L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 26, 1946

70 N.L.R.B. 868 (N.L.R.B. 1946)

0
In the Matter of L. A . YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION and FORE-
MAN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, CHAPTER No . 155
Case No. 21-C-2716.-Decided August W,1946
Mr. James A. Cobey, for the Board.
Cook, Smith, Jacobs & Beake, by Mr. Grant L. Cook, of Detroit,
Mich., for the respondent.
Mr. Warren B. Logan, of South Gate, Calif., for the Union.
Mr. Bernard Goldberg, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed by Foreman's Association of America,
Chapter No. 155, an unaffiliated organization herein called the Union,
the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by its
Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region (Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia), issued its complaint dated April 15, 1946, against L. A. Young
Spring & Wire Corporation, herein called the respondent, alleging
that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and
(5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act,
49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint accom-
panied by notice of hearing were duly served upon the respondent and
the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged
in substance that the respondent, on or about March 5, 1946, and there-
after, refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the respondent's employees within an
appropriate bargaining unit, although a majority of the employees
in such unit, in an election conducted under the supervision of the
Board on February 1, 1946, had designated and selected the Union as
their exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining,
and that the respondent thereby interfered with, restrained, and co-
70 N. L . R. B., No. 64.
868
L. A. YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION 869
creed its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act.
The respondent thereafter filed its amended answer in which it
admitted that on February 1, 1946, a majority of the persons in the
unit described in the complaint, in an election conducted under the
supervision of the Board, had affirmatively expressed their desire to
be represented by the Union, and that on approximately the date
mentioned in the complaint, and thereafter, the respondent refused to
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of
the employees in such unit; but denied that (1) the foremen and
assistant foremen are employees within the meaning of the Act, con-
tending that they are "employers," (2) the foremen and assistant
foremen constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining, within the meaning of the Act, particularly Section 9
(a) and (b) thereof, (3) the Union is a labor organization, within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act, and (4) it had engaged in
any unfair labor practices, within the meaning of the Act.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on May 15, 1946, at Los
Angeles, California, before Victor Hirshfield, the Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and the
respondent were represented by counsel and the Union by a representa-
tive. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded
all parties. During the course of the hearing, the Trial Examiner
ruled on various objections to the admission of evidence. The Board
has reviewed all the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds no prej-
udicial error. The rulings are hereby affirmed.
On May 29, 1946, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Re-
port, copies of which were duly served upon the parties, finding that
the respondent had unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. There-
after, the respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, a
supporting brief and a supplement thereto, and a motion to dismiss
the complaint. The Union has not filed any exceptions. For reasons
stated, infra, the motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby denied.
Subsequent to the issuance of the Intermediate Report, counsel for
the Board moved to supplement the record by incorporating therein
a stipulation embodying additional facts concerning the respondent's
business. This motion is hereby granted, and the stipulation dated
July 1, 1946, is hereby incorporated in and made part of the record
as Board Exhibit No. 9. On July 16, 1946, the Board at Washington,
D. C., heard oral argument, in which the respondent and the Union
participated.
870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the respondent's
exceptions and brief, and supplement thereto, and the entire record
in the case, and finds that the exceptions are without merit. '
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THL BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corporation, a Michigan corporation
having its principal place of business at Detroit, Michigan, is the
world's largest manufacturer of spring wire products, and normally
supplies about 40 percent of the springs used by the automobile indus-
try. The respondent operates numerous manufacturing plants through-
out the United States and Canada, including the plant at Los Angeles,
California, which is involved in this proceeding. At the Los Angeles
plant, the respondent is engalged in the 'manufacture and sale of auto-
mobile cushion spring constructions, inner spring mattress units,
cushion pad supports, plastic parts, and miscellaneous aircraft parts.
During the fiscal year ending July 31,1942, the last year of considerable
peacetime production, the respondent purchased for use at the Los
Angeles plant raw materials valued at approximately $285,451, of
which approximately 38 percent was shipped to the plant from points
outside the State of California. During the same period, the respond-
ent sold products manufactured at the same plant valued at approxi-
mately $889,400, of which practically all were shipped to customers
located within the State. Although the respondent's production since
the termination of the war has been very much below the pre-war nor-
mal for the plant, it contemplates resumption of full peacetime produc-
tion as soon as practicable. The respondent admits, and we find, that
it is engaged in commerce, within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Foreman's Association of America, Chapter No. 155, unaffiliated,
is a labor organization admitting to membership supervisory em-
ployees of the respondent?
