KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 24, 2020

14962529 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/962,529 12/08/2015 Jennifer CAFFAREL 2014P01241US01 7971
24737 7590 06/24/2020
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
PATEL, JAY M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JENNIFER CAFFAREL, GIJS GELEIJNSE, and
PRIVENDER KAUR SAINI
Appeal 2020-001086
Application 14/962,529
Technology Center 3600
Before LARRY J. HUME, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Koninklijke Philips N.V.
Appeal Brief 4, filed June 24, 2019 (Appeal Br.).
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BACKGROUND
This patent application concerns “systems and methods for creating
and adjusting a holistic care plan for a patient.” Specification 1:9–10, filed
December 8, 2015 (Spec.). Claim 1 illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for creating a patient care plan for a target patient,
the method including:
receiving inputs related to one or more social services and
one or more medical services that are each associated with target
patient data;
generating, based on the inputs, a profile vector of the
patient using a first input-to-vector mapping process;
generating, based on the inputs, a status vector of the
patient using a second input-to-vector mapping process;
selecting one or more social and medical services based on
a target assessment using the profile vector and the status vector;
calculating a net care benefit for each of the selected
services;
creating a patient care plan from outcomes including the
selected services with a highest net care benefit.
Appeal Br. 15.
REJECTIONS
Claims 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis 
1–21 101 Eligibility
1–21 103 Merkin,2 Eiden3
DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and Appellant’s
arguments. Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in

2 Merkin (US 2014/0164005 A1; June 12, 2014).
3 Eiden et al. (US 2013/0191157 A1; July 25, 2013).
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rejecting claims 1–21 under § 101. For this rejection, as consistent with the
discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s reasoning, findings, and
conclusions on pages 4–8 and 21–24 of the Final Office Action mailed
January 2, 2019 (Final Act.), the continuation sheet of the Advisory Action
mailed April 18, 2019 (Advisory Act.), and pages 3–7 of the Examiner’s
Answer mailed September 30, 2019 (Ans.). Appellant has persuaded us,
however, that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–21 under § 103. We
address these rejections in turn.
Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
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practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has revised its guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites subject matter that falls within one of the abstract idea
groupings listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54; see also USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility at 1–2, 10–15, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October SME Update”) (providing
additional guidance on determining whether a claim recites a judicial
exception and whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical
application). If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we
then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised
Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the § 101 rejection.
Appellant argues claims 1–21 together for this rejection, so as permitted by
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37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal for this rejection based on
claim 1.
Directed To
The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
includes “mental processes,” that is, acts that people can perform in their
minds or using pen and paper. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 &
nn.14–15. The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
also includes “certain methods of organizing human activity” such as (1)
fundamental economic principles or practices, (2) commercial or legal
interactions, and (3) managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The
Examiner determined that claim 1 recites subject matter that falls within
these categories of abstract ideas. See Final Act. 4–6; Advisory Act.,
continuation sheet; Ans. 3, 4.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites mental processes.
Claim 1 recites “[a] method for creating a patient care plan for a target
patient” made up of several broadly worded, result-oriented steps. These
steps focus on either collecting information (receiving inputs) or analyzing
information (generating profile and status vectors, selecting social and
medical services, calculating a net care benefit, and creating a patient care
plan). See Appeal Br. 15. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly determined that
claims similarly focused on collecting and analyzing information are
directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1353–56 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining that claims focusing
on “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis” are directed to an abstract idea); October SME
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Update at 7 (explaining that the claims in Electric Power Group are
examples of claims that recite mental processes); see also In re Downing,
754 F. App’x 988, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“This court has consistently treated
inventions directed to collecting, analyzing, and displaying information as
abstract ideas.”); In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We
have held in the computer context that ‘collecting information’ and
‘analyzing’ that information are within the realm of abstract ideas.”).
In addition, we see no meaningful difference between the method
recited in claim 1 and a number of other methods that courts have
determined are directed to mental processes. See, e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d
835, 837–41 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (method of diagnosing an abnormal condition
in an individual); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F.
App’x 950, 953–56 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (method for guiding the selection of a
therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known disease or medical
condition); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057,
1067–68 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (method of determining whether an immunization
schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated
disorder); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1370–77 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (method for verifying the validity of a credit
card transaction over the Internet); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
839 F.3d 1138, 1146–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (translating a functional
description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the
logic circuit). Like the method steps in these decisions, the method steps in
claim 1 are so broadly drawn that they encompass acts that people can
perform in their minds or using pen and paper. We therefore agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 recites mental processes.
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Appellant has not persuaded us otherwise. Appellant contends that
claim 1 is distinguishable from the claims in Electric Power Group because
the recited steps do not involve “merely displaying information.” Appeal Br.
7. Appellant also argues that, unlike the claims in Electric Power Group,
“the cited prior art fails to teach at least the use of a profile vector and a
status vector in generating the patient care plan as claimed” and thus “the
recited invention . . . make[s] use of a new source or type of information.”
Appeal Br. 8.
We disagree. The method steps recited in claim 1 are analogous to the
methods steps in Electric Power Group because they recite collecting and
analyzing information at high level of generality, not because they recite
displaying information. And even assuming that claimed method uses a new
source or type of information, that alone does not show that claim 1 is patent
eligible. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, LLC, 772 F. App’x 890, 902
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Similarly, even if a ‘user identity based policy’ is a new
source or type of information, it is still abstract information that, as such,
does not contribute to any inventive concept.”); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“As many cases make clear,
even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to
particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the
collection and analysis other than abstract.”). We therefore find these
arguments unpersuasive.
Appellant next argues that the human mind cannot practically perform
the steps recited in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 3–4. For example,
Appellant asserts that people cannot mentally perform the recited input-to-
vector mapping processes because the written description teaches that “the
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input-to-vector mapping process includes extracting context information
values and inputting them into a pre-calculated lookup table, a neural
network, or the like.” Reply Br. 3 (quotation marks omitted). But the written
description does not limit the recited input-to-vector mapping processes to
these conversion methods; the written description discloses that these
methods are exemplary. See Spec. 12:30–13:16. Even if the recited input-to-
vector mapping processes were limited to these methods, people can
mentally recognize values in an input and compare those values to a pre-
calculated lookup table to determine the associated vector. Cf. Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The concept of data collection, recognition,
and storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have always
performed these functions.”); In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary
Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining
that “comparing BRCA sequences and determining the existence of
alterations” is “an abstract mental process”). As for the remaining
limitations, as discussed above, given their breadth, they also encompass
acts that people can perform in their minds (or using pen and paper).
Appellant then contends that the Examiner erroneously determined
that claim 1 recites mental processes because the Examiner relied on “an
incorrect definition of vector as being a single scalar quantity.” Reply Br. 3.
According to Appellant, “a vector is a quantity having a magnitude and a
direction.” Reply Br. 2 (quotation marks omitted). Even assuming the
claimed vectors have a magnitude and a direction, Appellant has not
persuasively explained why this shows that the subject matter recited in
claim 1 falls outside the mental processes category of abstract ideas. People
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can process both vector and scalar quantities mentally or with the aid of pen
and paper, and the claimed method requires generating and using only a
small number of vectors. See Appeal Br. 15. We thus see no merit in this
argument.
Appellant also asserts that claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea
because the claim does not recite “a mathematical relationship, formula, or
calculation.” Reply Br. 3–4. This assertion does not address the Examiner’s
rejection. The Examiner found that claim 1 recites mental processes and
certain methods or organizing human activity, not mathematical concepts.
See Final Act. 4–6; Advisory Act., continuation sheet; Ans. 3, 4.
In any case, we also agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites
certain methods of organizing human activity. As discussed above, the
method for creating a patient care plan for a target patient recited in claim 1
includes receiving inputs, generating profile and status vectors, selecting
social and medical services, calculating a net care benefit, and creating a
patient care plan. See Appeal Br. 15. This method of creating a patient care
plan is similar to other methods that fall within the certain methods of
organizing human activity category of abstract ideas. See, e.g., In re Meyer,
688 F.2d 789, 795 (CCPA 1982) (determining that an “invention . . .
concerned with replacing, in part, the thinking processes of a neurologist
with a computer” is directed to an abstract idea); Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C) (explaining that the claims in
Meyer are examples of claims directed to managing human behavior); see
also In re Salwan, 681 F. App’x 938, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (determining that
a claimed method for transferring patient health information “describes little
more than the automation of a ‘method of organizing human activity’ with
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respect to medical information”); DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media
LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd, 599 F. App’x 956
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (computerized meal planning); My Health, Inc. v. ALR
Techs., Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00535-RWS, 2017 WL 1129904, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 27, 2017) (tracking compliance with treatment guidelines). We
therefore agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity.
Appellant argues that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea
because “the apparatus of claim 1 is not simply a device for automating a
known, conventional activity.” Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant, like
the claims McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), “there is no evidence that the claimed combination is
the same as a prior art process.” Appeal Br. 8.
We disagree. As an initial matter, claim 1 does not recite a device or
an apparatus; claim 1 recites a method for creating a patient care plan that
does not call for any particular hardware or software. See Appeal Br. 15.
That aside, even if the recited method is novel and nonobvious, that does not
mean that the method is patent eligible. “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is
still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151; see also SAP Am., 898
F.3d at 1163 (“We may assume that the techniques claimed are
‘[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,’ but that is not enough for
eligibility. Nor is it enough for subject-matter eligibility that claimed
techniques be novel and nonobvious in light of prior art, passing muster
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)). For the reasons discussed above, we agree with the Examiner that
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claim 1 recites abstract ideas, and Appellant’s assertion that the claimed
invention is novel and nonobvious does not show that the Examiner erred.
Appellant also contends that the claim 1 is similar to the patent-
eligible claims in McRO because claim 1 supposedly improves computer-
related technology and describes a specific way of solving a problem. See
Appeal Br. 9.
We disagree. The patent-eligible claims in McRO incorporated
specific, limited rules that improved a technological process. See 837 F.3d at
1313–16. In contrast, claim 1 recites a series of broadly worded, result-
oriented functions without meaningfully limiting how the claimed method
performs those functions. See Appeal 15. And claim 1 does not improve
technology or a technological process. At best, claim 1 recites an improved
method of creating a patient care plan, which is a method of organizing
human activity. Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084,
1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims of the ’999 patent do not improve the
functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently, or solve any
technological problem. Instead, they recite a purportedly new arrangement
of generic information that assists traders in processing information more
quickly.”); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (“The claims are focused on providing information to traders in a
way that helps them process information more quickly, not on improving
computers or technology.” (citation omitted)).
Because we determine that claim 1 recites abstract ideas, we next
consider whether claim 1 integrates the abstract ideas into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we
evaluate the claim as a whole to determine whether the claim “integrate[s]
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the [abstract ideas] into a practical application, using one or more of the
considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also October SME Update at 12
(discussing the practical application analysis). That is, we consider any
additional elements recited in the claim along with the limitations that recite
an abstract idea to determine whether the claim integrates the abstract ideas
into a practical application. See October SME Update at 12.
Here, each of the elements recited in claim 1 form part of the
identified abstract ideas. Whether we consider these elements individually or
as an ordered combination, these elements do not integrate the abstract ideas
into a practical application. These elements simply state the abstract ideas.
That is not enough to transform the abstract ideas into a practical application
of the ideas. Cf. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an abstract idea ‘while
adding the words “apply it”’ is not enough for patent eligibility.” (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72)); Rudy, 956 F.3d at 1385 (“But transformation of an
abstract idea into a patent-eligible claim ‘requires more than simply stating
the abstract idea while adding the words “apply it.”’” (quoting Alice, 573
U.S. at 222)). These elements thus do not amount to “to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18
(alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Appellant contends that claim 1 integrates the recited abstract ideas
into a practical application because the claim is similar to the patent-eligible
method for treating patients in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See
Reply Br. 4. We disagree. In Vanda, the claims were directed to “a specific
method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at
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specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.” 887 F.3d at 1136. Here,
although the method recited in claim 1 creates a patient care plan, the
method does not require implementing that plan, let alone treating a specific
patient using a specific compound to achieve a specific outcome.
Appellant next argues that claim 1 is patent eligible because it recites
“other meaningful limitations that use the alleged abstract ideas to improve
the previous care plan generation . . . such that the claim integrates the
exceptions into a practical application.” Reply Br. 5. According to
Appellant, unlike
existing systems that require clinician intervention[] and thus
rely on subjective assessment and lack detailed objective
information, the claimed invention involves the unconventional
use of mapping inputs to vectors, using the vectors to select
services, calculating a net care benefit for each of the selected
services, and creating a care plan based on the services having a
highest net care benefit.
