KYNDI, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 4, 2020

14965708 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/965,708 12/10/2015 Arun MAJUMDAR 463372US124 2021
22850 7590 05/04/2020
OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
1940 DUKE STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
EXAMINER
NGO, CHUONG D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2182
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
OBLONPAT@OBLON.COM
iahmadi@oblon.com
patentdocket@oblon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ARUN MAJUMDAR
Appeal 2019-001945
Application 14/965,708
Technology Center 2100

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, THU A. DANG, and
JAMES R. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1, 3–16, and 18–31 are pending, stand rejected, are appealed
by Appellant,1 and are the subject of our decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a).
See Final Act. 1; Appeal Br. 2.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An Oral Hearing was held on April 15, 2020.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as KYNDI, Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
2 Throughout our decision we refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”)
filed Dec. 10, 2015 (claiming benefit of US 62/090,190, filed Dec. 10,
2014); Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed Aug. 21, 2018; and Reply Brief
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention “relate generally to a method and apparatus for
encoding combinatorial hyper maps (CHYMAPS),” the encoding process
uses “a unique reversible code and a tree based numbering system that
embeds term algebras into the CHYMAPS.” Spec. 1:10–12. More
particularly, “the apparatus and method provide complex data structure
representation, pattern recognition, fast unification of sub-graphs, and
arithmetic operations on the numberings that are reversible and lossless (i.e.,
bijective) to operations on the term-algebras.” Spec. 1:13–15; see Abstract.
Claims 1 (reciting a method) and 16 (reciting an apparatus) are independent.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of representing and comparing graph
data in circuitry, the method comprising:
[(A)] representing the graph data as a generalized
combinatorial hypermap;
[(B)] bijectively representing a sub-map of the
generalized combinatorial hypermap using a plurality of arrays
of numbers including an array of fixed point free involutions;
[(C)] bijectively mapping the plurality of arrays of
numbers to a Gödel number;
[(D)] comparing the sub-map of the generalized
combinatorial hypermap with another submap by comparing the
Gödel number representing the sub-map to a Gödel number
representing the another sub-map, thereby to improve
computational efficiency for determining isomorphism between
submaps in order to efficiently perform composition and
unification of the graph data;

(“Reply Br.”) filed Jan. 3, 2019. We also refer to the Examiner’s Final
Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed Oct. 4, 2017; and Answer (“Ans.”)
mailed Nov. 5, 2018.
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[(E)] compiling a database of compositional patterns to
include topologies of submaps of the generalized combinatorial
hypermap that are determined to be isomorphic with another
submaps, the sub-map of the generalized combinatorial
hypermap being included in the submaps of the generalized
combinatorial hypermap, and the another sub-map being
included in the another submaps; and
[(F)] performing unification of respective submaps of
the generalized combinatorial hypermap when the respective
submaps of the generalized combinatorial hypermap are
determined to be isomorphic.
Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.) (bracketed claim limitation designations
added).
REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–16, and 18–31 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–3.
ANALYSIS
Subject Matter Eligibility—35 U.S.C. § 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 77–80 (2012). “[F]or distinguishing patents that claim laws of
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nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The
framework requires us first to consider “whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
If so, we then examine “the elements of [the] claim both individually and ‘as
an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). That is, we examine the
claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or combination of elements
that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has published revised guidance concerning this
framework and the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(hereinafter “2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people) (hereinafter
“Step 2A, prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
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Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (hereinafter
“Step 2A, prong 2”).3
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so
integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.4

3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08-2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
4 Items (3) and (4) are collectively referred to as “Step 2B” hereinafter and
in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
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See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. With these principles in
mind, we turn to the merits of the § 101 rejection. The Examiner rejects
Appellant’s claims 1, 3–16, and 18–31 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–6. Appellant does not separately
argue the claims with specificity and, instead, argues the claims together for
this rejection. See Appeal Br. 2–17. Accordingly, we address the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and the claims not separately
argued by Appellant as a group based on claim 1, as permitted by 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Statutory Subject Matter
Claim 1 recites a “method” (supra). Appellant’s “method” uses
“circuitry” to represent and compare graphical data. Appeal Br. 17 (Claims
App.) (claim 1). Accordingly, we analyze Appellant’s method as a process,
which is a statutory category of invention (subject matter) (USPTO’s Step
1).
Abstract Idea
The Examiner rejects Appellant’s claim 1 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–6. Specifically, the
Examiner concludes claim 1 and the other independent claims “are directed
to . . . representing and comparing graph data. [T]he invention as recited in
the claims merely include calculations and manipulation of data, and clearly
can be performed mentally or with pencil and paper, and thus is directed an
abstract idea” similar to CyberSource (CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Final Act. 2.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Appeal Br. 5–11;
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Reply Br. 2–7. Specifically, Appellant contends, with respect to the first
step of the Alice analysis, that the instant claims are “not directed to an
abstract idea” (Appeal Br. 5), the Examiner “oversimplifies the claims”
(Appeal Br. 9) and fails to consider the claims as a whole (see Appeal Br. 9–
10; Reply Br. 3–4), and CyberSource is inapplicable in that “the
manipulation of computer data structures” (Appeal Br. 10 (quotations
omitted)) cannot be practically performed in the human mind (see Appeal
Br. 10; Reply Br. 4). Appellant also contends that the instant claims “are
directed to a particular solution to a technical problem in the computer
related arts”—“searching a particular data-structure based on structure
matching” (Appeal Br. 5), and “the claims . . . are directed to . . . [a]
technological improvement, which . . . integrate[s] an abstract idea,” similar
to the claims in Enfish and McRO (Appeal Br. 7 (citing Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016))). See Appeal Br.
5–9; Reply Br. 3–6.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
(and the other pending claims) recites abstract ideas, these abstract ideas are
not integrated into a practical application, nor do they include an inventive
concept. In view of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we clarify and expand the
Examiner’s reasoning as follows.
We begin our analysis by broadly but reasonably construing
Appellant’s claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.)). Omitting the
portions of the claim invoking use of generic technology (which are
discussed separately below), claim 1 focuses on (as stated in the preamble) a
method (process) of “representing and comparing graph data” by performing
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the delineated functionality (steps, functions, or sub-processes). These
functions elaborate on the functionality of the graphical data representation
and comparison process, and comprise: (A) “representing the graph data as a
generalized combinatorial hypermap” (limitation (A))—that is, converting a
graph structure (graphical data) to a topological representation represented
by a list of numbers (see Spec. 4:20–6:2; 11:19–23); (B) “bijectively
representing a sub-map of the generalized combinatorial hypermap using a
plurality of arrays of numbers including an array of fixed point free
involutions” (limitation (B))—in other words, reversibly (see Spec. 1:15)
transforming a portion (sub-set) of the generalized combinatorial hypermap
into a number array that may include an invertible function (a function that
is its own inverse, i.e., when applied to itself results in the same value) (see
Spec. 8:24–9:15; 11:19–13:10); and (C) “bijectively mapping the plurality of
arrays of numbers to a Gödel number” (limitation (C))—i.e., transforming or
encoding the array of numbers into a single number (see Spec. 6:2–12;
13:11–21). The functions of the graphical data representation and
comparison process further comprise: (D) “comparing the sub-map[s] . . . by
comparing the Gödel number representing the sub-map to a Gödel number
representing the another sub-map” (limitation (D)) (see Spec. 10:14–16;
24:16–21); (E) “compiling a database of compositional patterns to include
topologies of submaps of the generalized combinatorial hypermap that are
determined to be isomorphic with another submaps” (limitation (E))—that is
compiling a database (storing data in a data structure) where the data are
topologies of submaps (the arrays of numbers encoded as Gödel numbers)
that are determined in the comparison (limitation (D)) to be isomorphic (see
Spec. 28:15–30; 29:12–30:11); and (F) “performing unification of respective
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submaps . . . when the respective submaps . . . are determined to be
isomorphic” (limitation (F))—in other words, unifying the submaps that are
determined in the comparison (limitation (D)) to be isomorphic (see Spec.
28:15–30:11; 34:1–12).