1 The respondent contends that the Union is not a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2 (5) of the Act . There is no merit in this contention. Section 2 ( 5) defines
the term "labor organization" as meaning "any organization of any kind , or any agency
or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose , in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes , wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work."
The foremen and assistant foremen being employees within the meaning of the Act, the
organization which seeks to represent them in collective bargaining relationships with the
respondent is clearly a "labor organization " within the definition of Section 2 (5).
L. A. YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION 871
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1. The appropriate unit and representation by the Union of a
majority therein
On January 8, 1946, the Board issued a Decision and Direction of
Election in Case No. 21-R-2816,2 finding, inter alia, that all foremen
and assistant foremen in the production and maintenance division of
the respondent's Los Angeles plant constitute a unit appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section
9 (b) of the Act.
On or about February 1, 1946, pursuant to said Decision and Direc-
tion of Election, an election by secret ballot was conducted under the
supervision of the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region.
Upon the conclusion of the election, a Tally of Ballots was furnished
the respondent and the Union in accordance with the Rules and Regu-
lations of the Board. No objections to the conduct of the election were
filed either by the respondent or the Union within the time provided
therefor. The Tally showed that there were approximately 17 eligible
voters, all of whom cast valid votes for the Union. On February 13,
1946, the Board certified the Union as the collective bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the unit heretofore described.
The respondent disputes the appropriateness of the unit formed by
the Board on the ground that (1) its foremen and assistant foremen
are not employees, within the meaning of the Act, and that, conse-
quently, the Board is without jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding
involving them, and (2) the Union is not independent of the labor
organization which represents the respondent's rank-and-file em-
ployees.
In the representation proceeding,3 we considered the status of these
foremen and assistant foremen under the Act and held that they
were employees, within the meaning of Section 2 (3), thereof. The
respondent has introduced neither evidence nor argument in this un-
fair labor practice proceeding which, in our opinion, effectively chal-
lenges the correctness of this holding. Despite the respondent's ap-
parent contention to the contrary, the definitions of "employer" and
"employee" contained in the Act are not mutually exclusive.4 The
same individual may be an "employer" for some purposes and an
"employee" for others. "A foreman, in his relation to his employer
is an employee, while in his relation to the laborers under him he is
2 Matter of L A. Young Spring & Wire Corporation, 65 N. L R. B. 298.
8 Matter of L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corporation, supra.
4 N. L R B . v. Armour & Co ., 154 F. ( 2d) 570 (C C. A. 10).
872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 'BOARD
the representative of Che employer and within the definition of Section
2 (2) of the Act." 5 The present proceeding involves only the "em-
ployee" aspect of the foremen's relationship to the respondent. Ac-
cordingly, for the purposes of this proceeding, the foremen and assist-
ant foremen are employees, within the meaning of Section 2 (3) of
the Act.6
The greatest part of the evidence adduced at the hearing on the
unfair labor practice charges pertained to the foremen's relationship
to a strike of the respondent's rank-and-file workers which commenced
on April 17, 1946. The respondent relies on this evidence, together
with that introduced in the representation proceeding, as proof of its
contention that the Union is not independent of International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, herein called the UAW, the labor organization which repre-
sents its rank-and-file employees.
Approximately a week before the start of the strike, the executive
committee of the Union arranged a meeting with officials of the UAW
for the purpose of learning if the UAW would permit the foremen to
cross the picket line in the event that the strike of rank-and-file em-
ployees then impending materialized. The UAW officials indicated
that they would have no objection to the foremen's entering the plant
should the strike occur. The meeting then adjourned without further
discussion.
The,strike of rank-and-file employees began at 9:30 a. m. on April
17, 1946, when all operations in the plant ceased. Shortly there-
after, the striking employees walked out of the plant and formed
a picket line. The foremen and assistant foremen remained in the
6N. L. R. B. v Skinner & Kennedy Stationesy Company, 113 F (2d) 667, 671 (C C A.
