised to increase wages and improve
benefits if employees ceased supporting the Union. Complaint
paragraph 8 alleges that during meetings with employees Sep-
tember 4, 1996, through September 6, 1996, Respondent,
through Technical Director James Hickman, impliedly prom-
ised to increase wages and improve benefits if employees
ceased supporting the Union.
To support these allegations, the General Counsel adduced
testimony from Lawrence Griffith, an employee who attended
one of the meetings. According to Griffith, Langdale discussed
the differences in pay rates earned by the Respondent’s em-
ployees and the rates earned at certain other companies. Grif-
fith testified that Langdale, “said the [employees at] other com-
panies, their pay was a little higher because they were non-
Union and because we were Union, that’s why we had a lower
pay. . .I remember [Langdale] had said that on the [decertifica-
tion] petition they had 200 percent, they had pretty close to 200
percent and he would be happy to see it get to 200 percent.”
(Tr. 292–293.)
I do not credit Griffith. Langdale impressed me as being
precise and methodical, and it seems unlikely that he would use
the extravagant phrase “200 percent.” Additionally, although
Griffith testified that about 12 people were in the room when
Langdale made the “200 percent” statement, no witness cor-
roborated this testimony.5
Based on the testimony of Langdale and Hickman, whom I
credit, I find that they did not promise to raise wages or im-
prove benefits if employees ceased supporting the Union.
With respect to the allegation that General Manager Lang-
dale solicited and encouraged employees to resign from the
Union and revoke their dues-checkoff authorizations, the evi-
dence does not establish that he made any statement about re-

5 Langdale did refer to employees paying $200 per year in union
dues. (GC Exh. 24.)
signing union membership or revoking checkoff authorization
in the speeches he gave on September 4 through 6, 1996.
However, in the earlier speeches which Langdale gave to em-
ployees on August 28 through 30, 1996, he did state, “[I]f you
want to pay [dues] to the Union—that’s your business. On the
other hand, many people have asked how they can get out of
the Union. Well, if you have any questions about how to do
that it’s covered by the checkoff authorization on the last page
of your contract—page 55, which requires you to give the
Company written notice of stopping your dues. Or you can just
see Personnel.” (GC Exh. 21.)
This statement does not constitute an unlawful solicitation of
employees to resign from the Union or revoke their dues-
checkoff authorizations. The Board has stated that it “is clear
that, under Section 8(c), and employer may lawfully furnish
accurate information, especially in response to employees’
questions, if it does so without making threats or promises of
benefits.” Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material, 306 NLRB 408, 409
(1992), citing Eagle Comtronics, 263 NLRB 515 (1982). See
also Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 322 NLRB 175, 176,
fn. 6 (1996). The evidence does not establish that either Lang-
dale or Hickman unlawfully solicited employees to resign from
the Union or revoke their dues-checkoff authorizations.6
Therefore, I recommend that these allegations be dismissed.
D. The Alleged Interrogation by Supervisor Jones
Complaint paragraph 9(a) alleges that sometime between
August 28, 1996, and September 6, 1996, Pole Mill Supervisor
Albert Jones interrogated employees concerning their support
for the Union, and solicited support for the revocation of the
Union’s representative status.
Employee Mizell Williams Sr. testified that on one occasion
when he was in the bathroom, Supervisor Jones pointed to a
sticker on Jones’ hardhat and asked Williams if he wanted to
wear one. This sticker displayed the word “UNION” in a circle
with a slash through it. (Tr. 304–305.)
Jones admitted having such a sticker on his hard hat, but de-
nied ever discussing it with Williams. I credit Williams.
At this time, Williams had been the Union’s shop steward for
about 5 or 6 years. He was actively campaigning against the
decertification petition, and encouraging employees who had
left the Union to return to it. (Tr. 309.) Moreover, on cross-
examination, Williams testified that when Supervisor Jones
asked him if he wanted a sticker Jones “was laughing, you
know, laughing about it.” (Tr. 308.)
In these circumstances, Jones’ statement did not interfere
with, restrain, or coerce Williams in the exercise of Section 7
rights, and was not unlawful. See Rossmore House, 269 NLRB
1176, 1177–1178 (1984). I recommend that this allegation be
dismissed.7
6 Even were I to credit Griffith’s testimony, which I do not, I would
not find that it established either an unlawful promise of wage or bene-
fit increases, or an unlawful solicitation of employees to resign from the
Union or withdraw their due-checkoff authorizations.
7 Additionally, I do not find any causal connection between this re-
mark and the Union’s loss of majority support. Lee Lumber & Bldg.
Material Corp., 322 NLRB at 177.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 610
E. Alleged Interrogation by Manager Stalvey
Complaint paragraph 9(b) alleges that sometime between
August 28 and September 6, 1996, Trucking Manager Rodney
Stalvey interrogated employees concerning their support for the
Union and solicited support for the revocation of the Union’s
status as the employees’ representative. The evidence does not
establish such a violation. Therefore, I recommend that these
allegations be dismissed.
F. Withdrawal of Recognition and Refusal to Bargain
Complaint paragraph 11(a) alleges that on September 6,
1996, the Respondent withdrew its recognition of the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the unit. Respondent has denied this allegation, but
admitted that on September 6, 1996, it announced that it would
withdraw recognition when the collective-bargaining agreement
expired.
Respondent has admitted the allegations in complaint para-
graph 11(b), that on September 6, 1996, it canceled a bargain-
ing session and announced its intention to refuse to bargain
with the Union for a collective-bargaining agreement to suc-
ceed the one expiring at midnight, November 21, 1996. The
Respondent has also admitted that it has continued to refuse to
bargain with the Union.8
Hickman credibly testified that as of September 6, 1996, the
Respondent had received petitions signed by 109 of 197 em-
ployees in the bargaining unit. The documentary evidence
supports this testimony. (R. Exh. 5.) Therefore, I find that
Respondent had a good-faith doubt, based upon objective evi-
dence, that the Union continued to enjoy the support of a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit.

