344 N.L.R.B. 225 (N.L.R.B. 2005)

Lancaster Nissan, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJan 31, 2005

344 N.L.R.B. 225 (N.L.R.B. 2005)

LANCASTER NISSAN 344 NLRB No. 7 225 Lancaster Nissan, Inc. and District Lodge 98, Interna- tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO. Cases 4–CA–32498 and 4– CA–32862 January 31, 2005 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN AND SCHAUMBER On September 30, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Jane Vandeventer issued the attached decision. The Re- spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General Counsel filed a brief in opposition. The National Labor Relations Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find- ings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.1 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Lancaster Nissan, Inc., East Petersburg, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Patricia Garber, Esq., for the General Counsel. Amy G. Macinanti, Esq., for the Respondent. Clark Ruppert Jr., Representative, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JANE VANDEVENTER, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried on April 13–14, 2004, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The complaint alleges Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing to meet with the Union for negotiations at reasonable times, by failing and refusing to provide neces- sary and relevant information to the Union, and by withdrawing recognition of the Union as the collective-bargaining represen- tative of the unit employees. The complaint in the second case alleges Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally implementing changes in the working conditions of the unit employees without notice to the Union or affording 1 Member Schaumber agrees with his colleagues that the judge cor- rectly found that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by, inter alia, failing to meet at reasonable times for bargaining. However, Member Schaumber believes that in her analysis of this issue, the judge should have considered whether the Union fully satis- fied its bargaining obligation when it insisted on the presence at bar- gaining sessions of two unit employees from this small bargaining unit, thus requiring that bargaining sessions be limited to evenings and weekends, and when it failed to request bargaining during business hours on those days when at least one of these unit employees was available for bargaining. Nevertheless, despite the judge’s failure to consider and balance the conduct of both parties, Member Schaumber finds that the evidence as a whole supports the judge’s conclusion. the Union the opportunity to bargain about the changes. The Respondent filed an answer denying the essential allegations in the complaints. After the conclusion of the hearing, the parties filed briefs, which I have read.1 Based on the testimony of the witnesses, including particu- larly my observation of their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence, and the entire record, I make the fol- lowing FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent is a corporation with an office and place of busi- ness in East Petersburg, Pennsylvania, where it is engaged in the retail sale and servicing of new and used vehicles. During a representative 1-year period, Respondent received gross reve- nues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received at its East Petersburg facility goods valued in excess of $5000 di- rectly from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Charging Party (the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts 1. Background Respondent operates an automobile dealership near Lancas- ter, Pennsylvania. There is a sales staff, which is not in issue in this case, as well as a service department. The service techni- cians, who repair and perform maintenance work on vehicles, voted in the autumn of 2002 to be represented by the Union. It is undisputed that the Union was certified to represent them on October 7, 2002, in a unit consisting of, “all full-time and regu- lar part-time Automotive Technicians at [Respondent], exclud- ing all other employees, office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees, Cashiers, Warranty Clerks, Janitors, Service Writers, Parts Department employees, Recon- ditioning employees, Service Drivers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.” As of that time, there were eight employ- ees in the bargaining unit. Respondent was owned by Robert Allen Sr. and John Seyfert at the time of the certification. Seyfert was a minority share- holder and held the position of vice president until September 29, 2003. He continues to own the property where Respondent is located, but is no longer a shareholder. Seyfert was a part of Respondent’s bargaining committee until his resignation as vice president. Rob Allen Jr. has been the general manager of Re- spondent throughout the period involved in this case. At the time of the certification, he was a minority shareholder of Re- spondent, holding a lesser share than Seyfert. His father, Robert Allen Sr., was the majority shareholder. As of Septem- ber 29, 2003, the ownership of Respondent changed. Rob Al- len Jr. (Allen) became the majority shareholder, and his father 1 The General Counsel also filed an unopposed motion to correct the transcript which is granted. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD226 ceased to have an ownership interest. Jim Langer, the manager of new car sales, became the minority shareholder. 2. Early bargaining Within the first month after certification, the parties in- formed each other who the leader of each negotiating commit- tee would be, and Respondent provided some information re- quested by the Union about the unit employees’ wages and working conditions. Attorney Amy Macinanti and Seyfert represented Respondent. Macinanti was the main spokesper- son. Seyfert would meet only on Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday evenings; he would not meet on weekends, or on any of his evenings off. Clark Ruppert Jr., a union business repre- sentative, was the leader for the union committee. Two unit employees, Neil Shirey and Steve Braun, formed the rest of the union committee. The Union proposed two bargaining dates in November 2002. These were not accepted, but one meeting in early De- cember was scheduled. This meeting was never held, due to a major snowstorm on the meeting date. The initial meeting between the parties did not take place until December 12, 2002. The Union had requested unpaid time off for its two employee bargaining committee members, but Respondent refused to grant them any time off, citing “productivity.” This and all subsequent meetings were scheduled after their working hours ended at 5 p.m. The Union provided its initial proposals to Respondent in advance of the first meeting. At the first meet- ing, Respondent informed the Union that its hours were slow- ing down for the service employees and that the least senior employee might be laid off.2 Respondent proposed to discuss noneconomic issues before economic issues, but imposed no other subject matter limitations. Most of the meetings between the parties lasted about 2 or 3 hours. 3. Continuation of bargaining The second meeting was scheduled for January 9, 2003. Ruppert received counterproposals from Respondent on the morning of that date. He testified that he did not have time to go over the proposals before the meeting, but the parties went over the Respondent’s proposals at the meeting. The parties met again on January 22,3 at which time Ruppert had a “walk- through” of Respondent’s facility, and the parties met for about 2 hours. Much of the meeting was taken up with the layoff of an employee and a disciplinary warning, which had been issued to one of the Union’s bargaining committee, Shirey. A third January meeting had been scheduled for January 23, but Maci- nanti cancelled that meeting. Ruppert requested bargaining meetings on five dates in February, but only two dates were tentatively agreed upon, February 13 and 26. Two days before February 13, Macinanti canceled the meet- ing on that date. The Union’s proposed alternative dates for rescheduling it were rejected by Respondent. The fourth meet- ing was held on February 26. The following day, Ruppert pro- posed 11 dates to Macinanti for March, but only two were 2 Gregory Gladfelter, Respondent’s service manager, testified that any service employee’s duties could be performed by any other service employee, that they were “interchangeable.” 3 Dates hereafter will be in 2003, unless otherwise specified. agreed to, March 12 and 20. The parties met on both these dates. In addition, Ruppert and Macinanti met for lunch on March 17 in order to assess the progress of bargaining. At the lunch, Ruppert proposed that the parties meet more frequently, and that Respondent complete its proposals, both economic and noneconomic, in the near future. Ruppert suggested meeting two times a week rather than only one, meeting longer, and meeting during the daytime. Respondent agreed to none of these proposals. Ruppert proposed additional specific dates in March and April. Respondent agreed to only two dates in April, April 16 and 22, but canceled the April 22 meeting early on that day. Ruppert proposed 15 dates in May, but Macinanti countered with a date not proposed, May 1. Ruppert agreed to that date, but 2 days before the meeting, Macinanti canceled it. Two weeks later, Macinanti accepted two dates in May, May 27 and 29. The eighth meeting was held on May 27, after a 6-week hia- tus in bargaining. One of the union committee members, Braun, had been replaced by employee Doug Miller. The ninth meeting was held on May 29, and at that time, one meeting in June was agreed to, June 23. Four days before the meeting, Ruppert once again requested Macinanti to complete Respon- dent’s proposals. This was never done during the course of the bargaining. At the trial, it appeared from testimony of Respondent’s wit- nesses that there were occasional days when both bargaining committee members had a compensatory day off at the same time during the week, due to their having worked on Saturday. At no time did Respondent volunteer this information to Rup- pert, and it was apparently not communicated to him by his own bargaining committee. There was no evidence in the re- cord to show how many of these days occurred during the course of bargaining. It is likewise not shown in the record whether Respondent would have agreed to meet on any of these dates, or whether Respondent would have advanced some of the same reasons for not meeting at other times, to wit, that it was a principal’s day off or that the general manager was needed to fill in for the new or used care sales managers. The 10th meeting was held on June 23. Allen joined Re- spondent’s bargaining committee at that time. From this time until the end of the bargaining, Respondent declared itself available to meet on only 1 evening a week, Monday evenings. Allen claimed 2 weekday nights as “evenings off,” and the other two as evenings on which he was obligated to work in the place of the new car sales manager or used car sales manager. The only date in July agreed to was July 28, but that meeting was canceled by Macinanti on the afternoon of July 28, as Ruppert was en route to the meeting. Ruppert again requested a complete proposal from Respondent, and requested the assis- tance of a mediator. No eleventh meeting was held until Au- gust 25, when a mediator was present. Once again Ruppert proposed additional meetings, and meetings on weekends. Allen refused to meet on weekends. Only September 22 and October 13 were agreed to for future meetings. 4. End of bargaining and withdrawal of recognition The 12th and final meeting was held on September 22. Rup- pert brought up wage increases, and proposed a 50-cent-per- LANCASTER NISSAN 227 hour increase. Respondent countered with 25 cents. This was the first discussion of wages at any meeting. Two weeks later, Ruppert again requested a complete proposal from Respondent in advance of the scheduled October 13 meeting. On October 13, Respondent canceled the October 13 meeting and withdrew recognition from the Union on the basis of a petition it had received from employees. The General Counsel and the Union do not attack the validity of the petition, and concede that if Respondent is found not to have violated its duty to meet at reasonable times, the Respondent would be privileged to with- draw recognition from the Union. 5. Information and unilateral change allegations Respondent’s change in ownership took place after the last bargaining meeting. On October 16, by letter, the Union re- quested information concerning the change in the ownership for the purpose of learning who had authority to bargain and what effects the change might have on the unit. It is undisputed that Respondent did not provide this information. Respondent does not dispute its relevance. It is further undisputed that Respon- dent did make changes in the working conditions of the bar- gaining unit after it withdrew recognition from the Union. In January 2004, Respondent notified its employees directly that it was instituting a bonus program, and the second was a “buy- back” program for unused sick or floating holiday days. Re- spondent implemented the changes on January 13, 2004. Re- spondent admits that it gave no prior notice to the Union of these changes. All parties agree that these actions of Respon- dent would violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act if Respondent had not been entitled to withdraw recognition because of its actions with regard to bargaining. If, on the other hand, Respondent’s conduct in meeting for bargaining is found to be lawful, the dependent violations described above would not violate the Act. B. Discussion and Analysis The Board has reiterated the central importance of the obli- gation to meet for bargaining on many occasions. In J. H. Rut- ter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86 NLRB 470, 506 (1949), the Board stated that the obligation to bargain “encompasses the affirmative duty to make expeditious and prompt arrangements, within reason, for meeting and conferring. Agreement is stifled at its source if opportunity is not accorded for discussion or so de- layed as to invite or prolong unrest or suspicion. It is not un- reasonable to expect of a party to collective bargaining that he display a degree of diligence and promptness in arranging for collective-bargaining sessions when they are requested, and in the elimination of obstacles thereto, comparable to that which he would display in his other business affairs of importance.” Recently, in Calex Corp., 322 NLRB 977 (1997), the Board elaborated on this obligation by stating that “considerations of personal convenience, including geographic or professional conflicts, do not take the precedence over the statutory demand that the bargaining process take place with expedition and regu- larity.” See also Caribe Staple Co., 313 NLRB 877, 893 (1994). Likewise, in John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 298 NLRB 524 (1990), the Board described the obligation to meet at reason- able times as something that should be a part of the regular business of an employer, not something to be fitted in at odd times, when no other demands on an employer’s time were being made. The Board has held in numerous cases that a party who lim- its and delays meetings has not met its obligation to meet and bargain, and has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In Calex Corp., supra, the fact that a respondent met only three times in a 3-month period, and cancelled other scheduled meetings was an indication of “purposeful delay” by the respondent. Even though the parties in that case bargained for 15 months and had agreed on 75 percent of the contract, this limited progress was not a defense to the refusal to bargain violation. In Caribe Staple Co., supra, the parties, over the course of about 13 months, met and bargained only about one time per month, each time for only 2 or 3 hours, despite repeated requests by the Union for more frequent meetings. This dilatory meeting schedule was deemed by the Board a failure [of] the respon- dent’s obligation to meet and bargain. In Bryant & Stratton Business Institute, 321 NLRB 1007, 1042 (1996), the respon- dent violated its duty to bargain by failing to meet at reasonable times. In that case, the respondent refused to meet on week- ends, and limited the bargaining sessions to evenings. The respondent limited the bargaining meetings to an average of only one meeting per month, and demonstrated an unwilling- ness to provide counterproposals in a timely manner. There the respondent canceled meetings on short notice, thus precluding the Union from rescheduling to another date within the same period. Here, Respondent engaged in similar conduct. It refused to permit employees’ unpaid time off in order to attend bargaining sessions. As an excuse for this refusal, Respondent claimed that it needed them to accomplish work, but at the same time, it laid off one employee who could have done this work. Re- spondent’s claimed reason for refusing the employees unpaid time off to attend bargaining sessions was inconsistent with its conduct, especially in light of its own witness’ testimony that all service employees could do the same work, and must be seen as an impediment to regular meetings. Respondent’s re- fusal to allow the employees unpaid time off limited the time available for meetings to evenings and weekends. Respondent then refused to meet on weekends, offering no reason at all for this refusal. During the first 8-1/2 months of the certification year, Respondent had declared itself potentially available to meet on only 3 evenings a week, for a total of approximately 12 evenings a month, yet Respondent persisted in meeting only 9 times during that period, for an average of one meeting a month. For the remaining 3 months, late June through late September, Respondent declared itself available only 1 evening a week. This would mean that a possible 4 evenings a month were available, yet Respondent met for bargaining only three times, again for an average of only one meeting per month. Therefore, Respondent met with the Union for only a total of 12 meetings during the initial certification year, a frequency which is strikingly similar to many cases in which the Board has found that a respondent has not met its obligation to meet and bargain. In addition, Respondent imposed many obstacles to the scheduling and holding of additional meetings, and turned a deaf ear to the Union’s repeated requests for additional meetings. Respondent refused to meet on any but a few eve- DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD228 nings a week, but when requested to schedule meetings at these times, Respondent would schedule no more than two meetings per month. Respondent then proceeded to cancel several meet- ings, with the result that Respondent in practice met with the Union for bargaining only an overall average of one evening per month. Since all the meetings began after the end of the employees’ workday, they were perforce limited to 2 or 3 hours in duration. In attempting to explain its dilatoriness in scheduling bar- gaining meetings, Respondent cited its managers need to work at the dealership, to back up the sales or service manager, as reasons for unavailability on some evenings. Respondent cited a manager’s “day off” or “evening off” as reasons for refusing to meet on other evenings. These multifarious reasons left only three, and later one evening in each week on which Respondent was available. But Respondent would not even meet on all of these available evenings, agreeing only to one or two meetings in the following month, and then, more often than not, cancel- ing one of the scheduled meetings, resulting in the one- meeting-a-month average which occurred. This conduct did not comport with the obligation set forth by the Board to accord collective bargaining equal importance to other business affairs. Rather, it accorded collective bargaining the lowest priority of any activity, whether business or personal, lower than all sales or service business matters, and lower even than personal days off and evenings off for managers. At the same time, employee negotiators were required to meet only on their “evenings off.” This conduct clearly does not meet Respondent’s obligation to accord bargaining equal importance with other business mat- ters. Another fact which indicates that Respondent did not accord bargaining equal importance with other business matters was its failure to make counterproposals on many subjects. The addi- tional fact that only a handful of smaller contract issues had been agreed to at the end of the twelve meetings is a further indication of Respondent’s lack of diligence in meeting its bar- gaining obligation. In fact, Respondent’s conduct is very simi- lar to that of the respondent in Briggs & Stratton Business Insti- tute, supra, where an independent violation of the obligation to meet at reasonable times was found. I find that Respondent has failed to meet its statutory obligation to meet for collective bargaining at reasonable times, and has thereby refused to bar- gain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent has defended by relying primarily on one case, 88 Transit Lines, 300 NLRB 177 (1990). There, the Board found no violation of Section 8(a)(5) by a respondent who had bargained with the union only during business hours, met for only a few hours at a time, and had refused to meet on consecu- tive days. There were 11 meetings held within the space of 7 months. The cited case is far less similar to the facts of the instant case than the precedent cited in the preceding para- graphs. First, the frequency of meeting in 88 Transit Lines was almost twice that in the instant case. Second, the respondent there was willing to and did make accommodations in the em- ployees’ schedules to allow for their participation in the nego- tiations, a significant difference from the instant matter. Third, in that case the allegation sought to be proved was “surface bargaining,” rather than the violation of a respondent’s duty to meet at reasonable times. There is no way to assess what the Board would have found in 88 Transit Lines if that had been the allegation alleged. For all these reasons, I find 88 Transit Lines inapposite to the facts and the allegation in this matter. At the hearing, the parties agreed that the allegation of fail- ure to provide information to the Union in response to its Octo- ber 16, 2003 letter was dependent upon a finding that Respon- dent had violated Section 8(a)(5). Respondent admitted that if it had violated the Act and was therefore not privileged to with- draw recognition from the Union on October 13, 2003, that it had an obligation to provide the requested information. I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to provide the Union with the information requested in its letter dated October 16, 2003. Furthermore, the parties also agreed at the hearing that the allegations of two unilateral changes implemented by Respon- dent on January 13, 2004, to wit, an additional service request bonus program and a sick/floating holiday buyback program, were similarly dependent upon a finding that Respondent had violated its obligation to meet at reasonable times. I find, there- fore, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally implementing two changes in employees’ terms and conditions of employment without affording the Union notice of the proposed changes, or an opportunity to bargain about them. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate bargaining unit: All full-time and regular part-time Automotive Technicians at the Dealership, excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees, Cashiers, Warranty Clerks, Janitors, Service Writers, Parts Department employees, Reconditioning employees, Service Drivers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. By failing to meet at reasonable times, Respondent has re- fused to bargain with the Union and has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 3. By failing and refusing to provide relevant information re- quested by the Union, Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union and has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. By withdrawing recognition from the Union, Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union and has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. By unilaterally changing two terms and conditions of em- ployment without affording the Union notice of the proposed changes and an opportunity to bargain about them, Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union and has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 6. The violations set forth above are unfair labor practices af- fecting commerce within the meaning of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action nec- essary to effectuate the policies of the Act. LANCASTER NISSAN 229 On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended4 ORDER The Respondent, Lancaster Nissan, Inc., Petersburg, Penn- sylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by failing to meet at reasonable times. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by failing and refusing to provide relevant information requested by the Union. (c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by uni- laterally changing two terms and conditions of employment without affording the Union notice of the proposed changes and an opportunity to bargain about them. (d) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by with- drawing recognition from the Union. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize the Union as the exclusive collective– bargaining representative of the unit employees and, upon re- quest, meet and bargain collectively with the Union for the period required in Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785 (1962). (b) Provide the Union with the information requested in its letter of October 16, 2003. (c) Rescind the two unilateral changes in terms and condi- tions of employment made on January 13, 2004. (d) Make employees whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the unilateral changes made on January 13, 2004. (e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi- tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re- cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its East Petersburg, Pennsylvania, location copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive 4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. 5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 16, 2003. (g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist any union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be- half Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time Automotive Technicians at the Dealership, excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees, Cashiers, Warranty Clerks, Janitors, Service Writers, Parts Department employees, Reconditioning employees, Service Drivers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union by failing to meet with the Union at reasonable times for the purpose of collective bargaining. WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Union unlaw- fully. WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to provide relevant information requested by the Union for the purpose of carrying out its rep- resentational duties. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union by making changes in employees’ terms and conditions of em- ployment without first giving the Union notice of the proposed changes and an opportunity to bargain about them. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL recognize the Union as your exclusive collective- bargaining representative and, upon request, bargain collec- tively with the Union in the unit set forth above. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD230 WE WILL provide the Union with the information it requested in its letter dated October 14, 2003. WE WILL rescind the changes in terms and conditions of em- ployment we made on January 13, 2004. WE WILL make whole, with interest, all employees in the bargaining unit for any loss of earnings or other benefits they may have suffered as a result of our unlawful changes in terms and conditions of employment. LANCASTER NISSAN, INC.