Lake Norman Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 4, 1998

No. 74628372 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 4, 1998)

Hearing: Paper No. 13
August 14, 1997 GDH/gdh
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT CITABLE
AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB 6/4/98
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Lake Norman Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc.
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Serial No. 74/628,372
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John C. Kerins of Kerkam, Stowell, Kondracki & Clarke P.C. for
Lake Norman Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc.
Sue Carruthers, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 108
(David Shallant, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Cissel, Quinn and Hohein, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Hohein, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Lake Norman Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., located in
Cornelius, North Carolina, has filed an application to register
the mark "THE TRUCK CENTER OF THE SOUTH" for "vehicle dealership
services".1
Registration has been finally refused under Section
2(e)(2) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(2), on the
ground that, as applied to applicant's services, the mark "THE

1 Ser. No. 74/628,372, filed on February 1, 1995, which alleges dates
of first use of October 1994.
Ser. No. 74/628,372
2
TRUCK CENTER OF THE SOUTH" is primarily geographically
descriptive of them.
Applicant has appealed. Briefs have been filed and an
oral hearing was held. We affirm the refusal to register.
As a general proposition, in order for registration of
a mark to be properly refused on the ground that it is primarily
geographically descriptive of an applicant’s goods or services,
it is necessary to establish that (i) the primary significance of
the mark is that of the name of a place generally known to the
public and (ii) that the public would make a goods/place or
services/place association, that is, believe that the goods or
services for which the mark is sought to be registered originate
in that place. See, e.g., University Book Store v. University of
Wisconsin Board of Regents, 33 USPQ2d 1385, 1402 (TTAB 1994); and
In re California Pizza Kitchen Inc., 10 USPQ2d 1704, 1705 (TTAB
1988), citing In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel
S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Provided that these conditions are met, and the goods or services
come from the place named by or in the mark, the mark is
primarily geographically descriptive.
Moreover, where there is no genuine issue that the
geographical significance of a term is its primary significance,
and where the geographical place named by the term is neither
obscure nor remote, a public association of the goods or services
with the place may ordinarily be presumed from the fact that the
applicant’s goods or services come from the geographical place
named in the mark. See, e.g., In re California Pizza Kitchen
Ser. No. 74/628,372
3
Inc., supra; and In re Handler Fenton Westerns, Inc., 214 USPQ
848, 850 (TTAB 1982). In addition, the presence of generic or
highly descriptive terms in a mark which also contains a
primarily geographically descriptive term does not serve to
detract from the primary geographical significance of the mark as
a whole. See, e.g., In re Cambridge Digital Systems, 1 USPQ2d
1659, 1662 (TTAB 1986); and In re BankAmerica Corp., 231 USPQ
873, 875 (TTAB 1986).
Applicant, in its initial brief, states that it "is a
vehicle dealership that sells trucks, vans, conversion vans,
minivans and automobiles to the public." While admitting that it
"is located in Cornelius, North Carolina, which is near Lake
Norman and Charlotte, North Carolina," applicant contends that
the mark "THE TRUCK CENTER OF THE SOUTH" is not primarily
geographically descriptive of its services because "only one
component of the overall mark is [even] arguably geographic in
nature" and, applicant maintains, that component, namely, the
words "THE SOUTH," does not form the dominant portion of its
mark. Applicant consequently insists, in light of the word
"primarily" in the statutory prohibition of Section 2(e)(2), that
"[a] mark cannot be primarily geographically descriptive where,
as here, a part of the mark that is admitted [by the Examining
Attorney] to be of at least equal prominence to the alleged
geographically descriptive term is not in any way geographically
descriptive." Applicant, however, notably fails to cite any case
law or other authority to support its position, which is plainly
contrary to one of the general principles mentioned above.
Ser. No. 74/628,372
4
Applicant also contends, in any event, that the
Examining Attorney has not established that the phrase "TRUCK
CENTER" is merely descriptive of applicant’s services and hence,
when combined with the geographical component formed by the words
"OF THE SOUTH," results in a primarily geographically descriptive
mark. Specifically, viewing the mark "THE TRUCK CENTER OF THE
SOUTH" in a vacuum and not in relation to the meaning which such
mark would have when used in connection with vehicle dealership
services,2 applicant argues that:
"Truck Sales Center" might be a more
descriptive or generic recitation of the
services, but the component of the mark at
issue, "Truck Center", could be associated
with any number of different services related
to trucks, such as might be found at a truck
stop or a truck maintenance or repair
facility. At best, "Truck Center" is
suggestive of the services offered by
Applicant, in that it would take a degree of
imagination to connect "Truck Center" with
vehicle dealership services, and not with one
of the many other possible uses of the mark.

2 It is well settled that a term or phrase is considered to be merely
descriptive of goods or services, within the meaning of Section
2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), if it immediately
describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic or feature thereof or
if it directly conveys information regarding the nature, function,
purpose or use of the goods or services. See In re Abcor Development
Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 217-18 (CCPA 1978). It is not
necessary, however, that a term or phrase describe all of the
properties or functions of the goods or services in order for it to be
considered to be merely descriptive thereof; rather, it is sufficient
if the term or phrase describes a significant attribute or idea about
them. Moreover, whether a term or phrase is merely descriptive is
determined not in the abstract but in relation to the goods or
services for which registration is sought, the context in which it is
being used on or in connection with those goods or services and the
possible significance that the term or phrase would have to the
average purchaser of the goods or services because of the manner of
its use. See In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591, 593 (TTAB 1979).
Consequently, "[w]hether consumers could guess what the product [or
service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test." In
re American Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
Ser. No. 74/628,372
5
Applicant, in this regard, further asserts that "the
Examining Attorney’s submission of evidence, in the form of a
very abbreviated printout of a search conducted on the NEXIS
database, confirms Applicant’s contentions, and is insufficient
to establish the descriptiveness of ’Truck Center’ for vehicle
dealership services." In particular, applicant observes that
rather than demonstrating, as asserted by the Examining Attorney,
that "many" truck dealerships use the phrase "TRUCK CENTER" in
their names, the results of the "NEXIS" search show only nine
examples in which such phrase is used "in clear correlation to
dealership services." According to applicant, that fact, as well
as the further facts that many excerpts lack meaningful context
or utilize the phrase "TRUCK CENTER" to refer to such services as
truck stop services or tow truck services, serve to "confirm
Applicant’s contention that the term ’Truck Center’ has many
other potential uses such that the term does not readily convey
the offering of vehicle dealership services, and is thus at least
suggestive of the services." Similarly, applicant maintains that
the Examining Attorney’s citation of a dictionary definition of
the word "center" as meaning "a place of concentrated activity"
does not establish that purchasers and prospective customers
would regard such term in applicant’s mark as anything other than
a suggestive appellation for applicant’s dealership services.
Applicant also urges that, "while the terms ’the’ and
’of’ do not have any independent trademark significance, they do
contribute to the overall commercial impression given by the mark
’The Truck Center Of The South’, and their presence in the mark
Ser. No. 74/628,372
6
require[s] that more than just a simple analysis of the terms
’South’ and ’Truck Center’ be conducted, as they contribute to
determining the overall prominence and meaning of those terms in
the composite mark." In essence, applicant contends that "[t]he
term ’Of The South’ does not carry the same connotation as would
the descriptive phrase ’in the South’," and thus the overall
commercial impression of its "THE TRUCK CENTER OF THE SOUTH" mark
is that of a unitary slogan which is not primarily geographically
descriptive of applicant’s vehicle dealership services. Rather,
as stated in its reply brief, applicant maintains that the "mark
suggests or implies to the consumer that the vehicle dealership
has some distinction that applies beyond its physical location."
Lastly, applicant asserts in reply that, while the
Examining Attorney made of record a definition which defines the
word "south," in relevant part, as connoting "[t]he southern part
of the United States, esp. the states that fought for the
Confederacy in the Civil War," such term lacks a geographical
significance when used in the context of applicant’s mark.
Instead, applicant contends, while the term "The South" may have
at one time "loosely connoted the states that seceded to the
Confederacy, the term survives today in the context of the war
not as a separate grouping of states within defined geographic
boundaries, but primarily as [indicating] the issues for which
the Confederacy stood." Therefore, according to applicant, "’The
South’ cannot be presumed to automatically give rise to primarily
a geographic significance, and the Examining Attorney’s evidence
fails to establish that to be the case."
Ser. No. 74/628,372
7
The Examining Attorney, on the other hand, argues that
"it is not necessary" for the geographical component of a mark
"to appear first in order for a mark to be primarily
geographically descriptive," nor need such a term otherwise form
the dominant portion of a mark, citing In re Wine Society of
America Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1139, 1142 (TTAB 1989) [affirming refusal
to register "THE WINE SOCIETY OF AMERICA" for "wine club
membership services" since "the mark as a whole is primarily
geographically descriptive of applicant’s services"] and In re
BankAmerica Corp., supra [holding "BANK OF AMERICA" for
"computerized financial data processing services" to be primarily
geographically descriptive thereof]. Thus, according to the
Examining Attorney, "[t]he fact that ’of the South’ follows ’The
Truck Center’ in applicant’s mark does not diminish the primarily
geographical nature of the mark."
Moreover, the Examining Attorney insists that, as used
in applicant’s mark:
"The South" is commonly understood as
the southeast portion of the United States,
especially the states that fought for the
Confederacy in the Civil War. As with "Truck
Center," the fact that "South may have other
meanings in other contexts does not lessen
its geographical descriptiveness in
applicant’s mark.
Case law has held that terms identifying
other broad areas of the United States are
primarily geographically descriptive.
"Midwest" was held geographically descriptive
in In re Mid-West Abrasive Co., [146 F.2d
1011,] 64 USPQ 400 (CCPA 1945) and In re
Southland Corp.[,] of Dallas, Texas, 162 USPQ
465 (TTAB 1969). Similarly, "Southwest was
referred to as geographically descriptive in
In re Allied Equipment Co., 197 USPQ 838
Ser. No. 74/628,372
8
(TTAB 1977). Like these words which identify
large regions of the United States, "South"
(particularly "the South") identifies a
specific geographical area.
Consequently, the Examining Attorney maintains that, inasmuch as
the geographical significance of the phrase "THE SOUTH" is its
primary significance, and since the area delineated by such
phrase is neither remote nor obscure, a public association may be
presumed from the fact that applicant’s services originate from
that area, given that the words "TRUCK CENTER" are merely
descriptive of applicant’s services.
Specifically, as shown by consideration of both the
previously noted dictionary definition of the term "center" and
the pertinent "NEXIS" excerpts demonstrating use of the words
"truck center" in connection with the retail selling of trucks,
the Examining Attorney asserts that, to purchasers and potential
customers of applicant’s services, "it requires no imagination to
determine the meaning of ’Truck Center’ when used in conjunction
with vehicle dealership services." A representative sample of
such excerpts is reproduced below (emphasis added):
Richard Giza, ... who had operated
Economy Car and Truck Center ..., was named
March 4 in a 143-count indictment .... --
Buffalo News, February 10, 1996 (article
headlined: "FORMER USED CAR AND TRUCK DEALER
PLEADS GUILTY TO FORGERY");
Badger Truck Center Inc., a Milwaukee
truck dealership .... -- Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, October 31, 1995 (article
headlined: "FORD NAMES 2 STATE DEALERS");
[O]wner Pat Norris thinks he has found a
solution: the Norris Auto Mall Used Car and
Truck Center.
Ser. No. 74/628,372
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The center, opening Nov. 1, will be just
west of the dealership’s Dodge showroom
....
To make room for the Used Car and Truck
Center, Norris purchased an adjacent 1.5
acres .. . ["to give] customers even more
room to comfortably shop for whatever vehicle
they want," he said.
The Auto Mall Used Car and Truck Center
will feature quality pre-owned vehicles,
Norris said. -- Plain Dealer, October 15,
1995 (article headlined: "NORRIS ADDS SPACE
FOR GROWING USED CAR, TRUCK BUSINESS");
Inland Truck Center sold Volvo trucks
and GMC delivery trucks, Anderson says. Last
week, Northland Peterbilt began selling those
lines at N910 Theirman, where Inland Truck
Center had operated. The dealership there
has been renamed Northland Truck Center, he
says. -- Journal of Business-Spokane, October
12, 1995; and
Bull Bash promotions begin today at
Dennis Dillon Auto Park and Truck Center ....
-- Idaho Statesman, September 28, 1995.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that, when
considered in its entirety, the mark "THE TRUCK CENTER OF THE
SOUTH" projects a primarily geographical connotation when used in
connection with the vehicle dealership services offered by
applicant from its place of business in Cornelius, North
Carolina. Unlike the term "DIXIE," which was held in In re Dixie
Insurance Co., 223 USPQ 514, 516-17 (TTAB 1984) not to be
primarily geographically descriptive of "property and casualty
underwriting services" in view of numerous other non-geographical
meanings for such term,3 the word "SOUTH" in applicant’s mark has
been shown, in light of the dictionary definition thereof, to

3 Although not cited in either of its briefs, applicant relied upon the
Dixie Insurance case at oral argument to further support its position.
Ser. No. 74/628,372
10
have as its sole pertinent connotation the region or geographical
area consisting of "[t]he southern part of the United States,
esp. the states that fought for the Confederacy in the Civil
War". Applicant’s speculative assertion that such term, when
used as part of the phrase "THE SOUTH," would presently be
identified "not as a separate grouping of states within defined
geographic boundaries, but primarily as [indicating] the issues
for which the Confederacy stood" is not only unsupported, but its
own advertisement (reproduced in relevant part in reduced size
immediately below),

Ser. No. 74/628,372
11
which it submitted as specimens of use of its mark, prominently
depicts a representation of such area directly beneath the words
"The South" along with an eye-catching arrow pointing to
applicant’s location. In light of such presentation, and since
we judicially notice that, for instance, The Random House
Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1987) at 1824 defines
"the South" as "the general area south of Pennsylvania and the
Ohio River and east of the Mississippi, consisting mainly of
those states that formed the Confederacy,"4 there simply is no
doubt that, not only is "THE SOUTH" the name of a place generally
known to the purchasing public, but when viewed in the above
context, the phrase "OF THE SOUTH" in applicant’s "THE TRUCK
CENTER OF THE SOUTH" mark primarily conveys a geographical
significance in relation to applicant’s services.
This conclusion, furthermore, is not diminished or
otherwise altered by the presence in applicant’s mark of the
merely descriptive, if not generic, phrase "TRUCK CENTER," which
as sufficiently demonstrated by the dictionary definition of
"center" and the pertinent "NEXIS" excerpts of record pertaining
to such phrase, conveys forthwith, as used in connection with
vehicle dealership services, a dealership which (among other
things) concentrates its activities on the sale and leasing of

4 It is settled that the Board may properly take judicial notice of
dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Hancock v. American Steel & Wire
Co. of New Jersey, 203 F.2d 737, 97 USPQ 330, 332 (CCPA 1953) and
University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.,
Inc., 213 USPQ 594, 596 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ
505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Ser. No. 74/628,372
12
trucks. While, as applicant asserts, the "NEXIS" excerpts also
show other meanings for the phrase "TRUCK CENTER," the Examining
Attorney correctly points out that the fact that a phrase may
have different meanings in other contexts is not controlling on
the question of descriptiveness. See, e.g., In re Bright-Crest,
Ltd., supra. Plainly, when viewed in the context of applicant’s
advertising, there is nothing in the phrase "TRUCK CENTER" which
is ambiguous, incongruous, indefinite or too abstract, nor would
any imagination, cogitation, mental processing or gathering of
further information be necessary in order for consumers
interested in applicant’s vehicle dealership services to perceive
precisely the descriptive significance of such phrase. Moreover,
even if the presence of the word "THE" in applicant’s mark may be
regarded as conveying to some purchasers or potential customers
of applicant’s services a notion or element of distinction among
truck centers, it remains the case that the mark "THE TRUCK
CENTER OF THE SOUTH" immediately conveys, without any speculation
or conjecture, that applicant claims to be the preeminent
dealership in the South. As such, applicant’s mark still
projects a primarily geographically descriptive connotation.
The Examining Attorney’s having satisfactorily
established that the primary significance of applicant’s mark is
geographical in that it serves to name a truck center dealership
located in the South, we further concur with the Examining
Attorney that the purchasing public would make a services/place
association. Applicant, we observe, does not contend to the

Ser. No. 74/628,372
13
contrary. We note, in any event, that regardless of whether it
can be presumed, in light of our finding that the geographic
significance of the mark is its primary significance and the fact
that the South is neither an obscure nor remote location, that
the purchasing public would believe that the vehicle dealership
services for which applicant seeks to register its "THE TRUCK
CENTER OF THE SOUTH" mark originate in the South, it is common
knowledge that vehicle dealerships are located throughout the
United States, including the South. The purchasing public,
therefore, would readily make a services/place association upon
encountering the mark in connection with the vehicle dealership
services rendered by applicant under such mark. Consequently,
and inasmuch as those services come from the South, the mark "THE
TRUCK CENTER OF THE SOUTH" is primarily geographically
descriptive of applicant’s vehicle dealership services within the
meaning of the statute.
Decision: The refusal under Section 2(e)(2) is
affirmed.
R. F. Cissel
T. J. Quinn
G. D. Hohein
Administrative Trademark Judges,
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board