KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 21, 2021

2021003528 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/314,993 11/30/2016 MARTIN JURNA 2013P01214WOUS 1685
24737 7590 12/21/2021
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
1600 Summer Street
5th Floor
Stamford, CT 06905
EXAMINER
AVIGAN, ADAM JOSEPH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3794
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/21/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARTIN JURNA, JONATHAN ALAMBRA PALERO,
MARCO BARAGONA, MARGARET RUTH HORTON, and
BABU VARGHESE
Appeal 2021-003528
Application 15/314,993
Technology Center 3700
Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
WILLIAM A. CAPP, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–11 and 13–21. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM and designate a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Koninklijke Philips
N.V. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a centrosymmetric radio frequency
electrode configuration for skin treatment. Claim 1, reproduced below, with
emphasis added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A device for RF skin treatment comprising:
an outer electrode arranged on an operational side of the
device and having an annular or equilateral polygonal shape;
an inner electrode arranged on the operational side of the
device at a center of the outer electrode and surrounded by the
outer electrode;
an RF generator configured to supply an RF treatment
voltage between the inner electrode and the outer electrode; and
a controller configured to control the RF generator to
generate the RF treatment wherein the controller includes an
impedance detection system configured to measure skin
impedance between the outer and inner electrodes, and the
controller is configured to maintain a local skin temperature
above 65°C and under 100°C by controlling the RF generator to
adjust the RF treatment based on the measured skin impedance.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Mehta US 2010/0010480 A1 Jan. 14, 2010
Flyash US 2012/0185029 A1 July 19, 2012
Adanny US 2013/0079766 A1 Mar. 28, 2013
Eckhouse WO 2012/023129 Al Feb. 23, 2012

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 13, 14, 17–19, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Eckhouse and Mehta. Final Act. 2.
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Claims 3, 15, 16, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Eckhouse and Mehta, or in the alternative, as being obvious
over Eckhouse, Mehta, and Flyash. Final Act. 9.
Claims 10 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious
over Eckhouse, Mehta, and Adanny. Final Act. 14.
OPINION
Initially Appellant is reminded that in the rules of practice before the
Board 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) states: “Each ground of rejection
contested by appellant must be argued under a separate heading . . . . Under
each heading identifying the ground of rejection being contested, any
claim(s) argued separately or as a subgroup shall be argued under a separate
subheading that identifies the claim(s) by number.” Despite this defect in
Appellant’s briefing, we will proceed to render a decision on the merits
according to our best understanding of what Appellant intended to argue.
See MPEP § 1205.03.
We understand the same issues to be raised regarding independent
claims 1 and 17. Appeal Br. 10–15. We understand Appellant to raise these
same issues with regard to independent claim 15 in addition to the issue of
the recited voltage range which is also relevant to dependent claims 3
and 20. Appeal Br. 15–20. Finally, we understand Appellant to argue a
distinction with regard to claim 8. Appeal Br. 20. We understand the
remaining claims to stand or fall based on dependency.

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Maintaining temperature by controlling the RF generator to adjust
treatment based skin impedance.
A version of the limitation emphasized in claim 1 reproduced above is
present in each of the independent claims before us, claims 1, 15, and 17.
Appellant and the Examiner agree that the subject matter described by this
limitation was not taught by Eckhouse, which, insofar as the relationship
between impendence and voltage is concerned, only teaches discontinuing
the application of voltage when impedance rises above a certain threshold
indicative of poor skin contact. Final Act. 2–3, 9–10; Appeal Br. 11;
Eckhouse paras. 43–44. The Examiner relied on Mehta to account for this
deficiency (Final Act. 4–5, 10–11) and Appellant argues the Examiner’s
finding in this regard is not correct because, according to Appellant, Mehta
teaches “treatment is based on tissue temperature or impedance” (Appeal
Br 11; Reply Br 3–6). Appellant does not take issue with any other aspect of
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 17.
In the Final Action, the Examiner cites paragraphs 121, 126, 130, 182,
and 195 of Mehta in support of the Examiner’s determination that Mehta
discloses the subject matter at issue. Final Act. 4–5; 10–11. Paragraph 121 of
Mehta indicates, among other things, that Mehta, like Eckhouse, will “stop
the treatment when a maximum allowable impedance value [of the tissue] is
reached.” Paragraph 126 of Mehta discusses maintaining a treatment
temperature without specifying precisely how this is achieved.
Paragraph 130 of Mehta discusses measuring tissue impedance and adjusting
an amount or rate of energy based upon that measured value. Paragraphs 182
and 195 provide some specific examples of the desirable temperature ranges
and it is undisputed that Mehta’s exemplary ranges between 60o and 100o C
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are sufficiently similar to teach or render obvious the 65o and 100o C range
recited.
The relevant paragraphs of Mehta cited by the Examiner,
paragraphs 121, 126, and 130 are rather generic and do not describe specific
examples of the relationships between the temperature Mehta’s controller is
“configured to maintain,” the measured temperature, and “the measured skin
impedance.” Reading these paragraphs it is not unreasonable for Appellant
to assert Mehta’s controller controls either desired temperature based on
measured temperature or desired impedance based on measured impedance
as opposed to desired temperature based on measured impedance as
Appellant’s independent claims require. Appeal Br. 11–12. However, a more
careful reading of Mehta, with particular attention to the portions of Mehta
cited by the Examiner in the Advisory Action and the Examiner’s Answer2
clearly reveals Appellant’s interpretation of Mehta’s operation is incorrect.
Appellant acknowledges that Mehta measures tissue (“skin”)3
impedance and bases the selection of respective values for the proportional,
integral, and differential coefficients, kp, ki, kd, which are used in the context
of a PID control system. Appeal Br. 12 (discussing Mehta para. 162 cited at
Adv. Act. 3). Appellant asserts that even if temperature control and
impedance control are not mutually exclusive, Mehta does not disclose a
controller configured to maintain local skin temperature because “[m]erely
controlling RF energy by a controller does not disclose or suggest that such a

2 See MPEP § 1207 and 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.39(a)(1) and (b) regarding
modifications to the grounds of rejection in an advisory action or answer.
3 “As noted herein, temperature, impedance, or other sensing may be
measured beneath the epidermis in the dermis region.” Mehta para. 123.
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controller is configured to maintain the local skin temperature.” Appeal
Br. 12.
The Examiner correctly responds that the equation Mehta provides at
paragraph 159 conclusively resolves this issue. Ans. 5–7.

In Mehta’s equation, the output voltage of the RF generator (V) is calculated
and set “to maintain a local skin temperature” Tset. That voltage,
undisputedly a form of “RF treatment,” is also calculated and set “based on
the measured skin impedance” because, as discussed above, the coefficients,
kp, ki, kd are determined “based on” Mehta’s measured impedance. Mehta
para. 162 (associating impedance bands with k values). It is of no moment
that Mehta additionally relies on the measured skin temperature Tmeasured to
set the voltage because Appellant’s claims are open-ended and do not
include language precluding the use of additional parameters besides
impedance to calculate or “adjust the RF treatment.”
Appellant contends the “coefficient variation based on impedance is
not to maintain any desired temperature, but is rather to change [the] voltage
increase rate.” Reply Br. 5–6. This argument is not commensurate in scope
with the claim language. It is not “coefficient variation” that must be
“configured to maintain a local skin temperature” according to the
independent claims. Rather, it is “the controller,” the output of which in
Mehta is represented not by the coefficients, kp, ki, kd, but by Mehta’s control
voltage V. Mehta’s control voltage V is for the express purpose of
maintaining a desired temperature, or in other words, minimizing the
difference between the set and measured temperature. Ans. 5–7. The
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variability of coefficient values based on measured impedance (discussed
above with respect to Mehta paragraph 162) is what makes Mehta’s voltage
calculation “based on the measured skin impedance.” Although, as
Appellant points out, the coefficients in Mehta’s voltage equation influence
the rate of voltage changes (Mehta para. 159), that rate is determined not just
based on the coefficients, but based on the difference between the desired
temperature Tset and the measured temperature Tmeasured. As Tmeasured
approaches Tset the PID components resulting from the coefficients all
approach zero—the value when Tmeasured = Tset. Thus, Mehta’s “controller is
configured to maintain a local skin temperature above 65°C and under
100°C by controlling the RF generator to adjust the RF treatment based on
the measured skin impedance” (emphasis added). It is of no moment that
“coefficient variation” changes the rate of voltage changes, and in turn, the
rate of temperature changes and does not in and of itself serve (or only
indirectly serves) to “maintain any desired temperature” as Appellant argues
because that is not what is claimed.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1 and 17.

Treatment voltage less than 50 V
Claims 3, 15, and 20 require the treatment voltage to be less than 50V.
The Examiner takes three different positions to address this limitation. We
agree with all three of the Examiner’s positions and address each in turn.
First, the Examiner considers Eckhouse’s device as meeting this
limitation because paragraph 48 indicates Eckhouse’s controller is
“configured to supply an RF treatment voltage,” wherein the voltage “does
not exceed 50 volt.” Final Act. 10. Appellant argues that paragraph 48 in
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Eckhouse describes a “test” voltage as opposed to a “treatment” voltage.
Appeal Br. 16; Reply Br 7–9. Appellant attempts to analogize this situation
to two identical processors being differently “configured,” by virtue of
different software, to perform different functions. Reply Br. 7. Although we
do not disagree with Appellant’s logic insofar as the processors are
concerned, Appellant fails to relate that analogy to the case here. For
example, Appellant does explain why Appellant’s “RF generator,” due to the
term “treatment” should be regarded as having some different software or
other structure as compared to the “RF generator” in Eckhouse. It is clear
from paragraph 48 that Eckhouse’s RF generator is “configured to” deliver
voltages not exceeding 50 volts. Appellant’s controller is defined not by
specific structure, but instead by what it is configured to do: “supply an RF
treatment voltage . . . wherein the RF treatment voltage is . . . less than 50
V.” Thus, the question becomes what structural difference the word
“treatment” makes in terms of distinguishing between Eckhouse’s RF
generator and that recited in Appellant’s claims. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon
S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This issue is not very well
developed in the record presently before us. Certainly, if Appellant can
direct our attention to at least some structure, be it in the form of software or
otherwise, that is necessary for an RF generator to deliver “treatment
voltage” as opposed to just a “test RF voltage” we might be inclined to agree
with Appellant that such structure is absent from Eckhouse. However, if the
difference between the RF voltage generated by Eckhouse and that
generated by Appellant amounts to no more than a difference in the
descriptive name associated with it, or the intended use to which the voltage
will be put, “test[ing]” versus “treatment,” we would likely be inclined to
agree with the Examiner that the RF generator in Eckhouse satisfies the
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claim language because neither the precise nomenclature chosen nor the
intended use is necessarily controlling in an analysis of apparatus claims:
what matters is the structure. As is often said, there is nothing wrong with
choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., by what it does, as opposed
to what it is. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212 (CCPA 1971). However,
doing so carries with it a risk. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). As stated in Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 213:
[W]here the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional
limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the
claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic
of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant
to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does
not possess the characteristic relied on.
Thus, we think under the burden-shifting framework discussed above and
further described in MPEP § 2112(V) the onus is on Appellant to come
forward with evidence or technical explanation to demonstrate precisely
what structural distinction is implicit by Appellant’s use of the term
“treatment” with respect to claims 3, 15, and 20. Because this has not been
done, we are inclined to agree with the Examiner on this point on the record
presently before us.
The Examiner takes a second position with regard to the recited “less
than 50V” range. According to the Examiner, if Eckhouse cannot be
reasonably regarded as disclosing an RF generator configured to supply a
treatment voltage within the range recited for the reasons discussed above, it
still would have been obvious to do so. Final Act. 11–12. The Examiner
bases this conclusion on the fact that Eckhouse discloses a range of voltages
from 50 volts to 400 volts specifically intended for treatment, and this range
abuts the recited range. Id (citing Eckhouse para. 49). The Examiner asserts
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that according to MPEP § 2144.05 this demonstrates a prima facie case of
obviousness, particularly where, as here, there is no dispute that treatment
voltage is recognized in the art as a result effective variable. Id.
The Examiner also takes a third position with regard to the recited
“less than 50V” range, additionally citing Flyash which discloses a treatment
range of 10–1000V. Final Act. 12 (citing Flyash para. 44). The Examiner’s
reasoning regarding Flyash is similar to the reasoning advanced in the
Examiner’s second position with the only significant difference being that
Flyash’s range overlaps instead of merely abuts the recited range like
Eckhouse.
Appellant addresses the Examiner’s second and third position
together, arguing that the claimed RF treatment voltage:
is not obvious in view of the 50-400V range disclosed in
paragraph [049] of Eckhouse, or the 10-1000V range disclosed
in paragraph [0044] of Flyash, since these prior art ranges are so
broad and have large upper limits of 400V and 1000V that they
do not render obvious the narrow range with a much lower upper
limit of less than 50V or 40V, as recited in claims 3, 15 and 20.
Appeal Br. 17. Appellant proceeds to analogize this situation to that
described briefly in MPEP § 2144.05(I) and in more detail in
MPEP § 2144.08 where the prior art discloses a genus having sufficient
breadth that it cannot reasonably be said to disclose, teach, or render obvious
every species falling within that genus. Appeal Br. 17–20; Reply Br. 8–9.
We think this situation is more similar to those in the cases discussed
in MPEP § 2144.054 involving close or overlapping ranges than it is to those

4 In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257 (CCPA 1976); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778
F.2d 775, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955).
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in the cases discussed at MPEP § 2144.085 with respect to the obviousness
of species when the prior art teaches a genus. Ans. 8–10. In the latter
situation, the standard often employed is whether the skilled artisan could
immediately “envisage each member” of the genus so as to be able to
consider the species falling within that genus known or obvious. In re
Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962) (cited at MPEP § 2144.08). There
is nothing difficult to envisage here where the recitation in question involves
a simple numerical range for voltage—an undisputedly result effective
variable. We think the cautionary reference to MPEP § 2144.08 in MPEP
§ 2144.05 is intended more for situations where there exists some difference
in kind rather than some difference in degree. See, e.g., MPEP § 2144.05(A).
As it pertains to ranges, this might include, merely for example, selecting a
sequence of values within a range when the prior art only mentions selecting
a value within the range or selecting a particular combination of parameter
values from a significant number of parameter ranges. These examples seem
more analogous to the situations in cases discussed at MPEP § 2144.08,
most of which are chemical in nature. The present case does not present such
a situation.
Appellant asserts the voltage limit is selected based on safety and
efficacy and the results of setting the voltage limit that low are unexpected.
Reply Br. 8. Appellant does not offer any evidence or technical explanation
to demonstrate specifically what was unexpected when selecting the recited
range. Clearly safety and efficacy would predictably be affected by the set
voltage. Furthermore, the language at issue in claims 3, 15, and 20 is not

5 E.g., In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Jones, 958 F.2d
347, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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actually directed to setting an upper limit for the voltage that can be
generated by the RF generator. Rather, according to the language of these
claims, the claims are met merely by configuring the RF generator to supply
a treatment voltage below 50V at any point in time.6 To the extent that
setting an upper limit is involved, the skilled artisan would reasonably
expect that setting the upper limit of the applied voltage predictably involves
balancing safety and efficacy.7 Appellant does not provide evidence or
reasoning to the contrary.
For the foregoing reasons we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 3, 15, and 20.

Claim 8
Claim 8, in relevant part, recites: “wherein a skin contact surface of
the inner electrode is annular.” Appellant presents a very brief argument
concerning claim 8 in the Appeal Brief: “as clearly shown in FIG 6 of
Eckhouse the inner electrode 612 is disc-shaped and not annular.” Appeal
Br. 20.
The Examiner responds by stating:
The examiner disagrees and maintains that the circular inner
electrodes shown [in] fig. 6b of Eckhouse can be considered
‘annular’ or ring-shaped according to the broadest reasonable

6 This would seem to clearly take place when implementing Mehta’s control
as discussed above because the applied voltage approaches zero based when
the difference between the set and measured temperature approaches zero.
7 It is perhaps worth noting that, although it does not appear to be relied
upon by the Examiner with regard to claims 3, 15, and 20, paragraph 162 of
Mehta, discussed at length above, also discloses limiting the maximum
voltage to a value of 100V in certain conditions and this upper limit appears
to be the closest upper limit in the cited prior art presently before us.
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interpretation of the term. Further, this interpretation is
consistent with the drawings which show[] all the inner
electrodes to have a circular shape.
Ans. 11.
In the Reply Brief Appellant presents a more detailed argument:
Clearly, a circular electrode is different from, and does not
disclose or suggest, any annular electrode. A circular electrode is
a solid electrode in the form of a circular, while an annular
electrode is a ring that forms a circle or surrounds a hollow circle,
which is consistent with the dictionary definition of annular,
namely, “having the form of a ring” as available at
dictionary.com; or “relating to, or forming a ring” as available at
merriam-webster.com.
Reply Br. 10.
Appellant’s extrinsic definition is consistent with Appellant’s usage of
the term “annular” in the Specification: “The circular inner electrode may be
annular (i.e. ring shaped) or disc shaped (i.e. having the shape of a filled
circle).” Spec. 3:5–6. Further, although drawings are often helpful in
understanding the proper meaning that should be given to claim
terminology, the fact that Appellant may not have complied with 37
C.F.R. § 1.83(a), which requires drawings in a nonprovisional application to
show every feature of the invention specified in the claims, does not
necessarily permit the Examiner to apply an overly broad interpretation of
“annular.”
The main problem here is that Appellant’s argument is not
commensurate in scope with claim 8. As noted above, the Specification does
disclose that “the circular inner electrode may be annular (i.e. ring shaped).”
Spec. 3:5–6. However, the annular element according to claim 8 is not the
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electrode itself. Rather, it is “a skin contact surface of the inner electrode.”
Neither Appellant nor the Examiner addresses this issue.
Because Appellant focuses on the language of the Specification as
opposed to that of claim 8, we not are apprised of anything in the claim that
requires “a skin contact surface” to refer to the entire surface of the inner
electrode. Thus, we are not apprised of any reason a disc shaped electrode is
not reasonably regarded as at least including an annular or ring-shaped skin
contact surface. That there may be an additional surface or surfaces
contacting the skin within a ring-shaped contact surface would not seem to
be something that is precluded by the language of claim 8.
Our reviewing court has “cautioned against reading limitations into a
claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if
it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the
specification.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). During prosecution Appellant is free to
choose claim language limiting the claim scope to embodiments depicted in
the Specification or Figures. Where Appellant chooses not to do so, it is our
duty in reading the claim in view of Appellant’s disclosure not to import
limitations Appellant chose to omit. It is well-settled that patent disclosures
need only describe the best mode, not all modes, of the invention. 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a). Accordingly, it is the claims that define the scope of protection
sought. The omission from the claims of certain aspects of the preferred
modes or embodiments in the disclosure can be just as informative to the
skilled artisan with regard to that scope as their inclusion. Were we to
construe “a skin contact surface of the inner electrode is annular” to simply
mean, as Appellant argues, “an annular electrode” we would not be giving
effect to Appellant’s choice to modify the language of the Specification and
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omit that requirement. Such a construction would not be consistent with
Specification.
For the foregoing reasons we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 8. Because we have modified and/or supplemented the Examiner’s
grounds for said rejection we designate our affirmance as including “new
grounds” under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) so as to afford Appellant the
procedural options associated therewith.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED. The affirmance as to
claim 8 is designated as a new ground of rejection.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1, 2, 4–9,
13, 14,
17–19, 21
103 Eckhouse, Mehta, 1, 2, 4–9,
13, 14,
17–19, 21
8
3, 15, 16,
20
103 Eckhouse, Mehta 3, 15, 16,
20

3, 15, 16,
20
103 Eckhouse, Mehta,
Flyash
3, 15, 16,
20

10, 11 103 Eckhouse, Mehta,
Adanny
10, 11
Overall
Outcome
1–11, 13–
21
8

RESPONSE
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection
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pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Section 41.50(b) also provides:
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is
binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion
of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims,
appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)