Lake Butler Apparel Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 13, 1966

158 N.L.R.B. 863 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY, ETC 863
[The Board directed that the Regional Director for Region 21 shall,
within 10 days from the date of this Dnection , open aid count these
ballots ]
Lake Butler Apparel Company, Norman Stephenson, Union
County Development Authority, Robert A Driggers, Dana L
Duke, Clyde U Crews, M G Langford , S. A Bryan, C L
Brown, A E Howard, Fred L Thomas, Wilford Croft, S M
Brown, and Hal Y Maines and Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers of America , AFL-CIO. Case No 12-CA-2967 May 13,1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On September. 1, 1965, Trial Examiner Phil Saunders issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
sithin the meaning of the National Labor Relations Aci, as amended,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion Thereafter, the Respondent, General Counsel, and the Charging
Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and support-
ing briefs The Charging Party also filed a brief in support of the
Trial Examiner's Decision
The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of
the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial
error was committed The rulings are hereby affirmed The Board
has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the find-
ings,, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with
the following modifications
The Trial Examiner found, inter a7ia, that on and after April 25,
1964, Respondent Company has refused to bargain collectively in
good faith in violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act We agree, but
we would date Respondent Company's refusal to bargain from
April 19, 1964, when it first acquired knowledge of the Union's
demand at which time the Union had a majority of 37 in a unit of
73 employees
1 We agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that the Union represented a majority as
indielted by the signed authorization cards, and with his finding contrary to Respondent
Company's contention that the cards were not signed on the representation that they
would only be used for the purpose of filing a petition for a representation election
Member Brown concurs in finding that the Union represented a majority of the employees,
but does so for the reason that in his opinion the signed designation cards are the best
evidence of the signatories ' intent absent a showing of fraud or coercion
158 NLRB No 85
864 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The general rule is that an employer may, in good faith, insist on
a Board election as proof of the -union's majority, unless it is moti-
vated, not by any bona fide doubt, but rather by a rejection of the
collective-bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within
which to undermine the union .2 Here, as found by the Trial Exam-
iner, Respondent engaged in an "open gauged campaign" of flagrant
8(a) (1) conduct which was calculated to undermine the Union's
position with the employees so as to dissipate its majority status.
This conduct refutes the existence of a good-faith doubt of the
Union's majority status and establishes the illegality of Respondent's
refusal to bargain. Accordingly, Respondent Company refused to
bargain collectively within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the
Act. The mere fact that the Respondent, after notice of the filing of
the Union's representation petition, agreed to go to an election, is
hardly sufficient to overcome the clear showing of Respondent's bad-
faith motivations in the present case.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order
with the following modifications :
[1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(f) :
P (f) Refusing to bargain collectively with Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative
of all production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Lake
Butler plant, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional
and technical employees, salesmen, guards, and supervisors, as defined
in the Act."
[2. Substitute the following for the last indented paragraph of the
notice :
[WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or corece our employees in the exercise of the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
and to refrain from any and all such activities.]
8 Joy Silk Mills, Inc ., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A D C ), cert denied
341 U.S. 914; Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268, enfd . 351 F. 2d 917,
S N.C. Manufacturing Co., Inc, 147 NLRB 809, enfd. 352 F. 2d 361, cert . denied 382 U.S.
902; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., etc., 143 NLRB 848 , enfd . 341 F. 2d 750, cert . denied 382
U.S. 830; Irving Air Chute Company, Inc., Marathon Division, 149 NLRB 627, enfd 350
F. 2d 176; The Colson Corporation, 148 NLRB 827, enfd. 347 F. 2d 128, cert. denied 382
U S. 904; Drug King, Inc, 157 NLRB 343; Dye Oxygen Company, 157 NLRB 1312.
Dayco Corporation, etc, 157 NLRB 1459; Richman Brothers Company, etc., 157 NLRB
1666 Fashion Fair, Inc., etc, 157 NLRB 1645; Ben Duthler, Inc, 157 NLRB 69 Coin-
pare John P. Serpa, Inc, 155 NLRB 99.
8Traders Oil Company of Houston , 119 NLRB 746 , 750, enfd. 263 F. 2d 835 (CA. 5),
cert. denied 361 U.S. 829.
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY,--ETC. 865
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The unfair labor practice charges on which the complaint herein is based , were filed'
on June 18 and September 25, 1964. The amended complaint was issued on April 15,
1965, against Lake Butler Apparel Company, herein called the Respondent or the
Company, and the Union County Development Authority, alleging violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a)( I) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The parties.
were represented by counsel and participated fully in the hearing held before Trial
Examiner Phil Saunders in Starke, Florida, on May 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1965. The parties
also submitted briefs which have been duly considered by me in arriving at my con-
clusions and findings.
It is mainly alleged in the amended complaint that the Respondent violated Section-
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing to respond to the Union's demands for recog-
nition; that the Company canceled plans for plant expansion due to the union orga-
nizational campaign; that an employee was told that if the Union won the election
some would be replaced by Negro girls; that various supervisors of the Company
threatened employees with the closing of the plant in the event the Union won the
election; that the Company promised improved vacation benefits; that the Respondent
required 42 employees to sign stereotyped affidavits establishing the Union's respon-
sibility for the Respondent's labor difficulties; and that the Union County Develop-
ment Authority and the individual members thereof acted as an agent of the Respond-
ent, and violated the Act by informing employees verbally and through the mail that
the Company was canceling plans for expansion, and that the plant would close if
the Union was voted in.
The main and overriding issue in this case is whether or not the Union , since on,
or about April 15, 1964, has been the representative of a majority of the production
and maintenance employees at the Company for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The General Counsel and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America maintain that
under the Bernel Foam decision, 146 NLRB 1277, the Company was obligated to.
recognize and bargain with the Union notwithstanding the fact that the Union lost
the election .' Other issues concern the 8( a)(1) allegations and the standing and
responsibility of the Union County Development Authority.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Lake Butler Apparel Company is a Florida corporation which is engaged in the
manufacture of men's and boy's trousers at its plant at Lake Butler, Florida. During,
the last 12 months, this employer has shipped in excess of $50,000 worth of manu-
factured products from its plant at Lake Butler, Florida, directly to points outside the
State of Florida. I find, therefore, that the Respondent is engaged in "commerce" and
in operations "affecting commerce" as those terms are defined in Section 2(6) and
(7) respectively, of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the
Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over the
Respondent.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union„
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Events
In February 1964, the Union began its organizing campaign among the Respondent's
production and maintenance employees by securing certain authorization cards
(General Counsel's Exhibits 6, 7a through gg., 8a-b-c, 9, 10, and 19).2 By letter
dated April 15, 1964,3 the Union demanded that Respondent recognize it as the
1 Under the recent Bernet Foam doctrine a union may file a refusal - to-bargain charge
after losing a representation election where unfair labor practices have been committed.