Apart from the use of generic technology (discussed further below),
each of the limitations of claim 1 describes “‘collecting information,
analyzing it,’” and compiling (collecting and storing) results of the
collection and analysis, “where the data analysis steps are recited at a high
level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the
human mind.” October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7, available
at https://www.uspto.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (hereinafter
“October 2019 Update”). The graphical data representation and comparison
process amounts to a mental process (see Final Act. 2) that is very similar to
Electric Power Group. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1351–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
A person can practically perform the functions of limitations (A)–(D)
and (F) (the representing, mapping, comparing, and unifying (performing
unification) functions) mentally, or by using pen and paper. Nowhere does
Appellant point to specific claim limitations that distinguish over a human
process. Further, the revised guidance explains that “mental processes”
include acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper,
even if the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the
acts. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim,
under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind
but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the
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mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed
in the mind.”) Because each of the limitations discussed above encompasses
an act that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, claim 1
recites mental processes. Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us
otherwise. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850
F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC
v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (Finding the “claims generally recite . . . extracting data [and]
recognizing specific information from the extracted data” and that the
“claims are drawn to the basic concept of data recognition.”). Even where
the analysis requires one to access and gather data, or utilize a pen and paper
in the analysis, such analysis may still be an abstract mental process. See
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (“[E]ven if some physical steps are required
to obtain information from the database . . . such data-gathering steps cannot
alone confer patentability.”). Additionally, the function of “compiling”
information in a database (limitation (E)) (i.e., collecting and storing data)
amounts to extra-solution activity to the mental process.
Also, apart from the use of generic technology (discussed further
below), each of the limitations of claim 1 describes activities that would be
performed during a graph (graphical) data transformation, comparison, and
unification process—i.e., standard mathematical techniques previously used
for evaluating graph data (see Spec. 16:11–15): limitations (A)–(C) describe
manipulating (transforming, converting, or encoding) (i.e., collecting and
analyzing) information. See Spec. 11:19–13:16. Limitations (D) and (F)
describe comparing (analyzing) the manipulated information, and unifying
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(analyzing) the compared information. See Spec. 10:14–22; 11:1–10;
24:17–21. Because a person can practically perform the steps of claim 1
mentally, or by using pen and paper, we find Appellant’s contentions—that
the Examiner oversimplified the claim and failed to consider the claim as a
whole—unpersuasive.
Appellant also contends (supra) that claim 1 is directed to a
technological improvement similar to the claims in Enfish and McRO.
Appeal Br. 7; see Appeal Br. 5–9; Reply Br. 3–6. We address the purported
technical improvements with respect to the “Practical Application” of the
abstract idea (below).
In summary, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1 recites a judicial
exception (USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 1; see 2019 Revised Guidance).
Specifically, claim 1 recites a process for representing and comparing graph
data using circuitry—the graphical data representation and comparison
process—by transforming data, comparing data, and performing data
unification, as discussed supra. The graphical data representation and
comparison process consists of mental processes that can be practically
performed in the human mind (or utilizing pen and paper) including
observation, evaluation, or judgment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52, 53 (listing “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as
some of the “enumerated groupings of abstract ideas” (footnote omitted)).
Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, whether
the claims are directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims integrate
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the abstract idea into a practical application of that abstract idea. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. In doing so, we evaluate the claim as
a whole to determine whether the claim “integrate[s] the [abstract idea] into
a practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55; see also October 2019 Update 12 (discussing the practical
application analysis). That is, we consider any additional elements recited in
the claim along with the limitations that recite an abstract idea to determine
whether the claim integrates the abstract idea into a practical application.
See October 2019 Update 12.
Claim 1 recites additional elements beyond the abstract graphical data
representation and comparison process (the judicial exception). The
additional elements in claim 1 include the circuitry and database (“compiling
a database (i.e., a data structure)). Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.) (claim 1).
Appellant’s Specification describes the circuitry as processing
circuitry (a computer processor)—the “processes described above and
features of the invention can be implemented using some form of computer
processor or processing circuitry” (Spec. 40:11–12) including a “Xenon
processor . . . or an Opteron processor” (Spec. 41:13–14) or a “processing
circuit” including “devices such as an application-specific integrated circuit
(ASIC) and conventional circuit components arranged to perform the recited
functions” (Spec. 41:19–22). Appellant’s Specification does not expressly
discuss the structure of the “database” recited in claim 1, but describes
storing data in a database—the “database of basic compositional patterns can
be defined by the compilation of input graphs into primitive submaps” and
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the comparison search can be performed “by unifying submap schemata
with query G-Maps from the database.” Spec. 29:14–18.
In summary, Appellant’s written description does not portray the
circuitry and database (additional elements) as anything but standard
computer components and data structures. Nor does Appellant’s written
description portray these components as operating in a new way. Instead the
written description depicts these components as generic components
operating in their accustomed manner.
Accordingly, Appellant’s written description shows that additional
elements are generic. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] patent need not teach, and
preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”); Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The
claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it
amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware, or firmware)
that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-
specific resources.”).
