Lamb-Weston, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 3, 1964

148 N.L.R.B. 798 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

798 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to join or assist the
aforesaid Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
M & S STEEL COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528
Peachtree-Seventh Building, 50 Seventh Street NE., Atlanta, Georgia, Telephone No.
Trinity 6-3311, Extension 5357, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Lamb-Weston , Inc. and F. G. Lamb Co. and Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union , Local No. 983 , Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehouse-
men & Helpers of America . Case No. 19-CA-2762. September
3,1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 22, 1964, Trial Examiner Ramey Donovan issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents
had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the Act and recommending that they cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondents
filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and
Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with the exception noted below.' -
I We do not adopt that portion of the Trial Examiner's Decision wherein he analogizes
the required standard of diligence in bargaining to that relationship expected between a
buyer and seller engaged in a commercial transaction . Nevertheless, we are of the opin-
ion that, on the basis of standards set forth in the Act and customarily applied by the
Board in such cases, the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
We also note that the Trial Examiner has omitted from paragraph No 4 of the Con-
clusions of Law reference to the unilateral wage increase imposed by the Respondents
which he also found to be a separate violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) in the body
of his Decision. We hereby amend paragraph No. 4 of the Conclusions of Law to correct
this omission.
148 NLRB No. 85.
LAMB-WESTON, INC. AND F. G. LAMB CO. 799
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondents Lamb-
Weston, Inc. and E. G. Lamb Co., their officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The above-mentioned Union filed a charge and an amended charge on October 25
and November 18, 1963, respectively. A complaint by the General Counsel, dated
January 24, 1964, was thereafter issued. The complaint alleged violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. In its answer, the Respondent denied the com-
mission of any unfair labor practices. The matter was heard on March 17, 1964, in
Pocatello, Idaho, before Trial Examiner Ramey Donovan. Briefs have been filed by
the General Counsel and by the Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from observation of the witnesses, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent Lamb-Weston, Inc., an Oregon corporation with its principal office in
Weston, Oregon, operates a potato-processing plant at American Falls, Idaho, where
it is engaged in the grading, sacking, packing, and sale of fresh potatoes and the
freezing of potatoes into french-fried potatoes and related products. Respondent
F. G. Lamb Co., an Oregon corporation with its principal office at Weston, Oregon,
operates a warehouse and cold-storage plant at American Falls, Idaho, for the potato
products of Lamb-Weston.
The two aforementioned Companies, at all times material, were and are affiliated
businesses with common control and management. The management formulates and
administers a common labor policy for the two Respondents. During the past year,
the Respondents, in the course and conduct of their business operations at American
Falls, Idaho, sold and distributed products valued in excess of $500,000, of which
products valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped to purchasers located outside the
State of Idaho. In the same period, Respondents, at their American Falls opera-
tions, purchased goods, materials, and services from outside the State of Idaho valued
in excess of $50,000.
Respondents are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain
Pursuant to a Board-conducted election, the Union was certified on March 1, 1963,
as the collective-bargaining representative in an appropriate unit of Respondents' em-
ployees. The appropriate unit consists of all production and maintenance employees
employed by the Respondents at their potato processing plant and warehouse and
cold-storage plant in American Falls, Idaho, including truckdrivers, warehousemen,
and laboratory employees, but excluding office clerical employees, guards, pro-
fessional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The parties first met on March 20, 1963, in American Falls.' This first session was
devoted to disposing of some employee grievances but the Union did submit a written
contract proposal.
'American Falls and Pocatello are about 25 miles apart . Roughly, Boise is approxi-
mately 230 miles distant from these two cities.
800 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The next meeting was held on April 1. All meetings were held in American
Falls. Although there was an occasional variation of one man or another, we can
accurately describe the negotiating teams as consisting of, Hill, business representa-
tive of the Union; Lott, secretary-treasurer of the Local Union; and two or three
employee committeemen; Weston, attorney representing Respondents, who had his
office in Boise; Fairchild, division manager of Respondents; Anderson, plant manager
for Respondents; and Scott, the personnel manager. The evidence indicates that
Hill was the chief union negotiator and Weston was the chief company negotiator.
At the April 1 meeting, the Company explained that it was just getting its feet on
the ground financially and that its plant was relatively new in the area. Using the
union-proposed contract as a basis of discussion, the parties discussed various items.
The Company said as to some items that they seemed to be all right and as to other
items there was more discussion. There was a difference of opinion about the terms
to be applicable to permanent and seasonal employees. In general, the Union wanted
both groups of employees to be accorded the same fringe benefits and the Company
believed that differentiation was called for .2 The question of paid lunch periods was
also gone into, with the Company expressing the view that the cost involved was of
material proportions. A tentative date for another meeting about April 15 was set,
but, subsequently, due to the unavailability of Weston, the next meeting was not held
until April 25.
The April 25 meeting involved discussion of views on such items as the permanent
and seasonal employees, paid lunch period, certain aspects of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act's applicability to various operations, and the bonus system. The Company
had a bonus system based on or related to attendance on the job. The Union wanted
the bonus abolished as such and incorporated into a negotiated wage rate. At some
point in the meeting Weston said that his time was valuable and if an agreement
could not be, or was not, reached, he was wasting his time in coming over from
Boise. There was some discussion of union security which the union proposal en-
visaged in its union-shop clause. The Company said that it was opposed but sug-
gested that union security be passed over at the time and that perhaps later it could
be resolved in the course of trading on various points. During this meeting Hill
advocated more frequent and longer bargaining sessions, including meeting at 10 a.m.
and meeting for a full day and for several days in succession in order to reach a
contract agreement. Both the April 1 and 25 meetings had commenced at 2 p.m.
and had run for 21/2 or 3 hours.
A few days after the April 25 meeting, the Union submitted wage proposals to
the Company. Prior to that the Union's contract proposal had not included a wage
schedule because the Union had not obtained a list of job classifications.
The next meeting was held on May 13. The union negotiators appeared at
10 a in., the prearranged time, but no one from the Company was present. Hill tele-
phoned the plant and spoke to Scott. Scott informed him that Weston had been de-
tained and could not be present until 2 p.m. The parties then met at 2 p.m. They
went through the various items of the proposed contract and reached agreement or
did not disagree on many provisions. Weston stated, according to Hill, that there
were apparently four items mainly in dispute, to wit, union security, fringe benefits of
seasonal employees in conjunction with permanent employees' benefits, paid lunch
periods, and wages. The meeting ended because Weston was not feeling well. A
tentative meeting was discussed for later in May. Weston had previously advised
the Union that he had scheduled a trip to Europe commencing in the first few days
of June. The Union had a convention to attend for a week in June.
Because the Union believed that a contract was close to realization, Hill was
anxious to meet again before Weston left the country. Weston wrote to Hill on
May 15 stating that he did not believe that he would be able to meet again before
he left the country. He listed his various engagements and the dates thereof. Weston
expressed the idea that "we can determine our positions on some of the remaining
issues through correspondence." He stated that the principal items were: union se-
curity; paid lunch periods; fringe benefits for seasonal employees as related to regular
or permanent employees; application of Fair Labor Standards Act to certain depart-
ments; wages; and length of contract. The letter then expressed the company posi-
2 Seasonal employees had been eligible voters and were part of the unit The nature of
the Company's business had significant seasonal characteristics in view of the nature of
the product with which it dealt
LAMB-WESTON, INC. AND F. G. LAMB CO. 801
tions on the lunch periods, seasonal employees, wages, and union security.3 On
lunch periods the letter said that it was an "extremely high cost item" and under pres-
ent conditions the Company could not yield. On seasonal employees, it was stated
that the Company did not feel that such employees should receive vacations since
they were off 2 or 3 months a year, "some system of proration might be considered
depending upon cost etc." Regarding union security, the Company's position was
stated to be that "there must be some compromise on the union-security clause .
particularly . as the election was won by a very small majority. This may be the
issue that will create a deadlock unless you can see some type of compromise along
the line we suggested in our counterproposal." 4 On wages, the letter stated that the
Company was already above its competitors and that it saw no prospect of a wage
increase. The letter concluded, "I would appreciate having your views, especially if
any of the items can be compromised, and your suggestions in that regard."
A week or so after the May 13 meeting, Hill telephoned Fairchild about another
meeting in May. Fairchild said that it did not appear that Weston would be avail-
able before he departed on his trip. Hill proposed that the parties meet during
Weston's absence if it was necessary. Fairchild was agreeable to this suggestion.
Subsequently, Weston telephoned Hill and said that he would not be able to meet,
as had been tentatively arranged on May 13, before his departure from the country.
Weston wrote to Hill on May 29 stating that he had been unable to work out a time
to meet with Hill before he left on June 5. He stated that he had talked to Fairchild
and had explained that if the Union insisted on meeting during Weston's absence, the
Union should advise Weston's office and either Weston's son or Eberle from the
office would attend the meeting. The opinion was expressed, however, that in view
of Weston's familiarity with the situation, it would be better to await his return.
Under date of June 4, Hill wrote to Fairchild referring to Weston's leter of May 29.
Hill suggested June 14 for a meeting and the entire week of June 17 and referred to
Weston's mention that his son or Eberle from his office would attend meetings be-
tween the Union and the company people in Weston's absence By a letter also
dated June 4, Weston wrote to Hill, stating that he had talked to Fairchild. Weston
stated that the Company had now decided not to negotiate in Weston's absence, ex-
pressing the view that a different course of action would confuse and delay the ulti-
mate preparation of a contract. Weston requested, "In the meantime," an answer to
his May 15 letter "so that some of the issues mentioned therein can be crystallized
before we start again."
On June 5, Fairchild answered Hill's letter of June 4, confirming "our telephone
conversation today" to the effect that the Company could not meet until the week of
July 15 by which time Weston would be back. Fairchild expressed the view that
Weston could meet for 1 or 2 days that week and "we could have additional meetings
that week in his absence."
Hill, on July 2, 1963, replied to Weston's letter of May 15 regarding the six con-
tractual items referred to by Weston in his letter. Hill stated that "I can see no
change in the Union's position on the items that you mentioned in your letter." He
then went on to refer to the resumption of negotiations in the week of July 15 as
3 Weston gave no exposition of the Fair Labor Standards and length of contract as-
pects. Considering Hill 's testimony regarding the May 13 meeting, where Weston men-
tioned four items as constituting the principal areas of disagreement, and Weston's letter
of May 15, wherein he mentioned but did not discuss the Fair Labor Standards and
length of contract points, it is a reasonable inference that the parties regarded four
items as major issues , with two others as also points to be resolved
'The record is not clear regarding the dates of the Company's contract proposals, at
least as far as the two typed contract instruments that the Company submitted are
concerned. At one point, both Weston, who was examining Hill, and the latter appeared
to agree that the first such proposal was on July 26. At another point, Weston's ques-
tions seemed to indicate that he believed that the proposal was first submitted in May.
Hill's recollection was that the Company's first contract proposal was submitted in July.
Fairchild testified that the first company proposal was submitted on May 15. The record
is clear that the Company did submit a written counterproposal on July 26, 1963, since
the letter of transmittal is in the record. Considering all the evidence, I am of the
opinion that the two written contract proposals by the Company were submitted in May
and July 1963, respectively. The reference in Weston's May 15 letter to union security
and the Company's counterproposal thereon referred, in our opinion, to the Company's
offer of a maintenance-of-membership clause as opposed to the Union's proposal for a
union-shop clause.
760-577-65-vol. 148-52
802 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mentioned by Fairchild. Hill called Weston's office around July 7 or 9 but Weston
had not returned.
The parties next met on July 16 from about 10 a.m. to 3 p in., with lunch inter-
vening. They went over the Union's proposed contract provisions and reached agree-
ment or completed agreement on some items such as a grievance procedure, including
arbitration. On the six items referred to in Weston's May 15 letter they made little
or no progress, with the possible exception of some progress on the Fair Labor
Standards application. On various matters, Weston would comment that particular
wording was all right or would suggest taking some phrase out or would comment
that something raised by the Union did not make that much difference or he would
say, "Strike out something," or "Use your wording." Toward the end of the meeting,
Weston said that he would prepare and submit a complete contract proposal to the
Union which he indicated would favorably surprise the Union.
On July 22 Weston wrote to Hill stating that the proposal was taking longer than
anticipated due in part to the nature of the task and because of other work in the
office. On July 26 Weston transmitted the Company's proposed contract and sug-
gested that Hill take it up with his committee or submit it at a meeting to the em-
ployees and let the Company know or that the parties arrange a further meeting.
According to Hill, the company proposal was not satisfactory to the Union. He
testified that there were omissions of matters that the parties had previously agreed
upon, such as certain aspects of seniority. Hill also said that the proposal contained
a management rights clause that had not previously been discussed. In any event the
Union rejected the proposal at a union meeting. A few days later, Hill notified Fair-
child of this action by telephone.5
The next meeting was on August 20, with Taylor, a Federal conciliator, participat-
ing. The parties went over the contract proposals. They discussed the differences
and the differences in language. According to Hill, on some language that bothered
the Company, the latter was satisfied when the Union gave certain explanations. On
the management rights clause, Hill testified that Weston agreed to its omission, say-
ing that the Company knew its rights anyway. The Union offered alternatives on
union security. Hill testified that the Company appeared to be interested in some of
the alternatives to a union shop that the Union mentioned. On wages, the Company
contended that they were paying more than their competitors. The Union disputed
this. The Company said that a wage increase at the time was prohibitive.
The parties next met on September 11, again with the conciliator. Very substan-
tial progress was made and the conciliator stated, in summing up the situation to the
parties, that the only matter on which they were apart was union security. Both
parties had made concessions and among these was an offer of a 10-percent wage
increase by the Company over a 3-year period. Fairchild testified that at that meet-
ing he had felt that the parties were so close to a contract that they practically had
one. Various approaches to the union-security issue had been explored and the
Union then proposed that a vote be conducted among the employees as to whether
or not they wanted a union-shop clause. The company people were receptive to the
idea of an election and there was discussion of who would conduct such an election.
Weston said that the NLRB would not do so. According to the credited testimony
of Hill and Lott, Weston said something about the State labor commission and in-
dicated that he would contact that body regarding the matter of a possible election.
Weston did not testify. Fairchild testified that he did not recall that Weston said
anything about contacting the State commission. Lott's testimony is not controverted
that he, Lott, also said that if the State commission would not conduct an election, it
could be done through a justice of the peace or by an accounting firm with the
parties agreeing on the rules for the election.6
5 A comparison of the company proposal with the original union contract proposal is
not possible since the latter was not offered in evidence We do know that the Union had
proposed a union-shop clause and the company proposal contained a maintenance-of-
membership provision Presumably the Union had also proposed a grievance and arbi-
tration provision and there was a grievance and arbitration clause in the company pro-
posal. The Union had proposed wage increases and the company proposal did not, al-
though, apparently, the bonus had been included in the wage rates.
In its brief, Respondent denies that it agreed to ask the State commission to conduct
an election A section of the State law is cited to the effect that there is no authoriza-
tion for "the commissioner to conduct an election on any matter which is within an ex-
clusive jurisdiction of any Federal act or Board ." Without becoming involved in a
matter of State statutory construction, I believe that the National Labor Relations Act
and the Board have no jurisdiction on the matter of a union-shop election regardless of
whether the Employer is otherwise within Federal jurisdiction.
LAMB-WESTON, INC. AND F. G. LAMB CO. 803
In any event, it is clear that the union-security issue had reached the point on
September 11 where the parties had agreed to explore the possibility of having a vote
by the employees on the union shop, and the implication was present that, if an elec-
tion could be arranged, its result could or would resolve the union-security issue.?
Confirmation of the foregoing is found in Fairchild's testimony that the company rep-
resentative in the contract negotiations discussed with Vice President and General
Manager Watson the matter of a compromise of the union-security issue by subject-
ing the matter to an election. Watson said, according to Fairchild, that he had no
objection to such an approach "if we could work out a satisfactory election with
proper rules and supervision."
On September 11, as the parties were concluding this discussion, aforedescribed,
regarding union security and an election, Lott asked the conciliator to arrange an-
other meeting so that the parties could go over the contract items and be sure what
was agreed upon and what was not and get the whole thing straightened out. At that
point, Weston arose and said, "If you think that we're going to renegotiate this con-
tract you're crazy" and he started to leave. Lott asked, "What about the agreement
to drop the management rights clause?" Weston said, "Leave it out." Lott asked
about the arbitration clause and Weston said in effect that if the Union liked its
language better, that would be all right. Lott said, "What about some of the other
things?" Weston continued toward the door and he and the company people left.
Lott testified that the reason he had proposed another meeting to go over the con-
tract items was because during the negotiations sometimes one proposal or phrase
was used and sometimes another and sometimes the language was left dangling. He
gave some illustrations, e.g., the Union had agreed to withdraw its request on the
lunch period if language was written in the contract establishing an 8-hour day for all
employees where possible. "There was several things of that nature that there was
no language on." Although the parties were in agreement on arbitration, there were
two proposed clauses with some differences in language. In short, it appears there
were the initial written contract proposals of the two parties; they subsequently, in
oral discussion, substantially resolved their differences; but there was no contract
instrument reflecting the compromises and no precise ironing out of the language to
be used in the various clauses.
Around September 25 Watson was staying at a hotel in Pocatello. Hill telephoned
him and introduced himself. They discussed some aspects of the contract negotia-
tions and Hill mentioned the alternatives that had been proposed by the Union on
the union-security issue. When Hill mentioned the proposed election, Watson said,
"Well, the Company agreed to that." Hill replied that he had not yet heard from
Weston to that effect.
Between September 11 and October 8 Hill drew up a new contract instrument. He
based this draft on the notes he had taken during the course of negotiations with re-
spect to the various proposals of the Union and the Company and the agreements
reached by the parties during the negotiations. * According to Hill, the only items in
the contract proposal of October 8 that had not been previously agreed upon were
the union-shop clause; 30 days' probation period for new employees instead of 60 as
proposed by the Company; and something about one pay bracket In his October 8
letter transmitting the contract to Weston, Hill stated that if the contract was not
accepted by the Company, "you may consider all previous offers by the Union
withdrawn."
Weston replied by letter of October 10. He stated that "there are several items
included in the agreement which were not agreed upon although the contract does,
in the main, follow our counterproposal." Weston then referred to some of the
items in which he considered that there were variations, e.g., physical examination
cost, according to Weston, was to be borne by the employee and the examination was
to be every 6 months whereas Hill's proposal had 12 months; the Company, said
Weston, proposed loss of seniority after a 48-hour period whereas Hill had 72 hours;
contrary to Hill's draft, Weston said that the Company had not agreed to furnish
rubber gloves or hair nets. Weston then stated,
This, of course, verifies what we stated at the time of our last meeting. We
did not think it advisable to renegotiate all of these items again after several
months of meetings. . [After further consideration] . the Company is
not inclined to compromise on the union security clause. Since that appears to
be the principal issue, we do not see any prospects of progress in a meeting at
4 Respondent's brief states: "The Company contends that it did agree to consider the
question and to consider a proposition contemplating a vote. The Company further ad-
mits that it agreed to call the N-L-R-B- and see if it would conduct an election. . . .
804 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
this time. However, if you are willing to change your position on the items
which caused the impasse and if you are willing to concede to an open shop con-
tract, or if you insist on a further meeting, we will be willing to accommodate
upon reasonable notice.
Hill testified regarding the items mentioned in Weston's October 10 letter on which
Weston said there were variations. In substance, Hill's testimony indicated that there
were details never precisely spelled out in negotiations but that there were things on
which Weston had used such language in the negotiations as, "if that is going to be
a stumbling block . I see nothing wrong in it." One of the examples referred to
by Hill to illustrate the point was the rubber gloves and hair net matter. In the nego-
tiations, the Company said that it used to furnish such items but the thing had been
abused. The Union informed the Company of control plans in other plants that pre-
vented abuse of the furnishing of gloves and hair nets and the Company then said
that it might be worked out "and it was dropped there . there wasn't," according
to Hill, "any apparent problem . it was never brought up again .. ." and Hill
incorporated the matter in his October 8 proposal because he did not consider it a
point of disagreement or something on which the parties had deadlocked.
During this period, in response to an inquiry from the Federal conciliator, Hill ad-
vised him that the Union was very definitely interested in further meetings with the
Company.
. About October 16, Hill made a long-distance call to Watson. He asked Watson if
he had seen the Union's October 8 proposed contract. Watson said that he was aware
of the state of the negotiations and he said that Weston had a formula to submit to
the Union for the employees to vote on the union-security issue. Hill said that
was fine.
About this time the conciliator alerted the Union for a meeting that he said he
was arranging with the Company. The conciliator then called back and reported
to Hill that Weston had said he had nothing further to discuss with the Union and
did not want any more meetings.
On October 17 or 18 the Union communicated with the conciliator about arranging
a meeting with the Company. The Union was thereafter advised by the concilia-
tor that a meeting was arranged for October 23. About this time Grami, a union
representative from the regional body of the Union, came to Pocatello. On Octo-
ber 21 Lott encountered Grami talking with Weston in the lobby of a hotel in
Pocatello. Lott joined them and listened to the conversation. Weston told Grami
that he saw no great difficulty in ironing out the contract but he said the NLRB
would not conduct a union-shop election. Grami said he was sure that the me-
chanics of an election could be worked out. Lott asked Weston if he had heard
from the conciliator and Weston said no. Lott said a meeting had been tentatively
set for October 23. Weston said he could make that meeting but would be tied up
the following day.
Hill and Grami went to the plant on October 22 to arrange for the release of the
union committeemen from work for the meeting on the 23d. Fairchild said he knew
nothing about such a meeting . The morning of October 23, the conciliator called
Hill and said that on the preceding night, October 22, Weston had advised that he
would not be available for the meeting on October 23. No meeting was held.
The Union sent a telegram to Respondent on October 23, proposing that the
union-shop issue be resolved by a secret ballot election conducted by an impartial
agency, with a 662/3 percent majority of the voters necessary to establish a union
shop; eligible voters to be all present employees who worked for the Company any
time last season or present employees who worked any time during the first week of
this season's operation, the choice to be the Company's. It was stated that the
Union's October 8 proposed contract contained all essential elements previously
agreed upon during negotiations and that any minor details not previously agreed
upon "are not strike issues and can be adjusted in further negotiations or arbitration,
at your option."
Attorney Weston replied by telegram of October 24. He stated that the Company's
position was that any unsupervised informal election not conducted by the NLRB on
union security would be impractical and unfair; that the Union's proposal on eligible
voters was "unrealistic"; 8 that the Union's contract proposal had so many changes
and new provisions that new negotiations or renegotiations would be required; and
8 Respondent made no counterproposal to the Union as to the matter of the eligibility
of voters The reason for this, according to Fairchild's testimony, was that Respondent
did not know "of any logical alternative."
LAMB-WESTON, INC. AND F. G. LAMB CO. 805
that the Company had offered a 10-percent wage increase in a 3-year contract with
all conditions previously agreed upon except union security and "since this issue can.
not be resolved we do not feel obligated to make further offers."
By letter, dated Thursday, October 24, Fairchild informed Hill that since the Com-
pany's competitors had increased wages and since a wage increase had been offered
to the Union by the Company during negotiations, "we have decided to put the wage
increase into effect on Monday, October 28th, per the enclosed bulletin."
The bulletin aforementioned, to which the letter referred, was a "Notice of Wage
increase" to the employees and bore the date October 24, 1963. Uncontroverted
employee testimony established that the notice was posted in the plant on October 25.
Hill saw Fairchild's letter and enclosure on October 30 although the letter had been
received in his office on Monday, October 28. I regard October 28 as the date of
receipt insofar as the sender's responsibility is concerned. In any event, it is apparent
that the letter to Hill was no more than a courtesy note advising him of a fait
accompli and did not and was not intended to have any effect upon the October 24
notice to the employees.
In its notice of wage increase, in addition to the wage rates, Respondent stated
that, for the first 30 days of their employment, new employees would receive 10 cents
per hour less than the posted rates. This feature indicates or establishes a 30-day
probationary period of new employees. Respondent's last written contract proposal
to the Union, which was in July, provided for a 60-day probationary period during
which the employee would receive 10 cents less than the regular wage rate. The
Union's contract proposal of October 8 had provided, inter alia, for a 30-day proba-
tionary period during which the employee received 10 cents below the regular rate.
Respondent, as we have seen, had refused to meet or to negotiate further with the
Union regarding the October 8 proposal which the Union contended did substantially
reflect the parties' positions in negotiations up to and-including September 11, the
last negotiating session.
The Union struck Respondent's plant on Monday, October 28, at 7 a.m. The strike
and the picketing ended at 7 p.m., October 29. On October 28, the Company gave
Hill a copy of a letter that it had sent to all employees, to the effect that any em-
ployee who had not returned to work on or before October 31 would be replaced.9
The evidence is uncontroverted that, when employee-strikers returned to their jobs,
they each received a copy of one of the Company's "Record of Absence" slips. It
was the Company's established practice to use such slips for any absence, excused or
unexcused, noting thereon the reason for the absence. One copy of the slip was
placed in the employee's personnel file and the individual received a'copy. The
strikers' slips bore the notation, "On strike," as the reason for the absence.
When the strikers in the department of Foreman Sloan, a supervisor, returned to
work, he advised them that they had each received a pink slip for both days that they
were on strike "and I need only one more to terminate you." A leadman in the
same department reiterated the foregoing statement as coming from the foreman.'°
Fairchild testified credibly that he was unaware that the foremen had made the
foregoing statement to employees. He testified that he and the other higher super-
visors at the plant were aware that under the law employees had the right to strike
without reprisal. The witness stated that the number of pink slips that an employee
had received would ordinarily be considered with respect to possible disciplinary
action. He also said that discharge actions before becoming effective were reviewed
by Plant Manager Anderson and Personnel Manager Scott."
On December 9, 1963, Hill wrote to Scott listing items that the Union desired to
discuss, e g., working women with less seniority; employees request adequate tools in
maintenance; safety hazards such as slippery floor at specified place; and so forth.
9 The plant operated during the strike. Hill estimated that one-half to one-third of the
employees were on strike
"The strikers who were out for 2 days received two slips, one for each day.
"A company notice, dated December 28, 1961, dealt with absenteeism under company
rules. Inter alia, the notice stated:
« • s s s • «
4 It is each employees' responsibility to let the Personnel Office know as soon as
possible when be will return to work from any absence, regardless of the reason.
5. These rules must be followed . .. .
6. Violation of Company Rules is cause for loss of seniority or being dropped from
the payroll.
806 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR -RELATIONS--BOARD
The meeting was not held because of-Weston's'advice'to his-client. • Weston advised
the Union by letter of December 11 that stewards could present grievances under
the Company's regular procedure and that, if the Union wished to meet for negotia-
tions, the request should be made to Weston.
Hill wrote to Weston on December 12, 1963, requesting resumption of negotia-
tions commencing January 6 and continuing on the 7th, 8th, and 9th. The writer
suggested that if those dates were not satisfactory the Company submit alternative
dates. Weston replied on December 17 stating:
. . . It will be impossible for me to meet on any of those dates as I have prior
commitments. Since we have covered all of the items of the Union's proposal
and have negotiated for practically a year and since you have refused the com-
pany's counter-proposal thereby causing an impasse, I think your suggestion of
further bargaining is out of place.
The letter also said that since the strike had been ineffective it indicated that the
Union did not have a majority and an election was suggested.
Conclusions
In defining the obligation to bargain under Section 8(a) (5) of the Act, Section
8(d) includes and specifies that the obligation contemplates meeting "at reasonable
times." Whether the meetings are at reasonable frequency and for reasonable dura-
tion as contemplated by Section 8(d) depends upon all the circumstances in a par-
ticular case. The problem is not a new one and has been dealt with by the Board.12
An excellent statement of the standards is to be found in the Rutter-Rex case, supra:
The obligation to bargain collectively surely encompasses the affirmative duty
to make expeditious and prompt arrangements, within reason, for meeting and
conferring. Agreement is stifled at its source if opportunity is not accorded for
discussion or so delayed as to invite or prolong unrest and suspicion. It is not
unreasonable to expect of a party to collective bargaining that he display a de-
gree of diligence and promptness in arranging for the elimination of obstacles
thereto, comparable to that which he would display in his other business affairs
of importance. [Emphasis supplied.]
The parties to collective bargaining under the Act are almost universally a union
and a business organization. Business organizations are, in various phases of their
activities, both buyers and sellers of products or materials and services. They deal
with other parties in a buyer and seller relationship. It is a helpful analogy to char-
acterize the parties to collective bargaining, the union and the company, as a seller
and a buyer, or a buyer and seller, respectively. For purposes of discussion it is not
important which party is the buyer and which is the seller since at various times the
roles are interchanged in negotiating for various provisions in the contract By rea-
son of the provisions of the Act, the collective-bargaining parties are not cast in the
role of casual or mildly interested or uninterested buyer and seller. Their standard
of conduct in collective bargaining is that of a seriously interested seller and seriously
interested buyer. When such a seller and such a buyer negotiate about items that
one is seriously interested in selling and the other is seriously interested in buying,
they can be expected to display considerable diligence, promptness, and attention in
the matter of arriving at mutually agreeable terms. In viewing the conduct of the
parties to collective bargaining, we can properly appraise their conduct by using the
standard of conduct that would be displayed by seriously interested buyers and sellers
in negotiating for an agreement about matters in which they have a serious and sub-
stantial interest.
Since the March 20, 1963, meeting of the instant parties was almost wholly devoted
to some individual employee grievances, we can consider that negotiations for a con-
tract commenced on April 1. The parties negotiated for approximately 21/2 or 3
hours on that date. They tentatively scheduled the next meeting for April 15 but that
meeting did not materialize because of the unavailability of Weston. On April 25,
as on April 1, the meeting commenced at 2 p.m. and ran until 4:30 or 5 p.m. The
Union requested that meetings commence in the morning and that they be held more
frequently and for longer periods and for some successive days. Apparently the best
that was accomplished along the aforementioned lines was an agreement to meet on
12 J. H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Company, Inc, 86 NLRB 470, 506; Insulating Fab-
ricators, Inc., Southern Division, 144 NLRB 1325; "M" System, Inc, Mobile Home Divi-
sion Mid-States Corporation, 129 NLRB 527; Exchange Parts Company, 139 NLRB 710.
LAMB-WESTON, INC. AND' F. G. LAMB CO`. 807
May 13 at 10 a.m. When the union representative appeared at the appointed time
and place, no representatives of Respondents were present . Through a telephone
call to the plant it was ascertained by the -Union that Weston had been detained and
could not be present until 2 p.m. The meeting therefore commenced at 2 p.m.
Attorney Weston had advised the,Union that he would be on a trip to Europe in
June. The Union tried unsuccessfully to have further meetings in May before
Weston's departure, particularly since the parties had narrowed the issues consider-
ably by May 13. Between May 13 and July 16, however, the Union was unable to
arrange any bargaining session with Respondents . This was due entirely to Respond-
ents' refusal to meet between May 13 and June 5 before Weston went abroad and to
Respondents' refusal to meet during Weston's absence.
In the period from April 1 to July 16 Respondents devoted no more than approxi-
mately 9 hours to contract negotiating sessions with the Union . It is our opinion that
this amount of negotiation over a period of more than 3 months did not square with
the statutory standards contemplated by Section 8(d) of the Act.
I do not question the fact that Attorney Weston is a busy practitioner. It is equally
clear that people do take vacations both abroad or in this country. But using our
analogy of a seriously interested buyer and seller, it is difficult to conceive that nego-
tiations would have similarly been allowed to lapse if the matter had involved the
purchase of a plant site or essential machinery or the sale of several carloads of
products.
The terms "bargain" and "bargaining" are advisedly used in the Act. Face-to-face
negotiations are contemplated and correspondence is not a substitute therefor. In-
deed , in the instant case, the value of face -to-face bargaining is well illustrated. In
written contract proposals and in written correspondence the parties were, at various
stages, well apart in their respective positions . However, when they did sit down to-
gether, considerable progress , toward narrowing the issues and in reaching agreement
on various matters, was made. By the time of and during the course of the Septem-
ber 11 meeting both parties had contributed to effective collective bargaining. The
abrupt termination of the September 11 meeting and the refusal of Respondents to
meet at any time thereafter with the Union is, to me, almost inexplicable when we
consider the facts of the situation.
Prior to September 11 there had been three written contract proposals. The last
such written proposal was that of Respondents on July 26. During negotiations the
parties discussed the various items in the proposals . Verbally, they agreed on cer-
tain items or discussed various changes in language in certain clauses without appar-
ent disagreement or Attorney Weston would comment that something did not make
that much difference or comment in a way that was at least susceptible to the inter-
pretation that the parties were either not apart on an item or that only some phrase-
ology rather than substance was involved . In any event , by the latter part of the
September 11 meeting, when the parties had made substantial progress , the record
indicates that the progress , in the form of agreement or apparent agreement on many
items, had not been memorialized by any written drafts reflecting the various modifi-
cations discussed by the parties . The Union 's proposal that the parties meet in order
to make sure exactly what they had agreed upon and the language to be used on cer-
tain items, where apparently there was no dispute on substance , was a reasonable
proposal in the circumstances . Respondent 's termination of the September 11 meet-
ing and refusal to meet again on the ground that the Union was attempting to re-
negotiate the entire contract , was, in our opinion , inconsistent with its statutory
obligation.
Respondents were at least obliged to meet with the Union and to consider what it
was that the Union was talking about . If the parties had previously agreed on items
a through f, for example , and had agreed on the specific language of Company's
July 26 proposal regarding such items or if they had agreed to the arbitration clause
language of the Union's contract draft, and the Union , after September 11, had sought
to renegotiate all such matters, the Respondents ' assertion that the Union was trying
to renegotiate the entire contract might have been a well-taken position. But the
record does not show that such was the fact . Respondents ' impatient termination of
negotiations on September 11 and its refusal to meet thereafter is the fact.
No party to collective bargaining is obliged to indulge in endless and fruitlessly
repetitive meetings but on September 11 such a point had not been reached. The
parties had made substantial progress . The precise terms of their agreement on vari-
ous matters needed to be put down in black and white since it was clear that the
earlier written contract proposals of the Union and the Respondents did not repre-
sent the language or the modifications that each party had in mind . At least a fur-
ther meeting was required to determine what precisely each party believed repre-
sented their agreement or even lack of agreement.
808 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The situation reached on September 11 cannot be characterized as an impasse
justifying a refusal to meet again. Even on the substantive issue of union security
the positions of the parties had not calcified. Respondents had expressed their will-
ingness to consider the possibility of having the union-shop issue voted upon by the
employees. Respondents had not presented to the Union a position that said Re-
spondents will not agree to a union shop.
The events that followed the September 11 meeting have previously been described
in this Decision. In our opinion it was the parties' obligation to meet in face-to-face
negotiations during this period. Instead of or in addition to writing to the Union on
October 10 and stating their position on various contract items, Respondents should
have met with the Union and there stated their position. If no agreement could be
reached, that would have been one thing, but the refusal to meet for the purpose of
discussion foreclosed any chance of agreement short of complete capitulation by one
side or the other. Perhaps if the parties had met the Company would have insisted
on a provision that employees have a physical examination every 6 months and the
Union would have insisted on a 12-month period.13 Neither party was obliged to
agree. But if they had met across the bargaining table on this and on other matters
there was at least a possibility of reconciling their differences by one or both reaching
an intermediate position or by one side yielding to the other or even if no agreement
was reached they would have fulfilled their duty to bargain.14 Respondents' refusal
to meet with the Union in the period after September 11, in our opinion, negated
their statutory duty.
It may be that even if Respondents had met with the Union and had bargained
further the parties might not have reached agreement. They might have ultimately
been apart on union security or other matters. But, by not meeting, the collective-
bargaining process was frustrated and failure was foreordained.
While Respondents were under no obligation to agree to a union shop, they had
agreed to consider the possibility of an election on the matter. Thereafter, Respond-
ents never sat down with the Union to state why they had decided against an election
or to discuss why such an election was not feasible or to discuss why they were
opposed to the Union's proposal regarding voter eligibility. In a letter, Respondents
simply characterized the eligibility proposal as "unrealistic" and testified at the hear-
ing that it had said nothing about other eligibility standards to the Union because Re-
spondents knew of no logical alternative standard to that proposed by the Union.
This is not collective bargaining. If Respondents had changed their minds on the
matter of a union-shop election, this should have been explained forthrightly to the
Union across the bargaining table. If, after discussion, the parties had been unable
to reach a meeting of the minds, the law would compel no agreement. But Respond-
ents, in October, appear to have been more interested in proclaiming an impasse than
in fulfilling their obligation to bargain. Had the parties, commencing on April 1,
sat down and bargained out their differences with reasonable diligence and had failed
to reach agreement after fulfilling their obligation under the Act, Respondents could
properly have placed in effect the wage increase that they had offered to the Union
during the negotiations. Instead of this, however, Respondents, in the respect previ-
ously described, did not fulfill their obligation to bargain, but by refusing to sit down
and bargain after September 11 achieved a proclaimed impasse and placed into effect
a unilateral wage increase. It is concluded that Respondents, for, the reasons set
forth in this section of the Decision entitled "Conclusions," have violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
Having been certified as the bargaining representative of the employees in an appro-
priate unit on March 1, 1963, the Union's majority status is presumed to continue dur-
ing the certification year.15 Respondent challenged the majority status of the Union
in December 1963, pointing to the assertedly ineffective strike in October 1963. The
exact number of employees participating in the strike is not clear but, even if less than
11 See Weston's letter of October 10.
14 When one party in collective bargaining places itself and the other party in the posi-
tion of writing or having to write letters and telegrams on bargaining subjects in place
of face-to-face negotiations on such subjects the frustration of the bargaining process is
complete. Each party then finds itself in a position of making statements about its firm
position or its final offer on various items. The written word or written contract item
set forth in a letter or telegram stands bleak and inflexible but the same word or item
when uttered orally or when discussed across the bargaining table can be readily modified,
explained, or phrased more convincingly when confronted with the face-to-face reactions
of the other party.
15 Ray Brooks V. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96.
e
LAMB-WESTON, INC. AND F. G. LAMB CO. 809
a majority participated, this factor is not determinative. A predictable and foresee-
able consequence of the stringing out of negotiations and of Respondents' failure to
comply with their bargaining obligations and their granting of a wage increase to the
employees on October 25 was that there would be some undermining of the Union's
position thereby. Procrastination in bargaining, 'including a paucity of bargaining
meetings, soon leads to a tolling of weeks andmonths. When the lapse of time is then
joined by a proclaimed impasse, the frustration of the bargaining process contem-
plated by the Act is complete.is
The Pink Slips
Respondent is responsible for the statement of Supervisor Sloan to returning strikers
that they had received two pink absence slips for the 2 days that they were on strike
and that he needed only one more pink slip to terminate them. Since the strike was
activity protected by the Act, Respondent could not use or threaten to use such
activity as a factor in any disciplinary action, present or future, against the strikers.
Sloan's statement aforementioned, however, did make it clear that he would use the
record of absence by reason of strike participation as part of a dossier that could lead
to discharge.17 The statement, therefore, constituted interference with rights guaran-
teed by the Act and was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in this Decision, occurring in connection with
its business operations, previously described, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
A refusal to bargain having been found, it will be recommended that, upon request
of the certified bargaining agent, the Union, Respondents sit down and bargain with
the Union and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
Regarding the pink slips given to strikers, the General Counsel urges that Respond-
ents be ordered to discontinue preparing and filing in any personnel records a record
of the absence of employees on strike. I regard the pink slips as part of Respondents'
customary personnel procedure. They were, in fact, absence slips used in the case of
any absence, authorized or unauthorized. Strikers are absent from work when they
are on strike and there would appear to be no reason why the employer cannot record
such an absence on forms used for absences. What is to be avoided is the use or the
threatened use of such slips, in the case of strikers, in the manner that inhibits or
interferes with the exercise of employee rights under the Act. It should be made
clear to employees that participation in a lawful strike will not be considered with
respect to present or future disciplinary action and that a pink slip recording absence
due to such a strike will not count as an absence for disciplinary purposes, present or
future. I believe that pink slips issued to strikers, or, if Respondents choose, all pink
slips, should have such a notation. In addition, it will be recommended that this
matter be referred to in the customary remedial notice which it is recommended be
posted for 60 days.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees employed by Respondents at their
potato processing plant and warehouse and cold-storage plant in American Falls,
Idaho, including truckdrivers, warehousemen, and laboratory employees, but exclud-
ing office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, constitute a union appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. The Union, at all times material herein, has been and now is the exclusive rep-
resentative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
18 Cf. Kit Manufactur¢ng Company, Inc, 138 NLRB 1290, 1292-1295
11 The possibility that higher supervision might not have sanctioned such action does not
alter the impact of the statement on the employees.
810 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. From the period commencing on April 25 to July 16, 1963, Respondent has
refused to bargain collectively by failing to meet at reasonable times, including at
reasonable frequency and for reasonable duration, and in the period from Septem-
ber 11, 1963, Respondents have refused to bargain collectively in that they have re-
fused to meet with the Union for the purposes of bargaining. By refusing to bargain
with the Union, as aforesaid, Respondents are engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. By stating to strikers that two pink absence slips would count against them in
Respondents' records and that one more pink slip would result in discharge, Respond-
ents interfered with the rights of employees and have engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record, it is recommended that Respondents, Lamb-Weston, Inc. and F. G.
Lamb Co., their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers Union, Local No. 983, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of all
employees at the American Falls, Idaho, plants, in the appropriate unit as found in
this Decision.
(b) Informing employees who participate in lawful strikes that absence slips given
to them recording their absence as strikers will be used against them for disciplinary
purposes at any time.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men & Helpers Union, Local No. 983, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, as exclusive representative of all
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Inform participants in the October 1963 strike as well as other employees that
absence slips given to participants in strikes or other activity protected by the Act will
not be used for disciplinary purposes at any time.
(c) Post at its place of business in American Falls, Idaho, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." i8 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 19, shall, after being duly signed by Respondents' representative,
be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for at least
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees customarily are posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other
material.
(d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of
this Decision, what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith.19
1e If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "Pursuant to a Deci-
sion and Order" shall be substituted for the words "as Recommended by the Decision of
a Trial Examiner". in the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of the
United States Court of Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution
of the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for
the words "a Decision and Order "
19 If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified
to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondents have taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
As recommended by the Decision of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, we are posting this notice in conformity with the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 983, International Brotherhood of
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 811
Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen & Helpers of America , as the law re-
quires. This union is the exclusive bargaining representative of the following
employees in the appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees employed at our potato proc-
essing plant and warehouse and cold -storage plant at American Falls, Idaho,
including truckdrivers , warehousemen , and laboratory employees , but ex-
cluding office clerical employees , guards, professional employees, and
supervisors.
WE WILL NOT consider for disciplinary purposes any notice of absence slip
that any employee who participated in the October 1963 strike may have received.
All our employees are free to remain or to become members of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union , Local No . 983, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen & Helpers of America , or any other union,
and they are free not to join any union unless at some time a valid union -shop con-
tract may be executed by us with a union.
LAMB-WESTON, INC. AND F. G. LAMB CO.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 327 Logan
Building, 500 Union Street, Seattle, Washington, Telephone No. Mutual 2-3300,
Extension 553, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions.
General Electric Company and Hanford Atomic Metal Trades
Council , AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Case No. 19-RC-3440. Septem-
ber 3, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a petition duly filed on May 25, 1964, a hearing was held be-
fore Hearing Officer Harold D. Kessler, on June 19, 1964. The Hear-
ing Officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial
error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Fanning and Jenkins].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent employees of
the Employer.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Sections
9 (c) (1) and 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons :
Petitioner seeks a unit of 27 motor messengers, mail handlers, and
addressograph operators employed at the Employer's Hanford proj-
ect. The Hanford project is operated by the Employer for the Atomic
148 NLRB No. 80.