Lamyra J. Hogan-Satcher, Complainant,v.Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 3, 2012
0120113905 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 3, 2012)

0120113905

02-03-2012

Lamyra J. Hogan-Satcher, Complainant, v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.




Lamyra J. Hogan-Satcher,

Complainant,

v.

Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice

(Federal Bureau of Prisons),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120113905

Agency No. P20100650

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s

appeal from the Agency’s July 15, 2011 final decision concerning

her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant

worked as a GS-12 Assistant Food Service Administrator (AFSA) at the

Agency’s Federal Correctional Complex in Beaumont, Texas. On August

16, 2010, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency

subjected her to hostile workplace discrimination on the bases of race

(African-American), sex (female), and reprisal for prior protected

EEO activity under Title VII when: she was made to endure involuntary

changes to her work schedule, verbal threats, unwarranted comments,

and preclusion from exercising her supervisory authority.

The record reveals that the Agency conducted a comprehensive Food

Service Program Review at the Beaumont Complex in January 2008. In a

report dated February 15, 2008, the Agency advised the Complex Warden

that the Food Service operation was deficient. The review identified

one ''significant finding" relating to food safety and sanitation,

finding that “internal controls for maintaining a safe, sanitary,

and secure environment were not adequate.” There were also three

repeat deficiencies that had been identified in the July 2005 Program

Review and two new deficiencies. The report also noted that a lack

of supervisory direction and failure to follow established procedures

existed in various areas, which hampered the overall effectiveness of

the department and prevented acceptable accomplishment of food safety

and sanitation. The memo also advised the Warden that he was required

to respond to the significant finding and provide recommendations with

planned corrective action and a time frame by March 16, 2008.

The record further reveals that an Operational Review of the Food

Service Program was conducted in February 2009 by the Occupational

Safety and Environmental Health Manager (OSE) at the Beaumont Complex.

In his February 27, 2009 report, the OSE said that there was a “repeat,

significant finding” relating to food safety and sanitation, and "repeat

deficiencies" relating to inaccurate food budget projections resulting

in significant underestimation of food service costs. The report noted

that while there were "repeat discrepancies," there were also numerous

improvements, and that the Safety Department was assisting Food Service

with formal inspection protocols. The report included that current

internal controls appear too narrow in scope and place the burden

on the Food Service Administrator (FSA) rather than on the AFSA and

staff responsible. A number of vital functions, affecting mandatory

ACA standards, are still not being performed at acceptable levels.

Improvements need to be made regarding protecting food from the risk of

contamination and the development of food borne hazards.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a

final decision within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f).

In its final decision, the Agency found no discrimination. The Agency

determined that, even if Complainant could establish a prima facie

case, management had recited legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions. Changes to Complainant's work schedule were based on

the significant health and sanitation problems and lack of supervisory

oversight by Food Service management identified in the 2008 and 2009

reviews. As an AFSA, Complainant was responsible for the overall

operation of the Food Service Department at her assigned institution

within the Beaumont complex. Although AFSA’s had not previously

worked weekends, the health and sanitation deficiencies and the need

for increased supervision in food services identified in the reviews

were legitimate reasons for making the schedule change and requiring

daily supervision. Concerning Complainant's remaining claims, the Agency

noted that these concerns were raised following the 2008 Program Review

and the 2009 Operational Review identifying problems in the oversight

and direction of the Food Services Department that should have been

provided by the FSA and assistants.

The FSA, Complainant's supervisor, stated that management did not believe

that the AFSA’s were doing an adequate job. These were not unreasonable

concerns given the serious deficiencies and lack of supervision identified

in the 2008 and 2009 reviews set out in this record. The Agency noted

that the FSA asked for the opportunity to work with the AFSA’s.

The Agency further noted that his efforts were successful, and the

FSA in fact complimented Complainant's contributions to improving the

department. When Complainant submitted a memorandum alleging workplace

harassment by the Associate Warden (AW), regarding the purported comments

he had made regarding her job effectiveness, the Agency stated that it

promptly addressed these allegations by establishing a threat assessment

committee. The committee did not find any threat of physical harassment,

but recommended that the AW undertake counseling and/or training for

more effective communication and interpersonal skills. Rather than

precluding Complainant from exercising her supervisory authority, the

record indicates that the FSA worked with Complainant to improve her

interactions with her staff and to administer discipline properly.

In conclusion, the Agency found that the events of which Complainant

complains, either individually or collectively fail to rise to the level

of unlawful harassment prohibited by Title VII. Most importantly, there

is no evidence that any of the actions or decisions of Agency management

were motivated by unlawful reasons. Complainant failed to establish that

any of management's reasons for its actions were pretextual or unworthy

of belief. Complainant failed to establish discrimination under either

the theory of disparate treatment or unlawful harassment.

On appeal, Complainant asserts, inter alia, that the Agency improperly

found no discrimination in this matter. She further asserts that the

Agency did not adequately address her claims of harassment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, § VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that

the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of

the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,

statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant

submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the

Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of

the law”).

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee’s

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior

EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive.

Wibstad v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699

(Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39

(D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (March 8, 1994). In determining that a working

environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the

alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court

has stated that: “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to

create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment that

a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title

VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (1993).

To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, complainant

must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class;

(2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal

or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment

complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the

harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;

and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of

Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should

be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the

victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance at 6.

An employer is subject to vicarious liability for harassment when it is

"created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority

over the employee." Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524

U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998). When the harassment does not

result in a tangible employment action being taken against the employee,

the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability. The agency

can meet this defense, which is subject to proof by a preponderance

of the evidence, by demonstrating: (a) that it exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (b)

that appellant unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive

or corrective opportunities provided by the agency or to avoid harm

otherwise. Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. at 2270;

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. at 2293; Enforcement Guidance:

Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999). This defense is not available when the

harassment results in a tangible employment action (e.g., a discharge,

demotion, or undesirable reassignment) being taken against the employee.

Here, Complainant asserted that based on her statutorily protected

classes, management continuously subjected her to a hostile work

environment. However, we find that Complainant has not shown that she

was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical

conduct involving her protected classes, or the harassment complained of

was based on her statutorily protected classes. Further, Complainant

has not shown that the purported harassment had the purpose or effect

of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. While Complainant

has cited various incidents where Agency management took actions that

were either adverse or disruptive to her, we find that Complainant fails

to show that these incidents were as a result of unlawful discrimination.

To the extent Complainant is alleging disparate treatment with respect to

her claims, she has not shown that the Agency's reasons for its actions

were a pretext for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision

because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish

that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time

period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration

as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely

filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted

with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider

requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very

limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 3, 2012

__________________

Date

2

0120113905

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120113905