None of these additional elements, whether taken alone or in the
context of the claims as a whole, integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. In particular, the recited limitations including the
additional elements may improve the mental process of graphical data
representation and comparison, but do not describe an improvement in the
functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or
technical field such as graph databases, generally (see Appeal Br. 13 (“the
technology of graph databases is improved by the specific features recited in
the claims”)). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
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Appellant contends claim 1 (and the other pending claims) provides a
“particular solution to a technical problem in the computer related arts”
(structure matching) (Appeal Br. 5), and is directed to a “technological
improvement,” similar to the claims in Enfish and McRO. Appeal Br. 7; see
Appeal Br. 5–9; Reply Br. 3–6. In other words, Appellant contends the
claims recite a technological improvement that amounts to more than simply
utilizing a computer as a tool to accomplish the graphical data representation
and comparison process.
Appellant’s contentions correspond to the reasoning in MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a) and 2106.05(d), where additional elements integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. We, however, disagree with
Appellant’s contentions. Appellant’s additional elements do not apply or
use the graphical data representation and comparison process (the judicial
exception) in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–24 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–
85). Rather, Appellant’s claim recites generic computer elements (e.g., the
processing circuitry) that are utilized as tools to carry out the collection
(compiling), analysis, and manipulation of information to represent and
compare graphical information as discussed supra. Utilizing computers as
tools to perform common data information analysis and data collection
functions that can be mental processes (an abstract idea) does not impose a
meaningful limit on the abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f); see also
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (Finding “if [the] recitation of a computer amounts to
a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on a computer that addition
cannot impart patent eligibility.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
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Appellant’s claim 1 (and the other pending claims) can be
distinguished from patent-eligible claims such as those in McRO, Enfish,
BASCOM, and DDR Holdings that are directed to “a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology” (McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314),
or “a specific improvement to the way computers operate” (Enfish, 822 F.3d
at 1336), solving a technology-based problem (BASCOM Global Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir.
2016)), or a method “rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a
problem specifically arising in the realm of computer [technology]” (DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257). Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, claim 1 is
not a technological improvement or an improvement in a technology.
Appellant’s claim 1 does not “improve the functioning of the computer
itself” or “any other technology or technical field.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225.
Nor does it provide a technological solution to a technological problem. See
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257; MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appellant fails to
explain sufficiently and persuasively how the instant claim(s) are directed to
an improvement in the way computers operate, nor has Appellant identified
any technical advance or improvement or specialized computer components.
See Appeal Br. 13–16.
In summary, “the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement
in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use
computers as tools.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(f) (instructing Examiners to consider “[w]hether the claim
invokes computers or other machinery merely as a tool to perform an
existing process” in determining whether the claim recites mere instructions
to apply the exception) (cited in 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55
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n.30) (emphasis omitted). Thus, we conclude the claims are directed to an
abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application.
Inventive Concept
Having concluded Appellant’s claims are directed to an abstract idea
under the 2019 Revised Guidance (Step 2A analysis), we consider whether
claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is, whether the claim has additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). As
discussed above, this requires us to evaluate whether the additional claim
elements add “a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not
well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or “simply
append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determined that Appellant’s claim 1 (and the other
pending claims) do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself—when viewed “both individually or in combination,” the additional
elements “do not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract
idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the
claim(s) amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Final
Act. 3; see Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 5–6. Specifically, the Examiner found that
the additional “elements such as circuitry and a processing circuitry in
claims 1 and 16 are recited in a high level of generality that would
encompass a generic compute[r], and a database for storing a data structure”
that are “component[s] of a generic computer.” Final Act. 2–3; see Ans. 4–
5.
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Appellant does not address explicitly which additional elements are
not well-known, routine, or conventional, or how the additional elements
perform functions that are not well-known, routine, and conventional with
respect to the second step of the Alice analysis. Appellant does, however,
contend that claim 1 and the other pending claims “recite specific features
that, when considered as an ordered combination, amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea itself”—specifically, that the claims recite
technical improvements (supra). Appeal Br. 11–15. Appellant also
contends claim 1 (as well as the other pending claims) should be upheld
under the Step 2B analysis. See Reply Br. 7–8. Specifically, Appellant
contends the Examiner has “provided no evidence or rationale to support
[the] assertion that the ordered combination of claimed elements . . . are
well-understood, routine and conventional in the field.” Reply Br. 8; see
Reply Br. 7 (citing the Office’s Berkheimer Memo).5
Appellant fails to persuade us of error in the Examiner’s rejection
with respect to the second Alice step (USPTO’s Step 2B). Claim 1 does not
explicitly recite any structure (non-abstract additional elements), but does
implicate additional elements (circuitry and compiling a database). To the
extent Appellant argues features beyond the judicial exception amount to an
“inventive concept,” we agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s claim 1
(as well as the other pending claims) does not evince an inventive concept

5 Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, entitled “Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.),” dated April 19, 2018
(“Berkheimer Memo”). The Berkheimer Memo is available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
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that is significantly more than the abstract idea itself. In particular,
Appellant fails to explain how the additional elements (supra) add specific
limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not well-understood,
routine, and conventional in the field.
As previously discussed, claim 1, to the extent it describes any non-
abstract structure, merely recites additional non-abstract elements (circuitry
and database) that perform the graphical data representation and comparison
process. The record supports the Examiner’s findings (see Final Act. 2–3;
Ans. 5–6) that the additional elements, individually and as an ordered
combination, are generic computer components that carry out common
information collection and analysis functions recited in the graphical data
representation and comparison process (the abstract idea), and that the
additional elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional, specified
at a high level of generality. See, e.g., Spec. 29:14–18; 40:11–12; 41:13–14,
19–22; Ans. 5 (a “generic computer structure is merely invoked as a tool to
perform the calculations and manipulation of values.” “Therefore, the
claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea as it is more similar to
Gottschalk v. Benson” (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972))); see
also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Such conventional computer processes operating on conventional
computer hardware “do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter.” FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at
1256). Further, generically claimed elements of circuitry and a database
have been found to be no more than well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity in the context of gathering, assembling, and analyzing
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information. See, e.g., Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370 (“These conventional
limitations of claim 1, combined with limitations of analyzing and
comparing data and reconciling differences between the data . . . amount to
no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data
with conventional computer components.”).
With respect to Appellant’s contentions that the purported technical
improvements and benefits of the graphical data representation and
comparison process (the abstract idea) in conjunction with the additional
elements provide significantly more than the abstract idea, we are not
persuaded. See Appeal Br. 11–15. According to Appellant, the
Specification describes and the claims recite purported benefits and technical
improvements—e.g., “the technology of graph databases is improved by the
specific features recited in the claims, which solves one of the main issues in
the technology of graph databases” (Appeal Br. 13). See Appeal Br. 11–15
(citing Spec. 4:20–5:2). The purported benefits and technical improvements,
however, flow from the abstract idea and not the additional elements. That
is, other than using generic technology, the purported benefits and
improvements are elaborations on the basic abstract idea itself. “It is clear
from Mayo that the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself.”
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant also fails to persuade us that the Examiner did not support
the determination that the additional elements are well-known, routine, and
conventional. The Examiner provides a number of citations to precedent to
support the determination. See Final Act. 3; Ans. 5 (citing Alice, Ex parte
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Gutta (93 USPQ2d 1025, 1033 (BPAI 2009) (precedential)), and Gottschalk
v. Benson). Appellant does not address the Examiner’s citations.
“The second step of the Alice test is satisfied when the claim
limitations ‘involve more than performance of []well-understood, routine,
[and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’”
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–48 and Alice, 573 U.S. at 225).
“Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a
skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.”
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369; see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
56.
Accordingly, we find the Examiner has supported the finding that that
the additional elements are well-known, routine, and conventional, and we
agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 5–6) that the additional
elements (supra) are well-known, routine, and conventional. The Examiner
has provided support from at least category 2 (below) of the four categories
of information required by the USPTO’s guidance in its Berkheimer Memo:
1. A citation to an express statement in the specification or to
a statement made by an applicant during prosecution that
demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional
nature of the additional element(s) . . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed
in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood,
routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s) . . . .
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4. A statement that the examiner is taking official notice of
the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the
additional element(s) . . . .
Berkheimer Memo at 3–4.
For at least the reasons above, Appellant has not persuasively shown
the additional elements amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
when considered either individually or as a combination, and we are not
persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of
independent claim 1, independent claim 16, and dependent claims 3–15 and
18–31, which depend from claims 1 and 16, respectively, and which were
not argued separately with specificity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we determine that claims 1, 3–16,
and 18–31 are directed to an abstract idea and do not demonstrate an
inventive concept. Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1, 3–16, and 18–31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–16, 18–31 101 Eligibility 1, 3–16, 18–
31

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f) (2017).
AFFIRMED