Kori S.,1 Complainant,v.Jay Clayton, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 21, 20180120160693 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 21, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Kori S.,1 Complainant, v. Jay Clayton, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency. Appeal No. 0120160693 Hearing No. 520-2015-00230X Agency No. SEC-00007-2014 DECISION On November 10, 2015, Complainant filed an appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s October 13, 2015, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. ISSUE PRESENTED The issue presented is whether there are genuine issues of material fact that require a hearing on Complainant’s claims as alleged. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Securities Compliance Examiner (SCE), SK-11, at the Security Exchange Commission’s (SEC) New York Regional Office (NYRO), located in New York, New York. During the relevant time-frame, 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120160693 2 Complainant was serving a one-year probationary period in the NYRO’s Investment Adviser/Investment Company examination program (IA/IC program). On January 9, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), national origin (British/Jamaican), sex (female), and color (black) when, on or about November 8, 2013, it terminated her probationary employment as a SCE, SK-11. After the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The Agency filed a motion for a decision without a hearing on April 30, 2015, to which Complainant filed an objection on May 15, 2015. The Agency responded on May 27, 2015, to which Complainant further responded on June 10, 2015. The AJ heard oral arguments on the Agency’s motion on June 29, 2015. The AJ granted the motion for a decision without a hearing, issued the Memorandum Decision on Summary Judgment on September 11, 2015, and issued a decision on October 8, 2015. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. UNDISPUTED FACTS Complainant began her one-year probationary term on December 3, 2012. The SCE position required a one-year probationary trial period which included attendance at initial/monthly formal SEC training and the need to successfully complete observation/review examinations administered under the Agency’s National Exam Program (NEP). As a Securities Compliance Examiner, Complainant was responsible for conducting examinations of SEC-regulated entities. The Agency claims that during her probationary period, she failed to meet the SEC’s performance expectations on three SEC Examinations (Exam): (1) Company A (Exam 1); (2) Company B (Exam 2); and (3) Company C (Exam 3). Exam teams consist of junior examiners, lead examiners, an Exam manager, and an Assistant Regional Director (ARD). Generally, lead examiners are senior examiners who supervise and mentor the junior examiners’ work on the day-to-day duties of the Exam. The junior and lead examiner interact with each other daily. The lead examiners interact with the managers of the Exam who generally oversee the work on the Exams. The managers update the ARDs on the status of the Exams. ARDs are less involved with the day-to-day activities than the managers. On March 28, 2013, Complainant received feedback regarding Exam 1, which was supervised by a lead examiner (LE1), an Exam manager (M1), and an ARD (ARD1). The feedback included several work-related areas involving skills and knowledge that needed improvement. On April 26, 2013, an ARD (ARD3) issued Complainant’s mid-year review and Performance Work Plan which identified areas of work performance requiring improvement. On July 31, 2013, Complainant received feedback regarding Exam 2 which was supervised by a lead examiner (LE2), an Exam manager (M2), and an ARD (ARD2). 0120160693 3 With respect to Exam 2, Complainant was advised to take a more active role in interviewing registrants and notified that her written work product must be in proper compliance with IA/IC program standards. Complainant’s work on Exam 3 was supervised by two lead examiners (LE3A and LE3B), an Exam manager (M3), and an ARD (ARD3). Complainant received feedback that she made errors, was a poor writer, and did not demonstrate a proper understanding of subject-matter concepts notwithstanding training and/or supplemental explanations. On October 7, 2013, ARD3 issued Complainant a memorandum (30-Day Notice) which referenced previous counseling sessions regarding her work deficiencies under the NEP. This memorandum also notified Complainant that if her work performance did not improve within the next 30 days, management would not support converting her to a permanent employment status with the Agency. On November 8, 2013, ARD3 issued a second memorandum (Notice of Termination) to Complainant notifying her that her performance did not improve and that she was being terminated. AJ DECISION After hearing oral arguments on the question of whether summary judgment was appropriate, the AJ concluded that the record failed to contain genuinely disputed material facts and that summary judgment was appropriate. The AJ further concluded that Complainant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove discrimination as alleged. Specifically, the AJ found that Complainant was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination since there was no evidence that a similarly situated individual from outside any identified protected group, received any different or better treatment from the Exam supervisors identified in the instant case. Even if Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination as alleged, the AJ found insufficient evidence that the Agency’s articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination (i.e., Complainant’s inability to demonstrate and/or improve her work performance during the probationary trial period) was a pretext for discriminatory animus on the part of any responsible management official. The AJ noted that Complainant’s own views and opinions about the quality of her work performance was not objective evidence to support a finding that the Exam supervisors considered Complainant’s race, color, national origin, or sex, when giving performance feedback. The AJ also referenced an October 15, 2013 anonymous letter to the Agency’s Office of Inspector General in Washington, D.C. (OIG Letter) which registers various accusations submitted on behalf of the “IA/IC Exam Program Staff” (Staff) concerning the “questionable ethics” of an Agency Manager (S2) (African-American, black, male) who was the only person identified by name. The OIG Letter raised numerous accusations including that: (1) S2 failed to verify the work history of a “black female applicant” (BFA) who was the friend of a friend of the Agency’s Associate Director in Atlanta, Georgia; (2) S2 hired eight outside contractors “the majority, in [sic] not all, are black or Hispanic” without informing the Staff; (3) S2 recommended a “female black Exam Manager” for a Mentoring Program without first informing the Staff; (4) S2 put “two white males … through the ringer” within a routine promotion process; 0120160693 4 and (5) S2 has been spotted in an area hotel leaving with a young black woman on some occasions. The OIG Letter essentially asserts that S2 favored Black and other minority applicants who were not qualified over qualified White applicants. The letter also asserts that S2 favored Blacks in other ways over Whites and that he engaged in unethical behavior. The AJ noted that Complainant submitted that she is the unnamed “friend of a friend” black applicant who was hired by S2 as referenced in allegation (1) of the OIG Letter. However, the AJ concluded that the OIG Letter is not relevant to his decision because: (1) the OIG Letter is from an anonymous source; (2) the OIG Letter does not identify Complainant by name thereby requiring speculation as to the knowledge, intent or purpose of an anonymous writer; (3) the OIG Letter does not make reference to the 30-Day Notice or Complainant’s subsequent Notice of Termination, and (4) even assuming Complainant is the BFA that is referenced in the OIG Letter, (at best) it confirms Complainant’s affirmative hiring by the Agency in December 2012 but provides no information about her termination in November 2013. Accordingly, the AJ concluded that the OIG Letter is not “acceptable evidence which can support a finding that illegal employment discrimination actually occurred as alleged.” ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO-MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (as revised, August 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant has failed to establish such a dispute. Even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in Complainant’s favor. 0120160693 5 Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the evidence of record, as well as the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that the AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s decision. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. 0120160693 6 Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations September 21, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation