Krajcev, Dimitar et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2019

14230870 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/230,870 03/31/2014 Dimitar Krajcev 041905-0431032 2840
909 7590 10/01/2019
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP
PO Box 10500
McLean, VA 22102
EXAMINER
HARRINGTON, MICHAEL P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket_ip@pillsburylaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DIMITAR KRAJCEV, SEAD DIZDAREVIC,
SANJIN KARABEGOVIC, LISA DOOLEY, MIRJANA GARCIA,
STEPHEN WELCH, ADAM WIXTED, ELIZABETHE MIELLO, and
BRIAN MOSTELLER
____________

Appeal 2018-0080151
Application 14/230,8702
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the decision
rejecting claims 1–20, which are the only claims pending in the Application,
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Our Decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Jan.
26, 2018), and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Aug. 1, 2018), the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 1, 2018) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed July 27, 2017).
2 According to the Appellants, the real party in interest is “Hospitality
Management Technologies Solutions LLC.” App. Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimed Subject Matter
Appellants’ “invention relates to a method for the creation and
management of hospitality programs for Olympic (and other) events,
including pre-event planning, onsite logistics and management and post
event activities.” Spec. ¶ 2. Independent claim 11, reproduced below with
bracketed notations, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
11. A method of coordinating event inventory
management for client groups and individual guests of the
client groups attending an event, the method being implemented
by a computer system that includes one or more physical
processors executing one or more computer program
instructions which, when executed, perform the method, the
method comprising:
[(a)] monitoring, by the one or more physical
processors, requests for one or more third-party event inventory
items and forecasting, by the one or more physical processors,
based on the request monitoring, future inventory item demand
on a hospitality program provider to which the monitored
requests are directed;
[(b)] causing, by the one or more physical processors,
based on the forecasted future inventory item demand, third-
party event inventory items to be purchased by generating
automated requests to purchase the third-party event inventory
items on behalf of the hospitality program provider;
[(c)] storing, by the one or more physical processors,
based on the automated purchase requests, the third-party event
inventory items as event inventory items that are at the disposal
of a hospitality program provider;
[(d)] receiving, by the one or more physical processors,
via a user interface over the Internet, one or more first requests
from a first one of the client groups for at least two of the third-
party event inventory items;
[(e)] causing, by the one or more physical processors,
based on the one or more first requests, allocation of a first item
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subset of the third-party event inventory items to the first one of
the client groups;
[(f)] receiving, by the one or more physical processors,
via a user interface over the Internet, one or more second
requests from the first one of the client groups to allocate
individual third party event inventory items of the first item
subset to first individual guests of the first one of the client
groups; and
[(g)] causing, by the one or more physical processors,
based on the one or more second requests, allocation of the
individual third-party event inventory items to the first
individual guests.
App. Br. 12–13 (Claims Appendix).

ANALYSIS
We are not persuaded by the Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner
erred in concluding that claims 1–20 are directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’” are
not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, first described in
Mayo and further clarified in Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)).
According to that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is
“directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before
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us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a
third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s, January 7, 2019 Memorandum, Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“2019 Guidance”). Under
Step 2A Prong One, the Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter: (a)
mathematical concepts, (b) certain methods of organizing human activity,
and (c) mental processes. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Under Step 2A
Prong Two, the judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) is evaluated for
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integration into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).3 Id. at 54.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, under Step 2B of the
Guidance, the Examiner looks to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Id. at 56.
Alice Step 1
The Examiner determined
the claims are directed towards a series of steps of acquiring
inventory items based on forecasted demand, allocating
inventory items to client groups based on requests, and then
allocating the inventory items to individual guests in the client
groups. This claimed invention is therefore directed towards an
abstract idea of gathering and organizing inventory items into
different allocations and storage, and allocating inventory to
clients based on a contractual agreement. This abstract is
similar to concepts previously identified by the Court, such as
organizing information through mathematical correlations
(Digitech), and completing a contractual relationship
(buySAFE). More simply, the organization of inventory items

3 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of Office guidance). Solely for
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
it under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of Office guidance). See Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
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into different allocations and storage, and allocating inventory
to clients based on a contractual agreement is an abstract idea.
Final Act. 15.
In contesting the rejection, Appellants argue claims 1–20 together as a
group. See App. Br. 4–9. We select claim 11 as the representative claim for
the group; thus, claims 1–10 and 12–20 stand or fall with claim 11.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In their Appeal Brief, Appellants do not contest
the Examiner’s characterization of the abstract idea.4 Appellants
acknowledge “the instant claims (at most) ‘involve’ the mathematical
organization of information or the completion of a contractual relationship”
(App. Br. 5), but argue that the claims “achieve an improved technological
result.” Id. at 6. For the following reasons, we are not persuaded by
Appellants’ arguments.

Does claim 11 recite a judicial exception?
Independent claim 11 recites “[a] method of coordinating event
inventory management for client groups and individual guests of the client
groups attending an event” comprising seven steps: (a) “monitoring . . .
requests for one or more third-party event inventory items and forecasting . .
. based on the request monitoring, future inventory item demand on a
hospitality program provider to which the monitored requests are directed;”
(b) “causing . . . based on the forecasted future inventory item demand,
third-party event inventory items to be purchased by generating . . . requests

4 Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (“If an
appellant fails to present arguments on a particular issue — or, more
broadly, on a particular rejection — the Board will not, as a general matter,
unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection.”).
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to purchase the third-party event inventory items on behalf of the hospitality
program provider;” (c) “storing . . . based on the . . . purchase requests, the
third-party event inventory items as event inventory items that are at the
disposal of a hospitality program provider;” (d) “receiving . . . one or more
first requests from a first one of the client groups for at least two of the third-
party event inventory items;” (e) “causing . . . based on the one or more first
requests, allocation of a first item subset of the third-party event inventory
items to the first one of the client groups;” (f) “receiving . . . one or more
second requests from the first one of the client groups to allocate individual
third party event inventory items of the first item subset to first individual
guests of the first one of the client groups; and” (g) “causing . . . based on
the one or more second requests, allocation of the individual third-party
event inventory items to the first individual guests.” App. Br. 12–13, Claims
Appendix.
The steps recited in claim 11 describe a process of coordinating event
inventory management for a hospitality program provider. For example, in
order to assess third-party event inventory items that need to be purchased,
steps (a) and (b) describe monitoring requests for those inventory items to
forecast future demand, and based on the forecasted future inventory item
demand, purchasing third-party event inventory items on behalf of the
hospitality program provider. Step (c) describes storing the third-party event
inventory items as event inventory items at the disposal of the hospitality
program provider so they can be allocated to a client group or individual
guest (steps (e) and (g)) based on the received requests (steps (d) and (f)).
As a whole, the activities recited in steps (a) through (g) describe a process
of managing the purchase and distribution of third-party event inventory
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items for a hospitality program provider, which describe fundamental
economic practices involving sales activities or behaviors that fall within the
Guidance’s “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” grouping, and,
thus, recite an abstract idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Predictive analysis is a well-established statistical technique applied in
a variety of fields, especially in the field of financial services to assess risk
and make future predictions in guiding decision making and managing
financial transactions, which is analogous to the concept held abstract by the
Federal Circuit in OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“claim 1 has the following relevant limitations:
(1) testing a plurality of prices; (2) gathering statistics generated about how
customers reacted to the offers testing the prices; (3) using that data to
estimate outcomes (i.e. mapping the demand curve over time for a given
product); and (4) automatically selecting and offering a new price based on
the estimated outcome;” that is, claim 1 is “directed to the concept of offer-
based price optimization”, an abstract idea). See also eResearchTechnology,
Inc. v. CRF, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 463 (W. D. Pa., 2016), aff’d, 2017 WL
1033672 (Mem) (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“obtaining data, generating an algorithm
by quantitative analysis, and translating said algorithm into a more useful
rule” is an abstract idea). In light of these precedents, we conclude that,
under Prong One of Step 2A of the Guidance, claim 11 recites an abstract
idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.

Is claim 11 “directed to” the recited judicial exception?
Because claim 11 recites an abstract idea, we determine whether the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application.
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. When a claim recites a judicial exception and
fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, the claim is
“directed to” the judicial exception. Id. The claim may integrate the judicial
exception when, for example, it reflects an improvement to technology or a
technical field. Id. at 55.
In that regard, Appellants argue that
the claims are patent-eligible under the first step of the two-part
Alice test at least because they recite a particular ordered
combination of operations to provide a particular useful
application that improves another technology or technical field,
such as improving upon prior event inventory management
computer systems by (i) reducing the amount of computational
resources for default/filler-based entry, (ii) making event
inventory management computer systems simpler or more
efficient for users to interact with, and (iii) increasing accuracy
of event inventory management computer systems, as described
in greater below.