The cards were solicited by Union Representative Arvel Culp who made calls on em-
ployees along with former employee Cecil Clemons , and by Union Representative Daisy
Pennington who was assisted on occasions by employee Eunice Griggs.
8 All dates are 1964 unless specifically stated otherwise -
221-731-67-vol. 158-56
S66' DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
collective-bargaining representative of its production and maintenance employees
(General Counsel's Exhibit 11). This letter was received by the Company on Satur-
day, April 18, but the letter was not opened until April 19, when Respondent's presi-
dent, Norman Stephenson, opened and read the Union's letter asking for recognition.
On or about April 20 the Union filed a representation petition with the Board's
Regional Director and a copy of the same was received by the Company on April 21,
1964. On April 22 the Board's Regional Office had a telephone conversation with
President Stephenson and after considerable discussions the election date of May 11
was agreed on. The Union lost the election and filed objections, and the Regional
Director's report of November 16 recommended that the May 11 election be set aside
and that a second election be conducted. On February 12, 1965, the Board issued
its decision sustaining its Regional Director's report. On April 1, 1965, the Board
ordered that the petition in Case No. 12-RC-1929 be dismissed on issuance of the
instant complaint .4
B. The demand, the unit, and the authorization cards
The General Counsel introduced 40 authorization cards into the record. As of
April 18 and 19 when the Respondent admittedly received the request for recognition
and up to the time of the election, the production and maintenance unit had 73 or 74
employees in the unit. Three employees signed their cards after the receipt of the
Union's first demand on April 15, but prior to April 25. In this respect the General
Counsel maintains that the Union's original demand for recognition on April 15 was
a continuing demand or claim for recognition and especially so when complied with
the filing of the representation petition, as aforestated, on April 20. I find nothing
in this record to indicate that the Union's demand was ever withdrawn; on the con-
trary, it also appears from the testimony of former employee Cecil Clemons and
Respondent Dana Dule (a member of the Development Authority) that the Union's
demand for recognition continued up to the time of the election. In Scobell Chemi-
cal Company, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 267 F. 2d 922, 925 (C.A. 2), where the court, assuming
that the union lacked a majority at the time of its bargaining request, found that it had
such a majority the next day and held that in the light of the strike and picketing
which there ensued, the Union's request for bargaining must be deemed a continuing
request. The instant case is somewhat like Scobell except that here, instead of striking
and picketing, the Union pursued its bargaining request through a representation
petition. See N.L.R.B. v. Burton-Dixie Corporation, 210 F. 2d 199, 200, 201 (C.A.
10), where the union lacked a majority at the time it requested recognition but where
the request was understood to be of a continuing character. In Burton-Dixie, as here,
the employer's attitude made it quite clear that a latter request would have been
futile, and the court's holding there suggests the propriety of a similar finding here.
In addition to these cases also see Gotham Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc., 149 NLRB
862. In view of the above, I am convinced, and find, that the April 15 demand was
in fact a continuing demand, and was still in effect when the Union subsequently
attained majority status. Counting 74 employees in the unit, the Union needed 38
valid authorization cards. The Respondent would include Alvin Griffis in the unit,
and the General Counsel maintains that he is a supervisor and is properly excluded.
The testimony in this record shows that Alvin Griffis trains employees in the cutting
room , directs them in their work, reports on the progress of new employees, and
effectively recommends them for wage increases . He actually supervises from four
to six employees in the cutting room and is the only supervisor who gives them orders
or directions in their work as they have no contact with Stephenson. Griffis selects
employees to work overtime or on Saturdays and also has authority to excuse absences
or lateness . Griffis can tell employees to correct or redo work, and he can also
effectively recommend the hiring of employees. It is further noted that the Company
did not include Alvin Griffis' name on the eligibility list at the time of the election
(General Counsel's Exhibit 5), nor did Griffis attempt to vote at the election under
challenge . Also during the investigation of objections in the related representation
proceeding, the Respondent admitted that Elida Stephenson, Deloris Oralls, and Alvin
'Various other documents and procedural matters of this case are contained in the
General Counsel's formal exhibits, and in Respondent's Exhibits 5, G, 7, 8, and 9
5 Clemons, who was assisting the Union in securing cards, and Duke engaged in two
conversations about the Union's campaign wherein, at Clemons' request, Duke indicated
that he would endeavor to arrange a meeting between the Company and representatives
of the Union. The first conversation took place on or about April 24, and the second
on or about April 28 or 29.
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY, ETC. 867
,Griffis were supervisors within the meaning of the Act . ( See General Counsel's
Exhibit 2, page 7, footnote 2.) However, at the hearing before me, the Respondent
would only stipulate that Elida Stephenson and Deloris Oralls were supervisors. In
accordance with the overwhelming testimony , in this ' record , I find that Griffis is a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act, and that he was also properly excluded
from the unit.
Employee Lottie Archer signed a card for the Union prior to the election, but this
card was later destroyed, and, therefore, I do not count her card. In the final analysis
here the Union secured 40 authorization cards during the relevant period in a unit of
73 or 74 employees, and which fact established and shows a clear majority.
The main and primary contention of the Respondent , however, is that many of the
employees in signing their authorization cards did not manifest an intention to desig-
nate the Union as their bargaining representative , and that misrepresentations to
employees of the various card solicitors strikes down at least four cards necessary to
defeat the Union's majority. The authorization cards in evidence are all signed, dated,
and on their face bear the printed legend:
SUBSCRIBE TO THE PROVISIONS PRINTED
ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS CARD
The reverse side of the cards contain a dues-deduction authorization and the legend
"have voluntarily accepted membership in Local Union -------- of the AMAL-
GAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, (AFL-CIO) and designate
said union as my bargaining agency in all matters pertaining to wages, hours and
other conditions of employment." The cards make no reference of any kind to a
union election . The Respondent , nevertheless , sought at the hearing to prove that at
least 15 women employees called as witnesses by Respondent were told by the union
organizers that the purpose of signing their cards was only to have a National Labor
Relations Board election . I will now as briefly as possible set forth pertinent portions
of their testimony , and the testimony of the union organizers as it relates to the signing
of the cards.
Frances Schneider, on direct examination, testified that Union Representative Culp
in securing her authorization card stated, "The card was to get an election up, and if
I'd sign, and if he had enough cards they would have an election." Schneider then
replied that Culp also informed her that this was the "only" reason for signing the
card. On cross-examination Schneider stated that Culp said the card "was for an
election," and could not remember if he said "only" for an election. Schneider testified
that she was not for the Union when she signed her card, but then later admitted that
she had attended a union meeting, and had also acted as observer for the Union at the
election. When confronted with her Board affidavit, Schneider admitted that she
had told Culp she was for the Union. Schneider further admitted that after signing
her card she told other employees that the Union would be a "good thing" and that
she wanted the Union to represent her. She also testified that Culp had talked to her
about the benefits of the Union at the time she signed her card.
Lola Thompson testified that Union Representative Culp told her that the card
she signed was "just to hold an election," and that the Union had to have a certain
number of cards signed to have an election. Thompson stated that she never desig-
nated the Union to be her bargaining representative. On cross-examination Thomp-
son admitted that Culp had mentioned paid vacations and holidays as benefits of the
Union, that she only read the front of the card, that after Culp had left she felt that
she should not have signed the authorization card as she did not want to pay union
dues, and that Culp could have stated that her card was "just" or "only" for an elec-
tion. Thompson , on cross-examination , also admittedly contradicted true statements
in her affidavit to the Board (Charging Parties' Exhibit 3)-that she had not been
expecting Culp to visit her, that she would not be tied to the Union. Thompson
admitted that she never sought to recover her card or revoke it.
Joyce Crews testified that in signing her card Culp informed her that it was only
for an election, and that she did not read "both" sides of the card. Later in her
testimony she stated that Culp had told her that the card was for an election, and
admitted she did not tell Culp that she was signing her card just for an election. Crews
also admitted that Culp informed her about the benefits of the Union, but that she
was not interested in them and did not want the Union to represent her as she was
100 percent satisfied with her working conditions.
Geraldine Griffis stated that she signed her card based on the statement by Culp
that he wanted to get enough cards to petition for an election , and that this was the
only reason she signed her card, she testified that Culp also told her that "it 's not the
card that counts-it's the vote," and that she did not read the back of the card. Later
868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in her testimony Griffis remembered that Culp had said the card was only for an
election , but admitted that Culp had told her about benefits and that she had also,
inquired if she had to pay dues.
Shirley Glover signed a union card for Culp and her husband was also present at
the time. According to Glover, Culp told her he was trying to get enough cards.
signed to have an election . She testified her husband said if it was "just for" an elec-
tion it would not hurt to sign. She testified, on cross-examination, that Culp did not
say that the only purpose of signing the card was to have an election. She further
admitted that her husband might have told her when she signed the card that the
Union would be a good thing for the plant. Glover further stated that it was possible
Culp may have also mentioned union benefits to her, and that she never tried to revoke
her card.
Willie Mae Bloodsworth initially stated that Culp had told her that the card she
signed was "for an election," but later testified that it was "only for an election," and
that this was the reason she signed her card. Bloodsworth admitted that Culp men-
tioned union benefits to her, but that she was 100 percent satisfied with the working
conditions. Her husband, a union member, was also present when she signed, but
stated that she never discussed her card with him and never discussed the Union or the
election with her husband or anybody else. She never sought to revoke her card'
though Union Organizer Pennington visited her once after the signing.
Lilla Lyons got a blank authorization card from employee Eunice Griggs and
signed it. A day or so before she signed Griggs asked her if she would sign a card
to bring the matter to an election and admittedly Culp had also talked to her about
the Union. On cross-examination Lyons admitted that she signed a union card to,
please Griggs because she (Griggs) said it would help those that wanted the Union.
Griggs told Lyons that if she did not want the Union, to sign the card to help those
that wanted it. Griggs did tell Lyons that some of the girls did want the Union, Lyons
herself did not want the Union, and said she would vote against the Union at the elec-
tion, but nevertheless signed her authorization card to help those that wanted the
Union. Lyons admitted that when Culp talked to her she did not know if he used the
word, "only" or not, and further admitted that she did not know or could not remem-
ber if Griggs used the word, "only" or not. Lyons testified that Culp discussed the
benefits of the Union with her.
Ina Claire Arnold testified that Culp told her when she signed a card that he wanted
to get enough cards so he could petition for an election and that was the only reason
Culp wanted her card. She stated that Culp did not discuss any benefits with her.
Wanda Sapp also signed a card for Culp, and stated that she did so only for an
election and that Culp had used the word "only." Sapp then admitted that Culp had'
also mentioned the possibility of paid vacations and holidays as benefits of a union,
and that she was interested in these things. Sapp further testified that though she
signed the card on February 7 she did not try to revoke her card before the election on,
May 11.
. Mildred Graham signed a card for Union Organizer Daisy Pennington while
Eunice Griggs was present. Culp had previously talked to her about signing a card,
and stated that on this occasion Culp had told her that he intended "to get" Stephensen
one way or another and that the employees were entitled to get what was coming to
them. According to Graham-Eunice Griggs then told her that the Union needed
a percentage of girls to bring the Union in for an election, and that since Eunice Griggs
was her friend she signed the card. On cross-examination Graham admitted that she
attended one or two union meetings, and that she never asked for a return of her card.
Audrey Griffis testified that Culp told her of some of the advantages the employees
would have with a union, and that signing her card was only for the purpose of getting
an election. In an affidavit given to a Board agent (General Counsel's Exhibit 24),
she did not state that Culp told her the only purpose for signing a card was for an
election. On his second visit when she signed the card, Audrey Griffis could not
remember whether he asked her to sign it or she came right out and asked him about it
Although many of Respondent's witnesses testified that there was no discussion or
mention of the Union, Griffis testified that the girls talked about the Union every day
and about the benefits the Union could obtain.
Kathryn Reddish signed a card for Culp, and stated that Culp had told her its
purpose was to get an election. Reddish admitted that Culp had also mentioned'
union benefits, and that Culp probably did not say that the card was "only" for an
election. Reddish stated that she was 100 percent satisfied with her working condi-
tions, but never tried to revoke her card.
Claudia Willis signed her authorization card for Culp and Cecil Clemons. Willis
testified she was asked at the time if she would sign the card for an election, but
admitted that union benefits were also discussed. On cross-examination Willis stated'
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY, ETC. 869
that she had been told by Culp and Clemons that her signing was for the purpose of
getting enough cards so the Union could petition for an election. She admitted that
there was "quite a bit" of discussion among the employees about the Union, and
that she never attempted to revoke her card.
Delores Holmes stated that she signed a card for Union Organizer Daisy Penning-
ton at a time when Eunice Griggs was also present at her home. She first testified
she was told the card was to have an election and "nothing else." Holmes admitted
that she, Eunice Griggs, was for the Union. She admitted that was the purpose of
Griggs coming to her home, to get her to sign a card to help the Union come into
the plant.
Q. But you knew Eunice wanted the Union to come in and represent the
employees and organize the girls?
A. Yes.
Q. In fact, when you signed the card you wanted the Union didn't you?
A. I liked what they had to offer at that time.
Former employee Daphine Griffis, called by the General Counsel, testified that
before she signed her card for Eunice Griggs, Culp told her that if she wanted the
Union to sign the card and then they would petition for an election. Griffis stated
that she finally decided to sign her card after talking with her sister, who belonged
to a union, and reading pamphlets because she "figured it be a good thing."
The General Counsel produced testimony through Union Representative Culp to
the effect that he gave all of the employees he visited the usual "sales pitch" about
the benefits of unionization, and that he often discussed also his work as business
agent with the employees. Culp stated that he told all of the employees he contacted
that the Union would petition for an election, and that the Union required no initia-
tion fees if the Union won the election. Culp admitted that all the signers did not
read the reverse side of their cards and that he did not read it to them, but he made
sure that all understood that the Union would be their bargaining representative if
the Union won the election. Culp and Clemons specifically denied that they had
told any of the employees that the only purpose of the cards was for an election, and
that neither one of them ever told employees that they were signing cards only for
such a purpose. Culp testified that none of the employees he signed told him that
they did not want to become a union member. Culp specifically denied telling Griggs
and Bloodsworth that he was "out to get Stephenson," and stated that he never met
Stephenson before the election.
Union Organizer Daisy Pennington testified that she told the employees who signed
for her and in the presence of Eunice Griggs that the cards gave the Union the right
to represent them in negotiations on wages, that she did not tell employees that the
card would be used for an election, but did state that the cards would be used to
petition for an election to allow the Union to represent them. Eunice Griggs, called
as a witness for the Respondent, testified that she told employees the purpose of get-
ting the cards signed was so they could petition for an election. On cross-examination
Griggs admitted, at least at the time she signed her own card for the Union, she was
for the Union, although at the hearing she was no longer interested in the union
(Griggs had formerly belonged to the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union at
another plant). Griggs admitted she let Daisy Pennington explain the benefits to
the employees they signed together, and also finally admitted that she did not tell
any of the employees that the purpose of the card was only for an election.
In the Englewood Lumber Company case, 130 NLRB 394, the Board refused to
count authorization cards based on the following considerations. The signatures of
two employees, who were opposed to the Union, were obtained on authorization
cards by the representation that an election would be held in which a vote could be
cast against the union as well as for it. About 10 employees testified that they were
brought to the point of signature by the belief that an election would result prior to
which opportunity for mature reflection on the question of choice would exist. The
Union's solicitor of authorization cards told practically everyone he talked to that
the cards would be sent to the Board so that a secret election could be held. The
Board stated, "In these circumstances, considering only what the employees were
told, and not what may or may not have been their subjective reaction to what they
were told, we do not think it can reasonably be said that the employees, by their act
of signing authorizations, thereby clearly manifested an intention to designate the
Union as a bargaining representative." In interpreting this decision and in applying
the rule in subsequent cases, the Board has limited this exception to situations where
an employee signs a card on the representation that the only purpose of the card is
to obtain an election . In the Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268, the
870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Trial Examiner, relying on the Board's decision in Englewood Lumber Company
case, held that 17 of the union's authorization cards were not valid for purposes of
determining majority status because the employees who signed them testified that
they were told, when they were solicited by fellow employees, that a purpose of the
cards was to secure an election. The Board'held, however, that the instant case is
factually distinguishable from Englewood Lumber. The following is quoted from
the Board's decision:
While it is true, as found by the Trial Examiner, that 17 of the signatories testi-
fied that they were told that a purpose of the cards was to secure a Board election,
it does not appear that they were told that this was the only purpose of the
cards. In this case the cards, on their face, explicitly authorized the Union only
to act as bargaining agent of the employees, and, contrary to the implied finding
of the Trial Examiner, the failure of the Union's solicitors to affirmatively restate
this authorization does not indicate that it was abandoned or ignored. Thus,
there is no evidence here to negative the overt action of the employees in signing
cards designating the Union as their bargaining agent, and the instant situation
is not one in which the Union has beguiled employees into signing union cards.
In footnote 3 to the Board's decision, it is pointed out that the solicitor of the signa-
tures on authorization cards in the Englewood Lumber case explained to almost all
the employees that the cards were only for the purpose of securing a Board election,
and thereby secured many signatures including those of two employees who were
hostile to the union. Various employees in the Cumberland case testified to the
following statements by solicitors: (1) One employee was told that the union needed
to have 80 percent of the employees signed up in order to get an election and that
it was to have an election. (2) Another employee was told substantially the same
thing and told that the purpose of the card was to secure an election. (3) Another
employee was told that the purpose of the card was to bring the union question to
a vote in an election In all, 17 employees testified that they were told when they
were solicited by fellow employees that the purpose of the cards was to secure an•
election. This testimony was undenied and credited by the Trial Examiner. One
employee testified that the talk all over the plant was about trying to get an election.
Thus, I conclude that the tests for determining whether a card should be counted'
is based, not on what an employee subjectively intended or understood, but on (1)
whether he was falsely told that the only purpose of the card was to secure an elec-
tion , or on (2) whether he was induced to sign the card by trickery or beguilement.R
In evaluating the testimony of the employees regarding any alleged misrepresen-
tations made to them at the time they signed their card, I have considered the testi-
mony of each witness as a whole. I do not consider as reliable the affirmative
answers which Respondent's witnesses gave in response to suggestive questions pro-
pounded by their counsel, where such answers appear to be in conflict with the rest
of their testimony. Thus, after testifying to what they had been told by union orga-
nizers as to the purpose of the card (e.g., to petition for an election), several of the
witnesses were then asked: "Did he tell you that this was the only reason that you
were signing the card?" Many answered in the affirmative. Yet it is clear from
their subsequent interrogation by counsel for the General Counsel that what they
meant was that what they had testified to was all that they had been told, and that
the person who had solicited them to sign did not affirmatively tell them that this
was the only purpose of the card. I believe that the truth is best revealed by that
portion of the testimony in which each witness stated in her own words what she
was told when she was asked to sign the union card.
In the final analysis here the testimony of the 15 employees called by the Company
is an incredible conglomeration of self-contradictions, inconsistencies. and subjective
conclusions adduced by suggestive questions. While on the other hand it appears
to me that the four witnesses who solicited signatures to the cards testified in a
straightforward manner . The union organizers frankly admitted and conceded that
there was talk of the possibility of an election; however, it is likewise abundantly
clear that many other statements and representations were also made to the employ-
ees. For instance, that the Union was attempting to organize the plant, that the
Union would try to get a contract, and that the Union would attempt to secure
improved benefits and working conditions-and the latter being openly admitted by
several of the Respondent's own witnesses. It is further noted and pointed out here
a See also Gotham Shoe Manufacturing Company, Inc., 149 NLRB 862; Boot-Ster Manu-
facturing Company Inc., 149 NLRB 933; Lenz Company, 153 NLRB 1399; and S.N.C.
Manufacturing Co., Inc., 147 NLRB 809.
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY, ETC. 871
that the women employees who testified for the Company are still working at the
plant, that several of them have members of their family or relatives who are also
employed by the Company, and that these witnesses were still on the clock and being
paid while testifying before me Obviously and clearly all had a definite interest in
supporting the Respondent's position at the hearing, and on my observations of these
witnesses it was evident from their demeanor that they were continuing with a pat-
tern of disavowing union activity because of fear of reprisals as pointed out by the
General Counsel.
In this case the employees signed their names to authorization cards that were clear
and expliCit.7 Coupled with this fact it is not trickery or misrepresentation to tell
employees to sign cards so that there can be a petition for an election, nor is it viola-
tive to tell them that if 51 percent sign they could have an election. There is no
convincing evidence in this record that the employees' signatures were obtained on
the promise that the cards would be used only for the purpose of filing a petition for
a representation election. The fact that the employees may have believed that an
election would be forthcoming does not offset a concurrent intention to authorize the
Union as their exclusive bargaining representative. As the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated in N.L.R B. v. Geigy Company, Inc., 211 F. 2d 553, 556, in
rejecting a contention similar to that made by Respondent here, the fact that employ-
ees may have contemplated that the authorization cards would be used in aid of a
petition for a Board election does not preclude a finding that the union was given
authority by the signed cards to represent the employees immediately for purposes
of collective bargaining. Contrary to Respondent's assertion that the employees
were unaware of the purpose of signing cards, and notwithstanding if its claim that
the Union's majority was the product of misrepresentations to the employees in which
some may not have actually read the authorization cards, the record establishes that
the employees were fully apprised of the import of the cards, and that the Union
provided them with more than ample opportunity to be advised as to their signifi-
cance. Even after subsequent ieflections as to what they had done none of the
Respondent's witnesses attempted to revoke their cards.
Based on credibility and other circumstances and factors set forth above, I find
that the Union had valid authorization cards from a majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit.
C. Interference, restraint, and coercion
The Union County Development Authority, herein called the Authority, was
created by an act of the Florida Legislature.i In recent years the Authoiity has been
active in promoting industrial development in Union County, and has actively
assisted in promoting the establishment of the apparel factory involved herein. In
1959 Stephenson met with the Authority and outlined his plans for an apparel factory.
After negotiations, the Authority loaned Stephenson $20,000 for working capital and
also constructed a factory building which it leased to the employer with an option-
to-purchase clause. The factory building and the land on which it is situated are
still owned by the Authority. Stephenson has repaid more than half of the loan
which he obtained when the plant was established. In the fall of 1963 when Stephen-
son wanted to expand his plant he asked the Authority for additional funds, and at
a meeting of the Authority on April 13, 1964, the members approved a loan of
$37,000 to Stephenson for expansion purposes.
It is undisputed that Stephenson appeared before the Authority at its meeting on
April 27, 1964, and canceled his expansion plans granted on April 13, as aforestated.
At the hearing before me the Company maintained that this cancellation was other
than for union purposes or activity. Stephenson and several members of the Author-
ity who testified all stated that the loan was canceled because the Company did not
want to tie up Authority funds which could be used elsewhere, and supposedly no
member of the Authority questioned Stephenson as to why he was not proceeding
7In N.LR.B. V. Peterson Brothers, Inc., etc., 342 F. 2d 221 (CA 5), the court clearly
restricted its limited holding to situations where the cards are ambiguous on their face.
We are not faced with such circumstances in the instant case.
9 The Authority consists of 12 members 7 of whom are ex officio members by virtue
of other public offices which they hold. These seven ex officio members are the five
county commissioners of Union County, the clerk of the Circuit Court of Union County,
and the county attorney. The remaining five members are citizens who are appointed
by the Governor of Florida. It is duly recognized that the Authority has no right to
hire and fire employees, or in any way direct the physical working operations at the
company plant.
872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with his own plans , no member asked him if his decision was irrevocable, no one
mentioned the Union , and no one could remember any other topic discussed at the
meeting Hal Mames, a member of the Authority and a Respondent herein , testified
that he and the other members were satisfied with "conditions like they were," that
"we were getting along all right ," that they wanted the plant to continue operating
without a union Authority member and Respondent Clyde Crews testified that the
members of the Authority felt that the Union's organizing "maybe was one of the
principal reasons" for canceling the plant expansion plans Crews only admitted
that he and other members of the Authority knew that the Union was trying to orga-
nize the plant Authority member and Respondent S M Brown denied that Stephen-
son made any reference to the Union at the meeting on April 27 but admitted that
his Board affidavit (General Counsel's Exhibit 22) was true and correct when he
signed it, and the relevant portion reads "A few weeks later Mr Stephenson met
with the Authority again and I was present He advised us that he wanted to cancel
his request for a loan He stated that he wanted to wait and see if he could still
operate if the Union came in' Brown then ventured that this statement was his
own individual opinion Authority member and Respondent Dana Duke testified
that at the meeting in question Stephenson merely stated that he would like to with-
draw his loan request, but in his affidavit (General Counsel's Exhibit 21), and which
he admitted was correct Duke stated as follows
He advised us that he wanted to withdraw his request for the loan He stated
that it looked like the Union was trying to come in and that he wanted to wait
and see what the Union did before he decided whether to expand his plant or
not Mr Stephenson further stated that he did not feel that he could operate
under a Union I do not recall him saying that he would close the plan if the
Union came in, but we more or less took this for granted Mr Stephenson did
not state any other reason for canceling his request for the loan 9
It is undisputed that on or about May 7, 1964, the Authority mailed out a letter
on their own stationery to all the employees The letter (General Counsel's Exhibit
20), was prepared by Authority member and Respondent Robert Driggers, and all
the members of the Authority consented to the letter Prior to the mailing Stephen-
son at Driggers' request, furnished Driggers with a mailing list of his employees,
and Stephenson also requested that a lawyer check over the letter before it was sent
out The letter in part states that Stephenson had withdrawn his request for expan-
sion funds, and that "it is the opinion of this Authority that the unsettled labor con-
ditions is the apparent reason Mr Stephenson withdrew his request for expansion
funds " The letter further stated, "If for any reason the cost of operation here
should increase so that it is not profitable, the Apparel Company will discontinue
their Lake Butler operations " Authority Member Crews testified that the May 7
letter went out because the Authority was concerned about "protecting our investment
in the plant " According to Crews, the Authority members felt that they should give
Stephenson "whatever aid that we could give him in regards to this union affair,"
and that "we didn't want a union in there we didn't feel that it would be a good
thing for our community " According to Authority Member C L Brown, the
May 7 letter was intended to discourage employees from voting for the Union, and
that "we might ought to encourage the Union not to come in at that time if we could
by our words and actions "
This record also shows that the May 7 weekly edition of the Union County Times,
a local county newspaper, carried a front page news item about Stephenson's cancel-
lation of his request for expansion funds and further carried an editorial attacking
the Union (General Counsel's Exhibit 15) Authority Member Driggers gave this
information to the newspaper Stephenson admitted that he saw the newspaper
article and the editorial when published, but there is no testimony that he disavowed
either of them in any way Stephenson testified that on April 27 he overheard Dng-
gers discuss the proposed Authority letter, as aforestated, with Editor Powell of the
local newspaper
Union adherent Cecil Clemons, a former employee, testifie d that on or about
April 24, Authority Member Duke visited him at home and told him that at a recent
meeting of the Authority, Stephenson said that he wanted to cancel his plant expan-
sion loan, and that he would probably move his plant out of Union County if the
*The aforementioned affidavits introduced into this record are only relied on to show
the inconsistencies between statements in the witnesses ' testimony and those made in
their affidavits
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY, ETC. 873
Union got into the plant. Duke, in his testimony, could not recall his exact words
but admitted that he told Clemons that if the Union got into the plant, Stephenson
probably would not be able to operate.
Duke admitted that members of the Authority had an "informal understanding"
that he and another Authority member, A. E. Howard, would talk to employees
about the Union. Duke further admitted that he also spoke to employee Bloods-
worth and told her about the same thing he told Cecil Clemons. Authority Member
A. E. Howard admitted in his testimony that he had visited employees Gainey and
Redding before the election and told them that neither the Union nor the Authority
could guarantee that the plant would stay in business, that if the plant closed it
would be an economic loss to the whole community, and Howard also told these
employees about strikes by other unions. Authority Member Crews testified that he
told some of the employees the Union would be a hindrance in bringing in new indus-
try into the county, and former employee Mary Gomillion testified that Authority
Member Maines told her at church the day before the election that if the Union
"comes in here we could stand to lose quite a bit." Maines did not deny this testi-
mony. Authority Member Driggers testified that he told three employees before the
election that "if the operating costs went up for any reason that it was no longer
profitable in my opinion that Lake Butler Apparel Company would close." Driggers
further admitted that he also informed employees before the election that it would
be for the best interest of Union County to vote "No" on the question of union
activity.
Agency is a contractual relationship, deriving from the mutual consent of principal
and agent that the agent shall act for the principal. But the principal's consent,
technically called authorization or ratification, may be manifested by conduct, some-
times even passive acquiescence as well as by words. Authority to act as agent in a
given manner will be implied whenever the conduct of the principal is such as to show
that he actually intended to confer that authority. Also a principal may be respon-
sible for the act of his agent within the scope of the agent's general authority, or the
scope of his employment if the agent is a servant, even though the principal has not
specifically authorized or indeed may have specifically forbidden the act in question.
It is enough area within which the agent acted.10 In the light of these general prin-
ciples of agency, I will now consider the circumstances and facts involved in this
phase of the case.
First of all it is noted that the Authority owns the land and plant facilities of the
Company, periodically loans money or working capital to the Company, and fully
cooperated and assisted in defeating the Union at the election. The Respondent fur-
nished the Authority with a list of all names and addresses of its employees so that
the Authority could mail out its letter of May 1,11 and Stephenson knew that at least
some of the members of the Authority were going around to employees and speaking
to them against the Union 12 Stephenson also admittedly knew that the newspaper
articles were published in the local county paper, and although Stephenson sent a letter
to the Authority asking them not to contact any employees (Respondent's Exhibit 3-
dated May 5), he did absolutely nothing in contacting the employees to repudiate,
explain, or disavow to them any of the actions and visitations of members of the
Authority and the newspaper articles, all of which he had knowledge and was well
aware of. The record in this phase of the case shows a clear responsibility devolved on
the Company to disavow to the employees the actions of the Authority.
In concluding here it is finally noted that the Lake Butler community is a rural area
dominated by farmers and businessmen who largely constituted the membership of
the Authority, and in view of the control and influences exercised by the Authority
10 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, CIO (Sunset Line and
Twine Company), 79 NLRB 1487, 1507-1508.
u All members of the Authority endorsed the May 7 letter, and in view of the close
business relationship between the Authority and the Company, which relationship the
letter also reflected, the employees had every right to assume that both the letter and
the clear implications it expressed were authorized by the Respondent. The failure to
disavow the letter in any way would be enough to create joint liability, but the record
here shows that Stephenson also furnished a mailing list to the Authority and further
requested that an attorney and Authority Member Maines check the letter before it
went out.
v Admittedly Duke called Stephenson about his conversation with Cecil Clemons, as-
aforesaid . Supposedly Stephenson also told Duke and other members of the Authority
not to act on his behalf, but Stephenson admittedly did not make this statement to the
members as a group nor did he tell any employees.
8 74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
membership its efforts on Stephenson's behalf were most effective. In accordance
with the above I find that by the Respondent' s silence to its employees, under the
circumstances detailed above, the Respondent impliedly ratified or passively acqui-
esced, and is therefore responsible for the activity and statements of the Authority
and its members.13 It has been well established that it is violative of the Act for an
employer or its agent to threaten to close its plant or to cancel expansion plans in
the event of unionization. In this case such threats of reprisal were clearly implied.
The remaining allegations in the complaint pertain to statements and actions of
Stephenson himself, and other supervisors within the Company. Mary Gomilhon
credibly testified that a week before the election the Respondent's vice president
and secretary, Elida Stephenson, told her that "if the Union came in that the colored
girls which was doing pressing jobs then would want a job out on the sewing
machines which they didn't have at that time," and that Elida Stephenson further
told her that the Company could not afford to pay union wages and was under no
law to keep the plant operating. Stephenson was not called as a witness-by Respond-
ent and hence this testimony attributed to her stands uncontradicted in the record.
Delores Holmes gave reliable testimony that before the election Supervisor
Deloiis Oralls told her that, "If the plant was to close down that there would be a
lot of us out of work, including herself " Although Respondent admitted that Oralls
was a supervisor she was not called as a witness to deny this testimony attributed to
her by Holmes.
Wilton Hart credibly testified that shortly before the election on May 11 the
Respondent's supervisor, Alvin Griffis, told Hart that "If you boys keep pushing
this Union and vote it in, Mr. Stephenson will close up." On May 8 Alvin Griffis
again told Hart that he knew Stephenson was going to close up if the employees
voted for the Union, and on a third occasion Griffis informed Hart that Stephenson
was not going to keep the plant open if the Union went in. Griffis, in his testimony,
stated that he told Hart that he did not think the Union would go in and that Stephen-
son was not financially able to support the burden of the Union. Griffis admitted
that he told Hart it was possible the plant would close
Perry Hart, Jr., credibly testified that before the election Supervisor Alvin Griffis
told him that Stephenson would close up and leave if the Union came in, and also
stated that if the Union was successful "we'll all be out of a job" On May 11,
before the election, Griffis told Hart, Junior, that he (Griffis) could not vote in the
election but that he (Hart) should do the best thing for all of the employees.
General Counsel's Exhibit 16 contains the speech given by Stephenson to the
employees a few days before the election . The speech consists of six typewritten
pages, and there is no testimony in this record that Stephenson went beyond the
statements contained in the written text. As a preface to his speech Stephenson
informed employees to a rumor that the plant would close down if the Union came
in, and impressions left by the Union that the Company could not close its plant
for any reason once it was organized. Stephenson told employees that the Company
could not close in retaliation against the Union, but he then stated that there was no
law which forced the Company to make parts at Lake Butler or anywhere else.
He continued to explain that there could be "economic reason, reasons of poor
health and a good many other reasons why a person can legally close their business
" Stephenson proceeded to tell the employees that if the Company had to give
in Lake Butler it still had a good business to fall back on, and that they had "not
put all our eggs in one basket," and then outlined his various merchandising opera-
tions which he had going and which he could develop into a profitable enterprise
with a little extra effort. He finished this portion of his talks by stating, "So, when
they tell you that we are hog tied to the business and would or could not ever leave
it, they are not telling you the truth." Stephenson went on to tell the employees that
the profit margin was only a matter of a few pennies on a pair of pants and on occa-
sions the Company had operated at no profit just to keep the employees working.
He stated that increased wages could come only from increased profits and not from
the Union, and that the Union could really only promise that the employees would
have to pay dues. Stephenson ventured that the reason the Union wanted to organize
the plant was to get even with him, and advised employees that practically all similar
' Waynline, Inc., 81 NLRB 511; Byrds Manufacturing Corp., 140 NLRB 147, enfd. 324
F. 2d 329 (C.A. 8). Cases cited and holding to the contrary are clearly distinguished
by their facts
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY, ETC. 875
apparel plants in several of the Southern States were nonunion. Stephenson closed
out the speech by urging employees to vote in the election, and to vote "No."
The principal issue here is whether Stephenson's speech contained any innuendoes
or subtleties which had the effect of creating or stimulating the fear that the plant
would close if the Union was voted in. In the final analysis here it is noted, as also
recognized by the Regional Director's report on objections to the election, that a con-
siderable portion of the speech dealt with the subject of plant closure and the matter
of business alternatives which were open to Stephenson if he closed the Lake Butler
plant. I agree with the Regional Director's conclusions that such emphasis, when
,considered together, with the remainder of the speech which stressed the narrow
profit margin, the fine competition in the business, and the clear inference that Ste-
phenson was already giving the employees all of the benefits he could afford, was
sufficient to convey the idea that it would be futile for the employees to seek addi-
tional economic benefits through a union, and that costs of any additional benefits
would force the Company to close the plant. It appears clear to me that by this
speech the Respondent effectively conveyed to its employees the impression that the
continued operation of the plant was linked to their rejection of the Union. Repeated
references to the general status and conditions in the apparel industry and the small
profits involved was clearly designed to impress on employees the fear of the
plant closing if the Union was voted in. This is in no way to say that the Company
could not refute and correct any misleading or deceptive union statements. How-
ever, it seems clear to me that Stephenson did not merely seek to covert such state-
ments, but chose, also, to emphasize its ability to close the plant, and the remainder
of Respondent's other business ventures or "eggs" in other baskets could only serve
as an implied threat to employees clearly violative of Section 8(a)(1) that their
selection of the Union would probably result in the closing of the plant, and I so
find.14
This record further shows that on or about May 22, the Respondent and its super-
visors required 42 employees to execute form affidavits purportedly showing that the
Company did not interfere with the holding of the election 15 The evidence further
shows that these affidavits were taken under coercive circumstances with supervisors
being present, employees told to report to the office or taken to the courthouse to
sign the affidavit. Moreover, the record is clear that the affidavits were already
prepared for employees beforehand. Although Stephenson testified that his purpose
in obtaining the affidavits was to support his position in the objection case, the
record fails to disclose that Respondent complied with the standards or criteria for
the taking of employee affidavits set forth in Johnnie's Poultry Co, 146 NLRB 770.
Thus, there is no showing that the Respondent communicated to all employees the
purpose of the questioning, nor assured them that no reprisals would be taken, nor
obtained participation on a voluntary basis. The questioning must also occur in a
context free from employer hostility to union organization , must not be itself coer-
cive in nature, and the questions must not exceed the necessities by prying into other
union matters; e g ., eliciting information ,concerning an, employee's subjective state
of mind. It is evident from the record that Respondent did not comply with the
Board's safeguards in the instant case and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1).
The foregoing instances that have been credited to the Company and the Devel-
opment Authority include numerous and repeated threats on many occasions to close
or move the plant, canceling plant expansion plans, a threat by Elida Stephenson that
some of the employees would be replaced, a threat by Supervisor Oralls that employ-
ees would be out of work, and the taking of 42 form affidavits from employees with-
out adequate safeguards.16 This conduct on the part of the Company and its agent,
the Development Authority, constitutes violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
14 There is ample authority to the effect that statements on the part of management
to employees that it might be necessary to close the plant, made during a period when
unionization of its employees was sought to be effected , must be regarded as coercive,
notwithstanding sincere belief that such result would follow. United Fireworks Mfg. Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 252 F. 2d 428, 430 (C.A. 6). Accord: N.L.R.B. v. Tru-Line Metal Products
Company, 324 F. 2d 614, 616.
is General Counsel's Exhibit 18.
16 There is insufficient evidence to show that the Company illegally promised employees
improved vacation benefits if they repudiated the Union . This particular allegation is
hereby dismissed.
876 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. Final conclusions in respect to the 8 (a) (5) allegations
Normally, an employer may insist on a Board-conducted election . Such an elec-
tion conducted in a "laboratory atmosphere " is the most accurate and secret method
for determining the employees ' true desires , although it is not the only method.
Where an employer has destroyed the "laboratory atmosphere" by unfair labor prac-
tices, calculated to affect the Union 's majority and the outcome of the election, as
here , the Board has held that this conduct , by its nature and timing , colors an:
employee 's expression of good -faith doubt, and has recognized an alternative method'
of determining a Union 's majority status-by a count of signed authorizations. The
Respondent argues, however , that since it consented to an election , agreed to an,
early date for an election , and otherwise cooperated with the Board in working out
the details of the election , it was thereby relieved of its duty to recognize the Union!
as the Company did not insist on an election to gain time in which to dissipate the
Union's majority.
A brief recapitulation of events shows that Stephenson admittedly made no reply
to the Union 's demand letter . This demand letter from the Union stated as follows:
Please be advised that the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, has been designated by a majority of your production and maintenance
employees as their collective bargaining representative.
We are prepared to prove our majority by submitting our authorization cards
to a mutually agreeable third party provided that under no circumstances the
names will be revealed of those employees who signed cards. We therefore
request at this time an appointment to meet with you at your earliest conven-
ience in order to arrange for a card check , and also to commence collective
bargaining negotiations.
I shall expect to receive a reply from you within the next three days.
Stephenson testified that before he could answer the Union 's demand letter for recog-
nition he received the petition for an election . It appears to me that regardless of the
time elements between the demand letter and the petition , and whatever implications•
the Company draws from these documents , overriding considerations must be the
events and the happenings in the interval between the demand and the election. The
fact that an employer consents to an election is of course one element which tends.
or may be indicative of a.good -faith desire to allow the Board's election machinery to
resolve the question . However, in order to determine the validity of a claim of good
faith , the Board looks to the employer's entire course of conduct 17 An employer who
fails with good reason to respond to bargaining requests of a union which represents
a majority of its employees , and embarks , instead, on a course of improper conduct
which is either calculated to or tends to destroy that majority, does not demonstrate the
good faith required to justify its failure to bargain . It should also be noted here again
that under Board decisions any doubts by the employer , such as suspicion that his
employees have been stampeded into joining the union, would not justify the employer
in refusing to deal with the union in the meantime . At the time the Union requested
recognition the Company was notified as follows: "We are prepared to prove our
majority by submitting our authorization cards to a mutually agreeable third'
party .... The Company did not avail itself of this opportunity to so check the
cards, nor did the Company then question the Union 's asserted majority or propose
any method to prove majority . The Company 's profession of a bona fide doubt is of
course further and conclusively refuted by its resorting to the illegal and violative
8(a) (1) conduct as previously detailed herein , and in this respect sufficient to bring
these violations within the Board 's Joy Silk Mills doctrine . As proven by the sus-
tained and open-gauged campaign of the unfair labor practices engaged in by
Respondents , which served as the basis for setting aside the election herein , the Com-
pany's rejection of the Union 's claim to representative status was made not because of
the good-faith doubt as to the Union 's majority but in order to gain time in which to
dissipate that majority.
Having found that the Union represented a majority of Respondent 's employees
in an appropriate unit on April 25, 1964, and made a proper request for recognition
and bargaining , which Respondent declined, and having found that Respondent 's ques-
tioning of the Union's majority is for the reasons stated herein , not advanced in good
17 It is well established that a union's filing of a representation petition does not itself
suspend an employer' s bargaining obligation, absent evidence of a good-faith doubt
Galloway Hanufacturing Corporation, 136 NLRB 405, 409, and cases cited therein See
also Crown Tar and Chemical Works, Inc, 154 NLRB 502.
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY, ETC. 877
faith, I find that Respondent has refused to bargain collectively in good faith in viola-
tion of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The operations of the Respondent, described in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the unfair labor practices above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions and upon the entire
record in this case, I make the following.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent and its agent, the Development Authority, have
-engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that they cease and
desist therefrom and that the Company bargain collectively with the Union, upon
request, and that it post appropriate notice to employees as provided in the Recom-
mended Order set forth below, which is found necessary to remedy the unfair labor
practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Lake Butler plant,
but excluding all office clerical employees, professional and technical employees,
salesmen, guards, and supervisors constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. The Union has been at all times material herein, and is now, the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. Commencing on April 25, 1964, and continuously thereafter, Respondent has
refused to recognize and to bargain collectively with the Union, thereby violating
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
6. Respondent and its agent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, thereby violat-
ing Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions, and upon the entire record
in this case, it is recommended that Lake Butler Apparel Company, its officers, agents
(Union County Development Authority), successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to close or to move its Lake Butler plant as a consequence of union
activity or affiliation.
(b) Threatening to, and canceling, plant expansion plans as a consequence of
union activity.
(c) Threatening employees with replacements because of union activity.
(d) Threatening employees with loss of work because of union activity.
(e) Illegally requiring employees to sign affidavits without proper regards for
their statutory rights under the Act.
(f) Refusing to bargain collectively with Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all production employees at
its Lake Butler plant, exclusive of office and clerical employees, and all guards,
professional and technical employees, salesmen, and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2 Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named union as exclusive
representative of all employees in the above-described bargaining unit, and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
878 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Post at its Lake Butler plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 18 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 12, shall, after being signed by a managing representative of the Respondent,
be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days of the receipt of
this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.'°
Is In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. If the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a united
States Court of Appeals the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the
words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the
words "a Decision and Order."
m In the event this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall
be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in writing, within
10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the collective-bargaining representative of
all our employees in the unit described as follows:
All production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Lake Butler
plant, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional and technical
employees, salesmen , guards, and supervisors as definer in the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close or move our Lake Butler plant as a conse-
quence of union activity or affiliation.
WE WILL NOT threaten' or cancel plant expansion plans because of union
activity.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with replacements because of union activity.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of jobs or work.
WE WILL NOT require employees to sign affidavits without proper safeguards
to their statutory rights.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, and to refrain from any
and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
All of our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
LAKE BUTLER APPAREL COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other mateiral.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fed-
eral Office Building, 500 Zack Street, Room 706, Tampa, Florida, Telephone No.
228-7711.