Laboratory Equipment Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 1, 1964

146 N.L.R.B. 1247 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

LABORATORY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, ETC. 1247
CIO, shall notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-seventh
Region, in writing, whether it will or will not refrain from forcing or
requiring the Employer, by means proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (D),
to assign the work in dispute to carpenters rather than lathers.
Laboratory Equipment Corporation ; Carl E . Schultz, Joseph A.
Sauer, and George J. Krasl , a Co-partnership , d/b/a Leco
Plating Company and District Lodge 39 of the International
Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO. Case No. 7-C.g-4213,
May 1, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 20, 1963, Trial Examiner Sydney S. Asher, Jr., issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. There-
after, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed cross-
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the General Counsel's exceptions and brief, the
Respondent's cross-exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions , and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
On May 1, 1963, District Lodge 39 of the International Association of Machinists,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , filed charges against Laboratory Equipment
Corporation , St. Joseph , Michigan , herein called Respondent Corporation , and Carl
E. Schultz, Joseph A . Sauer, and George J . Krasl, a co -partnership , d/b/a Leco
Plating Company , St. Joseph , Michigan , herein called Respondent Partnership. The
General Counsel i issued a complaint on June 12, 1963 , alleging that since on or
about March 22, 1963, the Respondents , by certain specified conduct , have interfered
with , restrained , and coerced their employees , and that Respondents discharged Walter
Lausman, an employee , on April 4, 1963 , and since then have failed and refused to
reinstate him, because he joined or assisted the Union or engaged in other concerted
1 The term "General Counsel " refers to the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and his representatives at the hearing.
146 NLRB No. 160.
744-670-65-vol. 146-80
'1248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
activities . It is alleged that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) and ( 3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended ( 6.1 Stat. 136), herein called the Act.
Thereafter each of the Respondents filed a separate answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint.
Upon due notice , a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Sydney S. Asher, Jr.,
on September 25 and 26, 1963, at St . Joseph , Michigan . All parties were represented
and participated fully in the hearing . At the close of the hearing , the Respondents
jointly moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of proof. Ruling thereon was re-
served . A recommendation with regard to the disposition of this motion is contained
herein . A brief was filed by the General Counsel and a joint brief was filed on behalf
of both Respondents . These briefs have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in this case , and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDING OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent Corporation is a Michigan corporation . Its only . place of business
is located in St. Joseph , Michigan , where it is engaged in the manufacture , sale, and
distribution of scientific instruments and related products . During the year ending
December 31; 1962 , Respondent Corporation purchased materials valued at more
than $ 50,000, which were delivered to its St. Joseph , Michigan , plant directly from
sources outside the State of Michigan . During the same period , Respondent Cor-
poration sold products valued at more than $50,000 , which were shipped from its St.
Joseph , Michigan , plant directly to destinations outside the State . The Respondents
admit , and it is found , that Respondent Corporation is, and at all material times has
been , an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
Carl E . Schultz, Joseph A. Sauer , and George J. Krasl are copartners doing busi-
ness under the trade name of Leco Plating Company, herein called Respondent
Partnership . Their only place of business is located in St. Joseph , Michigan, where
they are engaged in the plating and distribution of products . During the year ending
December 31, 1962, Respondent Partnership performed services valued at more than
$50,000 for Whirlpool Corporation , a firm which annually ships products valued at
more than $50,000 from its plant in Benton Harbor , Michigan , directly to destina-
tions outside the State of Michigan . The Respondents admit, and it is found, that
Respondent Partnership is, and at all material times has been , an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
The complaint alleges, and the'separate answers deny, that Respondent Corporation
and Respondent Partnership are "affiliated businesses conducted at the same premises
with common officers , ownership , directors and operators and constitute a single
integrated business enterprise ; the said directors and operators formulating and
administering a common labor policy . and they together constitute a single
Employer within the meaning of . the Act ." For reasons which will appear
hereafter , I deem it unnecessary to determine whether , as contended by the General
Counsel , the Respondents together should be considered as a single employer, or
whether, as the Respondents maintain , each of them should be regarded as a separate
entity.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answers each admit, and it is found , that the Union is,
and at all material times has been , a labor organization as defined in the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The alleged surveillance
1. Facts
At the St . Joseph , Michigan , plant Respondent Corporation employs about 150
.employees and Respondent Partnership approximately 50. So far as the record
shows, neither Respondent has had any history of collective bargaining.
In mid-March 1963 Thomas Morgan , an employee of Respondent Partnership,
.and Walter Lausman , an employee of Respondent Corporation , obtained blank
cards authorizing the Union 's parent international to represent employees for pur-
poses of collective bargaining . During nonworking time, and often on plant
premises , they distributed these cards to employees of the Respondents and solicited
signatures . By March 21 2 Lausman had signed up about 10 employees . On that
° All dates herein refer to the year 1963 , unless otherwise noted.
c
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, ETC. 1249
date six or seven employees of the Respondents, including Lausman, met with Leo
R. Cadwell, a representative of the Union, at the JAM ball in St. Joseph. There
Lausman and others signed authorization cards. Lausman then continued solicit-
ing his fellow employees on nonworking time and secured an additional 10 signatures.
On April 2 at approximately 7:30 p.m. Cadwell again met with employees of the
Respondents, including Lausman, at the same place. The JAM hall is located on
State Street, on the. second floor of the fourth building north of the intersection of
:State and Ship Streets. It is next door to a Judo Club. The intersection is one of
the main downtown intersections in St. Joseph and has a traffic control light. The
distance north from there to the JAM hall is about 100 to 150 feet.
Shortly before the meeting was scheduled to start (thus a few minutes before
7:30 p.m.) Lausman drove his car north on State Street, approaching the interseo-
•tion of State and Ship Streets, and parked on the east side of State Street four park-
dng spaces south of the intersection. As he was parking, he was passed by a car
driven by Charles Cerecke, a foreman employed by Respondent Partnership. Laus-
man got out of his car and began walking north toward the intersection. Cerecke
stopped his car at the interesction for a red light and (without getting out) carried
on a conversation with Morgan, who was standing on the sidewalk on the south-
east corner of the intersection. Then Cerecke turned his car left (west) into Ship
Street and Morgan walked right (east) on the same street. Lausman caught up
to Morgan and together they crossed Ship Street and then proceeded to a spot on
the sidewalk on the east side of State Street immediately in front of either the JAM
hall or the Judo Club. Meanwhile Cerecke, still in his car, twice more approached
the intersection by driving north on State Street, and each time turned left (west)
.at the intersection onto Ship Street.
At this particular hour on this particular day, most downtown stores and offices
were closed, but the Judo Club was open. There was still light.3 Few people were
on the sidewalk. There was not very much traffic, and parking spaces on the streets
were available .4
2. Contentions of the parties
The complaint alleges, and each answer denies, that on or about April 2 the
Respondents, through Cerecke, kept under surveillance the meeting place, meeting,
and activities of the Union. In this connection, the General Counsel points out
that Cerecke drove around the adjacent block at least three times, and that from
the intersection of State and Ship Streets he "had a clear view of the entrance to
the union hall." The General Counsel also stresses that Cerecke saw Lausman
and talked to Morgan both "in the immediate vicinity of the union hall." Finally,
he argues that no attempt was made to explain Cerecke's conduct on the night in
question. These facts, he urges, "compel the conclusion that Cerecke's presence
in the area of the union hall on the night of April 2 was for the purpose of observing
Respondent's employees who were coming there to attend the union meeting, which
per se constitutes interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of the
Act. In any event, by remaining in the area in full view of employees entering
the union hall Cerecke created the impression of surveillance, which is itself viola-
tive of the Act."
The Respondents, conversely, maintain that no illegal surveillance took place,
emphasizing that "the mere presence of supervisory personnel in the neighborhood
of a union function does not establish a surveillance of that function." Moreover,
argue the Respondents, Cerecke's conduct is not attributable to Respondent Corpo-
ration, as he was employed by Respondent Partnership and the two Respondents are
separate and distinct entities.
3. Conclusions
The presence of Cerecke in the center of downtown St. Joseph at 7:30 p.m. is
not in itself suspicious, even though most downtown stores and offices were closed at
that hour. This is especially true because there is a sizable hotel on Ship Street,
.only a block west of the intersection in question, and Cerecke turned his car west.
s Lausman 's uncontradicted testimony to this effect Is corroborated by the fact, of
which I take official notice, that at St. Joseph, 1lfichigan, on April 2, 1963, sunset occurred
. at 7:13 p.m ., eastern standard time.
*The findings of fact regarding this incident of April 2 are based upon the uncontra-
dicted testimony of Laiisman, corroborated In part by that of Donald Ridenour , an eni-
ployee of Respondent Corporation who attended the meeting. Neither Morgan nor
.Cerecke testified.
1250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
However, the unexplained fact that Cerecke drove around the block three times,..
although parking spaces were available, is somewhat suspicious. But suspicion
alone does not furnish a sufficient basis for a finding that Cerecke's conduct was un-
lawful, unless surrounding circumstances give rise to a re asonable inference that-
he was illegally motivated in what he did. It is therefore necessary to analyze
the context in which the incident took place.
The first and most significant factor is the complete lack of any evidence indicat-
ing the Respondents' union animus. Neither of the Respondents has been shown.
to have been antagonistic toward unionism in general or this Union in particular.5
The next circumstance of importance is that no notices were posted in or around'-
the plant, no leaflets were distributed announcing the meeting date and time, and
this information was not shown to have been communicated to any supervisor. The-:
record is utterly devoid of proof that Cerecke, or any other management agent,
knew that a meeting was scheduled to take place on April 2 at 7:30 p.m. Finally,
the IAM hall was not shown to have exhibited any sign identifying it as such, and
there is no evidence whatever that Cerecke, or any other supervisor, was familiar with-
the location of the Union's hall. In view of the foregoing, while the matter is not
entirely free from doubt, I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to estab-
lish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Cerecke was present on April 2
for the purpose of observing the meeting hall or that he illegally spied upon the
activities of the employees attending the meeting.6 It is accordingly unnecessary
to determine whether Respondent Corporation is accountable for Cerecke's conduct...
There remains the contention that Cerecke, by his conduct on April 2, created
the impression of surveillance because he "remained in full view of employees
entering the union hall." This issue seems to have been an afterthought. It wasp
not mentioned in the pleadings or at the hearing; it first appears in the General
Counsel's brief. As the matter was neither included in the complaint nor fully
litigated at the hearing, I do not consider that it is properly before me for disposition.
B. The discharge of Lausman
1. Facts
Lausman first began working for Respondent Corporation in September 1950..
While the record is not entirely clear, it appears that he was employed as an elec-
trician for a few years, probably until about 1953. During the remainder of his;.
employment he did painting, spraying, and bonderizing. Lausman received his last
individual wage increase in January 1963.
In addition to his job with Respondent Corporation, Lausman was superintendent
of the Water Department of Baroda, the town .where he lives. He performed the
duties of this position mostly on weekends. On April 2 Lausman told his supervisor,.
Albert I. Moniot, that there was trouble with the Baroda water tower which would
require his presence there the next day. According to Lausman, he told Moniot'.
"if it would take a few hours, I would come in the remaining part of the day, and
if the job [in Baroda] required more time and I used most of the day up at the
tower, I wouldn't be in that day at all," and that Moniot approved. Moniot's
version of this conversation is different. According to him, Lausman said that "he'
would be in to work the next day but he would be a little late but he was sure be
would be there by nine o'clock in the morning," and that he gave Lausman permission
to be late.
As previously noted, Lausman attended a meeting at the IAM hall on the evening-
of April 2. On the next day, April 3, he did not report to the plant for work at all.
On that afternoon Joseph A. Sauer, treasurer of Respondent Corporation, decided'
to discharge Lausman and obtained permission to do so from Carl' E. Schultz,
president of Respondent Corporation. Accordingly, a separation notice was prepared'
6 Ridenour testified that on about March 22 his supervisor, Albert I. Monint, said that-
he had heard "they" had had a union meeting the night before and that Ridenour an-
swered, with a rising inflection: "They did?" Moniot denied that be ever discussed the
subject of unions with Ridenour. Assuming, without deciding, that this conversation:
occurred substantially as described by Ridenour , this incident alone is, in my opinion,.
insufficient to establish the Respondents' union animus.
O Compare T. A. Mcdahey, Sr., et at., d/b/a Columbus Marble Works. 111 NLRB 116%.
and West Point Manufacturing Company, Wellington Mill Division;. 142_NLR.B:1161. In.
West Point there was strong union animus evidenced by the prior.. commission of unfair
labor practices, and it is therefore an a fortiori case.
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION , ETC. 1251
:and instructions were issued to make out Lausman 's pay through April 2. When
Lausman reported for work on the morning of April 4 he was told by Moniot that
he was discharged . Lausman asked why . According to Lausman:
He [Moniot] said he didn 't know, that he spent a restless night wondering about
it himself , he didn 't know the reason why , and I was one of the last employees
that he had in the plant and that anything like this would happen to, and that
he was . . . told to tell me that I was through . I told him . . . I would
like to know a definite answer to the reason why I was discharged . . . and he
said that he would like to know also . . . .
Moniot 's version is different:
I told him [Lausman ] . that Mr . Rohn had told me that he [ Lausman]
was being let go because he was wandering about the plant , his outside interest,
that caused this absenteeism once in a while , and his tardiness , that the rate that
he was being paid was away above what the rate was . for that type of
work . . . in the area , that there was no further chance for advancement with
the company , and that it would be to his benefit and the company 's benefit .. .
if they would sever relations.
Lausman next talked to William Rohn , works manager of Respondent Corporation,
who stated that the decision to discharge Lausman had been made by Sauer, that
"when he [ Sauer] makes up his mind , it is right now , and that was it, that I [Laus-
man] was through and there was nothing that he [ Rohn ] could do about it." Rohn
agreed to furnish Lausman with a letter of recommendation if Lausman found an-
other job? However , a few days later Moniot informed Lausman that no letter of
recommendation could be given to him because "Joe [Sauer ] said it might get into
the wrong hands."
The separation notice , retained in Respondent Corporation 's files, shows that
Lausman was discharged ; under "Remarks" appears the following : "Unacceptable
employee . Wandering thru plant , absenteeism due to outside interests , etc." Upon
inquiry by the Michigan Employment Security Commission regarding "what act or
.acts resulted in Claimant's [Lausman 's] dismissal on 4-4-63?" Respondent Corpora-
tion responded : "Services unsatisfactory . No protest."
2. Contentions of the parties
The complaint alleges that the Respondents discharged Lausman on April 4 and
thereafter failed and refused to reinstate him "because he joined or assisted the Union
,or engaged in other union activities or concerted activities ." The General Counsel
maintains that Lausman aided the Union , that the Respondents discovered this, and
that the Respondents then promptly discharged him on a pretext , but in reality be-
cause of his prounion activities.
The Respondents in their separate answers admit that Respondent Corporation dis-
.charged Lausman on April 3 and has not reinstated him since then . However, they
,deny that Lausman 's discharge was illegally motivated . In their joint brief, the
Respondents raise three defenses : ( 1) There is no evidence that Lausman 's union
activities ( described as "minimal ") were known to or suspected by Respondent Cor-
poration ; ( 2) Lausman was "an unsatisfactory employee who had a record of tardi-
ness and misconduct and failed to report to work as scheduled on the day of his dis-
,charge ," and he was discharged "for cause"; and (3 ) in any event Lausman was a
, supervisor , rather than an employee , as those terms are defined in the Act.
3. Conclusions
From the description of Lausman 's union activities referred to above it is clear, and
I find , that be was one of the two prime movers in the Union 's effort to organize the
Respondent 's employees . The question to which we must now direct our attention is:
Does the record show that the Respondents knew of or suspected this on April 3,
when Sauer decided to discharge Lausman ? To put it another way : Do the proven
facts (as contrasted with surmise ) warrant an inference of such knowledge or
suspicion ? For the purpose of answering this crucial question , it will be assumed,
without deciding , that the two Respondents together constitute a single entity and that
knowledge acquired by either is therefore attributable to both. It will further be
assumed , without deciding , that the Respondents were at that time , as the General
Counsel maintains "aware of organizational activity in the plant."
7The findings of fact regarding this conversation are based upon Lausman's undenied
testimony . Rohn did not testify.
1252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
. To indicate the likelihood that the Respondents were aware of or suspected Laus-
man's role in the Union's campaign, the General Counsel relies upon the fact that on
April 2 Cerecke saw Lausman "in the immediate vicinity of the union hall." How-
ever, this glosses over the failure of the record to demonstrate how Cerecke could
have recognized that the building (in front of which the General Counsel contends.
Cerecke saw Lausman standing ) was a union hall. There is no evidence that any
representative of the Respondents knew, on or before April 2, the JAM hall's
location.
The General Counsel also points out that Lausman's prounion conduct "was en-
gaged in at Respondents' plant during noon hours." However, there is not a scintilla
of evidence that any management agent saw Lausman soliciting other employees to
sign union cards. To get around this lack of proof, the General Counsel cites three
cases in all of which the total working complement involved was less than 50, and
the Board relied heavily upon the small size of the plant.8 Here, by contrast, the
combined working force was approximately 200, and the record only shows that
Lausman solicited about 20 of them.9 Under these circumstances I cannot agree, as
the General Counsel's brief puts it, that " it is highly unlikely that Respondents were
unaware of" Lausman's prounion activities. Finally, although the record contains
detailed testimony as to conversations on April 3 and the following days between
Lausman and Moniot, Lausman and Rohn, and Sauer and Schultz, it is significant that
in none of these instances was the Union mentioned at all in connection with Laus-
man or his discharge.
For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to
establish that, at the time of Lausman's discharge, the Respondents knew of or sus-
pected Lausman's interest in the Union. It follows that company knowledge-
an essential element of a discriminatory discharge 10-has not been proved. In
view of the lack of proof of the Respondents' knowledge or suspicion of Lausman's,
prounion activities and the lack of proof of the Respondents' union animus, I deem
it unnecessary to explore the Respondents' other defenses, namely, that Lausman
was discharged for cause and that he was a supervisor.11
C. The alleged coercive . interrogation
It will be recalled that some of the Respondents ' employees met with Cadwell
on March 21. Donald Ridenour , an employee of Respondent Corporation , testified
that on or about March 22 his supervisor , Moniot , said that he heard "they" had
had a union meeting the night before and that Ridenour answered , with a rising
inflection : "They did?" Moniot denied that he ever discussed the subject of unions
with Ridenour.
The complaint alleges, and the separate answers deny , that on or about March
22 the Respondents , through Moniot , "coercively interrogated employees . con-
cerning their union membership , activities and desires , and further concerning the
circumstances of a prior Union meeting , held on about March 21 , 1963." The
8Tru-Line Metal Products Company, et at., 138 NLRB 964, enfd. 324 F. 2d 614 (C.A. 6)
(36 employees ; the Board also found , at 966, that the discriminatees "between them, had
solicited most of the employees to join the Union." ) ; Fairbank Knitting Mill, Inc., 134
NLRB 951 ( 40 to 45 employees ; there is also reference at 956 to "the small size of the
community") ; and W. Ralston d Co., Inc., et al., 142 NLRB 1124 (47 employees).
8 Although Lausman's testimony and the General Counsel's brief give the impression
that all Lausman's soliciting occurred at the plant, Ridenour, a witness for the General
Counsel , testified that Lausman approached him "out of the plant , in Baroda."
10 Skyline Homes, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 323 F. 2d 642 (C.A. 5) ; The J. S. Dillon cf Sons
Stores Co., Inc., 144 NLRB 1235; Tennessee Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn Division, 143
NLRB 494 (discharge of William L. Brown) ; Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 142 NLRB 827;
Wausau Concrete Company, Inc., 142 NLRB 33; Diamond Ginger Ate, Incorporated, 125.
NLRB 1173; and Hadley Manufacturing Corporation , 108 NLRB 1641.
11 N.L.R.B . v. McGahey , Sr., et al., d/b/a Columbus Marble Works , 233 F . 2d 406, at
412-413 (C.A. 5) ; Lawson Milk Company, 136 NLRB 538, enfd. In part 317 F. 2d 756
(C.A. 6) at 546 in the Board 's opinion and at 760 In the court 's opinion ; 1Vau8au Concrete
Company, Inc., supra, at footnote 5 of the Intermediate Report ; Tennessee Packers, Inc.,
Frosty Morn Division , supra ( discharge of William L . Brown ) ; and The J. S . Dillon cE
Sons Stores Co., Inc., supra. See the opinion of Jones, C. J., in Skyline Homes, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., supra : "Without significant evidence that Overman or Kreischer knew of any
individual union participation, and a failure to show that he struck at a suspected group
of employees , his reasons for laying off these people were his business . It is not the place
of the Board or the courts to interfere with the managerial prerogative."
HY PLAINS DRESSED BEEF, INC. 1253
General Counsel argues in his brief that Moniot's statement , "was clearly intended
to evoke a reply from Ridenour as to whether he was aware " that a union meeting
had been held the night before. The Respondents defend on the ground that there
is no proof that Moniot's remark , if made, was designed to elicit information, that
it was isolated and did not take place in a coercive setting, and that in any event
Moniot 's conduct is not attributable to Respondent Partnership.
For the purpose of deciding this issue , it will be assumed without deciding that the
incident occurred substantially as related by Ridenour, that Moniot 's statement was
intended to elicit information regarding what interest Ridenour might have had in
the Union, and that each Respondent is responsible for Moniot 's conduct. In the
absence of any threats of retaliation or promises of benefit, and in a context lacking
union animus , it is difficult to look upon Moniot 's remark as coercive . But that
issue need not be decided. This is the only incident ( other than the alleged surveil-
lance ) shown to have happened in a plant of approximately 200 employees, and it
involved only one supervisor and one employee . Under such circumstances I deem
it to be an isolated instance , insufficient standing alone to justify a finding that the
Respondents violated the Act, or to warrant the issuance of a remedial order.12
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , and upon the entire record in this
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Laboratory Equipment Corporation and Carl E. Schultz , Joseph A . Sauer and
George J. Krasl , a co-partnership d/b/a Leco Plating Company, are , and at all
material times have been , employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. District Lodge 39 of the International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO,
is, and at all material times has been , a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The General Counsel has failed to establish that either of the Respondents
has engaged in or is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) or (3) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the
entire record in this case , it is recommended that the Board grant the Respondents'
joint motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
12 Union Carbide Corp. v. N.L.R. B., 310 F. 2d 844 , at 845 (C.A. 6).
Hy Plains Dressed Beef , Inc. and Amalgamated -Meat Cutters
& Butcher Workmen of North America , Local No. 340, AFL-
CIO. Cases Nos. 17-CA-.170 and 17-RC-4034. May 1, 1961,
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 6, 1963, Trial Examiner Benjamin B. Lipton issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's De-
cision. The Trial Examiner further found that certain of the afore-
said unfair labor practices engaged in by the Respondent interfered
with the results of the Board election in the above representation pro-
ceeding and recommended that the election be set aside and a new elec-
tion held at an appropriate time. He also found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recom-
146 NLRB No. 134.