8). See also Jones d Laughlin Steel Corp v. N L. R B, 146 F (2d) 833 (C C. A 5) ;
N. L. R. B. v. Armour & Co , supra; N. L. R. B. v. Packard Motoi Car Company, decided
August 12, 1946, 157 F (2d) 80 (C C A 6) . Matter of Jones S Loughlin Steel Corpora-
tton, Vesta -Shannopin Coal Division , 66 N. L R B. 386, and cases cited therein Cf
N L. R B. v Atkins and Co , decided May 31, 1946, 155 F (2d) 567 (C C. A 7), where the
Circuit Court of Appeals held that plant guards were not employees within the meaning
of the Act. The Board does not acquiesce in that decision . Moreovei, the case involved
plant guards and not foremen.
6 In its brief , the respondent has denied the accuracy of the examples cited in the ma-
jority decision in the representation proceeding in support of the statement that the au-
thority of the foremen is circumscribed in a number of respects . Assuming the validity of
the respondent ' s criticism , the record nevertheless fully substantiates the conclusion that
"The foreman 's authority , although extensive in these many respects , is circumscribed in
others. " To cite other and more complete examples of limitation of authority . A foreman
working overtime must secure written authorization from his immediate superior A fore-
man does no interviewing or hiring of new employees , except that, in the case of certain
skilled occupations , the employment manager, who usually does all the interviewing and
hiring, customarily requests i foreman with the necessary qualifications to interview appli-
cants for these skilled positions and follows the -recmmendat,on of such foreman as- to
hiring The foreman does not participate in collective bargaining negotiations with the
rank-and-file union, although the negotiators in behalf of the respondent solicit the fore-
men-at least they did so in the negotiations that preceded the making of the last collective
bargaining contract previous to the representation healing-for suggestions which the
foremen desire to see incorporated in the contract
L. A. YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION 873
plant for some hours after the start of the strike awaiting instructions
from higher officials. About noon, Horner, the respondent's fac-
tory manager, told the foremen that "if they (foremen and assistant
foremen), went out to lunch and couldn't get in through the line to
wait for a call, the Company would let them know when to come
back." The foremen left the plant at various times after receiving
these instructions and did not return either that day or the day fol-
lowing.
On April 18, 1946, the respondent sent a telegram to each of its
foremen and assistant foremen, directing the recipient to report for
work at 8 a. m. on the following day.7 The telegram also stated :
"You will be requested by the pickets not to cross their lines but
under law you have the right to enter the plant. Enter by main office
door." Prior to the receipt of the telegram addressed to him, Lo-
gan, president of the Union, received a telephone call from White,
president of the UAW at the plant. White informed Logan that the
respondent was sending out telegrams directing the foremen to re-
turn to work. He also said that he didn't want the foremen to go
through the picket line and that nothing would happen to the foremen
the next day if they did go through the line, but he refused to commit
himself as to what would happen thereafter. -
Instead of reporting for work on April 19 as directed in the tele-
grams, the foremen assembled on a parking lot outside the plant at
the stated hour. After some parleying with the respondent's offi-
cials, who refused to withdraw the instructions contained in the
telegrams, Logan or some other official of the Union telephoned Val-
lance, national vice president of the Foreman's Association of Amer-
ica, in Detroit asking for guidance. The union officials received
what they regarded as confused advice. The union officials then un-
successfully sought to persuade the UAW to agree to allow the fore-
men to pass the picket line. Thereafter, the union officials, in the
company of the UAW national representative who was directing
the rank-and-file strike, telephoned Vallance again, but the latter
was not in his office. The intended purpose of this second telephone
call was to have the representative of the UAW speak to Vallance.
An official of the Union then telephoned Mrs. Vallance in Detroit
and had her read from the statement of policy adopted by the national
executive board of the Foreman's Association on January 6, 1946,'
respecting the conduct to be observed by members of the Foreman's
Association in the event of strikes by rank-and-file employees. Mrs.
Vallance began ' reading this statement of policy over the telephone
and, according to Logan's uncontradicted testimony, "when we came
to a certain section, that is C, I believe, where is said, unless it is
' The regular shift reporting hour was 7 a m
874 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mutually agreed we should not go through the line, we decided then
and there not to go through the line." 8 The foremen then notified the
respondent that they would not return to work unless and until the
respondent and the UAW mutually agreed to their crossing the rank-
and-file picket line. The foremen appear to have adhered to this
decision. '
This evidence does not affect our finding in the representation
proceeding that the Union is an independent labor organization. The
refusal of one union to permit its members to cross a picket line es-
tablished by another does not prove that the first union is subordinate
to the second. It is almost a rule of trade union ethics for one labor
union to respect a picket line established by another. Even unions
affiliated with rival national labor organizations not infrequently
adhere to the rule. In the first Packard case,9 we held that the
Foreman's Association of America was an independent labor organi-
zation, notwithstanding that we anticipated that its members and
separately organized rank-and-file employees would "express moral
sympathy for the organizational efforts of one another and will, on
occasion, even refuse to cross the picket line established by the other
during a strike." Our conclusion iii that case, that the Foremen's Asso-
ciation is an independent labor organization, was affirmed by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.10' In accord with the
aforesaid decision respecting the Union's parent organization, we
find, as we did in the representation proceeding," that the Union is an
independent, unaffiliated labor organization organized for the ex-
clusive purpose of representing supervisory employees. Moreover,
in view of our holding in the Jones d Laughlin case,12 the question
of the character of the union seeking to represent a unit of foremen
has become immaterial.
We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that all foremen and 'assistant
foremen in the production and maintenance division of the respond-
ent's Los Angeles, California, plant constitute, and during all the
times. material herein constituted, a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining.
8 Section C of this statement of policy reads : "Should the striking union prevent super-
visory employees from entering the plant to perform their regular work only or as provided
for herein, there shall be no undue effort made by members of the Foreman's Association
to enter the plant." -
Section B of the same statement of policy provides : "During such a strike [an authorized
strike by rank and file employees] should the company and the union by agreement permit
all supervisory employees to enter the plant they may do so, but members of the Foreman's
Association shall not perform any work similar to that normally performed by the non- "
supervisory employees on strike, and they shall perform only their regular supervisory
duties except as hereinafter provided."
9 Matter of Packard Motor Car Company , 61 N. L. R. B. 4, 16.
'IN. L. R. B. v. Packard Motor Car Company, decided August 12, 1946. 18 LRRM 2268
(C. C A 6).
xx Matter of L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corporation, supra.
Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, Vesta-Shannopin Coal Division, 66
N. L. It. B. 386.
L. A. YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION 875
We further find, as did the Trial Examiner, that on and after Feb-
ruary 1, 1946, the Union was the duly designated bargaining repre-
sentative of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit, and that, pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 (a) of the Act,
the Union was on February 1, 1946, and at all times thereafter has
been, and now is, the exclusive representative of all the employees in
the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other condi-
- tions of employment.
2. The refusal to bargain
On February 27, 1946, after its certification by the Board, the Union
wrote a letter to the respondent requesting the start of collective bar-
gaining negotiations. By letter dated March 5, 1946, the respondent
rejected the Union's request, giving as its reason therefor its desire to
test in the courts the validity of the Board's decision in the representa-
tion proceeding. Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner,
that on March 5, 1946, and at all times thereafter, the respondent has
refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive repre-
sentative of its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment, and that the respondent has thereby interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III, above,
occurmg in connection with the operations of the respondent de-
scribed in Section I, above, have a, close, intimate , and substantial rela-
tion to trade , traffic , and commerce among the several States, and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, we must order the respondent, pursuant to the mandate of Section
10 (c), to cease and desist therefrom.
We shall also order the respondent to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the
respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the foremen and assistant foremen in the
production and maintenance division, we shall order the respondent,
upon request, to bargain collectively with the Union.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following:
876 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLnsIONs OF LAW
1. Foreman 's Association of America , Chapter No. 155, unaffiliated,
is a labor organizatioh, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All foremen and assistant foremen in the production and mainte-
nance division of the respondent 's Los Angeles , California , plant con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining,
within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. Foreman 's Association of'America , Chapter No. 155, unaffiliated,
was on February 1, 1946, and at all times thereafter' has been, the ex-
clusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining , within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of
the Act.
4. By refusing on March 5 , 1946, and at all times thereafter, to
bargain collectively with Foreman's Association of America, Chapter
No. 155, unaffiliated , as the exclusive representative of all its employees
in the appropriate unit, the respondent has engaged in, and is en-
gaging in , unfair labor practices , within the meaning of Section 8 (5)
of the Act.
5. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act , the re-
spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 ('6) and £7) of
the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record in the case , and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the respondent , L. A. Young Spring & Wire
Corporation , Los Angeles , California , and its officers , agents, succes-
sors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Foreman 's Association of
America, Chapter No. 155, unaffiliated , as the exclusive representative
of all foremen and assistant foremen in the production and mainte-
nance division of the respondent 's Los Angeles plant , in respect to
rates of pay , wages, hours of employment , and other conditions of
employment ;
(b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of Foreman 's Asso-
ciation of America, Chapter No. 155, unaffiliated , to bargain collec-
tively with it on behalf of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit.
L. A. YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION 877
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Foreman's Association
of America, Chapter No. 155, unaffiliated, as the exclusive representa-
tive of all foremen and assistant foremen in the production and main-
tenance division of its Los Angeles plant, in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment;
(b) Post at its plant at Los Angeles, California, copies of the notice
attached hereto, marked, "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted
by the respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained
by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material:
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request, with Fore-
man's Association of America, Chapter No. 155, unaffiliated, as
the exclusive representative of all our employees in a bargaining
unit composed of :
All foremen and assistant foremen in the production and
maintenance department of our Los Angeles plant.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of
the above-named Union to bargain with us, or refuse to bargain
with said Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the bargaining unit set forth above.
L. A. YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION,
Employer.
By----------------------------------------------
(Re presentative ) ( Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for sixty ( 60) days from the date
of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other
material.
878 'DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MR. GERARD D. REILLY, dissenting :
For reasons which I stated in Matter of Packard Motor Car Com-
pany,13 I am constrained to dissent with the decision in the instant
case. I should like to make one further observation.
In the Packard case, the majority found that the charging union
in this case , the Foreman's Association of America, was an independ-
ent organization ; consequently, my colleagues did not pass upon the
question which was ultimately decided by the Board in the Jones &
Laughlin case 14 with respect to making the machinery of the Act
available to organizations which represented both the'foremen and
the very employees they were hired to supervise.
It seems to me that the facts in this record 15 with respect to develop-
ments since our certification in `this case reveals that, although the
1361 N L R B 4
14 Matter of Jones if Laughlin Steel Corporation . Vesta-Shaniopcn Coal Division, 66
N. L. R. B. 386
15 The facts refereed to are as follows During the hearing in the complaint case there
was considerable testimony taken with respect to a strike of the production and
maintenance employees which commenced on Apiil 17, 1946 The principal witness was
one, Logan, president of the Foreman's Association local The quotations given are from
his testimony :
About a week before the start of the strike, the executive committee of the Foreman's
Association local met with officials of the UAW-CIO local The meeting was called at the
request of Logan , because, "there had been a rumor of a strike [ and] we wanted to know
whether they were going to let us through the line in case they had a strike and they
said that they had no objection to our coming in the plant, and that is about all that
was said there "
The strike began at 9:30 a. in on April 17, 1946, when all operations in the plant,
ceased and the production workers walked out They formed a picket line shortly there-
after. The foremen remained in the plant for some hours until about noon they had a
conference with Homier, the respondent's factory manager lloiner told the foremen
that "if they went out to lunch and couldn't get in through the line to wait for a call, the
Company would let them know when to come back " The foremen left the plant at
various times thereafter None of then returnyd to work either that day or at any time
during the strike
In' the evening of April 18, the respondent sent to each foreman a telegran directing
the recipient to report for work at 8 a in on the following day ( The regular shift
reporting hour was 7 a in ) The telegram also stated You will be requested by the
pickets not to cross their lines but under law you have the right to enter the plant. Enter
by main office door."
Before the receipt of the telegram addressed to him, Logan received a telephone call
from White, president of the UAW-CIO local White told Logan that the latter would
probably receive a telegram requesting him to return to work White said that he didn't
want the foremen to go through the picket line, that nothing would happen to the
foremen the next day if they went through the line but "after that" and he didn ' t finish
his conversation.
The same evening Legal received a number of telephone calls from various foremen
asking for advice on what to do on the receipt of the expected telegrams Logan had
another official call Evans, day superintendent, and ask about the telegrams in view of the
previous instructions not to cross the pick et line. Evans replied that he didn't know
anything about the telegram but would find out' before the foremen entered the plant
the next morning. Logan then instructed his fellow for'nien to meet on the -arkingg lot
outside the plant on the following morning, which they (lid While waiting for a report
from Evans, the foremen received from the pickets a leaflet addressed to office and
supervisory employees asking these two groups of employees not to cross the picket line
despite _ the respondent 's order to return to work. Evans reported to the assembled
foremen that the telegram still stood as it read.
The foremen then decided to call the national office of the FAA in Detroit for Instruc-
tions and advice. Either Logan or some other official spoke to Valiance , vice president
L. A. YOUNG SPRING & WIRE CORPORATION 879
charging union is nominally independent, it is subject to the discipline
of the C. I. 0. union which represents the production employees. The
most striking instance of this was the refusal of the Foreman's Union
to let its members pass the picket lines 'of the C. I. 0. union, although
the issues involved in the strike had nothing to do with the re-
lationship between the foremen and their employer. In fact, the
controversy which led to the strike related to issues in a different
bargaining unit. Moreover, it will be noted that the action of the
Foreman's local was in conformity with the ."national policy" of the
parent organization.
It has been well established (Mackay Radio d Telegraph Co. v.
N. L. R. B., 304 U. S. 333, reversing 92 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 9), aff'g
87 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 9), setting aside 1 N. L. R. B. 201) that in an
economic strike, not arising out of unfair labor practices (which was
the case here), an employer has the right to replace the strikers. It
is conceded that one of the duties of the foremen here was to pass
ultimate judgment upon the applicants referred to them by the per-
sonnel office, in order that workmen possessing the appropriate skills
of the FAA over the telephone Valiance told the foremen to apply for unemployment
insurance and enter the plant but, "I don ' t think he [ Valiance ] understood us, and it
was,rather mixed up, because we could not apply for unemployment insurance and also
go into the plant too." - The FAA local officials returned to the parking lot after this
conversation with Valiance and asked the committee of the UAW-CIO to let the foremen
through the picket line. The UAW-CIO committeemen replied that they still didn't want
the foremen to pass the line . The foremen then left the lot to make another telephone
call to Detroit. This time they were accompanied by- the national representative of the
UAW-CIO who was leading the strike of the rank and file employees . The purpose was
to have this representative speak to Valiance "to find out just their views on it." How-
ever, they were unable to reach Valiance Thereupon , one of the FAA local officials)
telephoned Valiance 's wife and had her read from the statement of policy adopted by
the national executive board of the FAA on January 6, 1946 , respecting the conduct to be
observed by members of the FAA in the event of strikes by rank and file employees.
Valiance 's wife began reading this statement of policy over the phone "and when we
came to a certain section , that is C, I believe , where it said , unless it ^s mutually agreed
we should not go through the line , we decided then and there not to go through the line."
Section C reads : "Should the striking union prevent supervisory employees from
entering the plant to perform their regular work only or as provided for herein, there
shall be no undue effort made by members of the Foreman ' s Association to enter the plant."
Section B of the same statement of policy provides "During such a strike [ an authorized
strike by rank and file employees ], should the company and the union by agreement
permit all supervisory employees to enter the plant they may do so, but members of the
Foreman ' s Association shall not perform any work `similar to that normally performed
by the nonsupervisory employees on strike , and they shall perform only their regular
supervisory duties except as hereinafter provided "
After this telephone conversation with Valiance ' s wife the foremen told the respondent,
through Superintendent Evans who was acting as intermediary , that they would stay out
until the UAW-CIO and the respondent agreed to the foremen 's crossing of the picket line.
While all these events were occurring the foremen remained on or about the parking lot.
They did not participate in the picket line but had casual conversation with the rank
and file strikers.
Logan's attitude which is probably that of the FAA respecting the crossing of rank and
file picket lines is summed , up in this examination of Logan ` by respondent ' s counsel :
Q. If they [the strikers ] didn't want you to cross it you wouldn't?
A. If it meant bodily injury, no.
Q. And if it did not, you wouldn't cross the picket line either , would you?
A. No, I don't believe I would
880 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be hired. Refusal of the foremen in this case to return to their posts
of duty during the strike rendered this right of replacement com-
pletely nugatory.
It seems to me, therefore, this case should be dismissed and that the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirm-
ing the Board's decision in the Packard case has no application here.