Reply Br. 5 (emphases modified). Appellant also contends that like claim 1
of Example 42 of the Office’s subject matter eligibility examples,4 claim 1
here includes additional elements that “recite a specific improvement over
prior art systems by allowing automated generation of a patient care plan
that provides a highest net care benefit, integrating information from
multiple sources of multiple data types.” Appeal Br. 10.
We disagree. As discussed above, the limitations recited in claim 1
form part of the identified abstract ideas, and merely reciting the abstract
ideas does not integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application. Cf.

4 USPTO, Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas (Jan. 7,
2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101_examples
_37to42_20190107.pdf.
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Alice, 573 U.S. at 223; Rudy, 956 F.3d at 1385. And despite Appellant’s
assertion to the contrary, claim 1 encompasses human intervention. Claim 1
does not explicitly limit who or what performs the method steps recited in
claim 1, nor does claim 1 recite that the method steps are automatically
performed. See Appeal Br. 15. As explained above, the method steps are so
broadly drawn that they encompass acts that people can perform in their
minds or using pen and paper. Although the inventors may have intended
that a computer perform the claimed method, claim 1 does not explicitly
require computer implementation or any hardware or software. See Appeal
Br. 15. We therefore find Appellant’s arguments on this point unpersuasive.
See, e.g., Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1149 (“While Synopsys may be correct that
the inventions of the Gregory Patents were intended to be used in
conjunction with computer-based design tools, the Asserted Claims are not
confined to that conception. The § 101 inquiry must focus on the language
of the Asserted Claims themselves.”).
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This requires us to evaluate whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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As discussed above, each of the claim elements recited in claim 1
form part of the identified abstract ideas, and nothing in these elements,
whether considered individually or in an ordered combination,“‘transform[s]
the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79).
Appellant argues for the first time in the Reply Brief that the
Examiner failed to show that “inventive concept (e.g., the specifically-
recited manner of generating a patient care plan) as a whole was well-
understood, routine, and conventional.” Reply Br. 6. Appellant forfeited this
argument because Appellant failed to raise it in the Appeal Brief and has not
presented good cause for belatedly presenting it. See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 41.37(c)(1)((iv), 41.41(b)(2). Even if Appellant had timely raised this
argument, we would have found it unpersuasive. The Examiner was not
required to show that the recited abstract ideas—and all of the recited
elements form part of the recited abstract ideas—were well understood,
routine, and conventional. See, e.g., BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899
F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the
claimed invention as a whole is unconventional or non-routine. . . . It has
been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept
to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” (first and second
emphases added)); Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F.
App’x 882, 892 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“At Alice step two we assess ‘whether the
claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it was directed were well-understood, routine, and conventional.’”
(quoting BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290)).
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Summary
For at least the above reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim
1 is directed to an abstract idea and lacks an inventive concept. We thus
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 101.
Section 103 Rejection
Claim 1 recites “generating, based on the inputs, a profile vector of
the patient using a first input-to-vector mapping process” and “generating,
based on the inputs, a status vector of the patient using a second input-to-
vector mapping process.” Appeal Br. 15. The Examiner determined that the
“general definition of a vector is a quantity having a magnitude and a
direction,” but concluded that the recited profile and status vectors
encompass a one-dimensional value such as a matrix that has “[a] vector
with one row and one column [that] may be a single number.” Ans. 8. Based
on this interpretation, the Examiner found that Merkin’s patient scores teach
the recited status and profile vectors. See Ans. 8.
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred because as the Examiner
acknowledged that “a vector is a quantity having a magnitude and a
direction.” Reply Br. 8. Therefore, in Appellant’s view, “a vector cannot be
a single number because a single number is merely a scalar quantity, it is not
a vector.” Reply Br. 8 (quotation marks omitted). Appellant also contends
that the matrix described the Examiner “is merely a scalar quantity, not a
vector.” Reply Br. 8.
Appellant has persuaded us that the Examiner erred. As argued by
Appellant, the Examiner acknowledged that vectors generally have a
magnitude and a direction, but the Examiner found that Merkin teaches the
vectors recited in claim 1 because Merkin teaches a scalar quantity. See Ans.
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8. This finding is inconsistent with the Examiner’s interpretation of “vector.”
We therefore agree with Appellant that the Examiner erred. As a result, we
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims
under § 103.
CONCLUSION
The following table summarizes our decision for claims 1–21, the
claims before us on appeal:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–21 101 Eligibility 1–21
1–21 103 Merkin, Eiden 1–21
Overall
Outcome 1–21

Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No
period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may
be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED