Lane Trenching, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 22, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 1341 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

Lane Trenching, Inc. and Anthony Ingallinera. Case
36-CA-3345
February 22, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND TRUESDALE
On October 25, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Bernard J. Seff issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the General
Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and
Respondent filed an answering brief to the General
Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions' of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified below.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for the Administrative Law
Judge's Conclusion of Law 3:
"3. By threatening to discharge Anthony Ingallin-
era in June 1978 if he continued to make overtime
claims pursuant to the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and by asking him, on July 27, 1978, if he had
been to the Union again, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Lane
Trenching, Inc., Eugene, Oregon, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order, as so modified:
I. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a):
"(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of
the Act by threatening to discharge an employee if he
continues to make overtime claims pursuant to the
collective-bargaining agreement, and by asking an
employee if he has been to the Union again."
247 NLRB No. 183
LANE TRENCHING, INC.
2. In paragraphs 2(c) and (d) substitute "Regional
Director for Region 19" for "Regional Director for
Region 36."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the
clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Producs. Inc.. 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
'The Administrative Law Judge found that President Stevens' June 1978
threat to discharge the Charging Party if he continued to file overtime claims
pursuant to the contract, an issue which was fully litigated, was a violation of
Sec. 8(aXl). However, he inadvertently omitted this violation from his
Conclusions of Law and appropriate provisions therefor from his recommend-
ed Order and notice. We adopt this finding, and we shall amend the
Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law, recommended Order, and
notice accordingly.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity
to present their evidence, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has found that we violated the National
Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this
notice. We intend to carry out the Order of the Board.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by asking
our employees if they have been to the Union
again, or by threatening to discharge them if they
make overtime claims according to the provisions
of the contract.
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees be-
cause of their protected union activity, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or
all such activities.
WE WILL offer Anthony Ingallinera immediate
and full reinstatement to his former job or, if that
job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed,
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and WE WILL make him whole for his loss of
earnings with interest thereon.
LANE TRENCHING, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BERNARD J. SEFF, Administrative Law Judge: This case
came on for hearing before me in Eugene, Oregon, on April
19, 1979. The complaint was issued by the Regional Director
of Region 19 on December 15, 1978,' based on a charge filed
by the Charging Party on September 29. The complaint,
dated December 15, 1978, alleges that Lane Trenching, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as either Respondent or Company)
by its superintendent, Terry Stamos, interrogated the Charg-
ing Party, Anthony Ingallinera, in violation of Section
8(a)(1); and that thereafter Respondent discharged Ingallin-
era because he filed and pursued a grievance involving his
claim for overtime pay, thus violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act. The Company denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to argue orally. Briefs submitted by the
parties have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record, and my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is an Oregon corporation, with offices and
place of business at Eugene, Oregon. It is engaged in the
business of constructing trenches in which wire or cable to
homes is laid that hook up along the highway. Its principal
work is for the telephone company. During the past 12
months Respondent sold goods and performed services
valued in excess of $50,000 for customers located within the
State of Oregon, who in turn received goods valued in excess
of $50,000 from suppliers located outside the State of
Oregon.
Respondent admits and I find that the Company is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union, Laborers Local No. 85, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
11. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
It is not disputed that Respondent's supervisory hierarchy
consists of Larry Stevens, president and assistant general
manager; Ernie Roman, general manager; Terry Stamos,
superintendent; and Dave Sanders, foreman (no longer
employed).
In March 1978, Respondent recognized the Union, and
Anthony Ingallinera, having been told by Stevens to join the
Union, did so in March. He attended four union meetings,
the first of which took place in April. This meeting occurred
at the union hall, and Stevens, Stamos, and Sanders were
also present. The Union's business manager, Herbert Herz-
berg, solicited questions from the members, and Ingallinera
asked a number of questions which encompassed whether
employees were to be paid for gassing up trucks, picking up
company materials, filling out daily reports, and making
reports to the telephone company.
Respondent and the Union became parties to the master
agreement which covers the period from April 1, 1975, to
May 31, 1980. This industrywide contract provides, inter
alia, 2 in article XI-reporting pay-minimum pay (p. 26),
that when qualified workmen report for work as directed
and no work is provided they shall be paid 4 hours at
straight time; regular employees who work less than 4 hours
shall be paid for 4 hours and if worked they shall be paid 4
hours at straight time; regular employees who worked less
than 4 hours shall be paid for 4 hours and if worked shall be
paid a minimum of 6 hours; if required to work more than 6
hours they shall be paid for 8 hours.
I. The events leading up to the alleged interrogation
Ingallinera tried to enforce the contract as he understood
it. In May he asked for overtime for working after hours in
order to secure homeowners' permission to install cable on
their property. His foreman, Sanders, denied this request
and said the Company would not pay for this work. Later in
June he asked for 8 hours' pay even though he had only
worked 7 hours. President Stevens told him Respondent
paid only for hours actually worked. Ingallinera explained
about the contract, but was denied overtime pay, and it was
not rebutted, that, according to his testimony, Stevens "told
me that if he had any more trouble like this, he would have
to let me go."
This matter came to a head when on July 25 Ingallinera
made a written request for show-up time along with his daily
report. He felt he was entitled to this pay under the contract,
as he had been unable to work because his truck was out of
service because of faulty brakes. On Thursday, July 27,
Stamos questioned Ingallinera about his request for "show-
up time." He explained what happened to his truck and I
credit his testimony that he told Stamos he should be paid
for this time as required by the union contract. He was
challenged by Stamos to prove what he said but he did not
have a copy of the contract with him. Stamos denied the
claim and Ingallinera attempted to explain the provisions of
the contract as they related to overtime.
Respondent in its brief argues that the interrogation
alleged in paragraph 5 of the complaint concerned "the
somewhat heated conversation between the employee and
Terry Stamos on July 21." However, the record shows that
this was not the basis of the interrogation. The questioning
' All dates are 1978, unless otherwise stated.
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: G.C. Exh. 3.
LANE TRENCHING, INC.
concerned a dispute about overtime as provided in the
collective-bargaining contract. Ingallinera was discussing the
union contract. He told Stamos that "it stated in the said
contract that the Company must pay the show-up time."
It is well settled that an employee has a statutorily
protected right to seek to enforce the terms of the contract.
The allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint specifically
relates to the question then put to Ingallinera by Stamos:
"He questioned me on talking to Mr. Herzberg my Union
representative."
Stamos then said, "You've been going to the union again,
haven't you?" I find that this last question constituted a
violation of Section 8(a)(1), taken in the context of an earlier
warning from Stevens that if Ingallinera again raised
questions concerning the contractual provision about over-
time he, Stevens, "would have to let me go." That is the
unlawful interrogation.
It is to be noted that in June Stevens said he would have to
let Ingallinera go if he continued to make overtime claims.
This statement, which I am persuaded was made by Stevens,
constitutes a direct threat of discharge for going to the
Union to grieve Respondent's refusal to pay overtime
according to Ingallinera's understanding of the contract's
provisions regarding overtime, and is violated of Section
8(a)(1). I so find.
The law is clear on this point: Motor City Electric
Company. 204 NLRB 460, 463, where Foreman Charlton's
implied threat that if an employee pressed his overtime
(1973) grievance he might be discharged was violative of
8(a)(1 ).
General Motors Corp., 239 NLRB 34, 36 (1978), "The
complaint alleges that in May Supervisor Kirk threatened
Andrews with discharge if he continued to advise fellow
employees concerning their right to file a grievance against
the Respondent.... Thus, the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(aX1) of the Act." The filing of grievances was
protected union and concerted activity. Violation of this
right is violative of 8(aX)(1) and (3). Hyster Co., 195 NLRB 84
(1972), enfd. 83 LRRM 2091,71 LC ¶13615 (7th Cir. 1973).
Conditioning of an employee's employment status on wheth-
er he continued to file repetitive grievances is violative of the
Act. See also Ad Art, Inc., 238 NLRB 1124 (1978); Texaco,
Inc., 233 NLRB 375 (1977); Precision Castings Co., 233
NLRB 183 (1977). The Board has frequently held, with
judicial concurrence in some cases, that protests or demands
whereby some employers' compliance with a collective-
bargaining contract is obtained provision will be deemed
concerted activity statutorily protected, though pursued by a
single worker, personally, whenever that worker's efforts
have been demonstrably directed towards goals which his
fellow workers would presumably share. See N.LR.B. v.
Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corporation, 428 F.2d 217-221 (8th Cir.
1970); N.LR.B. v. Interborough Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d
495, enfg. 157 NLRB 1295 (1966); H. C Smith Construction
Ca, 174 NLRB 1173, 1174 (1969); Bunney Bro. Construc-
tion Company, 139 NLRB 1516 1519 (1962). See W. Carter
Maxwell d/b/a Pioneer Concrete Co, 241 NLRB 264 (1979).
In this case, which is strikingly similar to the case at bar,
employee Cantrell was fired because he demanded overtime
pay when he put in some overtime work. The union
contract, signed by Maxwell, is enforceable in the event of
breach. Cantrell's discharge at least partially because he
sought benefits due him under the contracts, was a violation
of the Act.
2. The discharge of Anthony Ingallinera
The incident which occured on July 27 between Stamos
and Ingallinera resulted in a vigorous confrontation between
the two men. It appears clear that in the course of this
discussion the language of the parties became heated and one
of the witnesses testified that considerable screaming took
place. Ingallinera left Stamos' office to cool off, and the last
thing that Stamos said to him was that if he needed me he
would call me." At that point Ingallinera left.
Despite the comment indicated above, Ingallinera report-
ed for work at the usual time on July 28. As he was walking
towards the shop he was approached by General Manager
Ernie Roman, who immediately asked what he was doing
there. Ingallinera said he was reporting to work. Roman
asked if Stamos had called him, and Ingallinera admitted he
had not received a call. At that point, Roman dismissed him,
stating, "Then we dont't need you. Get out of here."
Shortly thereafter Ingallinera saw Buel White, Respon-
dent's mechanic, at the door of the garage. White told him
that Ingallinera's truck was down, and he would not be able
to drive it. White told Ingallinera that when he arrived at
work on the morning of July 28, Roman and Stevens and
Stamos were discussing Tony (Ingallinera) and it was
obvious they were mad. Roman asked White if anything was
wrong with the truck. White informed them that the truck
was ready to be used, at which point Roman ordered him
"to go up and find something wrong with the truck so that it
wouldn't go." In further corroboration of the fact that this
statement was made, White saw Ingallinera after work that
evening and apologized to him for the false story that
morning. He explained that Respondent ordered him to find
something wrong with the truck.
On Saturday, July 29, Ingallinera met Stevens in a local
coffee shop. Stevens said that Stamos wanted to talk to him,
and he told Stevens he would get in touch with Stamos.
Ingallinera called Stamos, who said he wanted to talk to him
at his (Stamos') home. Ingallinera testified that although he
refused to go to Stamos' home on nonworktime, he did offer
to meet with him at his own house or at a restaurant.
Ingallinera further testified that because he'd been ordered
off the premised on July 28 by Roman, he waited at home
for a telephone call from Respondent on Monday, July 31.
When he had not received any communication from the
Company by 10:30 in the morning, he went to the union hall
and talked to Herzberg. Later in the week, on or about
August I, Ingallinera received a termination slip in the mail.
It was signed by General Foreman Terry Stamos and stated
that he was fired on July 28 forinsubordination and
incompetence. This termination, identified in the record
asgeneral counsel Exhibit 2, recited that the termination date
of Ingallinera was 7-28-78. It is to be noted that the first
reason for discharge that appears on this exhibit is absentee-
ism. This item was not checked on the Ingallinera termina-
tion report. Ingallinera took the discharge slip to the union
office and asked Herzberg, "How can the Company fire me
for insubordination for standing up for my rights as a union
1343
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
member . . and how could they fire me for incompetency
when I worked for the Company for a period of time."
Herzberg told Ingallinera that the Union would file a
grievance on his behalf.' Stevens had told Ingallinera when
they had coffee together on Saturday that if he would
apologize to Stamos he could return to his job. Ingallinera
did not apologize.
The General Counsel's brief recites that "Respondent's
animus and distaste for following the Union contract and
grievances filed pursuant thereto was revealed even after
Ingallinera's discharge. In February or March 1979, employ-
ees were upset because they had not been paid for a company
meeting they had been required to attend. They mentioned
this to President Stevens and asked him what would happen
if they complained to the Union about this. According to the
credible testimony of Steven Hess, who was employed by
Respondent at the time of the hearing, Stevens told them,
"The chances of losing your job, you know, if you went to
the Union, the chances are, you would not have a job the
next day."
Discussion
It is important, in evaluating the validity of Ingallinera's
discharge which took place on July 28, to determine if
Ingallinera was fired for attempting to assert his rights under
the collective-bargaining contract as they related to over-
time. The Company gave a number of reasons for the
discharge. The termination report stated that he was fired
for incompetence and insubordination. The insubordination
related to the argument that Ingallinera had with Stamos.
.The charge of incompetence was dropped by the Company,
leaving only the question of the shouting match between
Stamos and Ingallinera as a basis for the discharge.
Ingallinera came to work on July 28, after admittedly not
having been called, and this was a violation of accepted
practice. It appears that his having come in under the
circumstances constituted a stretching of company policy.
The trouble with this argument is that regular employees,
and Ingrallinera was a regular, are not usually treated this
way.
The record shows that Roman, one of the owners of
Respondent, testified that "if a piece of equipment is not
working, we call the man unless we're shorthanded. Nine
out of 10 times the men go to work. If we know a man's
machine is down and we need the man, or it's a possibility
we can work him, we let him come in and we don't call him
because we can work him in another area. We would rather
use our own men than strangers."
3. The incident involving Buel White
White was employed in July 1978 as a mechanic charged
with the responsibility of repairing Respondent's trucks,
trenching equipment, and other vehicles and keeping them
in workable condition. Ingallinera reported to White on
Friday, July 21, that the brakes on his pickup truck were not
' A grievance was filed by the Union, but apparently the discharge itself was
not pan of the actual grievance which was considered by the grievance board.
This Board consisted of two union representatives and two employer
representatives, including Ingallinera's general foreman, Stamos, and his
working properly. White told Ingallinera that he would
repair the brakes on Saturday morning, July 22 When White
examined the brakes, he found that the brake drums had
been scored and they would have to be turned on a lathe.
There were no lathes available on Saturday morning. White
reported this to Stevens and told him the job could not be
performed until Monday. Ingallinera came to work on
Monday. He was told that the brakes would be repaired by
noon. Ingallinera came back about noon to ask if his truck
was ready. On Friday morning White reported to Roman
and Stevens, who were in the office. White testified they
were talking about Tony and they were mad. Roman asked
White if there was anything wrong with the truck. He
replied, "No, that as far as I was concerned, the truck was
ready to go-it could be used." Roman said, "They did not
want him to go out for the day so Roman told me to go up
and find something wrong with the truck so that it could not
go." White pulled the truck from the stall and disconnected
the machine. Ingallinera came in about 8 or 8:30 in the
morning, at which time White told him the truck was
broken down and needed some work. Tony said he did not
believe it but there was nothing he could do at that time. At
the end of the day I saw Tony parked in a parking lot and I
told him "I was sorry about the thing that happened that
morning . . . I told him that the truck was pulled down
because I was told to. And I didn't like it because I felt a
little guilty ... I told him what was going on."
When questioned on direct-examination about the inci-
dent regarding the truck Stevens said he could not recall the
conversation. Roman also denied he gave White such
instructions.
Note that Ingallinera testified about Respondent's instruc-
tions to find something wrong with the truck. His testimony
was corroborated by White. I credit the version of Ingallin-
era as corroborated by White and I discredit Stevens' and
Roman's denial. It is neither logical nor reasonable that
Ingallinera and White concocted a false story out of whole
cloth. In the context of the events as recounted by the
employees, it is clear that Respondent's version was devised
as a frameup to lay the groundwork for discharging
Ingallinera. Thus I find that Respondent contrived a pretext.
The real reason for firing Ingallinera was that he was
attempting to assert his contractual rights and as such was
engaging in activity protected by the Act. Thus, I find
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3).
It should be also noted that so far as the record shows,
Ingallinera's work was satisfactory; he was not disciplined or
warned at any time during his employment. In fact, Stevens
testified that Ingallinera was a good man.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
Respondent's activities set forth in section III above,
occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent
described in section i above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among
foreman, Dave Sanders (Res exh I). Because the Union failed to grieve the
discharge itself, this case is not appropriate for deferral Dubo Manufacturing
Corporation. 142 NLRB 812(1963), and General American Transportation,
228 NLRB 808 (1977).
1344
LANE TRENCHING. INC.
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom, and take certain affirmative actions designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that Respondent unlawfully discharged
Ingallinera. I will, therefore, recommend that Respondent
offer Ingallinera his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, a substantially equivalent job, without prejudice to his
seniority and other rights and privileges, and make him
whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the
discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum of
money equal to that which he normally would have earned,
absent the discrimination, less net earnings during such
period, with interest thereon to be computed in the manner
prescribed in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950), and Florida Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651
(1977).' It will be further recommended that Respondent
preserve and make available to the Board, upon request, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary and useful to determine the amounts of backpay due
and all the rights of reinstatement under the terms of these
recommendations.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record, I hereby make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Lane Trenching, Inc., is, and at all times material
herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Laborers Local No. 85 is, and has been at all times
material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By asking an employee if he had been to the Union
again, Respondent violated Section 8(a)( ) of the Act.
4. By discharging Anthony Ingallinera on July 28, 1978,
because of Ingallinera's protected activities, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
'See, generally. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 139 NLRB 716 (1962).
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules
and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
The Respondent, Lane Trenching, Inc., Eugene, Oregon,
its officers, agents, successors and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them in Section 7
of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by
asking an employee if he has been to the Union again.
(b) Discharging an employee because of his protected
union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the
Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Offer Anthony Ingallinera immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole
for his loss of earnings in the manner set forth in the section
of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents all payroll and other records, as set forth
in "The Remedy" section of this Decision.
(c) Post at its Eugene, Oregon, operation copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of the attached
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 36, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 36, in writing,
within 20 days of the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board"
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