Appeal Br. 5–6. Appellants draw a parallel between the claimed invention
and the decisions in Enfish,5 McRO,6 and Thales Visionix.7 See id. at 6–9;
see also Reply Br. 7–9. We are not persuaded by these arguments.
“The ‘abstract idea’ step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the
‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s
‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs
of Tex. v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (quoting Elec.

5 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
7 Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

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Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see
also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, we can look to the Specification to assess the problems addressed and
the solution advanced by Appellants, and the Specification makes clear that
the focus of the claimed advance lies in automating the claimed process.
Appellants identify the problem as follows: “The amount of planning and
logistics involved in handling some of these hospitality programs can be
very significant. In the past, many of these activities were performed
manually. This is tedious, time consuming and inefficient.” Spec. ¶ 3.
Appellants acknowledge that although “some aspects of these logistics and
management have been automated through the use of computer technology”
(id.), “[o]ne drawback is the inability to effectively and timely communicate
changes that may occur at the last minute.” Id. ¶ 4. Appellants solved this
and other drawbacks by fully automating the process to include real-time
alters, notifications, and updates (Spec. ¶¶ 43, 57–60), and “[i]n order to
enable effective and timely communication staff and guests may be provided
a mobile communications device” (id. ¶ 9), such as a “cell phone, pager,
PDA, or any other mobile device with network capabilities.” Id. ¶ 12.
Computer-based efficiency by itself does not save an otherwise
abstract method. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Performance by
computer of operations that previously were performed manually or
mentally, albeit less efficiently, does not convert a known abstract idea into
eligible subject matter.). Moreover, a claim does not gain subject matter
eligibility solely because it is narrowed or limited to Appellants’ alleged
improvement over existing processes. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC
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v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 216) (“A narrow claim
directed to an abstract idea, however, is not necessarily patent-eligible”); see
also BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“a claim is not patent eligible merely because it applies an abstract
idea in a narrow way.”).
We disagree with Appellants’ arguments that the method set forth in
claim 11 provides non-abstract improvements to computer technology.
Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between computer functionality
improvements, on the one hand, and uses of existing computers as tools to
perform a particular task, on the other. In Enfish, for example, the court
noted that “[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to computer
technology just as hardware improvements can.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335.
The court asked “whether the focus of the claims is on [a] specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.” Id. at 1335–36. The court found that the “plain focus of the claims”
there was on an improvement to computer functionality itself (a self-
referential table for a computer database, designed to improve the way a
computer carries out its basic functions of storing and retrieving data), not
on a task for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. Id.
Appellants do not explain, and we do not see, how any enhancement
in computer functionality is reflected in the language of claim 11; rather, any
alleged enhancement appears to be derived solely from automating the
recited process, and claim 11 recites this automation at a high level of
generality. And, unlike Thales, where the improvement was to a physical
tracking system, here the focus of the claim is not to a physical-realm
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improvement but an improvement in wholly abstract ideas—coordinating
event inventory management for a hospitality program provider.
In McRO the court asked whether the claim as a whole “focus[es] on a
specific means or method that improves the relevant technology” or is
“directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely
invoke[s] generic processes and machinery.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–15
(Claims determined not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted
improvement in computer animation.”). The claims in McRO were directed
to a system of lip synchronization and facial expressions of animated
characters, and the court concluded that the computerized system in McRO
operated by rules whose implementation was not previously available
manually. Id. at 1316. Here, in contrast to McRO, implementation was
previously available and conducted, although without computer assistance.
Unlike McRO, we find the focus of the claim as a whole here is directed to a
result or effect that itself is the abstract idea, because the claimed additional
elements (i.e., one or more physical processors, user interface over the
Internet) are merely invoked as tools for automating coordinating event
inventory management for a hospitality program provider.
We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the claims in
Core Wireless8 are similar to the claims before us here. Reply Br. 9–10. For
example, to the extent there is an improvement in claim 11, the improvement
is to the abstract idea, and this improvement is implemented with
conventional computer equipment and processing. Although Core Wireless
is “directed to a particular manner of summarizing and presenting

8 Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
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information in electronic devices,” resulting in an improved user interface,
claim 11 does not recite an improved user interface. See Core Wireless, 880
F.3d at 1362. There, the court stated:
Claim 1 of the ‘476 patent requires “an application summary that
can be reached directly from the menu,” specifying a particular
manner by which the summary window must be accessed. The
claim further requires the application summary window list a
limited set of data, “each of the data in the list being selectable
to launch the respective application and enable the selected data
to be seen within the respective application.” This claim
limitation restrains the type of data that can be displayed in the
summary window. Finally, the claim recites that the summary
window “is displayed while the one or more applications are in
an un-launched state,” a requirement that the device applications
exist in a particular state. These limitations disclose a specific
manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user,
rather than using conventional user interface methods to display
a generic index on a computer. Like the improved systems
claimed in Enfish, Thales, Visual Memory, and Finjan, these
claims recite a specific improvement over prior systems,
resulting in an improved user interface for electronic devices.

Id. at 1362–63. In contrast, Appellants’ claim is directed to a process that
qualifies as an abstract idea for coordinating event inventory management
for a hospitality program provider, in which a computer and GUI are
invoked merely as tools.
Therefore, we determine that the claims do not “apply, rely on, or use
the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception,” i.e., the claims do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application under Prong Two of Step 2B of the
Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
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Alice Step 2
“Well-understood, routine, conventional activities?”
To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, the
additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to
determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or
(2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
In that regard, the Examiner found:
The claims do not include additional elements, taken
individually or in combination that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception because the mere
reception and transmission of information (requests for
inventory items and individual allocation requests) are mere
extrasolution activity that would be routine, well-known, and
conventional in the field. In addition, the generic computer
elements (physical processors, and computer system), recited in
high generality, fail to amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea, as their implementation would have been routine,
well-known, and conventional in any computer implementation
of the abstract idea.
Final Act. 15.
Under the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, we are not
apprised of error in the Examiner’s determination that the elements of the
claim do not contain an “inventive concept” sufficient to “transform” the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. In their Appeal
Brief, Appellants do not dispute these findings. As such, any basis for
asserting error in this regard has been waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
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In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue that “the recent Federal Circuit
decision of Berkheimer v. HP Inc.9 made clear that one attacking the patent-
eligibility of a claim must factually demonstrate that the inventive concept
of the claim is well-understood, routine, and conventional.” Reply Br. 2.
However, the Federal Circuit also made clear that no such factual
demonstration is necessary when the alleged “inventive concept” resides
solely an abstract idea.
Berkheimer held that “[t]he patent eligibility inquiry may contain
underlying issues of fact.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Mortgage
Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“The § 101 inquiry ‘may contain underlying factual issues.”’)).
The inquiry as to whether a claim element or combination is well-
understood, routine, and conventional falls under step two in the § 101
framework. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted). As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact when
the only alleged “inventive concept” is the abstract idea. Id. (“Berkheimer
and Aatrix leave untouched the numerous cases from this court which have
held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the
abstract idea”) (citation omitted).
Also, “[w]hen there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the claim element or claimed combination is well-understood,
routine, [and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field” (i.e., no
facts are in dispute), evidence is not necessary. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at
1368. And, here, there is no factual dispute. The processors and GUI are

9 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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the only additional recited elements beyond the abstract idea. The
Specification conveys that these additional elements are generic computer
components that provide generic computing functionality that is well-
understood, routine, and conventional. (See e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 57, 59, 70, 74, 88,
90, 102, 120, Fig. 2.) Using a generic computer for “monitoring,”
“causing,” “storing,” and “receiving,” information simply takes advantage of
some of the “most basic functions of a computer.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
225 (the “use of a computer to obtain data, adjust account balances, and
issue automated instructions; all of these computer functions are ‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the
industry”) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71–73); see also Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972) (noting that a “computer operates then upon
both new and previously stored data. The general-purpose computer is
designed to perform operations under many different programs.”); Fair
Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (noting that using generic computing components like
a microprocessor or user interface do not transform an otherwise abstract
idea into eligible subject matter); Mortgage. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice
Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (indicating
components such as an “interface” are generic computer components that do
not satisfy the inventive concept requirement).
Finally, Appellants’ reliance on DDR Holdings10 (Reply Br. 15–16) is
unavailing, because the claims at issue do not address a problem unique to
the Internet. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA),

10 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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792 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The patent at issue in DDR provided
an Internet-based solution to solve a problem unique to the Internet that (1)
did not foreclose other ways of solving the problem, and (2) recited a
specific series of steps that resulted in a departure from the routine and
conventional sequence of events after the click of a hyperlink advertisement.
The patent claims here do not address problems unique to the Internet, so
DDR has no applicability.” (Citation omitted)).
As such, under Step 2B of the Guidance, claim 11’s additional
elements do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that claim 11 is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 11 under 35
U.S.C. § 101, and claims 1–10 and 12–20, which fall with claim 11.

DECISION
The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED