Kristie D.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Feb 6, 2018

0120160236 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 6, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Kristie D.,1
Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southern Area),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120160236

Agency No. 4G-350-0073-15

DECISION

On October 5, 2015, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
September 17, 2015, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons,
the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.

BACKGROUND

Complainant worked as a City Carrier Assistant at the Post Office in Decatur, Georgia. On April
27, 2015, Complainant filed an EEO complaint in which she alleged that the Postmaster and the
Acting Customer Services Supervisor (ACSS) discriminated against her on the basis of disability
(residual effects of unspecified on-the-job injury) by forcing her to work outside of her medical
restrictions between October 25, 2014 and March 2, 2015, and by informing her on March 2,
2015 that no work was available within her medical restrictions.2

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

2 Complainant also alleged reprisal as a basis. However, by her own admission, the basis for her
reprisal allegation was a union grievance that she had filed against the Postmaster, wherein she
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At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
investigative report (IR) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). On August 6, 2015, Complainant asked for a final decision on the
record. In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the
Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

According to the ACSS, Complainant was involved in an on-the-job accident on October 21,
2014, from which she continued to experience pain in her neck and left wrist. IR 148.
Complainant averred that between October 25, 2014 and March 2, 2015, she was expected to
perform above and beyond what her doctor had recommended. She also averred that after March
2, 2015, the Postmaster and the ACSS refused to honor her restrictions at all. IR 110-11. She
further averred that on March 9, 2015, she received a letter from the ACSS explaining that there
would be no work available for her until she returned to full duty. IR 114-16, 124. However,
when asked by the EEO investigator to describe the nature and extent of her medical condition,
she replied “N.A” to the entire sequence of questions dealing with that subject. IR 107-09. She
likewise responded “N/A” to the series of questions addressing whether she had sought a
reasonable accommodation. IR 109.

The Postmaster averred that between October 2014 and February 2015, Complainant was under
temporary medical restrictions that included no lifting, pushing, or pulling more than 25 pounds
and no grasping with her left hand. IR 125-26, 136. He also averred that in February 2015, the
Agency received updated medical restrictions that precluded Complainant from lifting more than
five pounds and operating a motor vehicle. IR 134-135, 138, 149. In addition, the Postmaster
stated that Complainant did not request a reasonable accommodation, and that although
Complainant herself did not request an appointment with the District Reasonable
Accommodation Committee (DRAC), he referred her to the DRAC. IR 135. The Postmaster
reiterated that Complainant had only been requesting temporary job assignments, not a
reasonable accommodation. IR 135-36.

The ACSS averred that Complainant was offered multiple temporary positions after her accident
in October 2014, that Complainant never mentioned that she had an impairment or limitations,
and that the job offers she received were based on the medical documentation she had submitted.
IR 149-51. In particular, the ACSS stated that Complainant was provided assistance with
loading the mail trucks for delivery. The ACSS could not say whether Complainant’s condition
was temporary or permanent, and that on March 9, 2015, she had asked Complainant to provide
updated medical documentation on her restrictions, but that Complainant had not done so. The
ACSS expressed her belief that, based on the medical information she had received,
Complainant’s condition did substantially limit her ability to do her job. IR 148-49, 152. The

did not raise any claims of discrimination. On appeal, Complainant did not challenge the
Agency’s dismissal of her reprisal claim.
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ACSS also emphasized that Complainant had never been denied a reasonable accommodation.
IR 149-50.

The Officer-in-Charge (OIC) averred that according to the medical documentation that he had
reviewed, Complainant had no specific impairment, and that her restrictions were temporary. He
stated that Complainant’s last job offer prior to the change in her medical restrictions was made
on December 5, 2014, and that she accepted the offer on January 25, 2015. He stated in addition
that when the Postmaster became aware of Complainant’s new restrictions in February 2015, he
referred Complainant to the DRAC and instituted a 50-mile-radius search in order to find work
for Complainant that was compatible with her restrictions, but to no avail. He repeated that
Complainant was never denied a reasonable accommodation and that the temporary
accommodations she had been granted until March 2, 2015 had been within the parameters set by
management and the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs in the Department of Labor.
IR 163-65. He denied that Complainant was ever forced to work outside of her medical
restrictions. IR 165, 167.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part
1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review
“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the
parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and
its interpretation of the law”).

Agencies are required to reasonably accommodate the known limitations of qualified individuals
with disabilities unless they can show that doing so would result an undue hardship upon their
operations. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), (p); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement
Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17. 2002); Barney G. v. Department of Agriculture,
EEOC Appeal No. 0120120400 (December 3, 2015). For purposes of this decision, we will
assume that Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability.

Complainant asserted that the ACSS forced her to work outside of her medical restrictions
because the ACSS did not believe that her injuries were severe enough to prevent her from
working full duty. IR 113. She also averred that the ACSS and the Postmaster refused to
provide her with work she could do after March 2, 2015. As a qualified individual with a
disability, Complainant would be entitled to an effective accommodation, but not necessarily the
accommodation of her choice. See Jill M. v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No.
0120151292 (June 2, 2017), citing Castaneda v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No.
01931005 (Feb. 17, 1994). In this case, the documented efforts of the Postmaster and the ACSS
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to provide Complainant with work that was compatible with her medical restrictions were
extensive. Until she was restricted from operating a motor vehicle in February of 2015, she was
allowed to carry her assigned routes and was given assistance in loading her delivery vehicle.
When the Postmaster became aware of Complainant’s new restrictions, he asked for updated
medical information, which Complainant had not provided. He also instituted a search for
positions within a fifty-mile radius of the Decatur Post Office, but had not received any
affirmative positions. There are no documents or statements indicating that Complainant had
been terminated or otherwise suspended from the rolls. We therefore find no violation of the
Rehabilitation Act on the part of the Agency.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the
Agency’s final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
Agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
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Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The
court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
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the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to
File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

February 6, 2018
Date