As discussed above, I have concluded that Respondent did
not commit unfair labor practices which would have interfered
with, restrained, or coerced its employees in deciding whether
they wanted the Union to represent them. Therefore, the peti-
tions which the employees signed were free of unlawful taint,
and the Respondent acted lawfully in refusing to negotiate a
new collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, and in
announcing that it would withdraw recognition from the Union
upon the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement then
in effect. I recommend that these allegations be dismissed.
8 The Respondent sent the Union a September 6, 1996 letter stating:
We have been presented with a petition and other documentation
signed by a majority of bargaining unit employees, in addition to other
evidence of employee sentiment constituting conclusive objective
proof that the United Food and Commercial Workers Union no longer
represents a majority of employees at the Valdosta facility. We must
therefore withdraw from bargaining, not attend the October 9, 1996
meeting, or any other meetings, concerning bargaining for a new con-
tract. Langdale Forest Products Co. will furthermore withdraw recog-
nition from your union effective 12:01 a.m. on November 22, 1996.
Langdale, of course, will honor all of its obligations under the existing
collective bargaining agreement, which expires on November 21,
1996. [GC Exh. 27.]
G. Announcement of Uilateral Changes in Wages, Benefits,
and Work Rules
Complaint paragraphs 12(a), (b), and (c), as amended at the
hearing, allege that on or about October 31, 1996, in meetings
with employees, and in mailings to employees on or about No-
vember 8, 1996, the Respondent announced to its employees
that it would raise wages by 8-percent “across the board” at the
expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect,
and that on January 1, 1997, it would implement a new health
plan and an employee manual with workplace rules different
from those in the collective-bargaining agreement. The Re-
spondent admitted the substance of these allegations.
Because the Respondent lawfully withdrew recognition from
the Union, based upon objective considerations that the Union
no longer represented the majority of the unit employees, it
could lawfully changes wages and benefits unilaterally, without
bargaining with the Union. Therefore, I recommend that these
allegations be dismissed.
H. Soliciting Employees to Abandon the Union
Complaint paragraph 10 alleges that on or about November
8, 1996, by a written “Important Notice,” the Respondent solic-
ited and encouraged employees to refuse to support the Union.
Respondent denied this allegation.
The evidence does not establish this allegation. Therefore, I
recommend that it be dismissed.
I. Wage Increase on November 22, 1996
Complaint paragraph 12(d) alleges that effective on or about
November 22, 1996, Respondent raised wages for all unit em-
ployees by 8 percent. Respondent admits the substance of this
allegation.
The wage increase went into effect the day after the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement expired. Respondent lawfully had
withdrawn recognition from the Union and had no duty, at this
point, to bargain with it. Therefore, the wage increase was
lawful. I recommend that this allegation be dismissed.
J. Other Alleged Unlawful Unilateral Changes
As amended at the hearing, complaint paragraph 12(e) al-
leges that on or about December 6, 1996, the Respondent noti-
fied all employees by memo that pension benefits would be
doubled, effective January 1, 1996. Paragraph 12(f) alleges
that sometime in mid-December 1996, the Respondent issued
an employee handbook to unit employees, implemented a new
complaint resolution procedure, and made other changes in
rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment. Paragraph 12(g) alleges that on or about
January 1, 1996, the Respondent increased employees’ pension
benefits and implemented new health insurance, life insurance,
and prescription drug benefits for unit employees.
The Respondent admits the substance of all of these allega-
tions. In view of my finding that the Respondent lawfully
withdrew recognition from the Union, I conclude that Respon-
dent had no duty to bargain with the Union before making these
changes. Therefore, it acted lawfully. I recommend that these
allegations be dismissed.
LANGDALE FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 611
K. The General Counsel’s Alternative Theory
The General Counsel argues that even if the evidence does
not establish a violation under current precedents, the Board
should overrule its previous decisions and adopt a new stan-
dard. Specifically, the General Counsel contends that the
Board should hold that an employer should not be allowed to
withdraw recognition from an incumbent union unless there has
been a secret-ballot election in which a majority of employees
voted against continued representation.
The General Counsel concedes that this position does not re-
flect the current law. Since the Board’s current precedents bind
me, it would not be appropriate for me to consider the General
Counsel’s arguments against these precedents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Langdale Forest Products Company is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1996,
AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. Langdale Forest Products Company has not engaged in
conduct violative of the Act, as alleged.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record in this case, I issue the following recommended9
ORDER
It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its en-
tirety.

9 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, these findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec.102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board, and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.